Śrīdaksināmūrtistotram Vol. II—A Study based on the Mānasollāsa and the Tattvasudhā with Sanskrit quotations from the Prasthānatraya and other standard texts on Advaita and translations thereon in English *Author* Sri D S Subbaramaiya. Published by Dakshinamnaya Sri Sharada Peetham, Sringeri–577 139 (Karnataka, India). Pages · xxiv + 593

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PUBLISHERS' NOTE

Śrīdakṣiṇāmūrtistotram of Śrī Ādiśaṅkarabhagavatpādācārya is an excellent epitome of Advaita Philosophy, which He reestablished on a firm foundation The ten *ślokas* are full of concepts of Advaita Philosophy composed in praise of Lord Śrīdaksiṇāmūrti who is the very embodiment of the Supreme Knowledge.

The project of bringing out this *Stotra* with English translation and exhaustive elucidation based on the commentaries '*Mānasollāsa*' of Śrī Sureśvarācārya, the first pontiff of the Daksiṇāmnāya Śrī Śāradāpīṭham and '*Tattvasudhā*' by Svayamprakāśayatīndra was undertaken at the explicit command of Their Holinesses Jagadguru Śankarācārya of Daksināmnāya Śrī Śāradāpīṭham, Śṛṅgerī, by Prof. D. S. Subbarāmaiya.

The First Volume was published in 1988 and was released by Brahmībhūta His Holiness Jagadguru Śrī Śrī Abhinavavidyātīrtha Mahāsvāminaḥ at the Gaṇapati Vākyārthasadas at Śṛṅgerī.

Prof. Subbarāmaiya is a rare combination of modern scientific knowledge and traditional Advaitavedānta. An ardent devotee of Śrī Śṛṅgerī Śāradāpīṭham and a close research associate of Sir C. V. Rāman, he taught Physics at the Central College, Bangalore, for over three decades. A naiṣṭhikabrahmacārī, he studied Vedānta under great traditional masters and is at present teaching Vedānta, leading a life of piety and contemplation.

Śrī Śāradāpīṭham takes privilege in placing at the hands of scholars the Second Volume of this work. The

readers will find this volume also on the same lines as the First Volume, both scholarly and authoritative.

The interest shown by Śrī Śankara Vidyā Kendra, Paścimī Mārg, Vasant Vihāi, New Delhi–110 057, in bringing out the volumes as a sponsor deserves appreciation.

The valuable help extended by M/s Victory Press (Pvt.) Ltd., Kunnakkulam, Trichūr Dist. and Śrī H. S. Subrahmanya, I R S., merits special mention. The efforts of Śrī H. N. Narasimhiah and a team of other devotees in coordinating the printing work are praiseworthy. Śrī D. S. Krsnācār of M/s. Prabhā Printing House, Bangalore, has taken special care and interest in printing this Volume in a very attractive style deserving rich appreciation.

The First Volume has been very well received by the scholars and it is hoped that the Second Volume will also appeal to the minds of researchers and critical thinkers. Śrī Śāradāpīṭham, Śṛngerī, will feel amply rewarded for the efforts put forth if the seekers make the best use of both the Volumes to have a true perspective of Advaita Philosophy.

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
DEDICATION

This blossom is placed with utmost devotion

at the Sacred Feet of the Revered Sadguru

ŚRĪMADABHINAVAVIDYĀTĪRTHAMAHĀSWĀMIPĀDA

by His humblest sishya



॥ तस्मै श्रीगुरुमूर्तये नम इदं श्रीदक्षिणामूर्तये ॥

AUTHOR

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

In the scheme of transliteration adopted here a, e, i and g always represent अ, ए, इ and ग respectively and never ए, इ, ऐ and ज or other values which they have in English; t and d are always used for त् and द् only The letter c alone represents च्. Since the natural function of h will be to aspirate a consonant (e g kh, ch, th, th, ph, gh, jh, dh, dh, bh), it would be an anomaly for a scientific scheme to use it in combinations like ch and sh for giving च् and ष् values; hence ch here is छ् and s h स् ह्. The vowel ऋ is represented by ṛ because ri, legitimate for रि only, is out of place, and the singular ri is an altogether objectionable distortion The tilde over n represents ञ्, ñ Accent mark over s gives श्, ś; dots above m and n give *anusvāra* (ˉ), ṁ and ङ्, ṅ, respectively Dots below h, and r give *visarga* (:), ḥ, and ऋ ṛ respectively Dots below s, n, t and d give their corresponding cerebrals ष्, ण्, ट् and ड्, s, n, t, and d; and macrons over a, i. u and r give आ, ई, ऊ, ॠ ā, ī, ū, r̄ respectively. Macrons are not used to lengthen the quantity of e and o, because they always have the long quantity in Sanskrit. The scheme in full is as follows:

अ a, आ ā, इ i, ई ī, उ u, ऊ ū, ऋ ṛ, ॠ r̄, ए e, ओ o, ऐ ai, औ au, ं ṁ. : h, क् k, ख् kh, ग् g, घ् gh, ङ् ṅ, च् c, छ् ch ज् j, झ् jh, ञ् ñ, ट् ṭ, ठ् ṭh, ड् d, ढ् dh, ण् ṇ, त् t, थ् th, द् d, ध् dh, न् n, प् p, फ् ph, ब् b, भ् bh, म् m, य् y, र् r, ल् l, व् v, श् ś, ष् s, स् s, ह् h.

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Mahaswamigal
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

Pañ.	*Pañcadaśī*
Chā. U.	*Chāndogyopaniṣad*
Mu. U.	*Muṇḍakopanisad*
Ka. U	*Kaṭhopaniṣad*
Kai U.	*Kaivalyopanisad*
Bṛ. U.	*Bṛhadāraṇyakopanisad*
Up. Sā.	*Upadeśasāhasrī*
Br. Vā.	*Bṛhadvārtika*
Sū. Bhā./Sū. Bh.	*Sūtrabhāṣya*
Mā.	*Mānasollāsa*
Śve. U/Śv. U	*Śvetāśvataropanisad*
Pra. U.	*Praśnopanisad*
Tai. U.	*Taittirīyopanisad*
Nṛ.U.Tā.U.	*Nṛsiṃhottaratāpinyupaniṣad*
Vi. Cū.	*Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*
Kau U.	*Kausītakyupanisad*
Ī. U.	*Īśāvāsyopanisad*
Chā. Bh.	*Chāndogyabhāsya*
Pr U.Bh.	*Praśnopanisadbhāṣya*
Gau. Kā.	*Gauḍapādakārikā*
Sū. Gī.	*Sūtagītā (Sūtasamhitā)*
Svā. Si.	*Svārājyasiddhi*
Ni. Pra. Pū.	*Nirvānaprakaraṇa Pūrvārdha (Yogavāsiṣṭha)*
Ke. U.	*Kenopaniṣad*
Br. Bhā.	*Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāsya*
Sam. Vā.	*Sambandhavārtika*
मु	मुण्डकोपनिषत्
क	कठोपनिषत्
बृ	बृहदारण्यकोपनिषत्
प्र उ	प्रश्नोपनिषत्
तै उ	तैत्तिरीयोपनिषत्
गी	भगवद्गीता
सू भा	सूत्रभाष्यम्

CORRIGENDA

Page No.	*Line No*	*Incorrect*	*Correct*
10	8	सहप्र	सहस्र
19	32 & 33	His	his
27	12	Prāśnopaniṣad	Praśnopanisad
28	11 & 12	निर्देश्ययोप	निर्देशोप-
97	20	time).	time),
103	10	inconsonance	in consonance
110	26	Omkara	Oṁkāra
110	last line	*Vācārambhanaśruti*	*Vācārambhanaśruti*
123	12	mind all	mind (all
123	13	Avidyā,	Avidyā)
138	last line	चित्	केचित्
141	27	षद्भाव	षड्भाव
245	14	स्वरसेनाहमिस्या	स्वरसेनाहमित्या
253	4	अहंवृत्यो	अहंवृत्यो
282	3	नान्या	नान्य
312	26	9.4.5	9.4.4
329	14	inseperably	inseparably
343	26	स्वाज्जातीयैः	सज्जातीयैः
348	2	Avasthajnana	Avastha(a)jnana
351	21	स्थान	स्थान-
357	2	षुप्तौ	सुषुप्तौ
385	21	ऽक्षिणिपुरुषो	ऽक्षिणि पुरुषो
411	18	decreptitude	decrepitude
415	28	विधिरप्युपद्यते	विधिरप्युपपद्यते
415	29	।	,
416	25	त्ववन्तं	त्ववन्न
477	30	सदिद	सदिद्-
486	28	. Says	, says
499	7	ताद्दङमया	ताद्दङ्मया
503	24	*Jñānakaṇḍa*	*Jñānakhanda*
508	21	स्वरूप .	स्वरूप....
554	26	मायाऽपरि...	मायापरि....
585	5	Nirvāṇāśatkam	Nirvāṇaṣaṭkam

ŚRĪDAKṢIṆĀMŪRTISTOTRAM

Volume II





श्रीदक्षिणामूर्तिः

|| श्रीः ||

श्रीदक्षिणामूर्तिस्तोत्रम्

SRĪDAKSIṆĀMŪRTISTOTRAM

A Study based on the Commentaries *Mānasollāsa and Tattvasudhā*

VOLUME II

7. FOURTH STANZA—SRIGURU AS THE SUSTAINER

7.1.1 Abiding in the Mahavakyartha—Need for Continued Enquiry

This identity of Brahman and Ātman, herein established as the teaching of the Śruti, is objected to by some who allege that it is opposed to all evidence furnished by *pratyaksa* etc., which are regarded as *pramānas*. The objections that are raised pertain both to the *Tatpadārtha* and the *tvampadārtha* The fourth stanza of the hymn concerns itself with the first of these in particular and the fifth and the sixth, with the other As the *Mānasollāsaṭīkā* (IV–1) points out, this is done in the spirit of the *Avirodhādhyāya* of the Brahmasūtras as already mentioned.

This enquiry removes the lurking notions to the opposite, if any, for the one who is blessed with the flash of enlightenment through the instruction of the *Mahāvākya*, thereby enabling him to abide in Brahman-Ātman alone. Śrī Śrī Vidyāraṇyacarana points out that Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda prescribes in the *Vākyavrtti* (49) that till the knowledge of the purport of the *Mahāvākya* 'I am Brahman' becomes firm, he, equipped with *śama* etc., should practise *śravana* etc.—

अस्तु बोधोऽपरोक्षोऽत्र महावाक्यात्तथाऽप्यसौ ।
न दृढः श्रवणादीनामाचार्यैः पुनरीरणात् ॥ (*Pañ.* VII–97)
अहं ब्रह्मेति वाक्यार्थबोधो यावद्दृढीभवेत् ।
शमादिसहितस्तावदभ्यसेच्छ्रवणादिकम् ॥ (*Pañ.* VII–98)

Needless to say that practice of *śravana* etc., must necessarily be undertaken by other seekers as well. This helps the one who, though having understood the *Mahāvākyārtha*, is yet to be blessed with enlightenment, by exposing the hollowness of all other viewpoints that are the impediments in the way of direct realisation The enquiry brought in accommodates the seekers who are yet to comprehend the purport of the *Mahāvākya* by reiterating the instruction of the *Mahāvākya*. It is sought to be understood how the experiences in parlance, such as 'the pot exists', 'the pot appears' as also 'I am a man' etc , can be reconciled. Further, it is shown wherein the seeker has to look for Brahman-Ātman which is to be sought in the spirit of the Śruti — सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः (Chā U 8–7–1). This is accomplished in the light of the enquiry undertaken in the *Samanvayādhyāya* and the *Avirodhādhyāya* of the Brahmasūtras and the *Bhāṣya* thereon. Such enquiry as also the *nididhyāsana* that is to be undertaken to get rid of the thraldom of *viparītabhāvanās* is to be suitably adopted depending upon the maturity of the seeker. Says the *Pañcadaśī* —

समन्वयाध्याय एतत् सूक्तं धीस्वास्थ्यकारिभिः ।
तर्कैः संभावनार्थस्य द्वितीयाध्याय ईरिता ॥ (VII–102)
बहुजन्मदृढाभ्यासाद्देहादिष्वात्मधीः क्षणात् ।
पुनःपुनरुदेत्येव जगत्सत्यत्वधीरपि ॥ (VII–103)
विपरीता भावनेयमैकाग्र्यात्सा निवर्तते ॥ (VII–104)

तत्त्वभावनया नश्येत् सातो देहातिरिक्तताम् ।
आत्मनो भावयेत्तद्वन्मिथ्यात्वं जगतोऽनिशम् ॥ (VII–112)

[This is well elaborated in the first chapter, Samanvayâdhyâya of the Brahmasūtras. In the second chapter, the plausibility of the subject is shown by reasonings calculated to establish firmly the intellect in Ātman

By reason of continued indulgence during many lives, the identification of Self with the body etc., suddenly comes up again and again, as also the conception of the reality of the universe. Thus the wrong conception is removed by concentration of the mind This wrong conception will be destroyed by contemplation of the Truth. Therefore one should contemplate on the Self's being distinct from the body, similarly on the unreality of the world, constantly]

Elaborating on this, the *Pañcadaśī* shows further that in this contemplation of Brahman, however, there is nothing to be compelled and there is no restriction in respect of thinking and talking etc., of Brahman. Episodes and *itihāsās* will not deflect him whose mind has culminated in the cognition 'Self is Consciousness alone and the world is unreal' as they all lead the seeker only to this culmination—

चिदेवात्मा जगन्मिथ्येत्यत्र पर्यवसानतः ।
निदिध्यासनविक्षेपो नेतिहासादिभिर्भवेत् ॥ (*Pañ*. VII-123)

The details in respect of this as pertaining to seekers as variously equipped are given in the *Pañcadaśī*.

7.1.2 Objection : The Existence and Shine of Objects their Own ; No Need for Senses

The *Mānasollāsa* (IV-1) says in introducing the fourth stanza of the hymn—

स्वतः सन्तः प्रकाशन्ते भावा घटपटादयः ।
नेश्वरस्य समावेशादित्यस्योत्तरमुच्यते ॥

[Things like pot, cloth etc, exist and appear by themselves as evidenced by experiences such as 'the pot exists', 'the cloth exists', 'the pot appears', 'the cloth appears', and not because of the entering of Īśvara into them]

The standpoint of the objector is given expression to more elaborately in the *Tattvasudhā* on the stanza—

नन्वेव तर्हि सर्वस्य जगत आत्मन्यध्यस्तत्वे भवन्मते कथं करणाद्यपेक्षा ? प्रकाशरूपात्मसंबन्धादेव सर्वं सर्वदा किमिति न भायात् ? सर्वगतचैतन्यस्याविरोधेन अज्ञानावृतत्वे वा कथं कादाचित्क जगतो भानम् ? अज्ञानस्य चैतन्यातिरिक्तनिवर्तकाभावात्, तस्य चाविरोधित्वात् ।

[If according to you, the entire universe is thus superimposed on Ātman, where is then the need for the senses etc ? Why should not everything shine always, because of direct association itself with Ātman which is of the nature of effulgence ? If it be maintained that it is because of obscuration by ajñāna, even then, since the only possible remover of ajñāna, the all-pervasive Consciousness, is not opposed to anything, even to ajñāna, in your system, how is there the possibility of even occasional shine of any object of the world ?]

Such is the objection raised on hearing (in the first line of the third stanza) that the things of the world derive their Existence and Shine from Īśvara.

7.1.3 Reply: Fourth Stanza

To this as the reply is the fourth stanza—

नानाच्छिद्रघटोदरस्थितमहादीपप्रभाभास्वरं
ज्ञानं यस्य तु चक्षुरादिकरणद्वारा वहिः स्पन्दते ।
जानामीति तमेव भान्तमनुभात्येतत्समस्तं जग-
त्तस्मै श्रीगुरुमूर्तये नम इदं श्रीदक्षिणामूर्तये ॥

[Obeisance to Him whose Consciousness flows outwards through the sense organs such as the eye like the light of the mighty

lamp placed in the bosom of a many-holed jar, and thus this whole universe shines after Him alone who shines in the consciousness 'I know', to that resplendent Daksināmūrti, incarnate in the glorious figure of one's own Guru]

7.1.4 Analysis of the Experience 'I know the pot'—Sakshi

Here attention is drawn to the experience 'I know'—जानामि—around which the entire discussion centres; that is, the enquirer is asked to recognise that one has not merely the cognitions such as 'the pot is'—घटोऽस्ति—'the pot appears'—घटः स्फुरति—arising from the *pramānas*; there are at the same time experiences such as 'I know the pot'—अहं घटं जानामि—'The pot is cognised by me'—मया विदितोऽयं घटः—traceable to the Witness-self—the *Sākṣī*. This recognition is vital as the *Mānasollāsa* (IV–2) points out—

अहमित्यनुसन्धाता जानामीति न चेत् स्फुरेत् ।
कस्य को वा प्रकाशेत जगच्च स्यात् सुषुप्तवत् ॥

[If in the objective consciousness 'I know it', the *pramātṛ* were not to manifest himself as 'I', what is there to shine or to whom? And every individual would be as if in deep sleep.]

The *ṭīkā* on it says—If an object were to shine all by itself, then there would be no experience pertaining to the *pramātr*, the cogniser of the object in the form 'I am conscious of the object'. Then, like a lamp burning in a cave closed on every side by solid rocks, no object will present itself to the consciousness of any individual. Thus, unaware of the universe around, one would even be quite inert as it were and unconcerned in the universe around as during deep sleep. Therefore it must be admitted that the universe depends on something else for its manifestation That something else, that light by which the universe gets its shine, must be constant and needs nothing else for its manifestation.

So also does the universe depend on another for its existence Says the *Mānasollāsa* (IV-3)—

प्रागूर्ध्वं चासता सत्त्व वर्तमानेऽपि न स्वत ।
तस्मादीशे स्थित सत्त्वं प्रागूर्ध्वत्वविवर्जिते ॥

What is non-existent in the past and in the future, cannot exist by itself even in the present as voiced by the *Māndūkyakārikā* (2-6) —आदावन्ते च यन्नास्ति वर्तमानेऽपि तत्तथा ।

Therefore, it has its being in the Lord who transcends past and future

Says the *ṭīkā* on it —

What are being considered viz, the external objects, have no existence of their own inasmuch as they are perceived only for a while, like the silver seen in a shell If they could exist by themselves, they would also manifest by themselves like Ātman and thus they would not be the objects of cognition of an individual, which they are invariably found to be. On the other hand, as Existence whence everything proceeds at its birth and whither everything recedes at the end, ever shining as the *Pratyagātman* who is the Witness of the different states of each and everything, the Lord's Existence and Effulgence must be ever unfailing; that is, never was a time when He was not and did not shine; and never will be a time when He will not be and will not shine. It is thus seen that it is of vital importance to take into consideration the experiences of the Witness-self in the form 'I am conscious of the pot' in addition to those of the form 'the pot exists' and 'the pot appears' in order to account for the experience of a thing as an object of cognition to an individual, it cannot be done otherwise. The opponent who swears by self-existence and self-effulgence of the objects of

the world, will never be able to account for this experience as also that of the transient nature of the objects, nor can he account for the need of the use of the instruments of cognition, the sense organs etc., in case the objects are ever shining by themselves. Thus the objects of the world have no self-existence and self-effulgence but owe their existence and shine to those of Ātman Says the *Tattvasudhā*—

आत्मवज्जगतः स्वतस्सत्त्वे तद्वदेवोत्पत्तिविनाशानुपपत्तेः, तद्वदेव करणाद्यनपेक्षया सर्वदा भानप्रसङ्गाच्च, न स्वतस्सत्ताप्रकाशौ भवतो जगतः किन्तु आत्मसत्ताप्रकाशाभ्यामेव जगतोऽपि सत्ताप्रकाशौ ।

7.1.5 Opponents' Views — Undesirable Consequences, Their Refutation

In the light of the hymn, the *Tattvasudhā* points out and refutes some of the undesirable consequences of the opponents' points of view—

केचित्तु अचिद्रूपात्मनिष्ठज्ञानेन घटादिविषयो भासत इति वदन्ति । तन्न । आत्मनिष्ठज्ञानस्य जडस्य स्वप्रकाशस्य वा घटादिविषयेण संयोगादिसंबन्धाभावात् स्वरूपसंबन्धस्य च अतिप्रसक्तत्वात् ।

केचित्तु विषयनिष्ठस्फुरणेन घटादिभानमिति कथयन्ति । तदपि न । विषयनिष्ठस्य आत्मना सह संबन्धाभावेन अहं जानामीति संबन्धप्रत्ययानुपपत्तेः । तस्मादस्मदुक्तप्रकारेण स्वप्रकाशसाक्षिचैतन्यसंबन्धादेव घटादिविषयभानमिति ।

[Some, however, assert that objects like pot etc., shine by the light of knowledge that resides in the insentient Ātman. But it cannot be so, for, be it inert or self-effulgent, knowledge that resides in Ātman does not have the relation of contact etc , with the objects like pot etc , and direct essential relation is out of place here.

Again some others assert that the shine of objects like pot etc , is because of the effulgence residing in the objects. Even that cannot be, because the consciousness residing in the object is not related to Ātman, and as such the knowledge of the relation in the form 'I know (the object)' cannot be accounted for. Therefore, the shine of the objects like pot etc , is because of its relation with the Self-effulgent Witness-consciousness, as mentioned already]

The *Mānasollāsa* points out some other undesirable consequences of the opponents' views—

स्वयमेव प्रकाशेरन् जडा यदि विनेश्वरम् ।
सर्वं सर्वस्य भासेत न वा भासेत किञ्चन ॥ (IV–4)
तस्मात्सर्वज्ञमज्ञं वा जगत् स्यादेकरूपकम् ।
तुल्ये स्वयंप्रकाशत्वे जडचेतनयोर्मिथः ॥ (IV–5)
तुल्यमेव प्रसज्येरन् ग्राह्यग्राहकतादयः ।
इन्द्रियाणामनियमाच्चाक्षुषाः स्यू रसादयः ॥ (IV–6)

[If the insentient objects were to shine by themselves independent of the Lord, the Self-conscious Ātman, perceiving them, they would always shine and appear to all individuals alike as objects of cognition If it be, however, in their nature not to become objects of cognition, then no individual would cognise any object Therefore all individuals in the world would be on one level, either all-knowing or knowing nothing

If the sentient and the insentient be alike self-luminous, then it would follow that each alike will both perceive, and be in turn perceived by, the other, and so on , and the sense organs being unrestricted in their scope of perception, taste could be perceived by the eye and so on. Thus the contention that external objects are self-luminous and self-existent is opposed to our uncontradicted experience of a distinction between the cogniser and the cognised, as well as to the experience that the external objects have all of them a more or less temporary existence.]

7.1.6 Triputi Involved in Cognitions; Opponents' Views Elaborated

The empirical experience, as is well known, involves not only the cogniser and the cognised but also the act of cognition—the *tripuṭī*. Raising the objection that this cannot be accounted for in any of the systems inclusive of the *Vedānta*, the *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha* (1-1) proceeds to demonstrate it in a few cases—

प्रमातृप्रमाणादिव्यवहारस्य सर्वेणापि वादिना दुरुपपादत्वात् । तथाहि—वेदान्तिसाङ्ख्ययोर्मते किमहङ्कारः प्रमाता उतात्मा ? नाद्यः, तस्य जडत्वात् । द्वितीयेऽपि प्रमाणाख्यक्रियारूपेण परिणामित्वं प्रमातृत्वम्, तच्चाविकारिण्यात्मनि दुःसम्पादम् । अन्तरेणैव प्रमातृत्वं चैतन्येन विषय-प्रकाशे तस्य सर्वगतत्वेन सर्वं युगपत् प्रकाशेतेति प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्था न सिध्येत् ।

तार्किकादिमतेऽपि किं सर्वगतात्मन्युत्पद्यमानं ज्ञानं यावदात्मसमवायि ? उत शरीरावच्छिन्नात्मप्रदेशसमवायि ? नाद्यः, नियामकाभावेन युगपत् सर्वावभासप्रसङ्गात् । धर्माधर्मौ नियामकाविति चेत्, न । तयोः सुखदुःख-जनकविषयेषु तथात्वेऽपि उपेक्षणीयतृणादिसर्ववस्तुष्वनियामकत्वात् । यस्य ज्ञानस्य यज्जनकं तत्तेन प्रकाश्यमिति नियम इति चेत्, न । चक्षुरादेरपि चक्षुर्जन्यज्ञानवेद्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् । विषयत्वे सति यस्य जनकं वेद्यमिति चेत्; न । विषयत्वस्याद्याप्यनिरूपणात्, लोकप्रसिद्ध्या तन्निरूपणेऽपि ज्ञानस्य गुणत्वे क्रियात्वे वा न स्वजनकविषयग्राहित्वानियमसिद्धिः । प्रदीपगुणस्य प्रकाशस्याजनकेऽपि घटे प्रकाशकत्वदर्शनात् । बाणादिक्रियाणां चानु-द्दिष्टेऽपि वस्तुनि स्वाश्रयसंयुक्तेऽतिशयहेतुत्वदर्शनात् ।

अथ ज्ञानाश्रयस्यात्मनोऽपि निरवयवत्वान्न सर्वसंयोग इति नास्ति युगपत् सर्वावभासप्रसङ्गः ? तर्हि न किञ्चिदपि प्रकाशेत, क्रियारूपस्य वा

ज्ञानस्य स्वाश्रयमनिलङ्घ्यान्यत्र संसर्गायोगात् । असंसृष्टग्राहित्वे चाति-प्रसङ्गात् ।

शरीरावच्छिन्नात्मप्रदेशसमवायि ज्ञानमित्यस्मिन् पक्षेऽपि प्रदेशस्य स्वाभाविकत्वे सावयवत्वमात्मनः प्रसज्येत । औपाधिकत्वेऽपि ज्ञानं तत्प्रदेश-संयुक्तग्राहि चेत्, तदा देहाद्बाह्ये घटादिर्न भासेत, बाह्यात्मप्रदेशसंयुक्त-ग्राहित्वे बाह्यं सर्वमप्यवभासेत ।

ननु संबन्धरहितेऽपि वस्तुनि व्यवस्थयैव ज्ञानक्रियातिशयं जन-यिष्यति । यथा अभिचारक्रियया सहप्रयोजनव्यवहितोऽप्युद्दिष्ट एव पुरुषो मार्यते तद्वत् । तन्न, तत्रापि हन्तृहन्यमानपुरुषद्वयसंयुक्तस्य देवतात्मन ईश्वरस्य वा कृत्यादेर्वा नियामकस्यानुमेयत्वात् । विमतमभिचारकर्म स्वसंबन्धिन्यतिशय-जनकम्, क्रियात्वात् बाणादिक्रियावत् ।

तर्ह्येवमस्तु ज्ञानाधारेणात्मना मनः संयुज्यते, मनसा चेन्द्रियम्, तेन च विषयः, सा चेयं संयोगपरंपरा नियामिकेति । तदप्यसत्, तस्याः परंपराया ज्ञानात्पूर्वं ज्ञानोत्पादन एवोपक्षयात् । ज्ञानादुपर्यपि संयोगपरंपरया विषयाव-भासे विषयसंयुक्ततत्संयुक्तादिरूपेणावस्थितं सर्वं जगदवभासेत । एवमणु-परिमाणदेहपरिमाणात्मपक्षयोरपि दोषा ऊहनीयाः । तस्मान्न सर्ववादिनां प्रमाणादिव्यवहारसंभवः ।

[In the *Vedānta* and the *Sāṅkhya* systems, is it the ego or Ātman that is the cogniser? Ego which is inert cannot be the cogniser Nor can the cognisership belong to Ātman, for the cognisership which consists in being transformed in the form of the act called *pramāna* cannot be attributed to Ātman that is changeless. If it be argued that even without cognisership the sentient Ātman that is Self-effulgent may manifest objects, then there is the contingence of the simultaneous manifestation of everything because of the Omnipresence of Ātman, as such the *pratikarmavyavasthā* stands unaccounted for

Similarly, in the system of the *Tārkikas*, is the cognition that is originated in the Omnipresent Ātman, pervasive of the

entire Ātman or inherent only in that part of Ātman which is defined by the body? It cannot be the former, for, in that case, since there is nothing to regulate it, there is the contingence of the simultaneous manifestation of all objects If it be said that *dharma* and *adharma* are the controllers, it may be so in respect of objects which produce happiness and misery respectively; but in respect of all those things which produce neither and are looked upon with indifference, like grass etc , *dharma* and *adharma* would be of no avail Nor is there a rule that cognition manifests its own generator, for, if that were so, there would arise the contingency of the eye etc., being manifested by the cognition generated by the eye etc. To say that, being an object of cognition, the eye, for example, is revealed by the cognition that is produced by the eye, is no explanation, for the so-called 'objecthood' is yet to be defined. If it is said that it is accepted as is obtaining in common parlance, even then, whether cognition be regarded as a quality or an act, it cannot be generalised that it apprehends the object which generates it, for it is seen that the light that is the illuminating quality of the lamp, illuminates even a pot that is not its generator, also the activity in an arrow etc , is seen to be the cause of the production of an extraordinary change like splitting etc., in that with which the arrow in which the activity inheres comes in contact

It may be said that, since Ātman, the locus in which the cognition inheres, is partless, Ātman has no contact with all things and as such there is no contingency of simultaneous manifestation of all things. Then there arises the contingency that there would be no manifestation of anything whatever, since cognition, be it a quality or an act, cannot have any relation with anything with which its locus has no relation If it is held that cognition can manifest an object even though its locus has no relationship with the object, then that would be unwarranted overstepping.

To avoid the defects in the view that cognition inheres in the entire Ātman, if it is held that it inheres only in that part of Ātman which is defined by the body, even in this case, if the

part defined by the body be natural to Ātman, there is the contingence of Ātman being made of parts. If that part be due to adjuncts and if cognition apprehends only those objects which are conjoined thereto, then there would be no cognition of the external things which are conjoined to the body If cognition were to apprehend what is conjoined to the part of Ātman which is outside the body, then nothing could prevent the simultaneous manifestation of all external objects.

It may be argued that cognition as an act produces as a rule something extraordinary even in things which are not related to it, as is done by *ābhicārikakriyā* i e., a maledictory performance which causes the death of the intended person alone even if he be situated thousands of miles away But this is not so, for, even here must be inferred a deity or Īsvara or *adrsta*, the effect of the *karma*, as the operating entity which is related both to him that kills and to him that is to be killed. This *ābhicārikakarma* in question is a producer of something extraordinary in what is related to it because it is an activity, like the activity in an arrow

To overcome this difficulty, if it is argued that—the manas comes in contact with Ātman (the locus of cognition), the sense organ, with the mind and the object of cognition, with the sense organ and it is this series of contacts that becomes the operating entity—even this is not true, for the role of this series of contacts is only prior to the arising of cognition and ceases thereafter Even after the generation of cognition, if this series of contacts were to manifest an object, then there arises the contingency of the manifestation of all objects in the world, each one of them being in some manner connected with that object by a series of contacts Similarly, that even the systems which regard Ātman as atomic in size or of the size of the body, fare no better can be easily seen Thus there is no possibility of accounting for the *pratikarmavyavasthā* in any of the systems]

So says the *Pratyaktattvacintāmani* (5–33, 34) as well—

एवमेवोहनीयाः स्युरणुमात्रात्मविन्मते ।
देहमात्रात्मवादे च दोषा युक्तिविदां वरैः ॥
तस्मान्मातृप्रमाणादिव्यवहारस्य संभवः ।
सर्ववादिमते नास्ति युक्तिभिश्चेति सङ्ग्रहः ॥

7.1.7 Other Grounds for Rejection of Non-vedic Views

The inexplicability of *pratikarmavyavasthā* on the part of any of these systems adds to the reasons already given by the Sūtras (2-2) and the Bhāsya thereon for rejecting all the non-vedic systems even on more fundamental grounds as already pointed out. Among the other reasons given for rejecting them, such as internal contradictions in each system, bad logic, the untenability of some of the concepts used etc., is also mentioned the reason that the system is not in consonance with Śruti, the sole *pramāna* in such matters. For example, under the Sūtra (2-3-12-10) ज्ञोऽत एव (establishing that Ātman is of the nature of Consciousness and not insentient as the *Nyāya-Vaiśesika* etc., say), the Bhāsya says—

वैशेषिकादितर्कश्च श्रुतिविरोधे आभासीभवति ।

Similarly, after pointing out that neither Ātman nor the *prakṛti* of Sāṅkhya which finds no place for Īśvara, will be able to originate activity, the Bhāsya (2-2-1-10) says—

प्रसिद्ध एव तु श्रुत्येश्वरकारणवादिन्या विरोधः तदनुवर्तिन्या च स्मृत्या ।

Similar criticisms in respect of all other systems not based on Śruti are to be found in the Bhāsya.

7.1.8 Appeal to Sruti Alone—Sakshijnana, the Key—The 'Light' of All Lights

In this predicament, the appeal is again to Śruti alone. The third line of the stanza, showing that the *Sākṣijñāna*—

I know (अहं जानामि)—is the key to the understanding of the present situation, is after the Śruti (Mu U. 2-2-11, Ka U. 5-15). This is pointed out by the *Tattvasudhā* and the *Mānasollāsaṭīkā* (IV-1) which says—

उक्तमर्थं श्रुत्या द्रढयति—जानामीति । अहमिदं जानामीति स्वगतेन निरपेक्षप्रकाशरूपेण विषयमवभासयन् यः स्वयमेव भासते, तमेव भान्तं प्रकाशमानम्, अनु अनुसृत्य, एतत् समस्त जगत् भाति, न स्वत इत्यक्षर-योजना । तथा च श्रुतिः —

न तत्र सूर्यो भाति न चन्द्रतारकं नेमा विद्युतो भान्ति कुतोऽयमग्निः ।
इति सर्वप्रकारप्रकाशविषयत्वोक्त्या स्वप्रकाशत्व प्रत्यग्ब्रह्मण उपपाद्य,
तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति ॥
इति भासमानात्मप्रकाशानुविद्धं तत्सर्वं जगदवभासत इति निर्धारयति ।

The Bhāsya on this Śruti (Mu. U. 2-2-11) says—

कथं तत् 'ज्योतिषां ज्योतिः' इति ? उच्यते ।

न तत्र तस्मिन् स्वात्मभूते ब्रह्मणि सर्वावभासकोऽपि सूर्यो भाति । तद् ब्रह्म न प्रकाशयतीत्यर्थः । स हि तस्यैव भासा सर्वमन्यदनात्मजातं प्रकाशयति । न तु तस्य स्वतः प्रकाशनसामर्थ्यम् । तथा न चन्द्रतारकम् । नेमा विद्युतो भान्ति । कुतोऽयमग्निरस्मद्गोचरः ? किं बहुना ? यदिदं जग-द्भाति तत् तमेव परमेश्वरं स्वतो भारूपत्वाद्भान्तं दीप्यमानमनुभात्यनुदीप्यते । यथा जलोल्मुकाद्यग्निसंयोगादग्निं दहन्तमनुदहति, न स्वतः तद्वत् । तस्यैव भासा दीप्त्या सर्वमिदं सूर्यादि जगद्विभाति । यत एव तदेव ब्रह्म भाति च विभाति च कार्यगतेन विविधेन भासा, अतः तस्य ब्रह्मणो भारूपत्व स्वतोऽव-गम्यते । न हि स्वतोऽविद्यमानं भासनमन्यस्य कर्तुं शक्नोति । घटादी-नामन्यावभासकत्वादर्शनाद्भारूपाणां च आदित्यादीनां तद्दर्शनात् ।

[How that is the Light of all lights is explained—The Sun, though the illuminator of all, does not illumine Brahman, the Ātman of the Sun The Sun illumines all else i e., the whole

universe that is other than Brahman–Ātman, himself shining by the Light of Brahman–Ātman Itself without which he would not have the capacity to illuminate; similarly neither the Moon nor the stars nor the lightning shines by itself, then how could this fire, which is an object of our cognition?

This universe which appears to shine, shines by the Light of Him alone, the Supreme Lord who shines being Himself of the nature of Effulgence. Just as water, fire-brand etc , heat not by themselves but because of their association with burning fire that produces heat, so does all this, the Sun and the whole world, shine by the Light of the Lord Since it is Brahman alone that shines thus and shines variously in the form of the shine of the objects, the self-effulgent nature of Brahman is known. That which is not by itself effulgent cannot illumine another; as is evident, pot etc , cannot illumine another and the effulgent Sun etc., can]

Discussing this Śruti, the Bhāsya under the Sūtras— (1–3–6–22, 23) अनुकृतेस्तस्य च and अपि च स्मर्यते (Because of the follow-up shine and the use of the word 'His', the Light mentioned in the *Mundakopanisad* is Brahman. Moreover so is mentioned in the Smrti.) after refuting that the concerned 'shine' is physical in character, and establishing that the 'shine' pertains to the self-effulgent *prājña* (भारूपः) and the shine of the objects of the world that is perceived is that of *prājña*, the substratum on which it is superimposed in the manner of the fire in the iron ball (यथा सुतप्तोऽय पिण्डोऽग्न्यनुकृतः, अग्निं दहन्तमनुदहति।) proceeds to say—

अथवा न सूर्यादीनामेव श्लोकपरिपठितानामिदं तद्धेतुक विभानमुच्यते। किं तर्हि? 'सर्वमिदम्' इति अविशेषश्रुतेः सर्वस्यैवास्य नामरूपक्रियाकारकफलजातस्य या अभिव्यक्तिः सा ब्रह्मज्योतिः सत्तानिमित्ता। यथा सूर्यादिज्योतिस्सत्तानिमित्ता सर्वस्य रूपजातस्याभिव्यक्तिः, तद्वत्। 'न तत्र सूर्यो भाति' इति च तत्रशब्दमाहरन् प्रकृतग्रहणं दर्शयति । प्रकृतं च ब्रह्म

'यस्मिन् द्यौः पृथिवी चान्तरिक्षमोतम्' इत्यादिना । अनन्तरं च 'हिरण्मये परे कोशे विरजं ब्रह्म निष्कलम् । तच्छुभ्रं ज्योतिषाञ्ज्योतिस्तद्यदात्मविदो विदुः' इति । कथं तज्ज्योतिषाञ्ज्योतिः ? इत्यत इदमुत्थितम् 'न तत्र सूर्यो भाति' इति । यदप्युक्तम्—सूर्यादीनां तेजसां भानप्रतिषेधस्तेजोधातावेवान्यस्मिन्नवकल्पते सूर्य इवेतरेषामिति । तत्र तु स एव तेजोधातुरन्यो न संभवतीत्युपपादितम् । ब्रह्मण्यपि चैषां भानप्रतिषेधोऽवकल्पते । यतो यदुपलभ्यते तत्सर्वं ब्रह्मणैव ज्योतिषोपलभ्यते । ब्रह्म तु नान्येन ज्योतिषा उपलभ्यते स्वयंज्योतिःस्वरूपत्वात्, येन सूर्यादयस्तस्मिन् भायुः । ब्रह्म ह्यन्यद्व्यनक्ति न तु ब्रह्मान्येन व्यज्यते । 'आत्मनैवायं ज्योतिषास्ते', 'अगृह्यो न हि गृह्यते' इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः ।

अपि चेदृग्रूपत्व प्राज्ञस्यैवात्मनः स्मर्यते भगवद्गीतासु—

न तद्भासयते सूर्यो न शशाङ्को न पावकः ।
यद्गत्वा न निवर्तन्ते तद्धाम परमं मम ॥ इति ।

यदादित्यगतं तेजो जगद्भासयतेऽखिलम् ।
यच्चन्द्रमसि यच्चाग्नौ तत्तेजो विद्धि मामकम् ॥ इति च ।

[Or it may be that it is not merely the shining of the Sun etc , mentioned in the Śruti, that is caused by Him What else is illuminated by Him ? Because of the Śruti 'all this' used without any reservation, it follows that the manifestation of this entire world consisting of names, forms, acts, agents and fruits of action, has for its cause the existence of the Light of Brahman, just as the revelation of all forms and colour is caused by the existence of the light of the Sun etc Moreover, the term 'there' in the Śruti—'There the Sun does not shine' shows that the subject matter under consideration is to be accepted, and the topic under consideration is Brahman as per the Śrutis like 'In whom the heaven, the earth and the interspace are woven', subsequently also the Śruti says—'In the supreme golden sheath is Brahman free from *rajas* and without parts , That is pure and the Light of lights , that It is which the knowers of Ātman realise'. To show

how that Brahman is the Light of lights, says the Śruti—'That, the Sun does not illuminate'. In refutation of the assertion that the denial of luminaries like the Sun etc , is possible only if there be some other entity which is itself a luminous principle, as for instance, no other light can shine in the presence of the Sun, we point out that it has been shown that Brahman alone and nothing else can be that luminous principle. Also, it is proper to deny the shining of the Sun, the Moon etc., in respect of Brahman for whatever is perceived is perceived only by Brahman that is the Light If Brahman were what could be perceived through some other light, then the Sun etc., could illuminate it, but Brahman which is of the nature of Self-effulgence, is not made known by any other light It is verily Brahman that manifests anything else, Brahman is not manifested by any other thing This is made clear by Śrutis like—'It is only by Ātman that is the Light, that one sits' etc , and 'He is never perceived for He is not perceivable'.

Moreover, this aspect is recalled in the *Bhagavadgītā*, as belonging to *Prājña* himself that is Ātman—Neither the Sun, nor the Moon nor the fire illumines That attaining which, men do not return, that is My Supreme Abode' and 'the Light which residing in the Sun illumines the whole world, that which is in the Moon and in the fire - know that light to be Mine']

7.1.9 Mind, the Divine 'Eye'—Role of Sense Organs

The *Chāndogyopaniṣad* (8–12–4, 5), showing that the source of all knowledge is Ātman, the Witness-self, points out the role of the mind and the sense organs in this connection—

अथ यत्रैतदाकाशमनुविषण्णं चक्षुः स चाक्षुषः पुरुषो दर्शनाय चक्षुरथ यो वेदेदं जिघ्राणीति स आत्मा गन्धाय घ्राणमथ यो वेदेदमभिव्याहराणीति स आत्माऽभिव्याहाराय वागथ यो वेदेदꣳशृणवानीति स आत्मा श्रवणाय श्रोत्रम् । अथ यो वेदेदं मन्वानीति स आत्मा मनोऽस्य दैवं चक्षुः ।

Says the Bhāsya on it—

अथ यत्र कृष्णतारोपलक्षितमाकाशं देहच्छिद्रमनुविषण्णमनुषक्तमनुगतं चक्षुः तत्र स प्रकृतोऽशरीर आत्मा चाक्षुषः, चक्षुषि भव इति चाक्षुषः पुरुषः तस्य दर्शनाय रूपोपलब्धये चक्षुः करणम् । यस्य तद्देहादिभिः संहतत्वात् परस्य द्रष्टुरर्थे, सोऽत्र चक्षुषि दर्शनेन लिङ्गेन दृश्यते परोऽशरीरोऽसंहतः । 'अक्षिणि दृश्यते' इति प्रजापतिनोक्तं सर्वेन्द्रियद्वारोपलक्षणार्थम् । सर्वविषयोपलब्धा हि स एवेति । स्फुटोपलब्धिहेतुत्वात्तु 'अक्षिणि' इति विशेषवचनं सर्वश्रुतिषु । 'अहमदर्शमिति तत्सत्यं भवति' (बृ. 4-1-4) इति च श्रुतेः । अथाऽपि योऽस्मिन् देहे वेद । कथम्? इदं सुगन्धि दुर्गन्धि वा जिघ्राणीत्यस्य गन्धं विजानीयामिति, स आत्मा, तस्य गन्धाय गन्धविज्ञानाय घ्राणम् । अथ यो वेदेदं वचनमभिव्याहराणीति, वदिष्यामीति स आत्मा । अभिव्याहरणक्रियासिद्धये करणं वागिन्द्रियम् । अथ यो वेदेदं शृणवानीति स आत्मा, श्रवणाय श्रोत्रम् ।

अथ यो वेदेदं मन्वानीति मननव्यापारमिन्द्रियामंस्पृष्टं केवलं मन्वानीति वेद स आत्मा । मननाय मनः । यो वेद स आत्मेत्येवं सर्वत्र प्रयोगाद्वेदनमस्य स्वरूपमित्यवगम्यते । यथा यः पुरस्तात् प्रकाशयति स आदित्यो, यो दक्षिणतो यः पश्चाद् उत्तरतो य ऊर्ध्वं प्रकाशयति स आदित्य, इत्युक्ते प्रकाशस्वरूप इति गम्यते । दर्शनादिक्रियानिर्वृत्त्यर्थानि तु चक्षुरादिकरणानि । इदं चास्यात्मनः सामर्थ्यादवगम्यते । आत्मनः सत्तामात्र एव ज्ञानकर्तृत्वं न तु व्यापृततया । यथा सवितुः सत्तामात्र एव प्रकाशनकर्तृत्वं न तु व्यापृततयेति, तद्वत् ।

मनोऽस्यात्मनो दैवमप्राकृतम् इतरेन्द्रियैरसाधारणं चक्षुः । चष्टे पश्यत्यनेनेति चक्षुः । वर्तमानकालविषयाणि चेन्द्रियाणि । अतोऽदैवानि तानि । मनस्तु त्रिकालविषयोपलब्धिकरणं मृदितदोषं च सूक्ष्मव्यवहितादिसर्वोपलब्धिकरण चेति दैव चक्षुरुच्यते ।

[Though by Himself without body, this Ātman as associated with the *upādhi* viz , the eye, the sense organ which is turned towards

the space of the dark pupil of the eye, is spoken of as residing in the eye. For Him, eye is the instrument for perception of colour This Ātman that neither possesses a body nor is an assemblage of body etc., is known through the analysis of the act of seeing, since the formation of the assemblage of the eye with the body etc., is for the sake of the other viz., the seer The statement by Prajāpati that He is seen through the eye, must be taken to apply to the process of perception through all the sense organs, because the perceiver of all objects is verily Ātman Himself. In all the Śrutis, the eye is specially mentioned, however, because of vividness of perception through the eye This follows from the Śruti which declares 'It is true because I have seen it' Similarly He who knows in this body as 'Let Me smell this of good or bad odour' and 'let Me perceive its odour', is the Ātman; the sense of smell is the instrument for His perception of odour. He who knows as 'Let Me utter these words, I will express Myself' is Ātman, the organ of articulation is the instrument for the act of speech. Again He who knows as 'Let Me hear this' is Ātman, the sense of hearing is for His preception of sound

Again He who knows as 'Let Me reflect upon this, let Me have recourse to mere reflection as unconnected with any organ' is Ātman The mind is for reflection. Since the usage 'He who knows is Ātman' is there throughout, it is understood that Consciousness is His very essence; just as when it is said 'He who illumines in the front is the Sun, he who illumines to the right, behind, to the left, as also above, is the Sun', it is understood that the Sun is of the nature of shine. The organs, eye etc, are only for the purpose of accomplishing the processes of seeing etc That perception on the part of Ātman is His very Existence as Consciousness, and not due to any act, is clear from the reading of the situation, just as the so-called agency of the Sun in the act of illumination is due to His mere presence and not any act on His part.

Mind is the divine 'eye' of Ātman. It is extraordinary and unlike the other organs. It is referred to as the 'eye' since Ātman 'sees' through it. And the organs have as objects only those

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that exist at the present time i.e., at the time of perception, hence they are non-divine. The mind, however, is the means for the perception of the objects of the past, the present and the future, it is free from defects and is the means for the perception of all objects that are subtle, remote etc., and as such it is termed the divine 'eye'.]

In respect of this says the *Sūtrabhasya* (2–3–12–18)—

अथ यो वेदेदं जिघ्राणीति स आत्मा इति च सर्वैः करणद्वारैः 'इदं वेद', 'इदं वेद' इति विज्ञानेन अनुसन्धानात् तद्रूपत्वसिद्धिः। नित्य-स्वरूपचैतन्यत्वे घ्राणाद्यानर्थक्यमिति चेत्, न। गन्धादिविषयविशेषपरि-च्छेदार्थत्वात्। तथाहि दर्शयति 'गन्धाय घ्राणम्' इत्यादि।

[That Ātman is of the nature of Consciousness is established on the authority of Śruti 'And He whose is the cognition such as "I smell this" is Ātman' which recalls the Consciousness underlying the experience such as 'He knows this', 'He knows this' through all the sense organs Though Ātman is Eternal Consciousness by its very nature, it does not follow that the sense organs like the ear etc, are useless, for they serve the special purpose of perceiving the particular objects like smell etc. This is shown by Śrutis like 'the sense of smell is for the purpose of perceiving odour'.]

The *Brahmavidyābharanavyākhyā* on this *Sūtrabhāsya says*—

तत्र यदि 'इदं यो वेद' इत्येवोच्येत, तदा तार्किकाभिमतोऽनित्य-ज्ञानाश्रय एवात्मा सिध्येत्, तन्माभूदिति, गन्धादिगोचरज्ञानावभासकतया आत्मा लक्ष्यते। गन्धादिगोचरज्ञानानां हि उत्पत्तिमारभ्य ज्ञाततानैयत्यात् जन्यज्ञानेन तदनुत्पत्तेः तदवभासकं नित्यं ज्ञानं सिध्यतीति स एवात्मा। न च यो वेदेति गन्धादिगोचरज्ञानाश्रयतायाः प्रतिपादनात् नित्यज्ञानाश्रयतैवात्मनः सिध्येत् इति वाच्यम्। तावताप्रकृताकाङ्क्षानिवर्तनासंभवात् ज्ञानस्वरूपब्रह्मा-भेदस्य नित्यज्ञानरूपतयैवोपपादनीयत्वात्। अतो वेदेतिनिर्देशः सत्तासतीतिवत् तादात्म्येन वा नित्यज्ञानरूपस्यैवात्मनो वृत्त्युपाधिकभेदकल्पनया वा द्रष्टव्य

इति न काचिदनुपपत्तिः । परिच्छेदो वृत्तिरूपो जन्यः । तत्र चक्षुरादीनामुपयोग इत्यर्थः । गन्धाय गन्धगोचरवृत्त्यर्थम् । दर्शनाय चक्षुः, श्रवणाय श्रोत्रम् इत्यादि समभिव्याहारात् ।

[If the Śruti were to say 'He who knows this', then Ātman would be the locus of evanescent jñāna, as accepted by the *Tārkikas.* To avoid this, Śruti employs language with a view to indicate that Ātman is the One that illumines cognition pertaining to smell etc The cognitions pertaining to smell etc., such as 'this is smell' are perceived continuously right from their origination This would not be possible if the perceiving consciousness were itself originated. Thus is established the Eternal Consciousness that illumines this cognition, and this Itself is Ātman. It should not be construed that Ātman that is established is only the locus of knowledge that is eternal because Ātman is described as the locus of cognitions pertaining to smell etc , by the Śruti 'He who knows'; since the expectancy in the present case would not be set at rest by such an answer and the identity of Ātman with Brahman that is Consciousness is established only on the basis of Ātman being of the nature of Eternal Consciousness.

Therefore the usage of the term 'knows' (*veda*) in the Śruti is to be understood as conveying the identity in the manner of the sentence 'existence is' or conveying the import that Ātman is the Eternal Consciousness, through the concoction of difference due to the *vrtti* as the delimiting adjunct; thus there is nothing unreasonable. Particularization is the arising of the *vrtti.* It is here that eyes etc., are of use The sense of smell is for generating the *vrtti* pertaining to odour; this is clear from the usage of this phrase along with phrases like 'the eye is for seeing, the ear is for hearing'.]

Mentioning the functions of organs and the mind, the *Sūtrabhāsya* (2–4–1–6) says—

शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धविषयाः पञ्चबुद्धिभेदाः, तदर्थानि पञ्चबुद्धीन्द्रियाणि वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाः पञ्चकर्मभेदास्तदर्थानि च पञ्च कर्मेन्द्रियाणि ।

सर्वार्थविषयं त्रैकाल्यवृत्ति मनस्त्वेकमनेकवृत्तिकम् । तदेव वृत्तिभेदात् क्वचिद्-भिन्नवद्व्यपदिश्यते मनः, बुद्धिः, अहङ्कारः, चित्तं चेति । तथा च श्रुतिः कामाद्या नानाविधा वृत्तीरनुक्रम्याह 'एतत्सर्वं मन एव' इति ।

[There are five distinctions in experience having for their respective objects sound, touch, colour, taste and smell, and for their perception are the five sense organs There are five types of activities viz, speaking, grasping, walking, ejecting and enjoying, and for these purposes are the five motor organs But the *manas* which has all things for its object, operating over all the three periods of time, is only one with various transformations or *vrttis* Because of its various functions, it is variously designated as *manas, buddhi, ahankāra* and *citta.* The Śruti also, after enumerating the various *vrttis* such as desire etc says—'All this is only the *manas*']

Says the *Vivekacūdāmani* (95-96)—

निगद्यतेऽन्तःकरण मनो धीरहङ्कृतिश्चित्तमिति स्ववृत्तिभिः ।
मनस्तु सङ्कल्पविकल्पनादिभिर्बुद्धिः पदार्थाध्यवसायधर्मतः ॥
अत्राभिमानादहमित्यहंकृतिः स्वार्थानुसंधानगुणेन चित्तम् ॥

[The inner organ is called *manas, buddhi, ahankāra* or *citta* according to its different functions, *manas*, from its considering the pros and cons of a thing, *buddhi*, from its determining the true nature of its objects, *ego*, from its identification with this body as one's own Self, and *citta*, from its function of remembering things it is interested in.]

7.1.10 Antahkarana—Necessity for accepting it

The necessity for accepting the *antahkarana* in addition to the sensory and the motor organs is brought out in the Sūtra (2-3-13-32) and the Bhāsya thereon—

नित्योपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गोऽन्यतरनियमो वान्यथा ।

तच्चैवंभूतमन्तःकरणमवश्यमस्तीत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । अन्यथा ह्यनभ्युप-गम्यमाने तस्मिन् नित्योपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गः स्यात् । आत्मेन्द्रियविषया-

णामुपलब्धिसाधनानां सन्निधाने सति नित्यमेवोपलब्धिः प्रसज्येत। अथ सत्यपि हेतुसमवधाने फलाभावस्ततो नित्यमेवानुपलब्धिः प्रसज्येत। न चैवं दृश्यते। अथवा अन्यतरस्यात्मन इन्द्रियस्य वा शक्तिप्रतिबन्धोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः। न चात्मनः शक्तिप्रतिबन्धः संभवति। अविक्रियत्वात्। नापीन्द्रियस्य। न हि तस्य पूर्वोत्तरयोः क्षणयोरप्रतिबद्धशक्तिकस्य सतो अकस्माच्छक्तिः प्रतिबध्येत। तस्माद्यस्यावधानानवधानाभ्यामुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी भवतः तन्मनः। तथा च श्रुतिः 'अन्यत्रमना अभूवं नादर्शमन्यत्रमना अभूवं नाश्रोषम्' इति, 'मनसा ह्येव पश्यति मनसा शृणोति' इति।

[If the existence of *manas* is not admitted, there would result either constant perception or constant non-perception, or else the delimitation of the power of either of the two viz., Ātman and the organs.

Hence it must be necessarily admitted that a *manas* of this kind does exist because otherwise there would be the contingency of constant perception or constant non-perception, for when the accessories of perception viz, the Ātman, the organs and the objects, are in contiguity, perception should occur always. Or else, if, even on the conjunction of the causal factors of perception, no result is produced, then there would be the contingency of constant non-perception. But it is not so in experience. Or else, obstruction to the power of either Ātman or the sense organs would have to be admitted. Also no obstruction is possible for the power of Ātman, for Ātman is changeless. Nor can the power of the senses be obstructed, for it is not possible that the power of the sense organs, which is not obstructed in the preceding and the succeeding moments, should without any cause be obstructed suddenly in the middle. Therefore mind is that entity through the attention and non-attention of which result perception and non-perception. Thus the Śruti declares—'My mind was elsewhere, I did not see, my mind was elsewhere, I did not hear' and 'it is verily through the mind that one sees and through the mind that one hears']

7.1.11 Association of Antahkarana with Atman till Enlightenment

That this association of the *antahkarana* with Ātman is always there till the dawn of enlightenment, obtaining in seed form in deep sleep and dissolution as well, is pointed out in the Sūtras (2-3-13-30, 31) Says the Bhāṣya—

यावदयमात्मा ससारी भवति, यावदस्य सम्यग्दर्शनेन संसारित्वं न निवर्तते, तावदस्य बुद्ध्या संयोगो न शाम्यति। यावदेव चायं बुद्ध्युपाधिसंबन्धस्तावज्जीवस्य जीवत्वं संसारित्वं च। परमार्थतस्तु न जीवो नाम बुद्ध्युपाधिसंबन्धपरिकल्पितस्वरूपव्यतिरेकेणास्ति।

The Śruti quoted in respect of this is—

योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु हृद्यन्तर्ज्योतिः पुरुषः समानः सन्नुभौ लोकावनुसञ्चरति ध्यायतीव लेलायतीव।

The Bhāsya points out further—

बुद्धिमयत्वं च तद्गुणसारत्वमेवाभिप्रेयते।

(Ref Sūtra 2-3-13-29)

एतदुक्तं भवति—नायं स्वतो ध्यायति, नापि चलति, ध्यायन्त्यां बुद्धौ ध्यायतीव, चलन्त्यां बुद्धौ चलतीवेति। अपि च मिथ्याज्ञानपुरस्सरोऽयमात्मनो बुद्ध्युपाधिसंबन्धः। नच मिथ्याज्ञानस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानादन्यत्र निवृत्तिरस्ति। . . अयमपि बुद्धिसंबन्धः शक्त्यात्मना विद्यमान एव सुषुप्तप्रलययोः पुनः प्रबोधप्रसवयोराविर्भवति।

[As long as transmigration is associated with Ātman and is not put an end to by enlightenment, so long the contact of Ātman with the intellect does not cease And as long as Its contact with the intellect as Its limiting adjunct lasts, so long remains the jīvahood of the *jiva* as also its transmigratoriness. In reality, however, there is no such thing as *jiva* apart from what is fictitiously concocted because of the connection with the intellect which is its delimiting adjunct.

The Śruti is—'This infinite entity *Purusa* that remains, identified with the intellect in the midst of the organs, the

Effulgence within the heart, assuming the likeness of the intellect, moves between the two worlds ; It thinks, as it were, and moves, as it were'. By identification with the intellect is meant the predominance of the qualities of the intellect . . The idea implied is this—By Itself It does not think, nor does It move But when the intellect thinks, It appears to think , and when the intellect moves, It appears to move. Moreover, this connection of Ātman with the intellect has but false ignorance as its root cause, and this false ignorance is not removable by anything other than enlightenment. . . . .

Similarly too, the contact with the intellect etc , remains in a potential form during sleep and dissolution and that itself emerges again at the time of waking up and creation]

7.1.12 Mukhyaprana

In addition to *manas* and the ten organs also termed as *pranas*, the *mukhyaprāṇa*, functioning as *prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna* and *samāna* is also to be reckoned in the make-up of the subtle body. The Sūtrabhāṣya says (2-4-5-12)—

वृत्तिभेदश्चायं कार्यभेदापेक्षः । प्राणः प्राग्वृत्तिरुच्छ्वासादिकर्मा । अपानोऽवाग्वृत्तिर्निश्वासादिकर्मा । व्यानस्तयोः सन्धौ वर्तमानो वीर्यवत्कर्महेतुः । उदान ऊर्ध्ववृत्तिरुत्क्रान्त्यादिहेतुः । समानः समं सर्वेष्वङ्गेषु योऽन्नरसान्नयतीति ।

Says the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* (97)—

प्राणापानव्यानोदानसमाना भवत्यसौ प्राणः ।
स्वयमेव वृत्तिभेदाद्विकृतेर्भेदात्सुवर्णसलिलमिव ॥

[This distinction of functions is based on the distinction of effects. *Prāna* is that which moves forward and performs the function of exhaling etc., *Apāna* is that which goes backward and performs the function of inhaling etc., *Vyāna* exists in between these two and performs works requiring strength. *Udāna* moves upward and is the cause of such acts as departure from the body. *Samāna* is that which carries the essence of food equally to all the limbs.

One and the same *Prāna* becomes *Prāna*, *Apāna*, *Vyāna*, *Udāna*, and *Samāna* according to their diversity of functions and modifications as in the case of gold and water]

7.1.13 Sukshmasarira, the Subtle Body

This subtle body, consisting of these subtle ingredients (अणवश्च etc) is spoken of in the Sūtrabhāsya (2-4-2-6) as per the Smrti—तथात्र स्मृतिः —

पुर्यष्टकेन लिङ्गेन प्राणाद्येन स युज्यते ।
तेन बद्धस्य वै बन्धो मोक्षो मुक्तस्य तेन च ॥

[He is associated with the *lingaśarīra* comprising of the eight ingredients viz , *prāna* etc His bondage consists in being bound by it, his release, in being freed from it]

Says the *Vivekacūdāmani* (98, 99)—

वागादिपञ्च श्रवणादिपञ्च प्राणादिपञ्चाभ्रमुखाणि पञ्च ।
बुद्ध्याद्यविद्यापि च कामकर्मणी पुर्यष्टक सूक्ष्मशरीरमाहुः ॥
इदं शरीरं शृणु सूक्ष्मसंज्ञित लिङ्गन्त्वपञ्चीकृतभूतसंभवम् ।
सवासनं कर्मफलानुभावक स्वाज्ञानतोऽनादिरुपाधिरात्मनः ॥

[The five motor organs such as that of speech etc., the five sense organs such as the ear etc , the five *prānas*, the five elements, such as ether etc , the *antahkarana* in its four aspects such as intellect etc , avidyā, desire and *karma*—these eight ingredients are said to constitute the subtle body.

This body designated as subtle is the *lingaśarīra* which is a product of the non-quintuplicated elements and is possessed of latent impressions , it is responsible for the experience of the fruits of actions, arising from ignorance in respect of oneself, it is the beginningless delimiting adjunct superposed on Ātman.]

The *Pañcīkaraṇa* to which the *Mānasollāsaṭīkā* repeatedly makes reference, says also—

अपञ्चीकृतपञ्चमहाभूतानि पञ्चतन्मात्राणि । तत्कार्यं च पञ्च प्राणाः,

दशेन्द्रियाणि मनो, बुद्धिश्चेति सप्तदशक लिङ्ग भौतिकं हिरण्यगर्भ इत्युच्यते। एतत्सूक्ष्मशरीरमात्मनः ।

[The five non-quintuplicated elements are the five *tanmātras*, their products, the *lingaśarīra*, physical in nature comprising of the seventeen ingredients viz., the five *prānas*, the ten organs, mind and the intellect, is called *Hiranyagarbha*. This is the subtle body of Ātman.]

That the *prāṇas* etc., are products follows from Śrutis such as—

एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनस्सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च ।

(Kai. U.; Mu. U. 2–1–3)

The *Prāśnopaniṣad* (2–3, 4) says that the pre-eminent *prāna*, having divided itself five-fold, holds this body together and supports it; and when it departs from the body, the others too depart; when it resides in the body, the others too reside, following it—

अहमेवैतत्पञ्चधात्मानं प्रविभज्यैतद्बाणमवष्टभ्य विधारयामि । तस्मिन्नुत्क्रामत्यथेतरे सर्व एवोत्क्रामन्ते। तस्मिंश्च प्रतिष्ठमाने सर्व एव प्रातिष्ठन्ते।

7.1.14 Activity and Cognition—Prana, Prajna and Chaitanya

All activity of jiva while residing in the body, departure from the body and the journey thereafter are to be traced to the *prana* i.e., to the *Caitanya* with *prāṇa* as *upādhi* The *Kauṣitakyupanisad* also says—

प्राणोऽस्मि प्रज्ञात्मा (3-2)। अथ खलु प्राण एव प्रज्ञात्मेदं शरीरं परिगृह्योत्थापयति (3-3)। यो वै प्राणः सा प्रज्ञा, या वा प्रज्ञा स प्राणः। स ह ह्येतावस्मिञ्छरीरे वसतः सहोत्क्रामतः। (3-4)

[I (Indra) am *prāna*, the Self that is Consciousness. Now then, it is *prāna*, one with consciousness that takes hold of the

body and makes it rise up What is *prāna*, that is verily *prajñā*, what is *prajñā*, that is verily *prāna*, for, together do these two live in the body and together do they depart.]

The *Sūtrabhāsya* (1–1–11–31) points out that the mind and the vital air which are the respective abodes of the two powers of cognition and action and constitute the *upādhis* of the Inner Self, may be spoken of as different; the Inner Self, on the other hand, which is limited by these two adjuncts, has no difference in Itself, so that the two may be identified as is done in the Śruti '*prāna* is *prajñā*'—

ज्ञानक्रियाशक्तिद्वयाश्रययोर्बुद्धिप्राणयोः प्रत्यगात्मोपाधिभूतयोर्भेदनिर्देशयोपपत्तेः, उपाधिद्वयोपहितस्य तु प्रत्यगात्मनः स्वरूपेणाभेद इत्यतः 'प्राण एव प्रज्ञात्मा' इत्येकीकरणमविरुद्धम् ।

Further, since the function of the *Prāna* also is to be traced to the presence of the Supreme Self, it can figuratively be ascribed to the latter, as the *Kaṭhopanisad* (2–5–5)—'No mortal lives by the breath that goes in and goes out, but, they (the mortals) live by another in whom these two repose'—says. This is pointed out in the *Sūtrabhāsya* (1–1–11–31)—

प्राणव्यापारस्यापि परमात्मायत्तत्वात् परमात्मन्युपचरितुं शक्यत्वात् ।

न प्राणेन नापानेन मर्त्यो जीवति कश्चन ।
इतरेण तु जीवन्ति यस्मिन्नेतावुपाश्रितौ ॥

Says the *Ātmapurāṇa* (2–246 to 257)—

आनन्दात्मा मया नायमवाङ्मनसगोचरः ।
वक्तुं शक्यो, न चानेन ज्ञातुमप्यत्यलौकिकः ॥

ततो ज्ञानक्रियाशक्ती प्राणप्रज्ञे हि लौकिके ।
आश्रित्याहं स्वमात्मान कथयिष्याम्यलौकिकम् ॥

प्राणप्रज्ञे विहायैते न देहादीह तिष्ठति ।
क्रियाशक्तिस्तथा प्राणो न तिष्ठति धियं विना ॥
स्थावरेषु यतो नैष दृश्यते बुद्धिवर्जनात् ।
प्राणं विना तथा बुद्धिर्न दृष्टा हि घटादिषु ॥
बुद्धिश्च जडरूपा हि प्रकाशं स्वात्मनः परम् ।
अपेक्षते यथा स्तम्भः प्राणेन सदृशी ततः ॥
अन्तर्वायुः प्रचलति प्रजानाति तथैव धीः ।
प्राण प्रज्ञेति वै तस्मादेतयोर्नाम देहिनाम् ॥
वस्तुतश्चलनं नैव जडानां दृश्यते क्वचित् ।
रथादयो यथा नैव दृश्यन्ते स्वयमेव हि ॥
अश्वादींश्चेतनान् हित्वा चलन्तःकर्हिचित् क्वचित् ।
प्रकर्षस्तत्र केन स्यान्मूलाभावात्तु हेतुतः ॥
ज्ञप्तिश्च न जडे क्वापि दृश्यते हि घटादिके ।
प्रकर्षश्च जडे ज्ञप्तेर्दूरापास्तः सदैव हि ॥
तस्माद्यत्सन्निधावस्य जडस्येदं विजायते ।
प्रकर्षेण तथा वायोः स प्राणश्चेतनो भवेत् ॥
प्रकाशयति यः सर्वं स ज्ञप्तिश्चेतनः स्मृतः ।
आत्मानं च प्रकर्षेण जडजातप्रकाशनात् ॥
स्वसजातिविजात्युत्थभेदाभावेन हेतुना ।
स्वप्रकाशेन चात्मानमात्मा जानाति नापरः ॥

[Even if instruction is to be given regarding Ātman, the question arises as to whether it should be communicated directly or through *upādhis*. Not the first, as it is impossible. Ātman that is Bliss, absolutely transcendent and beyond speech and mind, cannot be directly spoken about by me, nor can one get to know it that way In the world, speech can use words which stand for attributes, actions, species and others determined by usage. None of these pertains to Ātman, and as such, Atman is not directly conveyed by words Necessarily, therefore, the

second method is to be employed. Here, those *upādhis* that are distant pointers are given up and those in close proximity viz , *prāna* and *prajñā* are employed, thus gaining parsimony in the employment of the method of implication (*laksanā*) Distant *upādhis* like body etc , are, however, able to point to Ātman only through *prāna* and *prajñā* which are in closest proximity to Ātman *Kriyāśakti* and *jñānaśakti* well known in the world are these two *upādhis*; *prāna* and *prajñā* and these are caught hold of to make known the Ātman that transcends the world. The speciality of these *upādhis* is that without them, body etc., cannot exist and only with them do they exist Nor is *prāna* seen where *prajñā* is not seen, for example, in the plant world. This is from the standpoint of the experience in ordinarv parlance. If, however, it is maintained that there is evidence of *prāna* in plants as is inferred from growth etc , it is also to be maintained that there is evidence of *prajñā* too, which is to be inferred as well, from the seeking of upward region etc , by creepers Per contra, *prajñā* is not seen where *prāna* is not seen, as in pot, etc. *Prajñā* being inert, cannot know by itself, it is in need of the effulgence of Ātman just as a pillar; that way it is similar to *prāna* Since *prāna* moves inside the body and *prajñā* knows, as taken for granted in common parlance, they are designated as such. An inert entity cannot move by itself or know by itself as is evident in the case of a cart or a pot Thus *prāna* and *prajñā* are pointers to the sentient Ātman by whose proximity *prāna* 'moves' and *prajñā* 'knows' It is the Self-effulgent non-dual Ātman alone that can know by Itself as there is none other like Itself or different from It to make It shine.]

So says the *Anubhūtiprakāśa* (8–31 to 40 and 46) also—

प्राणोऽस्मीत्यादिवाक्येन तस्मै तत्त्वमवोचत ॥
प्राणप्रज्ञे क्रियाज्ञानशक्ती द्वे लिङ्गदेहगे ।
तदधिष्ठानरूपत्वात्ताभ्यामात्मोपलक्षितः ॥
प्रज्ञात्मा प्राणरूपोऽस्मीत्येवं तस्मा अवोचत ।
आनन्दोऽजर इत्यादि निर्णयस्तस्य उच्यते ॥

अत्रोपायो नास्ति कश्चिदुपाधिमुपलक्षकम् ।
विनात्मवाचकः शब्दो यस्मान्न क्वापि वीक्ष्यते ॥
लोके गुणक्रियाजातिरूढय शब्दहेतव ।
नात्मन्यन्यतमोऽमीषा तेनात्मा नाभिधीयते ॥
उपाधिष्वपि सर्वेषु सामीप्यात् प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
प्राणप्रज्ञाद्वयं योग्यमत्यन्तं तेन लक्ष्यते ॥
प्राणशब्दोऽभिधावृत्त्या वायु चेष्टकमाह हि ।
प्रज्ञाशब्दो ज्ञानहेतु बुद्धि वक्ति स्वशक्तित. ॥
तद्भ्रान्त्यधिष्ठानतया तद्धेतुत्वोपचारतः ।
ताभ्यामात्मा लक्ष्यमाणो ज्ञेय· शाखाग्रचन्द्रवत् ॥
देहेन्द्रियादयो भावा ज्ञानादिव्यापृतिक्षमाः ।
यस्य सन्निधिमात्रेण सोऽहमित्यवधारय ॥
अजडात्मवदाभान्ति यत्सान्निध्याज्जडा अपि ।
देहेन्द्रियमनःप्राणा सोऽहमित्यवधारय ॥
इन्द्रियाणां प्रवृत्तिः स्यात् प्रज्ञालोचनपूर्विका ।
प्राणवायुप्रेरिता चेत्येव लोके व्यवस्थितिः ॥

Prāna and *Prajñā* point to the Ātman by implication just as the branch of a tree points to the moon. Know for certain as Self that by the mere presence of which the body, senses etc , proceed to secure the knowledge etc., know for certain as Self that by the mere presence of which the body, senses mind and *prāna*, though insentient, appear as non-insentient. It is seen in the world that the senses proceed after due deliberation by *prajñā* and as impelled by *prāṇa*

7.1.15 Senses not the Orbs

What has been said so far in respect of the sense organs, the *prāṇa* and the *antaḥkarana* is on the basis of Śruti which is the only *pramāna* in these matters which are not accessible

to the empirical *pramānas* such as *pratyaksa* etc. The various views such as that the senses are the orbs, they are the capacities of the orbs, they are the products of *ahankāra* or they are substances other than the orbs etc., put forward by different schools are of the nature of mere guesses not based on any *pramāna*, and are defective; as such they are to be rejected So is the case with the views such as that the mind is atomic, it is eternal etc As has been pointed out by the Śruti, the senses, *prāṇa* and *antaḥkaraṇa* are all products arising out of the subtle elements, the *sūksmabhūtas*, and as such are physical in character and non-eternal as well. They have parts and can be endowed with movement etc. In addition to what has been already quoted, there are other Śrutis such as—अन्नमयं हि सोम्य मन आपोमयः प्राणस्तेजोमयी वाक्। (Ch. U. 6–5–4) (Mind, dear one, is the product of food (earth), *prāna*, of water, and speech, of fire), तन्मनोऽकुरुत। (Bṛ. U. 1–2–3) (That created the mind).

7.1.16 The Presiding Devatas

Śruti also points out that the sense organs etc., are presided over by *devatās* who enable them to perform their functions. The topic is discussed in the *adhikarana* (2-4-7) of the *Sūtrabhāsya*, beginning with the Sūtra (2-4-7-14)—

ज्योतिराद्यधिष्ठानं तु तदामननात्।

[But the organs etc., are presided over by *devatās* such as *Agni* etc , for so says the Śruti.]

7.2.1 Pratikarmavyavastha—Different Expositions

The various Vedāntic *prakriyās* which regard the mind as a sense organ or otherwise are all different modes of exposition involving reasoning in consonance with the Sruti, to suit various *adhikāris*. On this background is to be understood the first two lines of the fourth stanza of the hymn—

नानाच्छिद्रघटोदरस्थितमहादीपप्रभाभास्वरम्
ज्ञानं यस्य तु चक्षुरादिकरणद्वारा बहिः स्पन्दते ।

7.2.2 Revealing of Objects—Sense Organs, Antahkarana and Chidabhasa

Quoting the *Upadeśasāhasrī* (14–3,4) and the *Bṛhad-vārtika*, the *Pañcadaśī* (IV–27 to 30) mentions succinctly the role of the *antaḥkarana* and the sense organs in revealing the objects to the individual Self—

बाढ माने तु मेयेन योगात् स्याद्विषयाकृतिः ।
भाष्यवार्तिककाराभ्यामयमर्थ उदीरितः ॥

मूपासिक्तं यथा ताम्रं तन्निभं जायते तथा ।
रूपादीन् व्याप्नुवच्चित्त तन्निभ दृश्यते ध्रुवम् ॥

व्यञ्जको वा यथाऽऽलोको व्यङ्ग्यस्याकारतामियात् ।
सर्वार्थव्यञ्जकत्वाद्धीरर्थाकारा प्रदृश्यते ॥ (Up. Sā.)

मातुर्मानाभिनिष्पत्तिर्निष्पन्नं मेयमेति तत् ।
मेयाभिसङ्गतं तच्च मेयाभत्वं प्रपद्यते ॥ (Br. Vā.)

Again says the *Pañcadaśī* in the eighth chapter *Kūṭastha-dīpa*—

खादित्यदीपिते कुड्ये दर्पणादित्यदीप्तिवत् ।
कूटस्थभासितो देहो धीस्थजीवेन भास्यते ॥ (1)

घटैकाकारधीस्था चिद्घटमेवावभासयेत् ।
घटस्य ज्ञातता ब्रह्मचैतन्येनावभासते ॥ (4)

आभासहीनया बुद्ध्या ज्ञातत्वं नैव जन्यते ।
तादृग्बुद्धेर्विशेषः को मृदादेः स्याद्विकारिणः ॥ (8)

ज्ञात इत्युच्यते कुम्भो मृदा लिप्तो न कुत्रचित् ।
धीमात्रव्याप्तकुम्भस्य ज्ञातत्वं नेष्यते तथा ॥ (9)

ज्ञातत्वं नाम कुम्भेऽतश्चिदाभासफलोदयः ।
न फलं ब्रह्मचैतन्यं मानात् प्रागपि सत्त्वतः ॥ (10)

आभास उदितस्तस्माज्ज्ञातत्वं जनयेद्घटे ।
तत्पुनर्ब्रह्मणाभास्यमज्ञातत्ववदेव हि ॥ (13)

धीवृत्त्याभासकुम्भानां समूहो भास्यते चिदा ।
कुम्भमात्रफलत्वात् स एक आभासतः स्फुरेत् ॥ (14)

घटोऽयमित्यसावुक्तिराभासस्य प्रसादतः ।
विज्ञातो घट इत्युक्तिर्ब्रह्मानुग्रहतो भवेत् ॥ (16)

अहंवृत्तौ चिदाभासः कामक्रोधादिकासु च ।
संव्याप्य वर्तते तप्ते लोहे वह्निर्यथा तथा ॥ (18)

स्वमात्र भासयेत्तप्त लोहं नान्यत्कदाचन ।
एवमाभाससहिता वृत्तयः स्वस्वभासिकाः ॥ (19)

[It is quite true, but when the means of knowledge is in contact with the object of knowledge, it takes on the form of the object. This is mentioned by the authors of the *Bhāsya* and the *Vārtika*.

Just as molten copper poured into a mould takes on the shape of the latter, the mind that pervades an object with form etc., is certainly seen to be similar to it

Or even as the light takes on the form of the object which it illuminates, the mind, that manifests all objects, assumes the form of the object which it reveals

From the knower arises the means of knowledge On reaching the object to be known, the *pramāna* assumes the generic form of the object

Just like the light of the Sun reflected in a mirror illuminating a wall already illumined directly by the Sun in the sky, the body illumined by the Immutable Ātman is illumined again by the jīva, the *cidābhāsa* associated with the mind

The Consciousness reflected in the *antahkaraṇavṛtti* makes known only the pot; the knownness of the pot is caused by the Brahman-consciousness.

Knownness is not at all brought about by the mind without the *cidābhāsa*. What is the difference between such a mind and mud etc., which are inert and subject to modifications?

A pot is nowhere spoken of as known because of being smeared with mud Similarly knownness cannot be attributed to a pot pervaded merely by the mind (without the *cidābhāsa*).

Thus the knownness of a pot means the generation of the fruit etc , viz , the *cidābhāsa* in that pot. Brahman-consciousness cannot be said to be the fruit, for It exists even prior to the perception of the object.

The aggregate of the *antahkaranavṛtti*, the *cidābhāsa* and the pot is illumined by consciousness. But the *cidābhāsa* as the fruit, being located in the *vṛtti* of the form of the pot, illumines only the pot.

The statement 'This is a pot' is possible, thanks to the *cidābhāsa*, the statement 'The pot is known' is possible, thanks to the Brahman-consciousness

Modes like the ego (*ahamvṛtti*) as also emotions like desire, anger etc , are pervaded by the *cidābhāsa* just as a heated iron is pervaded by the fire.

The heated iron shows forth only itself and never anything else Similarly the *vṛttis* accompanied by *cidābhāsa* show forth only themselves]

7.2.3 Manifestation of Objects; Objections Answered

In the light of this, the objections voiced by the *Tattva-sudhā* in introducing this fourth stanza, are answered therein–

चैतन्यं तु स्वतोऽज्ञानाविरोध्यप्यन्तःकरणे प्रतिबिंबितं सत् तद्विरोधि। अत एव अन्तःकरणधर्मा रागादयः स्वसत्ताया सर्वदा भासन्ते । घटपटादि-विषयश्च बिंबचैतन्ये ब्रह्मण्येवाध्यस्तः तिष्ठति । अन्तःकरणेन चक्षुरादिद्वारा

विषयदेशं गच्छता घटाद्यधिष्ठानबिंबचैतन्यमुपाधीयते । तथाच एकोपाधिसंबन्धादन्तःकरणे प्रतिबिम्ब्यावस्थितेन साक्षिचैतन्येन घटाद्यधिष्ठानचैतन्यमेकीभवति । ततस्साक्षिचैतन्येन तदज्ञाने निवृत्ते घटादिविषयो भासते न सर्वदा । अतोऽज्ञानावरणभङ्गार्थं चक्षुराद्यपेक्षेति न कोऽपि दोषः ।

[Consciousness, however, though by Itself is not opposed to ajñāna, is opposed to it as being reflected in the *antahkarana* Hence it is that the qualities viz, modes of the *antahkarana* like attachment etc, show up whenever they exist, and the objects like pot, cloth etc, stand superimposed on Brahman, the prototype Itself. The prototype-Consciousness, the Substratum of the pot etc., is delimited by the *antahkarana* which goes out through the eyes etc, and pervades the object Thus by virtue of association with one delimiting adjunct, the Consciousness that is the Substratum of the pot etc, becomes one with the Witness-consciousness that is reflected in the *antahkarana.* When ajñāna in respect of an object like pot etc, is dispelled by the Witness-consciousness, it is only then that the object manifests, and not always Therefore eyes etc, are necessary for removal of ajñāna that is the obscuration; thus there is no inconsistency]

7.2.4 Self-effulgent Transcendental Atman, Impeller of Perception etc., by mere presence; Maya

In summary the Vedāntic position is this—As the *Kenopanisad*—

न तत्र चक्षुर्गच्छति न वाग्गच्छति ... श्रोत्रस्य श्रोत्रं मनसो मनो .... यद्वाचानभ्युदितं येन वागभ्युद्यते ... as also the Śruti—बुद्धेस्साक्षी मनसस्साक्षी सर्वस्य साक्षी ।

etc, point out, Ātman cannot be perceived by the eyes etc., but it is due to Ātman that the senses are able to perceive their respective objects. It does not come within the range of speech etc, but speech etc, are always able to function on account of Ātman. It impels *prāna*, enkindles

the body, senses, mind and intellect. Such is Ātman—pure, self-evident, one without a second, free from fear and of the nature of Consciousness, Existence and Bliss. Says the *Svārājyasiddhi* (3–9)—

यन्नेक्ष्य चक्षुराद्यैः प्रतिविषयममी येन सन्धुक्षितार्थाः
यद्वागादेः पदं न व्यवहरति मुहुर्येन वागादिवर्गः ।
येन प्राणः प्रणीतस्तनुकरणमनोबुद्धयो येन चेष्टाः
तच्छुद्धं स्वेन सिद्धं निरुभयमभय बोधसत्सौख्यमात्मा ॥

Thus the unique feature of the Vedāntic view is this—though in Itself the Supreme Self transcends all activity, as associated with Māyā, It is as if the impeller of all activity by mere presence. So says the *Sūtrabhāsya* (2–2–1–7)—

परमात्मनस्तु स्वरूपव्यपाश्रयमौदासीन्य मायाव्यपाश्रयं च प्रवर्तकत्वमित्यस्त्यतिशयः ।

What Śrī Sureśvarācāryapāda has said holds good equally well here—(Br. Vā. 1–4–1279)—

अक्षमा भवतः केयं साधकत्वप्रकल्पने ।
किं न पश्यसि संसारं तत्रैवाज्ञानकल्पितम् ॥

[Why is this reluctance on your part to attribute the causehood of all this to Māyā, or Ajñāna? Do you not see the *samsāra* concocted in Ātman Itself by Ajñāna?]

As pointed out previously, the *Pañcadaśī* (VI–236) says—

मायाख्यायाः कामधेनोर्वत्सौ जीवेश्वरावुभौ ।
यथेच्छ पिबतां द्वैतं तत्त्वं त्वद्वैतमेव हि ॥

[Īśvara and jīva are the two calves of the celestial cow viz., Māyā; one may drink the milk of duality to one's satisfaction; but the Truth is verily non-duality alone.]

In this manner, the explanation of the empirical experiences pertaining to the senses, the mind etc., which

defies accommodation in all other systems, becomes feasible in the Vedāntic system, without, in any way, impairing the transcendental glory of the Supreme Self.

The *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha* (1–1) quoted already proceeds therefore to say—

अत्रोच्यते—सत्यमेवमन्यत्र ; वेदान्तिमते तु कथञ्चित् संभवति ।

The *Pratyaktattvacintāmaṇi* (5–35 to 43) also gives—

अत्रोच्यते समीचीन त्वया प्रोक्तं मत मम ।
प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थायाः सर्ववादिष्वसभवः ॥

सा वेदान्तिमते सम्यक्संभवेद्व्यवहारतः ।
परमार्थदशायान्तु मास्तु सा तेन का क्षतिः ॥

तत्कथ श्रृणु वेदान्तसिद्धान्तमतमादरात् ।
नव शङ्काकलङ्कासंस्पृष्टं यदि विपर्ययम् ॥

अनिर्वाच्याऽविद्या सकलकलनाकारणतया
समावृत्यात्मान निरवधि चिदानन्दममृतम् ।
प्रपञ्चाकारेण प्रचुरगुणयुक्ता परिणता
प्रमात्राद्यध्यासं सृजति विमलेऽहङ्कृतितया ॥

अविद्याधिष्ठान प्रकृतिविकृतीशानमचलं
निरीह निर्द्वन्द्व सुखघनमबाध्यं समरसम् ।
परब्रह्माद्वैत जडजगदधिष्ठानवपुषा
प्रमात्राद्याकारैः स्फुरति विविधं व्यापृतिपदे ॥

तत्रात्मविद्याधिपतिर्महेशो मायां वशीकृत्य निजानुभूतिः ।
स्वतन्त्र आत्मस्थ उदारशक्तिर्ब्रह्मैव शुद्धं परमेश्वरोऽभूत् ॥
न तत्र मायाकृतदोष ईषत् स्वबोधतेजोऽनभिभूतधाम्नि ।
स्वीये महिम्नि स्थित एव सर्वं करोत्यकर्ताऽवति हन्त्यसङ्गः ॥

अखण्डमद्वैतमसङ्गमच्छं ब्रह्माप्यविद्यावृतभावतस्तत् ।
अनाद्यनिर्वाच्यमनन्तदुःखं जीवत्वमाश्रित्य भवं प्रयाति ॥

चैतन्यमेवानुगतं विशुद्धं सामान्यमेकं ह्युभयत्र वस्तु ।
उपाधिभेदेन विभाग इत्थं जीवोऽयमीशोऽयमिदं जगच्च ॥

7.2.5 Third Line of the Stanza

It is clear therefore that the objects of the world are to be regarded as deriving, as it were, their existence and shine from elsewhere. This stanza of the hymn shows, by the use of the expression जानामि in the line जानामीति तमेव भान्तमनुभात्येतत्समस्तं जगत् in the manner explained, that the existence and shine must be traced to the *Sākṣī* who is none other than Īśvara of the nature of Self-effulgence that never wanes अनन्याधीनालुप्तप्रकाशस्वरूपम्, as the *Mānsollāsaṭīkā* says. The expression अनुभाति is rendered by the *ṭīkā* as तमेव भान्तमनुसृत्य एतत्समस्तं जगद्भाति, न स्वतः. This follow-up shine on the part of the objects is not to be traced to the inherent shine in them, but to the Shine of the Substratum, the *Sākṣī* on which they are superimposed. The experience 'the pot shines' is to be understood in the manner of the experience 'the iron ball burns', as brought out by the *Tattvasudhā*—

घटादिकमहं जानामीति घटादिविषयसंबद्धतया भान्तं प्रकाशमानं तमेव साक्षित्वेनावस्थितं परमेश्वरमेव अनु पश्चात् एतत् विविधशब्दप्रत्ययगम्यं समस्तं सर्वं जगत् भाति प्रकाशते । अनुभानमपि न तस्य स्वतः, किन्तु अग्निं दहन्तमयोऽनुदहति इतिवत् अध्यासादेवेत्यर्थः ।

The *Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāsya* (2–1) says—

आत्मनः स्वरूपं ज्ञप्तिर्न ततो व्यतिरिच्यते । अतो नित्यैव । तथापि बुद्धेरुपाधिलक्षणायाश्चक्षुरादिद्वारैर्विषयाकारेण परिणामिन्या ये शब्दाद्याकारावभासाः ते आत्मविज्ञानस्य विषयभूता उत्पद्यमाना एव आत्मविज्ञानेन व्याप्ता

उत्पद्यन्ते । तस्मादात्मविज्ञानावभास्याश्च ते विज्ञानशब्दवाच्याश्च धात्वर्थभूता आत्मन एव धर्मा विक्रियारूपा इत्यविवेकिभिः परिकल्प्यन्ते ।

[Consciousness is the very nature of Ātman It is not distinct from Ātman, and It is therefore eternal Nevertheless, the transformations, in the form of sound etc , of the intellect which is an *upādhi* of Ātman, and which passing through the eye and other sense organs, puts on the forms of the sense objects, are objects of consciousness that is Ātman , and whenever they arise they become permeated by this Consciousness; and it is these transformations of the intellect—illumined by this Consciousness that is Ātman and spoken of as Consciousness Itself—which constitute the meaning of the root '*jña*' (to know) and are imagined, by the indiscriminating, to be inherent attributes (*dharmas*) changing every now and then, of Ātman Himself]

Says the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya* (5–4–2)—

यासौ लौकिकी दृष्टिश्चक्षुर्द्वारा रूपोपरक्ता जायमानैव नित्यया आत्मदृष्ट्या संसृष्टेव तत्प्रतिच्छाया तया व्याप्तैव जायते तथा विनश्यति च । तेनोपचर्यते द्रष्टा सदा पश्यन्नपि पश्यति न पश्यति चेति । न तु पुनर्द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेः कदाचिदप्यन्यथात्वम् । तथाच वक्ष्यति षष्ठे 'ध्यायतीव लेलायतीव', 'न हि द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते' इति च । तमिममर्थमाह—लौकिक्या दृष्टेः कर्मभूताया द्रष्टारं स्वकीयया नित्यया दृष्ट्या व्याप्तारं न पश्येः । यासौ लौकिकी दृष्टिः कर्मभूता सा रूपोपरक्ता रूपाभिव्यञ्जिका नात्मान स्वात्मनो व्याप्तारं प्रत्यञ्च व्याप्नोति ।

[The ordinary vision, however, is conditioned by the forms seen through the eye It appears to be connected with the eternal vision of Ātman and is but Its reflection, originates and ceases, pervaded by the Consciousness that is Ātman It is therefore that the eternal vision of Ātman is metaphorically spoken of as the witness, and although eternally seeing, is spoken of as sometimes seeing and sometimes not seeing. But as a matter of fact, the vision of the seer never undergoes any

change. So it will be said in the sixth chapter 'It thinks, as it were, and it moves, as it were', 'The vision of the Witness never ceases'. This is the meaning of the passage—you cannot see That which is the Witness of vision i.e , which pervades by Its eternal vision (i e , Itself), the act of ordinary vision. This latter which is an act, is conditioned by the form (of the objects seen) and reveals only the form of the object, but not the Inner Ātman that pervades this ordinary vision]

7.2.6 Development of Prakriya in Respect of Cognition

These *Bhāsyas* show the way for the development of *prakriyā* in respect of cognition. The *Svārājyasiddhi* (3–8) gives the *prakriyā* succinctly—

विषयाप्रबोधदलनाय संविदो विषयोपरागजननाय वा धियम् ।
विपयाकृतित्वमुपनेतुमिष्यते विषयाक्षयोगसरणिस्तनोर्बहिः ॥

[In order to remove the veiling with regard to an object or to forge the relationship of the *pramātrcaitanya* with the object i e., the *prameyacaitanya*, the *antahkarana* assumes the form of the object. Hence, the means for this viz., the contact of the senses with the object outside the body, has to be accepted]

The details of the *prakriyā* pertaining to the *pratikarma-vyavasthā* in its various shades are worked out in the *Vivarana-prameyasangraha*, the *Siddhāntaleśasangraha*, the *Advaitasiddhi* etc. The account given in the *Siddhāntabindu* (1) is—

ननु भवत्वविद्यावशाज्जीवेश्वरविभागव्यवस्था । मानमेयादिप्रतिकर्मव्यवस्था तु कथमिति चेत्, उच्यते । दृश्यत्वाज्जडत्वाद्विनाशित्वाच्च परिच्छिन्नाप्यविद्या अनिर्वचनीयत्वेन विचारासहा आवरणविक्षेपशक्तिद्वयवती सर्वगतं चिदात्मान-मावृणोति अङ्गुलिरिव नयनसन्निहिता सूर्यमण्डलम् । तत्र चक्षुप एवावरणे अङ्गुलेरप्यभानप्रसङ्गात्, अधिष्ठानावरणमन्तरेण विक्षेपानुपपत्तेश्च । ततः सा पूर्वपूर्वसंस्कारजीवकर्मप्रयुक्ता सती निखिलजगदाकारेण परिणमते । सा च स्वगतचिदाभासद्वारा चित्तादात्म्यापन्नेति तत्कार्यमपि सर्वमाभासद्वारा चिदनु-

स्यूतमेव । तथाच चैतन्यस्य दीपवत्स्वसंबद्धसर्वभासकत्वात् जगदुपादानचैतन्यं प्रमाणापेक्षामन्तरेणैव सर्वदा सर्वं भासयत् सर्वज्ञ भवति । तेन तत्र न मानमेयादिव्यवस्था, किन्तु जीवे । तस्य बुद्ध्यवच्छिन्नत्वेन परिच्छिन्नत्वात् । तेन चिदभिव्यक्तियोग्येन येनान्तःकरणेन यदा यत्संबद्ध भवति तदेव तदा तदवच्छिन्नो जीवोऽनुभवतीति न साङ्कर्यप्रसङ्गः । एवमत्र प्रक्रिया । शरीरमध्ये स्थितः सर्वशरीरव्यापकः सत्त्वप्राधान्येन सूक्ष्मपञ्चभूतारब्धः अन्तःकरणाख्यः अविद्याविवर्तो दर्पणादिवदतिस्वच्छो नेत्रादिद्वारा निर्गत्य योग्यान् घटादीन् विषयान् व्याप्य तत्तदाकारो भवति द्रुतताम्रादिवत् । तस्य च सौरालोकादिवत् झटित्येव सङ्कोचविकासावुपपद्येते । स च सावयवत्वात् परिणममानो देहाभ्यन्तरे घटादौ च सम्यग्व्याप्य देहघटयोर्मध्येऽपि चक्षुर्वदविच्छिन्नोऽप्यवतिष्ठते । तत्र देहेऽन्तःकरणभागोऽहङ्काराख्यः कर्तेत्युच्यते । देहविषयमध्यवृत्तिदण्डायमानस्तद्भागो वृत्तिज्ञानाख्यः क्रियेत्युच्यते । विषयव्यापकस्तद्भागो विषयस्य ज्ञानकर्मत्वसपादकमभिव्यक्तियोग्यत्वमित्युच्यते । तस्य च त्रिभागस्यान्तःकरणस्यातिस्वच्छत्वात् चैतन्यं तत्राभिव्यज्यते । तस्य चाभिव्यक्तस्य चैतन्यस्य एकत्वेऽप्यभिव्यञ्जकान्तःकरणभागभेदात् त्रिधा व्यपदेशो भवति । कर्तृभागावच्छिन्नचिदशः प्रमाता । क्रियाभागावच्छिन्नचिदशः प्रमाणम् । विषयगतोऽभिव्यक्तियोग्यत्वभागावच्छिन्नचिदशः प्रमितिरिति । प्रमेयन्तु विषयगतं ब्रह्मचैतन्यमेव अज्ञातम् । तदेव च ज्ञातं सत् फलम् । अत्र च यस्मिन् पक्षेऽन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नो जीवः यस्मिश्च पक्षे सर्वगतोऽसङ्गोऽविद्याप्रतिबिम्बो जीवः तत्रोभयत्रापि प्रमातृचैतन्योपरागार्था विषयगतचैतन्यावरणभङ्गार्था चान्तःकरणवृत्तिः । यस्मिश्च पक्षेऽविद्यावच्छिन्नः सर्वगतो जीव आवृतः, तस्मिन् पक्षे जीवस्यैव जगदुपादानत्वेन सर्वसंबद्धत्वात् आवरणभङ्गार्था वृत्तिरिति विवेकः ।

[Now the hypothesis of Avidyā with its powers may well serve to systematize the distinction in respect of jīva and Īśvara, but how about the empirical classification into the means of cognition, the object of cognition etc, i e, the *pratikarma-vyavasthā* viz, that at a particular time an individual cognises a

particular thing only? The answer is this—Though Avidyā as an object of perception, inert and perishable, is delimited, being indescribable it does not brook enquiry; and it is possessed of the two-fold power of concealing and diversifying, still it conceals the All-pervasive Ātman, the Consciousness, just as a finger placed in front of the eye covers the large solar orb. If in the illustration the eye alone is believed to have been covered, there would be the possibility of even the finger not being perceived Also, it is a general rule that illusion is not possible unless the substratum is concealed. Thereafter, the Avidyā being propelled by the actions of the individuals in each previous birth, lying dormant in the form of impressions, becomes transformed into the whole universe. This Avidyā having acquired an identity with the Consciousness through Its semblance, *cidābhāsa*, all its products become necessarily permeated by the Consciousness through *cidābhāsa*. On that happening, the Consciousness which is the material cause of the universe making everything manifest at all times even without standing in need of any *pramāna*, would be omniscient because the Consciousness, like a lamp, manifests everything connected with It. Thus in this case, the question of classification into the means of cognition, the object of cognition etc., does not arise. But such a classification becomes indispensable in the case of a jīva, because, owing to the limiting adjunct viz., the *buddhi*, the jīva is delimited. Therefore, at a particular time, only that particular object with which a particular *antahkarana*, as possessed of the capability of manifesting Consciousness, comes into contact, is directly cognised by the particular jīva limited by that particular *antahkarana*. Thus there is no possibility of any admixture of the cognitions pertaining to various objects as also various jīvas.

The modus operandi in this case is this—A modification of Avidyā called the *antahkarana*, residing in the body and pervading it throughout, is a product of the five subtle elements, with the *sattvaguna* predominant, and is pellucid like a mirror. This *antahkarana* having gone out of the body through the eyes etc.,

वाचस्पतिमिश्रमते तु अविद्यावच्छिन्न' सर्वगतो जीवः स्वाश्रिताविद्यया स्वस्मिन्नेव स्वरूपविशेषावरणपूर्वक प्रपञ्च कल्पयति । तथाच जीवस्याविद्यक-वस्तुतादात्म्यं सर्वदैवास्तीति न संबन्धार्था वृत्तिरपेक्ष्यते । किन्तु केवलमावरण-भङ्गायैवेति ।

What is sought to be driven home is this—The revealer of an object is, as a rule, *Adhiṣṭhānacaitanya* of the object—प्रकाशकं तावदधिष्ठानचिदेव (*Advaitasiddhi* — 1–30), साक्षिचित्प्रकाशिका (*Laghucandrikā* on the above)—in accordance with the Śruti—तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वम् i e., the universe shines by the Light of Him alone, Who, being Effulgence Itself, shines by Himself. As the Substratum of Avidyā, the *Adhiṣṭhānacaitanya* is the material cause of the object on which the object is superimposed by the relationship of illusory identification—*ādhyāsikatādātmya* Such identification regulates the revelation of the object by Consciousness that is the Substratum. This Substratum-consciousness, the *Adhiṣṭhānacaitanya*, reveals Itself as also the object superimposed on It In this way the objects always stand revealed to their Substratum-consciousness

If the *Adhiṣṭhānacaitanya* be the revealer of objects, the question is, how can the cogniser, the *pramātr* viz , the jīva know objects? In other words, how can the cogniser who is apparently distinct from the *Adhiṣṭhānacaitanya* reveal the object? The answer is that an object may be revealed to the cognising jīva when this cognising Consciousness merges its identity in the *Adhiṣṭhānacaitanya* which reveals the object This identity with the revealed *Adhiṣṭhānacaitanya* follows in all cases of the removal of ignorance of jīva with regard to some object, which is brought about by the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*. Thus, in revelation, in general, there has to be an *antaḥkarana-vṛtti* But the experience घटः स्फुरति (the pot shines) as

distinct from the experience घटमहं जानामि (I know the pot) shows that the revealing Consciousness, the *Adhiṣṭhānacaitanya* of the pot, is different from the *vṛtti* which operates in the revelation of the pot. Hence the *vṛtti* cannot be regarded as the revealer of the object.

The functions of the *vṛtti*, however, are delineated variously depending upon the conception of the jīva and his relation with the *Adhiṣṭhānacaitanya*. As mentioned already, that transformation of *Avidyā* which resides in the body and is called the *antaḥkarana*, goes out through the channel of the eyes etc., pervades suitable objects like the pot and becomes of their respective forms This is compared to the water flowing from the river to the fields through channels and assuming the forms of the respective fields Broadly speaking, the cognising jīva is conceived of in two ways. In one view, jīva is delimited by *antaḥkarana* and the *Adhiṣṭhānacaitanya* of objects is Brahman. The cognisership, *pramātṛtva*, in this case is attributed to the Consciousness with the vesture that is the *antahkaraṇa* with the additional feature of *vṛtti* Now in order that an object which is always revealed to the *Adhisthānacaitanya* be revealed to jīva, jīva has to make itself identified with the *Adhiṣṭhānacaitanya* The function of the *antahkaranavṛtti* here is to forge this identification If, however, mere identification between *visayacaitanya* and *pramātṛcaitanya* be enough for revelation of objects, then the objects should have been always revealed to jīva which as *Caitanya* is fundamentally identical with Brahman Therefore it must be admitted that the *vṛtti* apart from forging an identity between the *viṣayacaitanya* and the *pramātṛcaitanya* destroys the ignorance veiling the jīva with regard to the objects to be revealed by the *vṛtti*.

In the second view, jīva has Avidyā as the delimiting adjunct, *avacchedaka*, and as such, being all-pervasive is basically identical with the *Adhiṣṭhānacaitanya* of objects. This second view again has two developments. The first of these, as entertained by the authors of the *Vārtika*, the *Vivarana* and the *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka*, considers jīva as unrelated by nature to objects, '*asaṅga*' (i.e., *ghaṭāditādātmya-śūnya*), and not covered by *Avidyā*, though all-pervasive. Identity with the *Adhiṣṭhānacaitanya* of objects makes jīva connected with the physical objects only in a very general way. But being '*asaṅga*' (i.e., not connected with objects other than Avidyā, *antaḥkarana* and its *vṛttis*), jīva lacks special contact with the objects, necessary for their revelation to the cognising jīva. The reason is that jīva is not in this case the material cause of the universe. The physical objects are therefore, not superimposed on jīva. The function of *vṛtti* here also is to destroy the ignorance of the jīva with regard to that particular object The other function of *vṛtti* may be summed up as follows—*vṛtti* qualifies the otherwise '*asanga*' *jīva* with a capacity of revealing the objects. Śrī Madhusūdanasarasvatipāda in this context draws up an analogy from the old school of Naiyāyikas. According to this school, all objects have general relationship with universals like cowhood, but only the object marked by *sāsnādi* (i.e., dewlap etc ,) reveals cowhood, and not other objects like lions etc. Even so the omnipresent *jīva* associates with the *antaḥkaraṇa* with its *vṛttis*, not with anything else. The illustration is also given of the radiance of the lamp which, though pervasive of sky, odour, taste etc., in addition to colour, manifests colour alone to the exclusion of the rest. Thus there is the requirement of the *antaḥkarana* with its *vṛtti* for the sake of bringing about the association of jīva-

caitanya with objects. Again just as fire as unmanifest which is incapable of burning even a blade of grass, burns when it is associated with a ball of iron, even so the *jīva-caitanya* though unable to manifest objects, does so when it is associated with the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*. Thus in these two views Brahman is the material cause of the illusory universe set up by Avidyā and the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* performs the two-fold function viz., forging of a connection of the *Adhiṣṭhāna-caitanya* of the objects with the *jīvacaitanya* and removing the ignorance veiling the jīva, with regard to the objects.

In the second of these developments put forward by Śrī Vācaspatimiśra, jīva, the Consciousness delimited by Avidyā of which he is the support (*āśraya*), is omnipresent and is the material cause of his universe concocted by him because of the concealment of his essential nature that is Brahman. In this case jīva as the *Adhiṣṭhānacaitanya* has always the relationship of illusory identification with the objects (and is not '*asaṅga*' as in the first development), and no *vṛtti* is necessary for forging this connection of jīva with the objects. The function of the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*, however, is only in the removal of the ignorance veiling the jīva, with regard to its objects i e., in destroying the veil over the *prameyacaitanya* which then manifests itself along with the *avacchedaka* delimiting it i.e , the objects. By way of refuting the objection that the world, being a superimposition, is on a par with the objects of apparent reality like the shell-silver etc., and as such no accommodation can be found for *pratikarmavyavasthā* in the Vedāntic scheme, the *Advaitasiddhi* (1-30) points out that though a superimposition on the Consciousness, the present case is a different one, since the objects are deemed to have been concocted as existing prior to the advent of *vṛtti* and puts the situation in a nutshell—

ननु—विश्वस्याध्यासिकत्वे प्रातिभासिकस्थल इव विषयेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाधीनायाः प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थाया अनुपपत्तिरिति—चेन्न ; वृत्तेः पूर्वमेव घटादीनां चैतन्येऽध्यासेन प्रातिभासिकस्थलापेक्षया वैलक्षण्यात् । तथाहि—अन्तःकरणम् अक्षुर्वैत्तेजोऽवयवि । तच्चेन्द्रियद्वारेण तत्संयुक्तं विषयं व्याप्य तदाकारं भवति । यथा नद्याद्युदकं प्रणाड्या निःसृत्य केदाराद्याकारं भवति । सैव वृत्तिरित्युच्यते । तत्र जीवचैतन्यमविद्योपाधिकं सत् सर्वगतम्, अन्तःकरणोपाधिकं सत् परिच्छिन्नमिति मतद्वयम् । तत्राद्ये विषयप्रकाशकं जीवचैतन्यम् । द्वितीये ब्रह्मचैतन्यम् । आद्ये पक्षेऽपि जीवचैतन्यमविद्यानावृतमावृतं च । तत्राद्ये वृत्तिर्जीवचैतन्यस्य विषयोपरागार्था । द्वितीये त्वावरणाभिभवार्था । परिच्छिन्नत्वपक्षे तु जीवचैतन्यस्य विषयप्रकाशकतदधिष्ठानचैतन्याभेदाभिव्यक्त्यर्था । अनावृतत्वपक्षे ह्यनावृतं सर्वगतमपि जीवचैतन्यं तत्तदाकारवृत्त्यैवोपरज्यते, न तु विषयैः ; असङ्गत्वात्, यथा गोत्वं सर्वगतमपि सास्नादिमद्व्यक्त्याऽभिव्यज्यते, न तु केसरादिमद्व्यक्त्या ; यथा वा प्रदीपप्रभा आकाशगन्धरसादिव्यापिन्यपि तान्न प्रकाशयन्ती रूपसंसर्गितया रूपमेव प्रकाशयति तद्वत् ; केवलाग्न्यदाह्यस्यापि अयःपिण्डादिसमारूढाग्निदाह्यत्ववच्च केवलचैतन्याप्रकाश्यस्यापि घटादेस्तत्तदाकारवृत्त्युपारूढचैतन्यप्रकाश्यत्वं युक्तम् । एवञ्चानावृतत्वपक्षे तत्तदाकारवृत्तिद्वारा चैतन्यस्य तत्तदुपरागे तत्तदर्थप्रकाशः । आवृतत्वपक्षे तत्तदाकारवृत्त्या तत्तद्विषयावच्छिन्नचैतन्यावरणाभिभवेन तत्तदर्थप्रकाशः । अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नचैतन्यरूपत्वे जीवस्यावच्छेदकान्तःकरणतत्तद्विषयाकारवृत्त्या तत्तद्विषयावच्छिन्नचैतन्याभिव्यक्तौ तत्तत्प्रकाशः । यद्यपि प्रकाशकमधिष्ठानचैतन्यं सर्वगतम्, जीवचैतन्यं चान्तःकरणावच्छिन्नम् ; तथापि चैतन्याभेदेनाभिव्यक्तत्वात् व्यवस्थोपपत्तिः ।

7.2.8 Pramatruchaitanya, Pramanachaitanya, Prameyachaitanya

Here the *Siddhāntabindu* (1) raises some objections and answers them—

ननु चिदुपरागार्था वृत्तिरिति पक्षे स्वतोऽन्तःकरणसम्बद्धाना धर्माधर्मादीनां ब्रह्मणश्च वृत्तिमन्तरेणैव सर्वदा भानं स्यात् । न स्यात् । चैतन्यस्य

तत्तदाकारत्वाभावात् । तदभावश्च स्वच्छेऽपि ब्रह्मचैतन्य आवरणात् । अनावृतेऽपि शुक्तिरजतादावस्वच्छत्वात् । धर्माधर्मादौ तु अस्वच्छत्वादावृतत्वाद्वा । तेन स्वच्छेऽप्यावृते प्रमाणवृत्त्या तदाकारता । अनावृतेऽप्यस्वच्छे शुक्तिरजतादौ अविद्यावृत्त्या तदाकारता । अनावृते स्वच्छे तु सुखदुःखादौ स्वत इति नान्तःकरणसंबन्धमात्रेण भानप्रसङ्गः । ननु ब्रह्मणः कथमावरणम्, निरवद्य-स्वप्रकाशत्वेन सर्वज्ञत्वात् ? सत्यम् । स्वसंबद्धसर्वभासकतया सर्वज्ञमपि अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नजीवाज्ञानविषयतया आवृतमिति व्यपदेशात् । तस्मात् ब्रह्म जगदुपादानमिति पक्षे चिदुपरागार्था आवरणभङ्गार्था च वृत्तिः । जीवोपादानत्वपक्षे तु आवरणभङ्गार्थैवेति । नन्वेकेनैव घटादिज्ञानेनावरणस्य भङ्गे सद्योमोक्षप्रसङ्गः, अज्ञानस्यैकत्वात् । नानाज्ञानपक्षेऽप्येकस्य जीवस्यैका-ज्ञानोपाधित्वात् । न । उत्तेजकेन मणेरिव, वृत्त्या आवरणस्याभिभवाङ्गीकारात् । तथाच प्रमाणजन्यान्तःकरणवृत्त्यभावसहकृतमज्ञानं सति भात्यपि वस्तुनि नास्ति न भातीति प्रतीतिजननसमर्थमावरणमित्युच्यते । वृत्तौ जातायां तु अवच्छेदकाभावाद्विद्यमानमप्यविद्यमानसममेवेति न स्वकार्यसमर्थमज्ञानं तेनाभि-भूतमित्युच्यते ।

[Here an objection is raised—In the view that the function of the *antahkaranavrtti* is to forge a connection with the *pramātrcaitanya,* the jīva should always have the cognition of merit and demerit i.e , *dharma* and *adharma* and of Brahman, even without the intervention of the *vrtti* because they are themselves connected with the *antahkarana,* (for, as the *Nyāyaratnāvali* says—

ईशप्रसादकोपरूपधर्माधर्मयोरीशोपाधिमायापरिणामयोरपि तत्कारणयागादि-क्रियावन्मनोऽवच्छिन्नत्व स्वीक्रियते । तादृशमनोगतसुखादिजनकत्वादिति भावः ।

i.e., as the generators of happiness and misery obtaining in the *antahkarana, dharma* and *adharma* which are but favour and wrath of Īśvara and are the modification of Māyā, the *upādhi* of Īśvara, inhere in that portion of Māyā defined by the *antahkaraṇa* which partakes in the performance of sacrifices etc , as the *avacchedaka* of the jīva, the performer). Again Brahman, being

*

Omnipresent, has direct connection with the *pramātrcaitanya* as also its *upādhi*, the *antahkarana*

The reply is—In this view viz , *ciduparāgārthā vrtti*, only those objects are revealed to the cogniser, that are both pellucid, *svaccha,* and unobscured, *anāvrta* In this view, though Brahman, Supreme Effulgence, is necessarily perfectly pellucid, yet being covered by Avidyā, awaits the *vrtti* for the removal of the covering for being revealed In the case of shell-silver, though it is not covered, it is non-pellucid, being the transformation of the *tāmasic* aspect of Avidyâ pertaining to the shell Hence *vrtti* is necessary to make it pellucid In the case of *dharma* and *adharma* etc , which are non-pellucid and covered as well, the *vrtti* is required not only to make them pellucid, but also to break the veil of Avidyā over them (As a matter of fact, *dharma* and *adharma* are by their very nature unfit to become objects of direct cognition) Thus the *pramātrcaitanya* assumes the form of the *prameyacaitanya* (a) in the case of an object which is pellucid but covered, by means of the *vrtti* generated by a *pramāna*, (b) in the case of an object like shell-silver, which is unobscured but non-pellucid, by means of *avidyāvrtti* and (c) by itself i e , automatically in the case of pleasure and pain, the modes of the *antahkarana*, that are both pellucid and uncovered (which are directly cognised by the *Sākṣī*). Hence there is no possibility of cognition merely on account of there being some connection whatsoever with the *antahkarana*, other than the *vrtti*.

But how can Brahman which is Omniscient being Self-effulgent and without a blemish, be covered? True, It is Omniscient, being the Illuminator of everything related to It, nevertheless It is spoken of as covered because It becomes the object of ajñāna of the jīva who is delimited by *antahkarana.* Therefore in the view in which Brahman is the material cause of the universe, the aim of the *vrtti* is to forge a connection with the *pramātrcaitanya* and to remove the veil, while in the view in which the jīva is the material cause, the *vrtti* aims only at removing the veil

Now, an objection is raised—If the removal of the veil were to take place by one single cognition such as that of a pot etc., there would be the possibility of immediate liberation, because ajñāna is one only Even in the view that ajñānas are many, the result would be the same, owing to one jīva having one ajñāna as his *upādhi* The answer is—no. It is admitted that, just as a stimulating herb or incantation suppresses the subduing power of a jewel (which by its presence subdues the burning power of fire) so also does the *vrtti* suppress (for the time being) the obscuration due to ajñāna. That being so, it is ajñāna accompanied by the absence of the *antahkaranavrtti* generated by *pramāna*, which is capable of giving rise to the experience that a thing does not exist and does not shine though it does exist and does shine, that is spoken of as the veil. On the rise of the *vrtti*, however, ajñāna though in fact existing, is as good as not existing, owing to the absence of a limiting adjunct and is not able to do its work It is therefore spoken of as being suppressed (the adjunct here being the absence of the *antahkaranavrtti*)]

7.2.9 Functions of Antahkaranavritti—Other Viewpoints Refuted

Other viewpoints are also put forward to answer the same question The *vrtti* is useful in bringing about (1) suppression of Avidyā (2) sublation of *tūlājñāna* i.e., particular *ajñāna* (3) deflection of the particular state of Avidyā (4) partial dissipation or incapacitation of Avidyā (5) scattering away of Avidyā like a coward warrior (inasmuch as ajñāna is able to function only in the absence of *vrtti*) or (6) rolling up of Avidyā like a mat, as the *Advaitasiddhi* (1-30) says—

तस्मादविद्यायां सत्यामपि शक्त्यभिभवाद्वा, तूलाज्ञाननाशाद्वा, अवस्थाविशेषप्रच्यवाद्वा, एकदेशनाशाद्वा, भीरुभटवदपसरणाद्वा, कटवत् संवेष्टनाद्वा आवरणभङ्गानिर्मोक्षबाधानामुपपत्तिः ।

All the views noted above have the common conclu
that the *vrttıjñāna* does not destroy *mūlājñāna,* primor
ignorance, and therefore the question of the cognıs
liberation does not arıse The answer to the question
an ordinary *vṛttı* should reveal pure Consciousness, is that
antaḥkaraṇavṛttı assuming the form of an object can rem
Ajñāna pertaining to the *Adhıṣṭhānacaıtanya* of that partic
object alone; but ıt does not remove *mulājñāna* i.e.,
ajñāna regarding Brahman The superimposed worlc
sublated along with its material cause, *mūlājñāna,* only
the rise of *Akhandākāravrttı*

In this connection ıt may be pointed out that the
that even *Brahmajñāna* will not destroy but will c
suppress *mūlājñāna* need not be entertained because
enlightenment arising from the *Mahāvākyas* is not con
dictable unlike the knowledge arising through the empir
pramāṇas like perception etc., which knowledge is, in tru
not valid knowledge (*pramā*) at all but only illusory (*bhram*
Says the *Sıddhāntabındu* (1)—

नन्वेवं सति ब्रह्मज्ञानेनाप्यविद्याया अनिवृत्तेरनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गः।
तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यार्थज्ञानादविद्यानिवृत्त्यभ्युपगमात्। स्वविषयविषयकप्रम
नैवाविद्यानिवर्तकत्वात्। महावाक्यार्थज्ञानस्यैवाबाधितविषयतया प्रमात्वा
प्रत्यक्षादीनां तु बाधितविषयतया भ्रमत्वेऽपि व्यवहारसामर्थ्येन प्रामाण्या
मानात्। किञ्च ज्ञानादज्ञाननिवृत्तेरन्यत्रादर्शनमकिञ्चित्करम्। स्वानुभवसि
त्वात्, अन्यथानुपपत्तेश्च सर्वतो बलवत्वात्।

The testimony in respect of this is its own i e,
experience of the enlightened which can be seen for ones
as the *Bṛhadvārtıka* puts ıt—

उक्तेऽर्थे संशयश्चेत् स्यात् प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्या निरीक्षताम्।

Nor can ıt be understood ın any other way

Like the various views held in respect of *āvaraṇābhibhava* i.e., the suppression of the veiling with regard to the particular object, various views are held also in respect of *ciduparāga* i.e., in respect of forging of the relationship of the *prameyacaitanya* with the *pramātṛcaitanya* and in respect of *abhedābhivyakti* i.e., the manifestation of the identity of the *pramātṛcaitanya* with the *prameyacaitanya*. They are dealt with in detail delineating the role of the *cidābhāsa* or the *pratibimba* etc., in the classical treatises mentioned already.

Thus, broadly speaking, in general, depending on the conception of jīva, the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* has one or more of the three functions to perform—(1) *āvaraṇābhibhava* (2) *ciduparāga* and (3) *abhedābhivyakti*.

From all that has been said above, it may be concluded that the Vedānta recognises *vṛtti* as the necessary condition for the manifestation of all kinds of finite cognitions of the jīva (whether immediate or mediate).

7.2.10 Immediate and Mediate Cognitions

In respect of these two types of cognitions—immediate i.e., *aparokṣa* and mediate i.e., *parokṣa*—says the *Siddhānta-bindu* (1)—

द्विविधमावरणम् । एकमसत्त्वापादकमन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नसाक्षिचैतन्य-निष्ठम् । अन्यदभानापादक विषयावच्छिन्नब्रह्मचैतन्यनिष्ठम् । घटमहं न जानामीत्युभयावच्छेदानुभवात् । तत्राद्यं परोक्षापरोक्षसाधारणप्रमाणज्ञानमात्रेण निवर्तते । अनुमितेऽपि वह्न्यादौ नास्तीति प्रतीत्यनुदयात् । द्वितीयं तु साक्षात्कारेणैव निवर्तते । यदाश्रयं यदाकारं ज्ञानं तदाश्रयं तदाकारमज्ञानं नाशयतीति नियमात् । परोक्षज्ञानस्य स्थल इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाभावेन ज्ञानस्यान्तः-करणमात्राश्रयात् । अपरोक्षज्ञानस्यैव विषयव्यापारजन्यत्वेन विषयान्तःकरणो-भयजन्यत्वेन तदुभयनिष्ठत्वात् । तदुक्तम्—

परोक्षज्ञानतो नश्येदसत्त्वावृतिहेतुता ।
अपरोक्षधिया नश्येदभानावृतिहेतुता ॥

[The obscuration is of two sorts—one embracing the *pramātrcaitanya*, the *Sākṣī* as delimited by the *antahkarana* bringing about the obscuration of the existence of an object, the other embracing the *prameyacaitanya*, the Brahman-consciousness delimited by the object bringing about the non-perception of the object, because the obscuration is in experience in respect of both *(pramātṛcaitanya* and *prameyacaitanya)* e.g., in the cognition 'I do not know the pot' Out of these two, the former ceases to exist by some valid knowledge, direct or indirect, produced by a *pramāna* because no cognition of the nature of 'there is no fire' arises when once the existence of the fire is known even by inferential knowledge, but the latter obscuration is removed only on the perception of the object, the particular individual. The general rule is that knowledge as also the ignorance dispelled by it have the same locus and must pertain to the same form The indirect knowledge resides in the *antahkarana* (i.e., *prameyacaitanya)* as there is no contact of the sense organ and the object. It is only direct knowledge which is generated by the contact of the sense organ and the object, that resides in both the *antahkarana* and the object (i e , the *pramātrcaitanya* and the *prameyacaitanya)* So it is said—By mediate knowledge is destroyed the cause of the obscuration of the existence and by immediate experience is removed the other obscuration viz , the non-appearance].

The *paroksavrtti* ensures the knowledge 'the pot exists' घटोऽस्ति while the *aparoksavṛtti* ensures the knowledge 'the pot exists and it reveals itself to me'—घटः स्फुरति.

The *Advaitasiddhi* (1-30) says in respect of *paroksajñāna*—

परोक्षस्थले तु ... . प्रमातृप्रमाणचैतन्ययोरेकलोलीभावापत्त्या प्रमात्रवच्छिन्नमसत्त्वावरणमात्रं निवर्तते ।

[In the case of mediate cognition, only the two viz , the *pramātrcaitanya* and the *pramāṇacaitanya,* constitute one unit, and

thereby the ignorance pertaining only to the existence of the object, *prameya*, obscuring the *pramātṛ* is removed.]

7.2.11 The 'Fruit' Phala, Prama—Vrittivyapti, Phalavyapti

In respect of *aparokṣajñāna*, says the *Advaitasiddhi* (1-30)—

अत एवैकवृत्त्युपारूढत्वलक्षणैककलोलीभावापन्नं प्रमातृप्रमाणप्रमेयचैतन्यं भवति। ततः तदवच्छेदेनाज्ञाननिवृत्त्या भासमानं प्रमेयचैतन्यमपरोक्षं फल-मित्युच्यते।

[Thus all the three—the *pramātṛcaitanya*, the *pramāṇacaitanya* and the *prameyacaitanya*—pervading the same *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* constitute one unit; and the cognition revealing the *prameya-caitanya* arising on the removal of ignorance obscuring it is immediate perception, the fruit thereof]

The details in respect of these are delineated differently in the various *prakriyās* formulated depending on the conception of jīva etc. In the *ābhāsavāda*, for example, formulated by Śrī Śrī Sureśvarācāryapāda, the knownness of a pot means the generation of the fruit viz., the *cidābhāsa*, in that pot; it cannot be said that Brahman-consciousness is the fruit, for even prior to the perception of the object, It existed as pointed out by the *Pañcadaśī*—

ज्ञातत्वं नाम कुम्भेऽस्मिंश्चिदाभासफलोदयः।
न फलं ब्रह्मचैतन्यं मानात्प्रागपि सत्त्वतः॥ (VIII–10)

The *Pañcadaśī* quotes further the *Sambandhavārtika* (159, 160)—

परागर्थप्रमेयेषु या फलत्वेन संमता।
संवित् सैवेह मेयोऽर्थो वेदान्तोक्तिप्रमाणतः॥ (*Pañ.* VIII-11)

[The same Consciousness (*saṁvit*) which is accepted as the fruit in the case of the external objects when known through means of valid knowledge i.e. empirical *pramāṇas*, is itself what is to be known here (i [illegible] Vedāntic set-up) through the Vedāntic testimony [illegible] a.]

It may be noted that the same idea is expressed also in the *Sambandhavārtika* (230)—

अनात्मनि प्रमेयेऽर्थे या फलत्वेन संमता ।
प्रमेया सैव वेदान्तेष्वनुभूतिरिहात्मनः ॥

Apparently there seems to be a contradiction as the fruit, *phala*, that is spoken of refers to the *cidābhāsa* in the object, while the *samvit* or the *anubhūti* refers to the Brahman-consciousness The *Pañcadaśī* (VIII-12) resolves the contradiction by pointing out that the real intention of Śrī Śrī Vārtikakārapāda is to declare that the fruit is only similar to Brahman-consciousness (since the *cidābhāsa* resembles its prototype, the Brahman-consciousness). The distinction between the Brahman-consciousness and the reflection is declared in the *Upadeśasāhasrī*—

इति वार्तिककारेण चित्सादृश्य विवक्षितम् ।
ब्रह्मचित्फलयोर्भेदः साहस्रयां विश्रुतो यतः ॥

Śrī Śrī Vārtikakārapāda himself has pointed out in the *Bṛhad-vārtika* (3–4–128) that the *phala* as well as all other factors involved in the perceptual knowledge are only appearances—

ईदृगेव फल चात्र मानमेयादिक तथा ।
कुतो भेदावकाशः स्याददृयैकप्रमात्मनि ॥

The *Ānandagiriṭīkā* says—

ईदृगिति । रज्जुसर्पादिसदृशं काल्पनिकमिति यावत् । तथेति कल्पितत्वोक्ति । वस्तुतो विभागाभावे हेतुः —कुत इति ।

In summary, all the four necessary factors or phases of a perceptual cognition—the *pramātṛ*, the *prameya*, the *pramāṇa* and *phala*, the *pramā*, i.e , the subjective, the objective, the instrumental and the consequential—are appearances or only seeming aspects like the rope-snake etc., of the

Immediate, Self-effulgent, Aspectless, Indivisible, Non-dual Brahman-Ātman-consciousness which alone is basically the *pramā* — अनधिगताबाधितार्थविषयकज्ञानं (cognition having for content an entity that is not already known and is not sublated).

As has been made amply clear previously, on deeper analysis it is seen that it is the Self-effulgent Brahman-Ātman-consciousness alone that is veiled by ajñāna and not the objects which, as set up by ajñāna, are themselves ajñāna itself. As such, ajñāna pertains only to this Consciousness which alone is the *prameya* in the true sense of the word by revealing which the *pramānas* derive their *pramānahood.* Says the *Bṛhadvārtika* (3–4–292)—

प्रथते यः स्वयं साक्षादज्ञातत्वादिभूमिषु ।
स प्रमेयः स्वयंज्योतिः प्राक्प्रसिद्धेः प्रमातृतः ॥

Thus, these two terms *prameya* and *pramā* which denote in parlance the respective *cidābhāsas* along with the *Adhiṣṭhāna*, are indicators per accidence (*upalaksana*) of the underlying Reality, the Brahman-Ātman-consciousness, the *Adhiṣṭhāna* in which they are concocted; likewise are *pramātṛ* and *pramāṇa.* The *Svarūpa* of the *pramātṛcaitanya* is the Brahman-Ātman-consciousness which is realised through the *Mahāvākya.* In reality, this realisation itself is the only *pramā*, the *phala*, arising on the operation of the *pramāṇa.* Likewise, the *pramāna*—*pramākaraṇam*—the instrument of valid cognition, is in reality the Self-effulgence Itself i.e., the Brahman-Ātman-consciousness which illumines the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* endowing it with the capacity of revealing objects.

7.2.12 'Immediacy' Derived from Brahman-Atman

Thus from the standpoint of reality, Consciousness Itself may be regarded as *pratyakṣapramā*, as the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (1)

says—प्रत्यक्षप्रमा त्वत्र चैतन्यमेव. It is this Consciousness that is called perceptual knowledge when through the *vrtti* and the sense-contact the revelation of the object is brought about All perceptual knowledge refers to this Consciousness only which is One, undifferentiated and not engendered at all yet seems to originate and disappear by superimposition on It of the attributes of the *vrtti* which originates and disappears. This has misled even some philosophers to the wrong belief that the sense organs or the *antahkaranavrttis* illumine things and constitute the so-called perception The name 'knowledge' given to the *vrtti* is figurative only, because it determines knowledge but it does not constitute knowledge in reality. Says the *Vivarana*—

अन्तःकरणवृत्तौ ज्ञानत्वोपचारात् ।

That the *vrttivyāpti* and the *phalavyāpti* are thus to be distinguished and that the latter is of no consequence in the realisation of Brahman-Ātman has already been explained.

The most noteworthy characteristic of perception is its 'immediacy' and 'directness'. What is actually 'immediate' i.e., never 'mediate' i e., not obstructed from the cogniser, the *pramātrcaitanya,* in any sense whatsoever, is his very Self alone. Again, it is this experience of this Self alone that is 'direct' in the true sense of the word and not of *mithyātmā* like body etc., or the *gaunātmā* like son etc., as applied to which the notion of direct experience is only figurative. Pointing to this say the Śruti (Bṛ. U. 5–4–1)—

यत्साक्षादपरोक्षाद्ब्रह्म य आत्मा सर्वान्तरः

and the *Bhāsya* thereon—

यद्ब्रह्म साक्षादव्यवहित केनचिद्द्रष्टुरपरोक्षादगौणं न श्रोत्रब्रह्मादिवत् । किं तत् ? य आत्मा । आत्मशब्देन प्रत्यगात्मोच्यते । तत्रात्मशब्दस्य प्रसिद्धत्वात् । सर्वस्याभ्यन्तरः सर्वान्तरः । यद्यःशब्दाभ्यां प्रसिद्ध आत्मा ब्रह्मेति ।

[The word Brahman denoting the Absolute when employed anywhere else e.g., referring to the ear as Brahman, is employed only in a figurative sense. The words *'yat'* and *'yah'* indicate that Self familiar to all is identical with Brahman.]

The empirical object such as pot etc., is perceived and becomes immediate on the fulfilment of certain conditions e.g., the contact of the sense organ with the object, the arising of a *vṛtti* etc. This immediacy follows from the fact that in perceptual knowledge the non-difference of the *pramātṛcaitanya* from the *prameyacaitanya* is brought about through the *vṛtti*. So the immediacy of the perceptual knowledge is derived from Brahman-Ātman that is immediate and direct—*Sākṣādaparokṣa*. This identity manifested by the *vṛtti* serves as the indispensable factor of immediacy of an object. In other words the objective condition governing the immediacy of any present and perceivable object is that its existence should be identical with that of the apprehending Consciousness However, in the case of the immediacy of internal objects such as pleasure and pain which are regarded to be manifestable by the Witnessing Consciousness, neither the going out of the *vṛtti* nor any extraneous sense organ is needed. The service of the *vṛtti* in respect of any of its three functions mentioned is also not needed since the *vṛtti* and the object are not different.

Just as fire pervading an iron ball illumines it without depending on any extraneous light, the *cidābhāsa* pervading the *vṛttis* reveals them, as the *Pañcadaśī* (VIII–18, 19) says—

अहंवृत्तौ चिदाभासः कामक्रोधादिकासु च ।
संव्याप्य वर्तते तप्ते लोहे वह्निर्यथा तथा ॥

स्वमात्रं भासयेत् तप्तं लोहं नान्यत् कदाचन ।
एवमाभाससहिता वृत्तयः स्वस्वभासिकाः ॥

7.2.13 Internal Objects and Illusory Objects have no Ajnata-satta

The same fact of non-difference explains the perceptual character of the cognitions like 'I am happy', 'I am miserable' etc., Consciousness defined by happiness, misery etc., and the Consciousness defined by those respective *vrttis* being non-different; and hence the immediacy of perception of happiness or misery. Internal objects like happiness and misery have only *jñātasattā* i e., their cognition is co-eval with their production; the *vrtti* i e , *jñāna* and the *pramātṛ* which is non-different from the Consciousness, also have only *jñātasattā* while external objects have *ajñātasattā* also i.e., they exist and their cognition is brought about only on the advent of the *vrtti* The *Svārājyasiddhi* (3–7) brings out these—

अनावृतचिदभेद एव विषयेषु योग्यता, सैव वृत्तीनामापरोक्ष्ये प्रयोजिकेत्युक्तम् । तत्र चिदभेदः स्वाभाविकश्चिति, घटादिजडे तु विषयताख्यचित्तादात्म्यघटक आध्यासिक इत्यवान्तरवैलक्षण्येऽपि तादृशचिदभेदत्वेनैवोभयत्रापि वृत्तावापरोक्ष्यप्रयोजकत्वात् तस्या ऐकरूप्यमेव । आपरोक्ष्यं तु मुख्यं चैतन्यस्यैव । ज्ञातृज्ञानज्ञेयेषु तु अपरोक्षचित्सवलनाद्विमर्शे गौणम् । तथाच बाह्यवस्तुषु अपरोक्षचित्सवन्धाय करणजन्यवृत्त्यपेक्षायामान्तरे ब्रह्मणि वाक्योत्थवृत्त्यैवाज्ञाननिवृत्तिसंभवान्नास्त्येव करणापेक्षेत्याह चैतन्यस्येति ।

चैतन्यस्यापरोक्ष्यं स्वरसनिजदृशो मुख्यमन्याऽनपेक्ष
गौण तद्गोचरेष्वावरणविरहिते तत्र तादात्म्यवत्सु ।
बाह्ये चैतन्ययोगं घटयितुमुचिता वृत्तिरक्षप्रसूता
वाक्योत्था मोहमात्र विघटयति चितस्स्फूर्तिरन्यानपेक्षा ॥

[The direct perception of the Self-effulgent *Ātmacaitanya* is absolutely independent of anything else, and as such is primary. The notion of directness of cognition as pertaining to the *jñātr*, the knower, *vrttijñāna*, the knowledge, and *jñeya*, the entity that is known, which are the objects of cognition of Self (as unobscured i.e., the Witness-self) is but secondary because it is conditional on their being identified with *Ātmacaitanya*. While this identification is perforce there in the case of internal objects like happiness, misery etc., in the case of external objects, however, the service of *vrtti* generated by the senses is necessary to bring about the required contact of *pramātrcaitanya* with the objects. But the effulgence of *Ātmacaitanya* as manifest in the *Akhandākāravrtti* arising from the *Mahāvākya* i.e., the plenary experience, destroys all ignorance, in accomplishing which it is not in need of anything else. Thus the services of the *cidābhāsa* are not necessary in this case, नाभास उपयुज्यते, as already shown, while the services of the *vrtti* are not necessary to bring about identification in the case of cognition of internal objects.]

It may also be mentioned that in the case of the so-called direct perception of illusory objects like shell-silver, it is Avidyā that transforms itself as the object and co-eval with it as the *avidyāvrtti* which is instrumental in generating its knowledge. The illusory objects have no *ajñātasattā*.

The immediacy of the perception of empirical objects which is temporal and occasioned by certain circumstances, necessarily presupposes a primordial 'immediacy' which is not engendered at all. The essential condition of every perceptual knowledge is that the three Consciousnesses—*jñātr*, *jñāna* and *jñeya*—should constitute one unit for the time being. The immediacy stems from this identity; and the distinctions are due to limitations only.

The discussion on the direct perception pertaining to the case of vision through the eye is illustrative, in the main, of

perception through the other senses as well. The immediacy in the direct perception of objects that are outside stems from the identification of the *prameyacaitanya* with the *pramātṛcaitanya* A modicum of the difference between the two is retained, as it were, because of the respective *upādhis*. The *prameya*, however, has no existence that is different from that of the *pramātṛ*— प्रमातृसत्तातिरिक्तसत्ताभावः.

Fundamentally, it is the Consciousness alone that is the primordial 'Immediacy' and this is one's own *Svarūpa*, Self

Insofar as the said identity manifests in the *prameya-caitanya*, the latter is apprehended as immediate. In internal perception such as that relating to happiness and misery as also the experience of the *Svarūpa* of the *Sākṣī*, the conditioning factors are there only as pointing to the Consciousness which directly illumines them in the former case and is Itself in the latter case and the immediacy is experienced without an extra *vṛtti* etc. In a similar manner, the immediacy in respect of internal perception and perceptual illusions and the immediacy of even those that are regarded as known or unknown सर्वं ज्ञाततया अज्ञाततया वा साक्षिभास्यम् and also of ajñāna is thus to be traced to the Immediacy that is the Consciousness.

7.2.14 Enquiry into Pratikarmavyavastha culminates in Brahmatmajnana

With the dawn of the plenary experience, the *mūlājñāna* is dispelled and the Immediacy that is the Consciousness stands out in Its sublime form. The immediacy of the experience pertaining to outside objects where identification is brought about, as it were, and the experiences pertaining to *Sākṣī* where there is only *jñātasattā* as also that in deep

sleep, in which case identity is already there, as it were, are thus manifestations of the real identity experienced in the *Akhaṇḍākāravṛtti*. This means that the abolition of the duality of the knower and the known, forms the real basis of all perception. This suggests that it is the plenary experience that forms the real basis of all perception and that every perceptual experience shorn (*bādhita*) of the incidental factors would be found to culminate in the plenary experience—ब्रह्मविद्या सर्वविद्याप्रतिष्ठा.

In the manner सविता प्रकाशते the Consciousness that shines by Its own Self-effulgence is the same in all cases of direct immediate experience, actual or figurative, and remains the Substratum of all superimpositions. When any other entity is brought into Its fold, as it were, by superimposition by Māyā, Consciousness is said to illuminate that entity in the manner सविता प्रकाशयति. It is also said to know that entity where the *antaḥkarana* is brought in by superimposition along with the rest to perform the function of the intermediary. Its *vṛtti* as conjoined with the Shine of Consciousness is spoken of as jñāna, as has been seen. Thus all that is associated with jñāna like immediacy in perception, self-luminous nature, the intrinsic generation, cognition of its validity etc., are all to be traced to the underlying Consciousness which possesses these characteristics intrinsically and absolutely. The departure from these features in any situation is to be traced to the conditioning factors, and basically Avidyā. So also in respect of *nirvikalpakapratyakṣa* (the presentation of only the entity without distinction of any sort whatever) and *savikalpakapratyakṣa* (presentation with distinctions of substance, attributes etc.). The experience of the whole [illegible] ...ṇḍākāravṛtti is the basic *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* [illegible] ...he so-called *savikalpakapratyakṣa*,

has been explained already, the actual experience is of the *Sattā* and the *Bhāna* of the Substratum, the Consciousness. Also, it has been made clear already that in the case of every *pramāna*, it is only *Anubhava* (Consciousness) which alone is liable to be obscured, that is revealed Thus in all cases the basic experience is that of the Consciousness that is *nirvikalpaka*, all else being due to Avidyā and its products. This basic *nirvikalpaka* experience is what is secured through the *Mahāvākya*

All this has been brought home in the light of the *ābhāsavādaprakriyā* as formulated by Śrī Śrī Sureśvarācārya-pāda Śrī Śrī Vidyāraṇyacarana has in the main followed this in the chapter *Kūṭasthadīpa* in the *Pañcadaśī* and shows how the formulation leads to the realisation of the Brahman-Ātman-consciousness, by taking also the case of *sandhi*, the interval between two *vrttis* etc. The other *prakriyās* referred to already such as the *pratibimbavāda* and the *avacchedavāda*, though seemingly different, serve the same purpose. This is also referred to in the *Kūṭasthadīpa* towards the end where the *Brhadvārtika* (1–4–402) cited already has been alluded to—

यया यया भवेत्पुसा व्युत्पत्तिः प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
सा सैव प्रक्रियेह स्यात् साध्वी सा चानवस्थिता ॥

[In whatever way the enlightenment pertaining to the Inner Self arises in the seekers, that method itself is appropriate here, hence there is no absolute fixity about it.]

Introducing the *Svārājyasiddhi* (3–9) already cited, the *ṭīkā* says—

प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थास्मारितसर्वेन्द्रियव्यवहारनिर्वाहक निष्प्रपञ्चचैतन्यैक-रसमात्मान सिंहावलोकनन्यायेनालोच्य दर्शयति ।

[After delineating *pratikarmavyavasthā*, Ātman, the One Homogeneous Pure Consciousness bereft of the world, which is responsible for the entire parlance of all the senses as made known by the *pratikarmavyavasthā*, is contemplated through retrospective recollection and shown herewith.]

Says the *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka* (1–331)—

वहु निगद्य किमत्र, वदाम्यहं श्रृणुत सङ्ग्रहमद्वयशासने ।
सकलवाङ्मनसातिगता चितिः सकलवाङ्मनसव्यवहारभाक् ॥

[What is the use of elaborating this point? I shall state the essence of the tenets of *Advaita*, listen to it The Pure Consciousness transcends mind and speech. And It comes within the range of mind and speech because of Avidyā.]

Thus the enquiry into the *pratikarmavyavasthā* leads to the knowledge of the Non-dual Consciousness, Brahman-Ātman.

7.2.15 Modern Physical Science—Indecisive Nature; Quest Ending up in Despair

A lot of criticism has been levelled against the Vedāntic *prakriyā* particularly in respect of the mechanism of visual perception, from the so-called scientific standpoint adopted by the laity, the so-called scientists acquainted or steeped in western science and adventures as also adepts immersed in western philosophical thinking. The main point of the criticism centres round the idea that in Vedānta, the mind, *antaḥkarana*, is believed to go out through the channels of the senses, reach and assume the form of the object which is perceived. As an example, taking the case of visual perception it is asked as to how the mind, a non-material entity, bereft of parts etc., can move out, even to considerable distances extremely rapidly and assume the form of the object and this, in the face of demonstration by the science

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of optics that it is the object that apparently gets into the eye, as it were, by the formation of the image of the object on the retina in the manner of the formation of the images by a double convex lens which here is located in the eye. This objection is almost universally entertained, and needs to be answered.

Before a reply is given, it might be asked in return as to how this mechanism which is spoken of as successfully standing the test of pragmatic efficiency such as prescription of lenses for the eyes, accounts for the experience pertaining to vision, for, a number of doubts have to be cleared before this contention can be accepted First of all, how can the image that is formed on the retina (practically a two-dimensional one, in the language of the scientist himself) lead to the notion of a three-dimensional object? From the patches of light and darkness on the retina, is it ever possible for the perceiver, be it through his mind, to construct the object in all its details that are believed to be perceived in experience, unless the mind has previously acquainted itself with the object by direct apprehension? If this be admitted, then how did this experience come about; is it with or without the lens, the retina etc.? If the former, the question remains; if the latter, how is this direct experience without the said accessories, to be accounted for? Obviously, it cannot be put in the category of remembrance How is the experience of the object obtained as it actually is, when the image through which it is obtained is an inverted one? Again, how do several objects, separated from one another even by considerable distances, form the content of a single perception? How are the separations etc , and the distinctions between them as observed, to be

acccounted for through the experience of the images that even overlap on the screen, the retina? How are the sizes of the objects as experienced, to be accounted for on the basis of the sizes of the images on the retina? Again, if what is observed is confined to the images only, then the experience should be of the form that the object is perceived in the position of the retina and not that it is perceived out there. All objects should be perceived to be stationed only in the position of the retina Movement, as experienced, should not be perceived. The opponent's view is thus beset with formidable difficulties.

To get over them, it is clear that apart from the physical mechanism, the physiological and the psychical apparatus having interactions with the physical mechanism are also to be indented upon. In the main, the mind must be conceived of as not only a passive observing entity but also active in probing towards the object seeking what it wants, sifting the data of raw-material such as the images on the retina and reconstructing them in such a way as not to give room for the psychological impediments such as doubt and error. Ascribing these characteristics to the mind is clearly travelling more than half way towards the Vedāntic position.

Again, to quote the physicist as far as the formation of the image is concerned and thereafter seek the mercy of the physiologist or the psychologist and reject the physicist for further development is like cutting an egg into two halves, one for cooking and the other for hatching! This compartmental approach dividing the field of experience into various parts—physical, physiological, psychological etc.,—without suitably defining clearly their mutual relationships, can hardly

be appreciated It is not even clear whether the ultimate position, insofar as it stands today, taken by the physicist, is understood or accepted in such contentions, for the idea that the 'rays' of light coming from the object are converged into a focus called the image, is only a representation of a deeper situation, a crude picturing, enough to serve the needs of looking into mirrors, prescribing lenses for the eyes, shadow formation etc. If some other facts in the list of physics such as interference and diffraction are also considered, the geometrical theory of 'rays' is to be replaced by a 'wave' theory. There cannot be two theories accounting for the same phenomenon. Indeed the so-called phenomenon of refraction by a lens is really a diffraction phenomenon pertaining to the light-wave that necessarily arises because of the lateral delimitation of a wave front. Further, by adding other phenomena such as dispersion, absorption and scattering to the list of facts, it is seen that the theory is once again to be revised. Scattering now becomes the fundamental phenomenon of which diffraction becomes a particular case The notion of the physical nature of light undergoes further modifications when the question of emission and absorption as also the intrinsic characteristics of light waves themselves such as polarisation are taken into account. Now, one adopts the electromagnetic theory in which light is to be regarded as an electromagnetic phenomenon, only spoken of in the language of waves It does not stop there Facts such as emission, absorption, distribution of energy in the spectrum and photoelectricity, when added on to the list, call once again for a thoroughgoing revision. All the previous theories have to be laid aside and drastically new concepts are to be brought in Quantum mechanics and quantum electrodynamics come in. The interaction of the observer with the

observed figures prominently and all attempts at 'explaining' phenomena are entirely given up (Dirac's quantum mechanics). At best, there can be only a laconic self-consistent way of 'describing' phenomena, and that by means of advanced mathematical techniques like differential equations, operator theory etc. This is all that is meant by a picture of the phenomena. No picture in the conventional manner of geometrical diagrams etc., can ever be given and if spoken in such terms involving pictures, the language must be deemed entirely metaphoric in character. No mental picture can be had of what is meant by an elementary particle, electron etc., or wave or the process of radiation etc. All this terminology is only figurative, if understood in the familiar sense of parlance.

The notions put forward by the theory of relativity which are of fundamental importance in modern physics must be considered as well The notions that space intervals, and hence size and shape etc., time intervals and therefore simultaneity etc., are all to be spoken of as related to a particular observer and have no absolute meaning attached to them, make the situation profounder and more difficult The conception of various observers is brought in. Also the notion of an absolute space-time continuum whose curvature as spoken of purely in mathematical terms involving the Rieman Christoffel tensor and curvature tensor etc., regarded as matter, removes the last vestiges of any attempt at interpreting the physical entities in terms of familiar parlance. The important idea of the theory of relativity viz., the equivalence of mass and energy leads to the view that energy is the only fundamental entity of the physical world. The relativistic quantum theory concerning itself with the

apparent disappearance of fundamental particles, the so-called dematerialisation, as also the reverse of it i.e., the so-called materialisation, lends support to this view that the fundamental stuff of the physical universe is energy which is dynamic in nature The interaction of the observer with the observed which is of such basic importance in quantum mechanics, informs that the so-called observer, as conceived of in physics, is really a 'participator'. The situation therefore may be summarised in this manner : The physics view of the universe is that there is a dynamic entity which may be called 'energy' from which all else must be regarded as arising, whatever they may be called. Notions of forces etc., are not necessary, as in the scheme only potentials come in, though their space derivatives are sometimes spoken of as forces etc., to conform to the old pattern of thinking The use of language involving words such as particles, interaction, position, movement, size and shape, if invested with the meanings usually employed in the empirical world, which may be necessary to establish contact with the apparatus and the laboratory, conceived of in the manner of parlance however, must be deemed to be totally metaphorical in character necessitated only by pragmatic considerations. In other words, it is loose talking and at best, it may be said that in a particular situation an entity (if it can be conceived by itself as such) is apparently describable for certain purposes in that manner. The actual situation is something totally different, which can be spoken of only in mathematical terms. In other words, in parlance, the entity is spoken of 'as though'—इव— it is a particle or a wave etc , only in that specific situation. In the strict sense of the term, the 'participator' with whom the physicist is confronted cannot be the 'observer' as well.

The 'actor' cannot be the 'witness'! If the notion of 'observer' and also 'observation', 'observed' etc., is to have any meaning at all then one has to distinguish between the 'observer' and the 'participator', though they seem to be always bound together. All this is a roundabout method of putting things which are put clearly and in a straightforward way by Vedānta through the conceptions of *pramātr* and *Sākṣī*. Again, speaking of different observers would have to be understood as speaking of different *pramātrs* as identified with the *Sākṣī*. While the notion of *pramātr* is inevitably bound with the mind, *Sākṣī* transcends it. Evidently, such notions point the way out of the impasse that has resulted in modern physics.

In a nutshell, the situation is this—whether one likes it or not, the difficult situation of the notion of the 'observer' being a 'participator' at the same time can be got over only by appeal to the Witness-self. By identification i.e., *tādātmyādhyāsa,* with a framework i.e., the space-time co-ordinate system, that is some recording apparatus etc., one secures the 'particular observer'. The fundamental stuff is only energy that is dynamic, which is merely a different way of speaking about the *tamoguna* and the *rajoguna* aspects of *prakṛti,* the *sattvaguna* being predominant in the mind-aspect associated with the *pramātr,* the 'observer'. On this basic stuff, the energy, are superimposed the notions of time, space etc , and eventually radiation, material particles etc , etc , if the necessary contact is to be established with the laboratory parlance. All this being a figurative usage, it is obvious that the parlance reality so vehemently adhered to, must be regarded as having only the status of an appearance. By speaking in terms of the experiences of the various 'observers' in each case as actually

observed by him, physics is well on the way to reach the *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda*. In other words, the notion of Self, the Witness, realisation that the parlance reality is only an appearance, and that any theory, however well it may account for all the facts that it concerns itself with, is only a concoction etc , point to the fact that modern physics should tread the footsteps of Vedānta.

The use of the concept of the localised corpuscles to account for some phenomena, the subsequent use of the concept of the waves that are extensive, to account for some other phenomena, and resorting once again to the notion of corpuscles in respect of the same entity like light and eventually in respect of the so-called material entities like the atomic and the sub-atomic, the notion of determinism being adhered to in some cases when the opposite notion of indeterminism is staring one in the face, the use of the notion of certainty and precision in some cases, probability being brought in in some other cases, anthropomorphic concepts such as forces being used claiming at the same time that nature has been 'stripped' of its anthropomorphic character, eventually giving up the notion of force altogether and speaking only in terms of energy wherein also the unseen (*adṛṣṭa*) creeps in, when such concepts as potential energy and latent heat are used, the fundamental entities like atoms, protons, neutrons etc., being spoken of as purely physical in character, at the same time attributing the character of spontaneity to them in respect of transitions, radioactive decay etc , the problem of the observer vs the participator, the dependence of the magnitudes of the so-called objective entities like length, mass and time on the position of the observer, culminating in *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda*, that is subjective—all point out the

inherent indecisive nature of the system of thought that is employed in physics.

The position is that modern physics has declared its incompetence to offer 'explanations' of the physical situations, setting before itself, the modest objective of only 'describing' them, as already pointed out. The quest of Reality has thus ended in despair by declaration of ajñāna, the glaring ignorance about the fundamental Reality. That such would be the situation in all systems other than the Vedānta has been pointed out by Śrī Śrī Vidyāranyacarana in the *Pañcadaśī* (VI–143)—

निरूपयितुमारब्धे निखिलैरपि पण्डितैः ।
अज्ञान पुरतस्तेषां भाति कक्षासु कासुचित् ॥

Substituting for the picture of the parlance world, another picture, a finer one involving molecules, for example, and for this the picture of the world of atoms and instead of this the world of fundamental particles etc., etc., leading to a blind end, as far as search for Reality is concerned, would only mean replacing one world of concoction by another. This is only an exercise in futility. The way out would be when the *prakriyā* that is offered, though it must have contact with parlance reality, dissolves all other concoctions and dissolves itself in turn This is done eminently by Vedānta Vedānta also recognises that for this purpose, suitable modifications have to be made in the scheme of the concoction as naturally entertained by the enquirer and the concepts reoriented to achieve this end. It is thus not with the idea of gaining support from parlance experience which is ordinarily sought to testify to the viewpoint of the theory, that Vedānta concerns itself with parlance. A seeming correlation is all that can be had in this game, as it would be idle

to pretend that the very parlance experience that is sought to be understood, belonging to the realm of appearance, should bear testimony to what is regarded as the basic Reality. Vedānta knows this full well, but adopts the situation, as it were i e., only as an *abhyupetyavāda*. In truth, every *vāda* is only an *abhyupetyavāda*; the basic truth is its own testimony in the light of which all else must be seen and not vice versa. Recognising this procedure on the part of Vedānta spoken of as the *adhyāropāpavādanyāya* and conforming to it would enable the critics to develop the clear perspective that is required and align themselves accordingly.

7.2.16 In Vedantic Scheme Mind Active, not Passive Recorder

In the Vedāntic scheme, mind being considered to be a product of the *sūksmabhūtas*, the subtle elements, which arise from the *prakrti* and therefore material in character having parts, there is no difficulty in regarding the going out of the *vrtti* which is actual and is not to be treated as a metaphor Mind is not the passive recorder of impressions, but is active. While perceiving, not only does it run and fill a mould but its analytic and synthetic functions are in evidence In striving for समन्वय (harmony) and अविरोध (non-contradiction), employment of reasoning faculty and the use of imaginative faculty, remembrance etc., are all in evidence. Again, whatever structure it concocts on the basis of the data that it receives, is superposed on the so-called external world. A theory offered by the mind is at best a mental construction designed to bring all facts into a harmonious whole, starting from a set of concepts, fewest in number, in the simplest, most reasonable and beautiful manner. The activity of the mind ranges from looking far and into the objects, or events pertaining to the phenomena,

and by way of ensuring an arrangement of the data-manifold to building it in the aforesaid manner into a coherent system of thought A theory thus comes to be offered. This theory should not, in any system of thought, be looked upon as mirroring or photographing the situation actually obtaining in nature. The theory is necessarily perched on an anvil, as it were, ready to undergo suitable modifications, if necessary, to enable it to accommodate new facts if and when a situation arises. Sometimes a theory is rejected wholesale and an entirely new one with a totally different set of concepts takes its place. Thus such revolutions in respect of a theory often take place and not merely evolutionary adjustments Anyhow, a theory is projected on the world outside, as it were, believing it to be at least for the time being as having a one-to-one correspondence with the actual structure of the world. This latter cannot ever be proved to be true unless there is independent means of the mind getting access to the so-called world directly and thereby verifying the correspondence postulated There is no such means, and from the empirical standpoint one must have recourse only to the law of pragmatic efficiency or the law of non-contradiction. These also are provided only by the mind; even the notion of the external world and the notion of common parlance are what are provided by the mind. Recognition of such a situation might lead to the so-called solipsism, which, however unpalatable, must be gulped in. There is no room for dislike of such a situation. It is only by giving due recognition to such an inevitable state of affairs as also the recognition that the scheme speaking in terms of व्यावहारिकसत्ता—parlance reality—when probed into deeply demands the giving up of the notion of the व्यावहारिकसत्ता itself, seeking shelter in the notion of प्रातिभासिकसत्ता—apparent reality—that

Vedānta puts forward the *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda*. The *sṛṣṭidṛṣṭivāda* is only a concession to those wedded to common parlance This step which is necessary in the case of all the theories to establish contact with everyday life is also in evidence here It is in relation to such background that the outgoing of the mind is to be considered There is no difficulty whatever in conceiving of the mind, an elastic material substance with parts, as moving out and assuming various forms, nor is its speed to be wondered at when the so-called light of the scientist, a much grosser entity, is endowed with such an enormous velocity as 186,000 miles per second ! The projection of the *vṛtti* to considerable distances such as a star etc., and rapid contraction towards a nearby object are also intelligible. It is not denied that light is instrumental in producing visual perception Says the Sūtrabhāsya (3–3–30–54)—

अपि च सत्सु प्रदीपादिषूपकरणेषूपलब्धिर्भवति, असत्सु न भवति।

Nevertheless, the *antaḥkaraṇa* has to go out and assume the form of the object That the mind assumes the form of the object is also to be accepted if the experience of memory in which even without the object, its form is recalled, is to be accommodated In view of its elastic nature, this idea is not far-fetched either. Regarding the so-called difficulty—(which is said to arise in respect of the perception of distant objects which are no longer there at the time of perception such as a star) viz , that if the *antaḥkarna* takes time, as it should, to reach it, there is no guarantee that the star exists in the place by the time the *antaḥkarana* reaches it, and as such the Vedāntic scheme does not properly explain the situation—it is to be pointed out that if there is such a difficulty, it is not overcome even in the scheme which swears by the formation of optical images on the retina

which leads to visual sensation and perception for on that theory also (if there is perception, as there would be), the question arises as to what it is that is perceived since the object is no longer there. Such a difficulty does not arise in the scheme put forward by Vedānta, since the transformation of the mind which goes out from the perceiver, the *vrtti*, is occasioned only on contact with the object. Also the situation as portrayed in astrophysics in terms of common parlance concepts cannot be taken as such, before this problem of perception is satisfactorily solved. If it is accepted that the star, say, has been extinguished in the meanwhile, how is this known at all, to accept it and pass it off as true? All the evidence that is available relates only to what is believed to be seen viz., the images on the retina, which always tell us as long as they last that the star is there. If extinction is accepted on the basis of correlation with other facts believed to be well-established, then its perception would be an illusion and the problem shifts over to that of accounting for such an illusion Therefore the theory accounting for illusions is to be indented upon. In this case Vedānta indents upon the services of Avidyā which is the material cause of the *antahkarana*

Any such criticism of the Vedāntic set-up is therefore not to the point. It has already been seen that the *prakriyās* like those of *Nyāya-vaiśesika* or *Sānkhya* (particle or field theory in modern terminology) which speak in terms of the reality of the external world are not able to account for the *pratikarmavyavasthā*. The Vedāntic *prakriyā* alone is able to account for it with its notion of Māyā as pointed out already, Consciousness, the Substratum, being responsible for the perception of objects As in all other situations in parlance,

it is Māyā that enables to account for the empirical experiences pertaining to perception, leaving however, the supreme Reality, the Consciousness, unimpaired Says the *Pañcadaśī* (VIII–75)—

मायामेघो जगन्नीरं वर्षत्वेष यथा तथा ।
चिदाकाशस्य नो हानिर्न वा लाभ इति स्थितिः ॥

[Just as the rain cloud pours down water without let or hindrance, let Māyā conjure up the universe in its myriad aspects. There is neither any loss nor gain at all to the *Ākāśa* that is Consciousness—such is the truth.

7.2.17 Perception and Plenary Experience According to Abhasavada

The gist of the Vedāntic position in respect of perception may be put in the following manner by adopting in particular the viewpoint of the *ābhāsavāda* as formulated by Śrī Śrī Sureśvarācāryapāda.

The *antaḥkaranavṛtti* is indispensable for establishing and manifesting an identity between *pramātṛcaitanya* and *prameyacaitanya* It is the Consciousness whose appearance is set within the object—विषयावच्छिन्नाभासप्रतियोगिचित्—and is constantly associated therewith that really manifests the object, but the *pramātṛ* is held to be so because of the said identity manifested by the *vṛtti* at that time so far as that particular object is concerned It is therefore that a particular object alone is known only by a particular subject at a time, and not another or by another. Simultaneously with the rise of the *vṛtti* in respect of a particular object, there ensues through that *vṛtti* connected with the subject on the one hand and the object on the other, an identification of the two appearances of Consciousness pervading the subject and the object of the

knowledge in the manner of ether pervading a pot etc.; says the *Bṛhadvārtika* (4–3–94)—

विषयः प्रत्यगात्मा च स्वाभासेन विशेद्धियम् ।
स्वाभासवत्स्वयं साक्षाद्वियत्कुम्भादिगं यथा ॥

Thus all the three—viz, the *cidābhāsas* pertaining to the *pramātṛ*, the *prameya* and the *vṛtti*, the *pramāna* immanent in that particular psychological process—constitute one unit, एकलोलीभावापन्ना, for the time being; and the cognition arising under these conditions is called perception. This unity of *cidābhāsas* does not militate against their maintaining at the same time their adjunctive differences—औपाधिकभेद. Thus as long as the *vṛtti* lasts, there is no confusion of the tripartite division, *tripuṭī*, universally admitted in all cases of cognition. Besides the occasional appearance of the *cidābhāsa* in the modified part of *antaḥkarana*, there is a constant *cidābhāsa* in the *antaḥkaraṇa* which is pre-existent to the *vṛtti* and is called the *pramātr* in relation to it. This *pramātrcidābhāsa* is comparatively permanent but the object form or mould imprinted in the *vṛtti* is occasional for it is brought about by *dharmādharma* of the person concerned. So says the *Bṛhadvārtika* (4–4–651, 652, 653)—

प्रत्यक्चिदाकृतिस्तत्र सर्वदा धर्मधर्मिणोः ।
हेत्वन्तरानपेक्षत्वादात्मत्वात्सन्निधेस्सदा ॥
आत्माकृतिरतो नित्या तद्धेतोः संभवात्सदा ।
अज्ञानादेश्च चिद्रूपं तद्याथात्म्यान्न वार्यते ॥
धर्माधर्माद्यपेक्षत्वादन्यत्वाच्चान्यवस्तुनः ।
शब्दाद्याकारता तस्मात्कादाचित्की धियो भवेत् ॥

Consciousness which is the prototype of the *cidābhāsa* caught up in the object is thus identified with the object on

account of its non-discrimination from the *cidābhāsa* which is engendered by the *antahkaranavrtti*. The *cidābhāsa* imbedded in the *vrtti* is non-different from the *cidābhāsa* associated with the *antahkarana* The *prameyacaitanya* which is now rendered manifest as identical with the *pramātṛcaitanya* through its *cidābhāsa*, reveals the object. This is the process of perception according to the *ābhāsavāda*. During this perception, the *pramātrcaitanya* is spoken of as the knower and the *prameyacaitanya* as the known. Hence it is that the revealing Consciousness is spoken of thus—

चिदाभासोपश्लिष्टवृत्तिप्रयोज्यान्तःकरणनिष्ठाभासाभेदाभ्यक्तविषयगताभासप्रतियोगिचैतन्यम् ।

Here arises the question—Though the objective 'form' of the mind viz., the *vrtti* is occasional, the *antaḥkarana* which like all else has in reality the 'form' of Ātman is in addition always pervaded by the effulgence of Ātman ; therefore how could there ever be ajñāna in respect of the Innermost Reality, Ātman, as it stands dispelled by the knowledge (of Ātman) that is always there? The answer is that though the *vṛtti* of the form of an object as also its absence is always pervaded by Ātman-knowledge still this latter lies dormant, as it were, being subdued by the other *vrttis*. Hence there is every need for the *antaḥkaranavṛtti* arising from the *Mahāvākya* like 'That thou art'; this alone is capable of dispelling ajñāna which is established in one's experience as 'I am ignorant'. That this ajñāna which does not brook enquiry, अविचारितसिद्ध, is not established by any *pramāna* but is testified to by the Witness-self, has already been shown. Says the *Brhadvārtika* (4–4–654, 655)—

यद्यपीमौ जगत्यस्मिन्नात्मज्ञानपुरस्सरौ ।
शब्दाद्यनात्मविज्ञानभावाभावौ स्वभावतः ॥

तथाप्यनुभवादेव प्रत्यक्तत्त्वानभिज्ञता ।
अनात्मबोधवत्सिद्धाऽविद्याऽतः प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥

This is reminiscent of the opening sentences of the *Sūtra-bhāṣya* which bring out the situation in a masterly way—

युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोर्विषयविषयिणोः तमःप्रकाशवद्विरुद्धस्वभावयोरितरेतरभावानुपपत्तौ सिद्धायां तद्धर्माणामपि सुतरामितरेतरभावानुपपत्तिः, इत्यत अस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरे विषयिणि चिदात्मके युष्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरस्य विषयस्य तद्धर्माणां चाध्यासः, तद्विपर्ययेण विषयिणस्तद्धर्माणां च विषयेऽध्यासो मिथ्येति भवितु युक्तम् । तथाप्यन्योन्यस्मिन् अन्योन्यात्मकतामन्योन्यधर्माश्चाध्यस्येतरेतराविवेकेन, अत्यन्तविविक्तयोर्धर्मधर्मिणोर्मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य, 'अहमिदम्' 'ममेदम्' इति नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः ।

['Thou' and 'I' cognitions have as their contents the cognised and the cogniser which by their very nature are opposed to each other as are darkness and light, and as such it is a settled fact that neither of them can pass off for the other! This being the case, much less can the attributes of the one be passed off for the attributes of the other. Hence it is but appropriate that the superimposition on the content of the 'I' cognition viz, the cogniser which is verily the Consciousness Itself, of the content of the 'thou' cognition viz, the cognised as also its attributes, must be deemed to be absolutely false Also vice versa i e, the superimposition of the content of the 'I' cognition and its attributes on the cognised is also likewise false. Either of these superimpositions simply cannot be.

In spite of this the natural worldly parlance in the form 'I am this' and 'mine is this' which is in evidence, is to be traced to the reciprocal identification by superimposition of the essence as well as attributes (of the cogniser and the cognised) arising from the non-cognition of the distinction between entities that are totally distinct both contentwise and attributewise which in turn is due to the primal ignorance that is by itself false, thereby fusing together, as it were, the basically real and the basically unreal.]

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Incidentally, the *Bhāsya* indicates also that to speak of the arising of the plenary experience through the Guru and the Śāstra is like speaking of the arising of the space in the well on digging, that is, by the removal of the obstacles like mud etc , though in fact, the space has always been there. The *Bṛhadvārtika* (4–4–656) also says—

उत्पन्नस्यापि चोत्पत्तिः कूपाकाशादिवत्ततः ।
प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यबोधस्य व्युत्पत्तेर्गुरुशास्त्रतः ॥

The following verse from the *Śreyomārga* quoted already also expresses the same—

आत्मानात्माकारं स्वभावतोऽवस्थित सदा चित्तम् ।
आत्मैकाकारतया तिरस्कृतानात्मदृष्टि विदधीत ॥

The detailed discussion of the *pratikarmavyavasthā* accounted for by Vedānta in the aforesaid manner centres round the notion of the *vṛtti* illuminated by the Witness-self, the *Sākṣī*. Like the causal ajñāna, the *cidābhāsa* also pervades the *antaḥkaraṇa*, its *vṛtti* etc. The *vṛtti*, being insentient, would be worthless without the association of the *cidābhāsa*. So says the *Bṛhadvārtika* (4–3–93)—

कारणान्वयवद्बुद्धेश्चिदाभासोऽपि सर्वदा ।
चिदाभासातिरेकेण बुद्धेः परिणतिर्वृथा ॥

The *vṛtti* without the illumination by the *Sākṣī* cannot be designated as jñāna—

नासाक्षिका सत्त्ववृत्तिर्जानातिनाऽभिधीयते ।
(*Sū. Bhā.* 1–1–5–5)

7.2.18 Jnanasakti, Kriyasakti—Two Aspects of Antahkarana

The *Mānasollāsa* (IV, 7 to 10) and the *ṭīkā* put the situation pertaining to this *liṅgaśarīra* consisting of *kriyāśakti*, *jñānaśakti*, senses etc., and the relation between them laconi-

cally. It may be pointed out that in this context the *Mānasollāsa* uses the term *antaḥkaraṇa* for both the aspects viz., *jñānaśakti* and *kriyāśakti* taken together—

मलिनामलिनादर्शपश्चात्प्राग्भागतुल्ययोः ।
क्रियाशक्तिज्ञानशक्त्योरन्तःकरणभागयोः ॥ (IV–7)
प्रतिबिंबे स्फुरन्नीशः कर्ता ज्ञातेति कथ्यते । (IV–8)

स्वतो निर्व्यापारत्वादुपाध्यायत्तव्यापारवत्त्वाच्चेति मत्वा कर्तृत्वज्ञातृत्वे ईश्वरस्योपपादयति—मलिनामलिनेति ।

Prāṇa constitutes that aspect of *antaḥkaraṇa* which is spoken of as *kriyāśakti* i.e., wherein Īśvara manifests Himself in many a form of activity. It corresponds to the dark (or the back) side of a mirror. *Manas* and *buddhi* constitute that aspect of *antaḥkarana* which is here spoken of as *jñānaśakti* wherein Īśvara manifests Himself as a self-conscious cogniser. This corresponds to the clear (or the front) side of a mirror. The Self-conscious Ātman when associated with the *upādhi* of *prāṇa* in activity, by way of lending to it His own Existence and Shine, is spoken of as the doer; and when associated, in the same way, with the *manas* and *buddhi* which undergo changes of condition, He is said to cognise. Says the *Mānasollāsa* IV—

बुद्धिस्सत्त्वगुणोत्कर्षान्निर्मलो दर्पणो यथा ॥ (8)
गृह्णाति विषयच्छायामात्मच्छायानुभावतः । (9)

[Like unto a clear mirror, intellect, because of the predominance of the *sattva* in it and in virtue of the reflection of Ātman in it, receives images of external objects.]

The predominance of *sattva* is necessary since otherwise *rajas* and *tamas* would g[illegible] rise to covetousness and forgetfulness, as [illegible] it [illegible] *Gītā* (XIV–17)—

सत्त्वात् सञ्जायते ज्ञानं रजसो लोभ एव च ।
प्रमादमोहौ तमसो भवतोऽज्ञानमेव च ॥

[From *sattva* arises wisdom, and greed from *rajas*; heedlessness and error arise from *tamas*, and also ignorance]

Though by nature the senses move towards their respective objects, still their action is limited and controlled by *buddhi*; so the perception, non-perception or misperception of sense objects through the sense organs, depend at any given moment on the state of the *antaḥkarana* at that time, as mentioned already—

अन्तःकरणसंवन्धान्निखिलानीन्द्रियाण्यपि ॥
रथाङ्गनेमिवलये कीलिता इव कीलकाः । (Mā. IV, 9, 10)

It may be pointed out here that the senses which naturally run outward towards their objects are controlled by the *buddhi* This is brought out through the metaphor of a charioteer in the *Kathopanisad* (1–3–3–4)—

आत्मानꣳ रथिनं विद्धि शरीरꣳ रथमेव तु ।
बुद्धिं तु सारथिं विद्धि मनः प्रग्रहमेव च ॥
इन्द्रियाणि हयानाहुर्विषयाꣳस्तेषु गोचरान् ।

[Know Ātman as the Lord of the chariot, the body as verily the chariot, know also the *buddhi* as the charioteer, and know the mind as the reins The senses, they say, are the horses, the objects which they perceive are the paths they range over.]

7.3.1 Nadis—The Subtle Body

Antaḥkarana as referred to here is the *lingaśarīra* impregnated with *jñānaśakti* and *kriyāśakti* i.e., endued with the faculties of cognition and action. It is through what are called *nāḍis* which are tube-like threads of subtle ethereal matter in the body, that all the senses accompanied with the mind in one or another of its forms pass towards their

respective objects in the external world. The *nādıs* form a net-lıke structure because of the numerous openings in them, as the Śruti यदेतदन्तर्हृदये जालकमिव (Br. U. 6–2–3) and the *Bhāṣya* thereon अनेकनाडीच्छिद्रबहुलत्वात् जालकमिव point out. Says the *Mānasollāsa* (IV–10, 11)—

नाड्योऽन्तःकरणे स्यूता जालसंस्यूतसूत्रवत् ॥ (10)
ताभिस्तु गोलकान्ताभिः प्रसर्पन्ति स्फुलिङ्गवत् ।
करणानि समस्तानि यथा स्वं विषयं प्रति ॥ (11)

[There are *nādıs* woven in the *antahkarana* lıke unto threads woven ınto a net. By them, verily, reachıng up to the physıcal regions of sensation, all sense organs move, lıke sparks of fire, towards theır respective objects.]

When passing from deep sleep to the waking state, these sense organs pass up to the very physical regıons of sensation such as the eye, the ear etc.

The concept of the subtle body involvıng the mind, the *prāna*, the senses etc., whıch are also physical in character enables the understanding of the functıons of the sensory organs in the respective orbs when carrıed over to them by the *krıyāśakti* due to *prāṇa* using the *nāḍıs* as the vehicles. Such an explanation is not available in the schools which do not speak in terms of the subtle body of the type mentıoned. The *nādis* have been brought in here in connectıon with the detailed exposition pertaining to the *pratıkarmavyavasthā*. This forms one class of experıences in the waking state. Consideratıon of thıs *pratikarmavyavasthā* is, however, to be regarded as illustrative of all other activitıes pertaining to the lıvıng body as experienced in the waking state, a few of the well-known among which are activitıes and movements noticed in the varıous organs, hands, feet etc., blood circulation, breathing, action of the heart, beating of the pulse, transmission of

food and water, metabolic activity like digestion, absorption and assimilation, production and transmission of bile, insulin etc., excretion etc , and even the cessation of all activity of the living body termed as death which according to this system is due to the exit of the subtle body from the gross body. All activity ranging from the mental to that of the external organs must be traced to the *prāna* with its various phases like *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *samāna* and *udāna*. This implies that the subtle body with its *prānaśakti* in its various aspects is to be regarded as pervading the entire gross body; this pervasion is through the *nādis* which form a network of interconnected tubular channels suitable for the movement of *prāna* i.e., the subtle body for purposes of all activity mentioned. The *nādis* are of various kinds—for the movement of gaseous matter, for circulation of fluids like blood and bile, for transport of food etc., for the running of the sense organs towards their orbs as directed by the mind etc. Mention is made of these in Śrutis, for example, in the *Nādīkhanda* of the *Chāndogyopanisad*—

अथ या एता हृदयस्य नाड्यस्ताः पिङ्गलस्याणिम्नस्तिष्ठन्ति शुक्लस्य नीलस्य पीतस्य लोहितस्येत्यसौ वा आदित्यः पिङ्गल एष शुक्ल एष नील एष पीत एष लोहितः । (8–6–1)

Now as for these *nāḍis* of the heart, they are composed of fine subtle matter, subtler than the gross body (the subtle body, however, is subtler still). They are of various colours, reddish brown, white, blue, yellow and red because of the colours of the fine fluids etc., they carry. Details in respect of this are given in the *Bhāsya* thereon which directs that the *Āyurvedaśāstra* may be consulted for further details The Śruti says that these colours are eventually to be traced to the relationship with *Āditya*. The *Brhadāraṇyakopanisad* (6-3-20) and the *Bhāsya* thereon say—

ता वा अस्यैता हिता नाम नाड्यो यथा केशः सहस्रधा भिन्नस्ता-वताणिम्ना तिष्ठन्ति शुक्लस्य नीलस्य पिङ्गलस्य हरितस्य लोहितस्य पूर्णा . . .।

. . . ता वा अस्य शिरःपाण्यादिलक्षणस्य पुरुषस्येता हिता नाम नाड्यो यथा केशः सहस्रधा भिन्नस्तावता तावत्परिमाणेन अणिम्ना अणुत्वेन तिष्ठन्ति । ताश्च शुक्लस्य रसस्य नीलस्य पिङ्गलस्य हरितस्य लोहितस्य पूर्णा एतैः शुक्लत्वादिभीरसविशेषैः पूर्णा इत्यर्थः । एते च रसानां वर्णविशेषा वातपित्तश्लेष्मणामितरेतरसंयोगवैषम्यविशेषाद्विचित्रा बहवश्च भवन्ति । तास्वेवं-विधासु नाडीषु सूक्ष्मासु वालाग्रसहस्रभेदपरिमाणासु शुक्लादिरसपूर्णासु सकल-देहव्यापिनीषु सप्तदशक लिङ्गं वर्तते ।

[In him, this man with head, hands etc , are those *nādis* called *hitā* which are as fine as a hair split into a thousand parts, and they are filled with white, blue, brown, green and red serums Many and varied are the colours of the serums owing to the intermixture in various proportions of *vāta*, *pitta* and *ślesma* The subtle body with its seventeen constituents has its seat in these *nādis* which have the fineness of the thousandth part of the tip of a hair, are filled with serums, white and so on and spread all over the body]

The *Praśnopanisad* (3–6) says—

हृदि ह्येष आत्मा । अत्रैतदेकशत नाडीनां तासां शतं शतमेकैकस्या द्वासप्ततिर्द्वासप्ततिः प्रतिशाखानाडीसहस्राणि भवन्त्यासु व्यानश्चरति ।

[This Ātman with the subtle body as the *upādhi* that is the jīva is verily in the heart. Here are these hundred and one *nādis*; every one of these has a hundred branches , again every one of these has seventy-two thousand sub-branches In them moves the *vyāna*]

The *Ānandagiriṭīkā* on the *Bhāsya* thereon points out that the Śrutis mention that the *nādis* branch out from the heart, by way of refutation of the viewpoint of some of the

yogis that they branch out from the navel. The *Kaṭhopanisad* (2–3–16) and the *Bhāsya* thereon say—

शतं चैका च हृदयस्य नाड्यस्तासां मूर्धानमभिनिस्सृतैका ।
तयोर्ध्वमायन्नमृतत्वमेति विष्वङ्ङन्या उत्क्रमणे भवन्ति ॥

तत्र शतं च शतसङ्ख्याका एका च सुषुम्ना नाम पुरुषस्य हृदयाद्विनिस्सृता नाड्यः शिराः । तासां मध्ये मूर्धानं भित्त्वाभिनिस्सृता निर्गता एका सुषुम्ना नाम ।

[A hundred and one are the *nāḍis* of the heart. Of these, one leads up to the crown of the head. One goes up through it to *Brahmaloka* and thereafter securing *Jñāna* attains immortality. Other *nādis* proceeding in different directions provide the passages for the departure of those who are yet subject to transmigration.

Here *nādis*, one hundred in number and one other named *susumnā*, branch out from the heart of man Among them the one named *susumnā* goes out piercing the head]

The *Taittirīyopanisadbhāsya* (1–6) points out that this *nādi*, as distinguished from the other hundred, is what is well known as *susumnā* in the *Yogaśāstra*—

सुषुम्ना नाम नाडी योगशास्त्रेषु च प्रसिद्धा ।

Incidentally it is seen that some of these topics form the subject matter of *Yogaśāstra* as well.

7.3.2 Meditation on Chakras—Samvadibhramanyaya

The *Mānasollāsa* (IV, 11 to 23) and the *tīkā* thereon make mention of the names of some of the principal *nādis*, the extent and function of each of them as also the six *cakras*, concerned deities, *bindu*, *nāda* and some details in respect of them. Śrutis like the *Darśanopanisad*, the *Yogaśikhopanisad*, the *Yogatattvopanisad*, the *Yogacūdāmanyupanisad*, and the *Śāndilyopanisad*, and also works on *Yoga*, like the

Yogayājñavalkyam make mention of these *nāḍis* and *cakras* with the same nomenclature. From this it is clear that purification of the *nādis*, meditation by concentrating the mind on the *cakras* etc., as prescribed in the *Yogaśāstra* must be undertaken in such a way that they will prepare one to acquire the knowledge of the identity of Brahman-Ātman taught in the Upanisads. It is with this end in view that some of the Vedāntic texts have given details in respect of these *cakras* and delineated how they are to be adapted for meditation. Great *jñānis* who were at the same time great *tapasvins* like Śrī Śrī Sadāśivabrahmendrapāda as also Śrī Śrī Vidyātīrthapāda, the *Jagadguru* who adorned the Śrī Śṛṅgerīśāradāpīṭha and who is believed to be in what is known as *Lambikāyoga*, are known to have been *yogis* par excellence. This *Lambikāyoga* is referred to in the *Mānasollāsa* and the *ṭikā* (IV, 22 and X, 32). The *Vidyāraṇyabhāṣya* as also the *Mitākṣaraṭīkā* on the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* (1–6–1)—

अन्तरेण तालुके। य एष स्तन इवावलम्बते। सेन्द्रयोनिः।

mentions *Lambikāyoga*. Also the *Mantraśāstra* gives *sādhana* by showing how the fifty letters beginning with अ are to be meditated as situated in the petals of the lotuses that are the *cakras* as also *bhūśuddhi*, *bhūtaśuddhi*, *mātṛkānyāsa* etc. This shows that the meditation etc., on the six *cakras* have been brought in to provide a scheme for eventually conquering the elements and paving the way for the realisation of the true Self bereft of all limitations.

Since enquiry is the principal *sādhana* in the *Vedāntic* system, karma and *upāsana* of this type are indispensable for securing purity and fitness for *sādhanasampatti* which is most essential for successful enquiry. The purport of the

Vedāntaśāstra is in casting off all limitations superimposed on Ātman by freeing oneself from the elements etc., i.e., by conquering them whether it be by following the path laid by *Bhaktiśāstra* or any *prakriyā* formulated on lines similar to the *Pātañjalayoga*, *Śaivatantra*, *Śākteyatantra* or any other *tantra* The essential thing is to make an ascent from spheres or planes that are more and more 'veiled', 'closed', 'limited' and 'gross' to others that are more and more 'conscious', 'open', 'unrestricted' and 'subtle' i.e., from the *aśuddha* to the *śuddhatattvas*. In all systems providing for the spiritual practice such a process is essential though the nomenclature and details differ The Śruti itself indicates such a procedure—while referring to the dissolution of the effect into the cause, the gross into the subtle, that into the causal and that into the Substratum—as *layakrama, upasaṅkramana*, *bādha* etc The *Mānasollāsa* on the ninth stanza of the hymn points out that the meditation on the *Aṣṭamūrtisvarūpa* of Īśvara as prescribed is to overcome Māyā by the grace of Īśvara. In the *Aṣṭamūrtisvarūpa* mentioned, reference is seen to the five elements as also the Sun, the Moon, the deities associated with the *nāḍis*—*iḍā* and *piṅgalā*. In other words, to reach the *Svarūpa* of Īśvara that is Consciousness as such, His grace is sought by such a meditation. Inasmuch as the *manas* cannot readily ascend to incomprehensible matters, the *Guru* teaches the contemplation of the Universal Self in the eight visible forms Further, the *Mānasollāsa* outlines meditations on the *cakras* etc., as the seats of the seven worlds etc., in order to secure identification of the microcosm with the macrocosm. The eight limbs of *Yoga* and meditation on *Praṇava* are also mentioned and it is emphasized that the Grace of *Guru* who is none other than Īśvara is necessary for attaining perfection

in *Yoga* which consists in the realisation of the true nature of the Self, Consciousness. The *prakriyā* suitable for the seeker is determined only by his own enlightened *Guru*. Just because Vedānta employs language similar to that of *Tantraśāstra,* it should not be construed that Vedānta approves *Tantraśāstra* as it is. Here it is not at all a matter of primary concern as to what the different *cakras* and *nāḍis* are, how many of them are there and what the plexus associated with them are according to physiology, whether they have physical existence, or they are capable of being perceived only by *yogis* etc. These are paths designed for the seeker depending on the equipment he already has, to prepare him to acquire *Brahmajñāna.*, i.e , they are of the nature of प्रतिकल्पना, counter-concoctions, brought in to remove the concoction in which the disciple is entangled What is desired to be accomplished is secured in the manner of *samvādibhramā* which, though a delusion, culminates in a fruitful end as outlined in the *Dhyānadīpa* of the *Pañcadaśī*. If this is recognised there will be no contradiction whatsoever.

7.3.3 Apara and Para Aspects of Sadhana

As has been pointed out again and again, Vedānta takes its stand on the supreme teaching of the Upanisads, the *Mahāvākyārtha*, Brahman-Ātman which alone exists All else is concoction. Ordinarily however, the disciple is not in the frame of mind which enables him to recognise this all at once. He has, to speak in his own language, a past history and in his endeavour to realise the Truth has travelled not along the right royal path in the light of the preliminary Vedic and Vedāntic disciplines but has wandered along lanes and bylanes having been exposed to other 'disciplines' which pass off as being

easier, better etc. The result is that he finds himself in a rigid conceptual framework. He has to be retrieved from this position. In the spirit of the Vedānta, the Guru in His Infinite mercy has recourse to the method of *adhyāropa-apavāda* through providing a suitable counter-concoction involving the very concepts or categories employed by the disciple but with a changed complexion that remains unnoticed for the time being, leading to the situation where there remains absolutely no कल्पना speculation of any sort whatsoever. At every step it is only Brahman-Ātman that is spoken of, perhaps with suitable delimitations to enable the establishment of contact with the notions entertained by the disciple The Sruti, the *Bhagavadgītā*, the *Sūtasamhitā* etc., themselves show the way in this regard It is pointed out, for example, that all the necessary prerequisites for securing the plenary experience such as the four-fold equipment—साधनचतुष्टयसम्पत्ति — stem from the *Svarūpa* Itself. Such is the case with whatever has been enumerated in the *Gītā* under jñānasuch as अमानित्वमदंभित्वं humility, modesty (XIII—7 to 11) and अभयं सत्त्वसंशुद्धिः fearlessness, purity of heart etc., (XVI—1, 2, 3) under *Daivīsampat*

The characteristics of *Sthitaprajña*, *Saṁnyāsī*, *Bhakta*, *Gunātīta*, *Yogī* etc., which happen to be the very nature of the enlightened, provide the means for the seeker ; what is *sahaja* of the *siddha* is the *sādhana* for the *sādhaka*. The *Sūta-samhitā* and the *Aparoksānubhūti* for example, which speak of the various limbs of the *Rājayoga* such as *yama*, *niyama* and *āsana* along with their subdivisions, show how each one of these stems from the *Svarūpa* The same is the case in respect of the Vedāntic *pūjākrama* as given by Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda in His *Parāpūjā* All such *sādhana* emanating from the *Svarūpa*

Itself may be spoken of as the *parā* aspect of the concerned *sādhana* in each case. In addition, each of these has an *aparā* aspect as well in which karma, external or internal, *pūjā*, *yajña*, *homa* etc , *upāsana*, *dhyāna*, *cittavṛttinirodha* etc., find a place. The *aparā* aspect is always to subserve the *parā* aspect as a necessary preliminary enabling the *adhikārī* to attain the competence to proceed to the *parā* aspect The various types of *yajña* referred to in the *Bhagavadgītā* (IV), coming after the *śloka* 24—where Jñāna has been represented metaphorically as *yajña*, serves as an illustration—

ब्रह्मार्पणं ब्रह्महविर्ब्रह्माग्नौ ब्रह्मणा हुतम् ।
ब्रह्मैव तेन गन्तव्यं ब्रह्मकर्मसमाधिना ॥

[Brahman is the offering, Brahman the oblation; by Brahman is the oblation poured into the fire of Brahman ; Brahman verily shall be reached by him for whom *karma* is nothing but Brahman]

So it is when Jñāna is spoken of as *tapas* in Śruti and elsewhere and other types of *tapas* involving action, bodily and mental, are mentioned along with it. Again, in the *Sūtasamhitā* along with the *Rājayoga* already referred to, the concerned aspects are mentioned as well. The concepts such as *mūlādhāra*, *svādhiṣṭhāna*, *maṇipūra*, *anāhata* and *viśuddhi* would refer in their *parā* aspect to the *Svarūpa* Itself in the light of the statements such as—

अहमेवाखिलाधार [I am verily the support of all]

विश्वाधिष्ठानमद्वयं [The non-dual Substratum of the Universe]

शुद्धस्फटिकरूपोऽहं [Clear as a crystal am I]

अनाहतस्वरूपोऽहं [Unscathed am I]

सर्वसाक्षिस्वरूपोऽहं [The witness of all am I]

विशुद्धोऽहं स्वभावतः [By very nature am I absolutely pure].

The *aparā* aspects of these may very well be what is conceived of as real in parlance or what is prescribed by the Śāstras by way of superimposition as in the case of worship of idols, images etc., or when one is asked to meditate upon each of these—heaven, cloud, earth, man and woman—as fire—

असौ वाव लोको गौतमाग्निः, पर्जन्यो वाव गौतमाग्निः, पृथिवी वाव गौतमाग्निः पुरुषो वाव गौतमाग्निः, योषा वाव गौतमाग्निः। (Ch. U.V)

or on the mind as Brahman, the Sun as Brahman—

मनो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत, आदित्यो ब्रह्मेत्यादेशः।
(Ch. U. III, 18-1, 19-1)

Says the *Pañcadasī* (IX-10, 11)—

प्रत्यक्षस्यानुमानस्य तथा शास्त्रस्य गोचरे।
उक्तन्यायेन संवादिभ्रमाः सन्ति हि कोटिशः॥
अन्यथा मृत्तिकादारुशिलाः स्युर्देवताः कथम्।
अग्नित्वादिधियोपास्याः कथ वा योषिदादयः॥

7.3.4 Yoga in Upanishads—Vaidikayoga

The important point is to secure by these artifices purity of mind, one-pointedness of mind and alignment of the undeviated attention in the right direction—मनश्शुद्धि, एकाग्रता and आभिमुख्य for the disciple, मुमुक्षु. Speaking of *Yoga*, the *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* points out its culmination, in the *mantras* (II-14, 15)—

यथैव बिम्बं मृदयोपलिप्तं तेजोमयं भ्राजते तत्सुधान्तम्।
तद्वात्मतत्त्वं प्रसमीक्ष्य देही एकः कृतार्थो भवते वीतशोकः॥
यदात्मतत्त्वेन तु ब्रह्मतत्त्व दीपोपमेनेह युक्तः प्रपश्येत्।
अजं ध्रुवं सर्वतत्त्वैर्विशुद्ध ज्ञात्वा देवं मुच्यते सर्वपाशैः॥

[Even as a mirror, stained by dust, shines brightly when it has been cleaned, so the embodied one seeing the truth of Ātman

realises oneness and becomes one of fulfilled purpose and freed from sorrow.

When the *yogī* realises the truth of Brahman through the 'perception' of the truth of Ātman in this body as the self-luminous entity, then, knowing the Divinity as unborn, eternal and free from all the modifications of *prakṛti*, he is freed from all fetters.]

As a preliminary to this development is given—

समे शुचौ शर्करवह्निवालुकाविवर्जिते शब्दजलाश्रयादिभिः ।
मनोनुकूले न तु चक्षुपीडने गुहानिवाताश्रयणे प्रयोजयेत् ॥

(Śve. U II–10)

[In a clean level place, free from pebbles, fire and gravel, free from disturbing noises and dampness, favourable to the concentration of the mind, not offensive to the eye, in a hidden retreat protected from the wind, let one undertake the practice of yoga]

Quoting this Śruti in the *Bhāsya* on the Sūtra (4-1-7-11) यत्रैकाग्रता तत्राविशेषात् (Meditation is to be undertaken wherever the mind gets concentration, because there is no specification in respect of direction, place and time). Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda points out that the phrase 'favourable to the concentration of the mind' moreover shows that meditation may be carried on wherever concentration of the mind may be attained—

'मनोनुकूले' इति चैषा श्रुतिर्यत्रैकाग्रता तत्रैवेत्येतदेव दर्शयति ।

Śrī Śrī Bādarāyanācārya, the author of the Sūtras, advises in a friendly way that with regard to the particulars mentioned in the Śruti such as place, there is no hard and fast rule—

सति त्वेतस्मिन् तद्गतेषु विशेषेष्वनियम इति सुहृद्भूत्वाचार्य आचष्टे ।

This shows that these must subserve the main purpose, namely unhindered practice of yoga. The same is true of the limbs of the yoga such as *āsana*, as the *Bhāsya* on the previous *adhikaraṇa* (4-1-6), beginning with the Sūtra—

आसीनस्सम्भवात् (7) (Sitting, one is to meditate, on account of the possibility) points out—

स्मरन्त्यपि च शिष्टा उपासनाङ्गत्वेनासनम् 'शुचौ देशे प्रतिष्ठाप्य स्थिरमासनमात्मनः' (गीता VI-11) इत्यादिना । अत एव पद्मकादीनामासनविशेषाणामुपदेशो योगशास्त्रे ।

[Authoritative authors also teach in their Smrtis that the sitting posture subserves the act of meditation, e g, (*Gītā* VI–11) 'Having made a firm seat for oneself in a pure spot'. For the same reason the *Yogaśāstra* teaches different sitting postures, such as *Padmāsana*.]

The *Pātañjalayogasūtra* (2-46) स्थिरसुखमासनम् (The posture is to be firm and comfortable) may be recalled in this connection. That the various shades as also the stages of yoga and as to how they are harmoniously related are taught in the *Gītā* is only too well known. In this process, whatever is not contradictory is accepted many a time from the other systems as well परमतमप्रतिषिद्धमनुमतं भवति। (Sū. Bhā. 2–4–5–12). The purport is in securing for the disciple the appropriate equipment in respect of his mind and intellect and not in the delineation of the karmas or the *upāsanas* just as the purport in discussing creation is not in delineating it—as it is shown to be a concoction—but in directing the attention towards the Creator as has already been explained. The actual disciplines that are prescribed which may have a *Vedic*, *Tāntric* or apparently a mixed complexion, would depend upon the particular *adhikārī* and the situation in which he is placed, much like the dictum that one has to follow his *svadharma* at any cost as taught by the *Gītā*—

श्रेयान् स्वधर्मो विगुणः परधर्मात्स्वनुष्ठितात् ।
स्वधर्मे निधनं श्रेयः परधर्मो भयावहः ॥ (III–35)
स्वभावनियतं कर्म कुर्वन्नाप्नोति किल्बिषम् ॥ (XVIII–47)

The statements in the *Sūtasamhitā*—

वैदिकी तान्त्रिकी चेति द्विजेन्द्रास्तान्त्रिकी तु सा ।
तान्त्रिकस्यैव नान्यस्य वैदिकी वैदिकस्य हि ॥ (1–5–4)

and

श्रुतिपथगलितानां मानुषाणां तु तन्त्रं
गुरुगुरुरखिलेशः सर्ववित्प्राह शम्भुः ।
श्रुतिपथनिरतानां तत्र नैवास्ति किञ्चि-
द्धितकरमिह सर्वं पुष्कलं सत्यमुक्तम् ॥

are to be understood in this manner. In the *ṭīkā* thereon Śrī Śrī Vidyāranyacarana points out that the culmination of the *Vaidic* and the *Tāntric* paths is the same viz., the realisation of the non-dual Brahman. However, the path to be pursued depends on the *adhikārī*—his *varna*, the appropriate initiations etc.

7.3.5 Vedantic Position Necessarily the Basis of All other Systems

In many cases what is prescribed to be meditated upon is the geometrical representation, as it were, of the situation which is beyond the pale of pictures or imagery, very much like Avidyā—the storehouse of all previous karma as also the cause of the world-illusion, thus presenting both the potential and the kinetic aspects—which is pictured as the serpent-power, *Kundalini* Quite often, the same situation is referred to differently as *Bhagavattattvasākṣātkāra* by the *Bhakta*, *Svarūpa-sākṣātkāra* or the dispelling of Avidyā by the Jñāni, *Asamprajñātasamādhi* by the Yogi, arousal of and piercing the *cakras* by the *Kuṇḍalinī* by the Śāktas etc. The various *mārgas* (paths), devious or straight, culminate in *Brahmavidyā* as already pointed out and it is only because of this that they are to be reckoned with and not because of the *siddhis* they promise. These are of the nature of eulogy and the seeker

*

after liberation is not concerned with them. The disciplines also speak of *Śakti* as non-different from Śiva with the illustration of moonlight and the Moon. Sometimes expressions like *acintyabhedābheda*, *avikriyapariṇāmavāda* etc., are used, which are reminders of the underlying situation that categorisation, causality etc , are all concocted and not enduring That the underlying Reality transcends speech and mind यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह (Tai U–2) is admitted in some sense or other by every system and also that the world defies explanation. Necessarily it would follow that the world is illusory, as the Vedāntin points out. Several other systems speak of the world as real, as otherwise the seeker in a premature state may be led astray A warning to this effect is given by the Vedāntins themselves—

अज्ञस्यार्धप्रबुद्धस्य सर्वं ब्रह्मेति यो वदेत् ।
महानिरयजालेषु स तेन विनियोजितः ॥

[To make an ignorant or a half-baked person contemplate as ' all this is Brahman ' would be veritably pushing him into a mesh of horrible hells]

However, as has already been made clear, all these disciplines lead in a straight or circuitous manner to the Vedāntic path of enquiry. Many a time concepts and terminology found in the Upanisads are seen to have been employed by other schools with varying connotations e g , *prakṛti, avyaktā, mahat* etc , (by the *Sāmkhyas*) and the term Yoga used variously by others The Vedāntic meaning of these terms are made clear in the *Bhāṣyas* on the Śrutis as also in the *Sūtrabhāṣya* e.g , on the *Ānumānikādhikarana* (1–4–1–1), the *Camasādhikarana* (1-4-2-8) etc The claims made by every one of the other schools that it is its system that is voiced by the Upaniṣads, are thereby counteracted Moreover, the

untenability of their positions is exposed by showing that the criticism levelled by each of them against Vedānta, far from achieving its aim, does in fact strike at the very root of its own system i.e., by hoisting one with one's own petard परदण्डेनैव परस्य ताडनम् (beating him with his own stick) ; the way is also shown as to how, by suitable modifications, each system may be accommodated in the Vedāntic scheme as a particular case. This is amply in evidence in the *Gītā*, the *Sūtasamhitā* etc., as is well known. This spirit—of abiding only in that Fundamental which is ever unchanging, seeing everything else from that point of view, bracing up to any situation involving confrontation and criticism and facing it, beating the opponent in his own game but without rancour, accommodating opposing systems as far as possible, paving the way for their absorption into the Vedāntic fold and leading the seeker towards the Supreme goal along the path that is most appropriate to him without violently dislodging him from his bearings—is maintained and handed over traditionally. This is in evidence, for example, in the famous work of Śrī Śrī Gauḍapādācārya viz., the *Māṇḍūkyakārikā* wherein the terminology and the arguments of the Buddhists are employed with advantage not only to establish the Vedāntic viewpoint as against the other systems but also to vanquish the Buddhist himself. This great Master, the uncompromising *advaitin*, is reputed to be the author of the *Subhagodaya* as well. Śrī Śrī Śankarabhagavatpadācārya, famous as the Bhāsyakāra, because of His inimitable *Bhāsyas* on the *Prasthānatraya*—the Upaniṣads, the *Brahmasūtras* and the *Bhagavadgītā*—is also well known as *Saṇmatasthāpanācārya* i.e, the *Ācārya* who put on a sound basis each of the six faiths viz., *Śaiva*, *Vaisṇava*, *Śākta*, *Saura*, *Gānāpatya* and *Kaumāra* and provided them with plenty of *stotra* literature. He is

the author of the *Ānandalaharī* and the *Saundaryalaharī* as also the celebrated *Prapañcasāra* No wonder He is acclaimed by each one of these devotional schools verily as their own champion Again it is in the spirit of the same tradition that Śrī Śrī Sureśvarācāryapāda has, as already pointed out, proclaimed that any other system has perforce to accept as its basis the Vedāntic position viz., that ignorance is a matter of empirical experience and that knowledge destroys it, and also that there are as many paths as there are persuasions—

वादिनामविसंवादस्तथाऽज्ञानेऽप्यसंशयः ॥
तद्बाधोऽप्यवबोधस्य बोधेनाभ्युपगम्यते ।
एतावतैव पर्याप्तमस्मद्राद्धान्तसिद्धये ॥
यया यया भवेत्पुसा व्युत्पत्तिः प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
सा सैव प्रक्रियेह स्यात्साध्वी सा चानवस्थिता ॥

(Bṛ. Vā. I–4–1365, 1366, 402)

It is Śrī Śrī Vārtikakārapāda that is the author of the *Mānasollāsa* as well The meditation on the *Aṣṭamūrti-svarūpa* prescribed in stanza IX of the hymn—meditation on the five elements etc., as the *Svarūpa* of Brahman—as a means of transcending and sublating them, is the pointer to other such meditations as well The *Mānasollāsa* follows it up in mentioning the concerned meditations in the set-up of *nāḍīs*, *cakras* etc , in the body of the individual and also brings in the *vyasti* (microcosmic) and the *samasti* (macrocosmic) correlations as also the meditation on the *Pranava*. This Vedāntic tradition is maintained even today Thus while the various other sects may be mutually opposed to one another, the fundamental point of view viz., that of Vedānta is not opposed to any of them, as the *Gaudapādakārikā* (3–17) says—परस्पर विरुध्यन्ते तैरय न विरुध्यते ॥ for it should be remembered that all *sādhanas* are calculated to effect the transformation

of the worshipper and the worshipped, the meditator and the meditated, the *Bhakta* and the *Bhagavān*, the seeker and the Sought etc , as also the means and the acts in each case into *Cit* or *Caitanya* which they all are in their kernel; and thus they culminate in realising the essential identification in perfect experience of the principle of 'thou' and the principle of 'That'

7.3.6 Nadis—Understanding the Experiences of Jiva in the Body, Exit etc.

Thus inconsonance with the Śruti, the *Mānasollāsa* and the *ṭikā* thereon have brought in an account of the subtle body, the *nādis* etc., whereby *pratikarmavyavasthā* stands explained. Incidentally, the way is shown for understanding the experiences of Yogis, *upāsakas* etc. Following the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* (2–3–16) already quoted, the *Mānasollāsa* (IV–22, 23) says—

शतं चैका च नाड्यः स्युस्तासामेका शिरोगता ॥
तयोर्ध्वमायन्मुक्तः स्यादिति वेदान्तशासनम् ।

[There are a hundred and one *nādis*. Of them, one goes into the *brahmarandhra* in the head. Going upwards by that, one attains (relative) immortality. Such is the Vedāntic teaching.]

This is made clear in the Sūtra (4–3–5–10) and the *Bhāṣya* thereon—

कार्यात्यये तदध्यक्षेण सहातः परमभिधानात् ।

कार्यब्रह्मलोकप्रलयप्रत्युपस्थाने सति तत्रैवोत्पन्नसम्यग्दर्शनाः सन्तस्तदध्यक्षेण हिरण्यगर्भेण सह अतः परं परिशुद्धं विष्णोः परम पदं प्रतिपद्यन्त इति । इत्थं क्रममुक्तिरनावृत्त्यादिश्रुत्यभिधानेभ्योऽभ्युपगन्तव्या । नहि अञ्जसैव गतिपूर्विका परप्राप्तिः संभवतीत्युपपादितम् ।

[In the event of the dissolution of the world of *Brahmā* that has come into being, jivas therein who have attained enlightenment in the meanwhile, enter, along with Hiranya-

garbha, the ruler of that world, what is higher than that viz , the Supreme, absolutely pure state of Visnu This kind of liberation by stages has to be admitted on the strength of Śrutis speaking of non-return etc , for it has already been established that it is incomprehensible that the Supreme Brahman should be reached by the act of going.]

So says the Smrti also as pointed out in the *Bhāsya* on the next Sūtra—स्मृतेश्च—

ब्रह्मणा सह ते सर्वे संप्राप्ते प्रतिसञ्चरे ।
परस्यान्ते कृतात्मानः प्रविशन्ति परं पदम् ॥

The exit of the jīva from the gross body means in effect the exit of the subtle body from the gross. This topic is discussed in the *Brahmasūtra* (4–2–9–17) and the *Bhāsya* thereon—

तदोकोग्रज्वलनं तत्प्रकाशितद्वारो विद्यासामर्थ्यात् तच्छेषगत्यनुस्मृति-योगाच्च हार्दानुगृहीतश्शताधिकया ।

[When jīva who has done *upāsana* in the manner prescribed for this purpose, is to depart, the top of his abode (the heart) gets illumined, the door of his exit gets illumined thereby. By the efficacy of the knowledge and practice of *upāsana* involving the way as well, favoured by Him (Brahman) who resides in the heart, the jīva departs through the hundred and first *nādi*.]

The subsequent Sūtras such as रश्म्यनुसारी (4–2–9–18) (Proceeds along the rays of the Sun) and the *Bhāsya* thereon point out that the *nādis* are related to the rays of the Sun. In the *pādas* 3 and 4 of the fourth *adhyāya* of the *Brahmasūtra* and the *Bhāsya* thereon, a detailed discussion is given in respect of the manner of exit and the subsequent journeys of jīvas The *nādis* thus provide the means of understanding not only the ordinary experiences of the jīva when he is alive i.e , when the subtle body resides in the

gross body, but also its exit. The *Brahmasūtra* and the *Bhāsya* thereon draw attention further to the experiences of the jīva while in the gross body, such as the dream and the deep sleep states. Says the *Sūtrabhāsya* (1–3–5–20)—

संप्रसादशब्दोदितो जीवो जागरितव्यवहारे देहेन्द्रियपञ्जराध्यक्षो भूत्वा तद्वासनानिर्मितांश्च स्वप्नान्नाडीचरोऽनुभूय शान्तः शरण प्रेप्सुरुभयरूपादपि शरीराभिमानात् समुत्थाय सुषुप्तावस्थायां परंज्योतिराकाशशब्दितं परं ब्रह्मोपसंपद्य विशेषविज्ञानवत्त्वं च परित्यज्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते।

[The jīva referred to by the term *samprasāda* (serene) plays the role of the supervising director of this cage made up of the body and the senses, during all the parlance of the waking state, and then moving in the *nādis*, he experiences the dreams created by the impressions of that waking state Then becoming tired and desirous of having some refuge he rises above (i e., gets detached from) his identity with both kinds of bodies (gross and subtle), approaches in the deep sleep state the Supreme Light that is the Supreme Brahman referred to by the term *Ākāśa*, and getting rid of the particularised cognition attains his true nature]

Commenting on the Sruti (Chā. U. 8–6–3)—

तद्यत्रैतत् सुप्तः समस्तः संप्रसन्नः स्वप्नं न विजानात्यासु तदा नाडीषु सृप्तो भवति। the *Bhāṣya* says—

सृप्तः प्रविष्टो नाडीभिर्द्वारभूताभिर्हृदयाकाशं गतो भवतीत्यर्थः।

[When jīva is asleep, reposing under perfect rest so that he sees no dream, then he has entered inside through the *nādis*. The *Bhāsya* clarifies that this entry means that through the doorway of the *nāḍis* he enters into the *Ākāśa* of the heart (i.e., the Supreme Brahman)]

The topic is discussed in detail in the Sūtra (3–2–2–7)— तदभावो नाडीषु तच्छ्रुतेरात्मनि च। (The absence of dream is in the *nāḍis* as well as in Ātman as per Śruti) as also in the next Sūtra and the *Bhāsya* thereon. The experience of the jīva

pertaining to these three states is delineated succinctly in the *Mānasollāsa* (IV–23 to 27) for which purpose an exposition pertaining to the *nādis* is given, as the *ṭīkā* points out—

इदानीं नाडीभेदतत्स्वभावकार्याद्यनुक्रमणप्रयोजनं चिदात्मनोऽवस्थात्रययोगोपपत्तिमनुक्रमते—यदा बुद्धिगतैरिति ।

यदा बुद्धिगतैः पुण्यैः प्रेरितेन्द्रियमार्गतः ॥
शब्दादीन् विषयान् भुङ्क्ते तदा जागरितं भवेत् ।
संहृतेष्विन्द्रियेष्वेषु जाग्रत्संस्कारजान् पुमान् ॥
मानसान् विषयान् भुङ्क्ते स्वप्नावस्था तदा भवेत् ।
मनसोऽप्युपसंहारः सुषुप्तिरिति कथ्यते ॥
तस्मान्मायासमाच्छन्नः सन्मात्रो वर्तते पुमान् ।
मूढो मत्तोऽज्ञ इत्येवं मायावेशात् प्रकाशते ॥
सुखमस्वाप्समित्येवं प्रबोधसमये पुमान् ।
सच्चिदानन्दरूपस्सन् सम्यगेव प्रकाशते ॥

[When Ātman becomes conscious of objects of senses like sound etc , (within and without the body) through the sense organs which are impelled by the merit (and demerit) ingrained in the *buddhi*, then it is the waking state.

When the sense organs are withdrawn (from the orbs into the *nādis*) and Ātman is conscious of the mental images generated by the *samskāras* of the waking experiences, it is the dream state.

The withdrawal of even the *antahkarana* with all its *vāsanās* into the causal state viz , the Avidyā, when all forms of cognition cease to appear, is spoken of as the deep sleep state Thus all the three states of Ātman, the Consciousness, are due to His association (which can only be due to Māyā) with the *upādhis*, undergoing changes of state like the waking etc Therefore Ātman remains as pure Existence, veiled by Māyā. It is because of Māyā that He appears as deluded, inert, ignorant and so on.

Ātman that is Existence, Consciousness and Bliss, does manifest Himself on waking from sleep as 'I slept happy'.]

7.3.7 Panchikarana—Vyashti and Samashti—Triad of States and Turiya—Pranava

While explaining the *Mānasollāsa*, the *ṭīkā* quotes frequently from the *Pañcīkaraṇa* of Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda which (itself based on the *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad*) says—

पञ्चीकृतपञ्चमहाभूतानि तत्कार्यं सर्वं विराडित्युच्यते । एतत्स्थूलशरीरमात्मनः ।

इन्द्रियैरर्थोपलब्धिर्जागरितम् । तदुभयाभिमान्यात्मा विश्वः । एतत्त्रयमकारः ।

अपञ्चीकृतपञ्चमहाभूतानि पञ्चतन्मात्राणि तत्कार्यं च प्रञ्चप्राणा दशेन्द्रियाणि मनोबुद्धिश्चेति सप्तदशक लिङ्गं भौतिकं हिरण्यगर्भ इत्युच्यते। एतत्सूक्ष्मशरीरमात्मनः ।

करणेषूपसंहृतेषु जागरितसंस्कारजः प्रत्ययः सविषयः स्वप्न इत्युच्यते। तदुभयाभिमान्यात्मा तैजसः । एतत्त्रयमुकारः ।

शरीरद्वयकारणमात्माज्ञानं साभासमव्याकृतमित्युच्यते। एतत् कारणशरीरमात्मनः । तच्च न सन्नासन्नापि सदसन्न भिन्न नाभिन्नं नापि भिन्नाभिन्नं कुतश्चित् न निरवयव न सावयवं नोभयं किन्तु केवलब्रह्मात्मैकत्वज्ञानापनोद्यम् ।

सर्वप्रकारज्ञानोपसंहारे बुद्धेः कारणात्मनावस्थान सुषुप्तिः । तदुभयाभिमान्यात्मा प्राज्ञः । एतत्त्रय मकारः ।

अकार उकारे, उकारो मकारे, मकार ॐकारे, ॐकारोऽहम्येव। अहमात्मा साक्षी केवलश्चिन्मात्रस्वरूपः, नाज्ञान नापि तत्कार्यं किन्तु नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तसत्यस्वभावं परमानन्दाद्वयं प्रत्यग्भूतचैतन्यं ब्रह्मैवाहमस्मीत्यभेदेनावस्थान समाधिः ।

'तत्त्वमसि', 'ब्रह्माहमस्मि', 'प्रज्ञानमानन्द ब्रह्म', 'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म' इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः ।

The sum total of all the quintuplicated five elements and their products is said to be the *Virāṭ*. This is the gross

body of Ātman. Waking is that state where the knowledge of objects is derived through the senses. Ātman, in identification with the gross body (the seat of the sense organs) and the waking state, is known as the *Viśva.*

The *Pañcīkaraṇavārtika* (30) of Śrī Śrī Sureśvarācāryapāda says—

येयं जागरितावस्था शरीरं करणाश्रयम् ।
यस्तयोरभिमानी स्याद्विश्व इत्यभिधीयते ॥

These three (the gross body, the waking state and *Viśva*) together are denoted by the single first syllable अ (A) of ॐ (AUM) the *Praṇava.*

This is to drive home the factual situation that all distinctions such as *vyaṣṭi* and *samaṣṭi, ādhyātmika, ādhibhautika* and *ādhidaivika, upādhi* and *aupādhika* are fictitious, and the syllable अ serves to denote the *Virāṭ* i.e., Īśvara with *samaṣṭi upādhi* as also *Viśva* i e., jīva with *vyaṣṭi upādhi* i.e., '*Tat*' and '*tvam*'; likewise the other two syllables as well.

The five unquintuplicated subtle elements and their products viz, the five vital airs, the ten organs (sensory and motor), the mind and the intellect, seventeen in number, constitute the material *liṅgaśarīra* spoken of as Hiraṇyagarbha. This is said to be the subtle body of Ātman.

When the sense organs are withdrawn, the Consciousness appearing as both the subject and the object along with the knowledge arising from the impressions of the waking state, is called the dream state. Ātman in identification with both these (the subtle body and the dream state) is called *Taijasa.* Says the *Vārtika*—

करणोपरमे जाग्रत्संस्कारोत्थं प्रबोधवत् ॥ (37)

ग्राह्यग्राहकरूपेण स्फुरणं स्वप्न उच्यते ।
अभिमानी तयोर्यस्तु तैजसः परिकीर्तितः ॥ (38)

These three (the subtle body, the dream state and *Taijasa*) together are denoted by the single second syllable उ (U) of the *Praṇava*.

The *cidābhāsa* together with the ajñāna veiling Ātman which is the cause of the gross and the subtle bodies, is spoken of as *avyākṛta*, the undifferentiated This is the causal body of Ātman. This is neither existent nor non-existent, not even both existent and non-existent, neither different from nor identical with anything whatsoever, not even both different from and identical with anything whatsoever. This is neither composite nor without parts and not both composite and without parts. But this is dispelled only by the knowledge of the identity of Brahman and Ātman.

When all cognitions (of waking and dream states) are withdrawn and the determinative intellect lapses into its causal condition (i.e., like the seed which is the potential form, for example, of a banyan tree) it is called the state of deep sleep. Ātman in identification with these two viz., the causal body and the state of deep sleep is spoken of as the *Prājña*. These three (the causal body, the deep sleep state and the *Prājña*) together are denoted by the single last syllable म् (M) of the *Praṇava*. The *Vārtika* says—

ज्ञानानामुपसंहारो बुद्धेः कारणतास्थितिः ॥ (42)
वटबीजे वटस्येव सुषुप्तिरभिधीयते ।
अभिमानी तयोर्यस्तु प्राज्ञ इत्यभिधीयते ॥ (43)

Says the *Vārtika* in addition—

विश्वं वैराजरूपेण पश्येद्भेदनिवृत्तये ॥ (31)

हिरण्यगर्भरूपेण तैजसं चिन्तयेद्बुधः । (39)
जगत्कारणरूपेण प्राज्ञात्मानं विचिन्तयेत् ॥ (43)
विश्वतैजससौपुप्तविराट्सूत्राक्षरात्मभिः ।
विभिन्नमिव संमोहादेकं तत्त्वं चिदात्मकम् ॥ (44)
विश्वादिकत्रयं यस्माद्वैराजादित्रयात्मकम् ।
एकत्वेनैव संपश्येदन्याभावप्रसिद्धये ॥ (45)

In conformity with the *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad,* as pointed out in the *Siddhāntaleśasangraha* (1) and its *ṭīkā* as also the commentaries on the *Pañcīkaraṇavārtika,* the above lines are to be understood to mean that in each of the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep, the *vyaṣṭi* I-consciousness of the concerned experiencer viz., *Viśva*, *Taijasa* or *Prājña* must be looked upon as extending to include the corresponding *samaṣṭi* viz., *Virāt*, Hiranyagarbha and Īśvara so that in each case the notion of the concerned difference which is illusory, may be removed. With this extended outlook अ stands for *Viśva*, उ for *Taijasa* and म् for *Prājña* i e., the experiencer in each case. Says the *Vārtika*—

अकारमात्रं विश्वः स्यादुकारस्तैजसः स्मृतः ।
प्राज्ञो मकार इत्येवं परिपश्येत्क्रमेण तु ॥ (47)

The experiencer, *Viśva*, of the waking state symbolised by अ is to be merged in that of the dream state symbolised by उ ; this *Taijasa* again which is subtle is to be merged in the experiencer of the deep sleep state symbolised by म् ; and this *Prājña*, the causal personality, is to be merged in Oṁkara which is to be merged in one's own Self, the Pure Consciousness. In the case of the seeker of highest competence, given to the path of enquiry, this merging would mean the recognition of the identity of the effect which is only in name and a mere superimposition, with the cause, in the spirit of the *Vācārambhanaśruti* A seeker of lesser

competence, however, should, as a prelude to the realisation of this identity in *samādhi*, contemplate with firm determination and great effort the merging of all these in the order of gross, subtle and causal states, in Ātman, the Pure Consciousness. Says the *Vārtika*—

समाधिकालात्प्रागेवं विचिन्त्यातिप्रयत्नतः ।
स्थूलसूक्ष्मक्रमात्सर्वं चिदात्मनि विलापयेत् ॥ (48)

अकारं पुरुषं विश्वमुकारे प्रविलापयेत् ।
उकारं तैजसं सूक्ष्मं मकारे प्रविलापयेत् ॥ (49)

मकारं कारणं प्राज्ञं चिदात्मनि विलापयेत् । (50)

'I am Ātman, the Witness of all, the Absolute, of the nature of Pure Consciousness; I am neither ajñāna nor even its product but Brahman Itself, the Eternal, Ever Pure, Enlightened, Ever Free and Absolute Existence by very nature; I am the Supreme Bliss, One without a second, the Innermost Consciousness; I am *Praṇavasvarūpa Vāsudeva*' —Thus the discerning, contemplating mind must be merged into Ātman, the Pure Consciousness and should not be disturbed. One should abide in that Infinite Consciousness like the full, motionless ocean. Remaining in this state of absolute identification is what is termed *samādhi*. Says the *Vārtika* -

चिदात्माऽहं नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तसदद्वयः ॥ (50)

परमानन्दसन्दोहवासुदेवोऽहमोमिति ।
ज्ञात्वा विवेचकं चित्तं तत्साक्षिणि विलापयेत् ॥ (51)

चिदात्मनि विलीनं चेत्तच्चित्तं नैव चालयेत् ।
पूर्णबोधात [illegible] मुद्रवत् ॥ (52)

Śrutis such as 'That [illegible] ahman am I', 'Consciousness Bliss is Brahman', [illegible] Brahman' are the *pramāṇa* in this respect.

7.4.1 Chitsvarupa, the Experiencer of All States

Thus all these states centre round the experiencer. By the discussion of the experiences in the waking, like the *pratikarmavyavasthā*, it has been shown how the experiencer *Viśva* is essentially *Citsvarūpa*. Consideration of the dream state shows that Ātman is different from the body etc, that He is Self-effulgent and that He is untouched by anything, as the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (4–3), the *Vārtikasāra* and the *Anubhūtiprakāśa* make clear—

देहादिव्यतिरिक्तत्व स्वप्रभत्वमसङ्गता । (*Anubhūtiprakāśa* 18–24)

pointing again to the same *Citsvarūpa*. Consideration of the deep sleep state shows that Ātman is of the nature of Non-duality, Consciousness that never ceases and Absolute Bliss—

अद्वैतत्वं दृष्ट्यलोप आनन्दैकस्वभावता । (*Anubhūtiprakāśa* 18–25)

The experiencer of all states is thus only *Citsvarūpa*. The states, the experiences thereof, the divisions within them as *ādhyātmika* etc, are all to be traced to *upādhis* set up by Avidyā or Māyā Shrouded, as it were, by the *upādhis*, the causal, the subtle and the gross bodies—all the three in the case of *Viśva*, the first two in the case of *Taijasa* and only the first in the case of *Prājña*—it is this One *Citsvarūpa* i.e., the One Īśvara, that appears as the experiencer of the three states. It is again this One *Citsvarūpa* with Māyā or its products as *upādhis* that 'shines' as various objects experienced in each of the three states. The experience of anything whatsoever in any of the three states must be traced to the experiencer thereof i e, to his essential *Citsvarūpa* which is 'inside' of these *upādhis*; this is the import of the phrase—

नानाच्छिद्रघटोदरस्थितमहादीपप्रभाभास्वरं

in the stanza, the outlets being the corresponding *vṛttis* as

also the senses etc., as pointed out by the word आदि in the next line—

ज्ञानं यस्य तु चक्षुरादिकरणद्वारा बहिः स्पन्दते ।

While it is by the Shine of the Supreme Lord who manifests Himself by pervading the entire universe that even the luminaries like the Sun glow, what is to be said of the other objects like a pot! So says the *Mānasollāsa* (IV–28)—

इत्थं जगत्समाविश्य भासमाने महेश्वरे ।
सूर्यादयोऽपि भासन्ते किमुतान्ये घटादयः ॥

Śrutis such as येन सूर्यस्तपति तेजसेद्धः (Tai. Br. 3-12-9-7) and येनादित्यस्तपति तेजसा भ्राजसा च (Tai. U. 4-3) point to this. Therefore all things derive their existence and shine from the Existence and Shine of Īśvara in whom they abide, as being superimposed. By Śruti, Brahman is declared to be Existence, Consciousness and Infinite, as says the *Mānasollāsa* (IV-29)—

तस्मात् सत्ता स्फुरत्ता च भावानामीश्वराश्रयात् ।
सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं च श्रुत्या ब्रह्मोपदिश्यते ॥

That is to say, things have no existence or shine of their own; as set up by Māyā, the world of names and forms is illusory, as the *Vākyasudhā* (20) points out—

अस्ति भाति प्रियं रूपं नाम चेत्यंशपञ्चकम् ।
आद्यत्रयं ब्रह्मरूपं मायारूपं ततो द्वयम् ॥

The world of names and forms, be it pertaining to either the waking or the dream, is illusory. Commenting on the *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad*—4, स्वप्नस्थानोऽन्तःप्रज्ञः (He whose sphere of activity is the dream, who is conscious of internal objects etc.,) the *Bhāṣya* says—

जाग्रत्प्रज्ञा अनेकसाध [illegible]
सती तथाभूतं संस्कारं मन

[Waking-consciousness being associated as it is with several means and appearing as experiencing objects that are external, as it were, though in reality they are nothing but the modes of the mind, leaves in the mind corresponding impressions]

Also the *Bhāṣya* on the Śruti (Br U. 6-3-19)—

यत्र सुप्तो न कञ्चन कामं कामयते न कञ्चन स्वप्नं पश्यति ।

[Falling asleep he craves no desires and sees no dreams.]

says—जागरितेऽपि यद्दर्शनं तदपि स्वप्नं मन्यते श्रुतिः ।

[The experience of the waking state also is considered by the Śruti to be but a dream]

The non-difference between the waking and the dream states has already been pointed out; and from the higher point of view they do not exist at all. Forms are illusory i.e., they are only imagined; they have no existence of their own i.e , *tucchā*; and the names associated with them are only *vikalpas*. But still the objects appear to exist like the rope-snake or the shell-silver. In contrast to the *adhiṣṭhāna* which is *Saccitsvarūpa* i.e., Existence and Sentience, the superimposed should be deemed to be non-existent and insentient i.e., *asatkalpa* as expressed in the third stanza of the hymn. So it is that the *Mānasollāsa* (IV-30) says—

जाग्रत्स्वप्नोद्भव सर्वमसत्यं जडमन्धवत् ।

Thus though the *Mānasollāsa* countenances, as a first step, the viewpoint that the waking is relatively more real as compared with the dream, further enquiry leads to the situation that the difference between them is not one of kind. The enquirer who holds on to the waking as real, seeks to account for all the experiences of the waking. The endeavour of the scientist who is likewise wedded to the waking state is also to formulate a unified theory which provides an explanation for all the phenomena with a premium on the

waking state. Also, seekers who are in this stage point out that the *sādhana*—like karma, *upāsana* and even enquiry—is to be undertaken by the experiencer in the waking state and not in the dream state. Thus they involve themselves, in one way or the other, in parlance and stick to it. Therefore to evolve such sticklers, their point of view is accepted as it were, in the first instance. Subsequently, however, they are led through enquiry to the higher point of view which liberates them from such entanglements. Thus enquiry conducted in a detached manner without involving oneself in the waking or any state, leads to the negation of the 'experienced' in every state, while the experiencer who recollects himself to be the same in all states remains untainted—

दृष्टमेव प्रतिबुद्धः प्रत्याचष्टे । द्रष्टारन्तु तमेव प्रत्यभिजानाति . . . ।

This dictum given in the *Sūtrabhāsya* (1–3–5–19) in the context of dream thus holds good with equal vigour to the waking as well.

7.4.2 Analysis of Aham—Three Meanings

Essentially the *Svarūpa* of the experiencer from which all the experiences stem is Existence and Consciousness as already seen. All other paraphernalia associated with the *Svarūpa* in the various states are *upādhis* set up by Avidyā which belong to the realm of the experienced. As such this *Svarūpa* of the experiencer is that of Īśvara, the *Adhiṣṭhāna.* This *Svarūpa* of the experiencer, stripped of all the last vestiges of the experienced i.e., *idam,* can only be indicated by the word *aham* 'I'. Says the *Naiskarmyasiddhi* (2–54, 55, 56)—

नाज्ञासिषमिति प्राह सुषुप्तादुत्थितोऽपि हि ।

लक्षणं परमात्मनः ॥

*

प्रत्यक्त्वादतिसूक्ष्मत्वादात्मदृष्ट्यनुशीलनात् ।
अतो वृत्तीर्विहायान्या ह्यहंवृत्त्योपलक्ष्यते ॥

आत्मना चाविनाभावमथवा विलयं व्रजेत् ।
न तु पक्षान्तरं यायादतश्चाहंधियोच्यते ॥

[One who wakes up from deep sleep says 'I did not know anything in deep sleep', as is well known. Here the term 'I' indicates the pure Self, just as the term 'iron' in the statement 'the iron burns' indicates fire by which the iron has become red hot.

Since the ego is felt as being within, is very subtle and is blended with the conception of Self, Self is indicated by the ego-sense bereft of all other aspects viz., those of 'this' or 'thou'.

The ego either fuses with Self or disappears; it has no alternative. Hence the ego-sense indicates Self.]

The *Mānasollāsa*, after driving home that the existence and shine of everything in the universe are due to the Omnipresent Īśvara as the Substratum of the universe, now establishes that Īśvara Himself is the innermost Self of all creatures manifesting Himself as 'I' in them—

एवं सर्वजगदधिष्ठानरूपतया सर्वानुस्यूतस्येश्वरस्य सर्वसत्तास्फुरत्तात्मत्वमुपपाद्य तस्यैव प्रत्यगात्मत्वं पूर्वश्लोकोक्तमुपपादयति—ईश्वरश्चाहमिति ।

ईश्वरश्चाहमित्येवं भासते सर्वजन्तुषु ॥ (Mā. IV–30)

When one is referring to the content of one's innermost experience which pertains to oneself as 'I', one is no doubt aware of Śiva, not as He is in Himself i e., as the Supreme Lord, the inner Controller and, in fact, bereft of all *upādhis*, but as identified with the ego-sense; this is because of Māyā. Says the *Sūtasamhitā* (1–8–36, 37)—

तमहंप्रत्ययव्याजात्सर्वे जानन्ति जन्तवः ॥
तथापि शिवरूपेण न विजानन्ति मायया ।

But why do they not recognise Him as Īśvara? In answer to this question, the *Mānasollāsa* analyses the content of 'I', as the *ṭīkā* points out. It is pointed out that 'I' is used in three different senses—

प्रतिज्ञातमर्थमुपपादयितुमहङ्कारं भिनत्ति ।—

निर्विकल्पश्च शुद्धश्च मलिनश्चेत्यहं त्रिधा। (Mā. IV–31)

In general, as pertaining to all creatures, 'I' would mean the impure entity i.e., the blend of Self with the superimposed ego stained by its intimate association with body, sense organs etc. This is like *ākāśa* pervaded by dense darkness, appearing to be finite and impenetrable—

देहेन्द्रियादिसंसर्गान्मलिनं कलुषीकृतम् ॥

यथाकाशं तमोरूढं स्फुरत्यनवकाशवत् । (Mā. IV-33, 34)

The pure 'I' sense is described by the *Mānasollāsa* (IV-32, 33) and the *ṭīkā* thereon. Though under ordinary circumstances Ātman does not present Himself to all, the Pure Ātman does occasionally manifest Himself to him who has thoroughly investigated the nature of jīva and Īśvara and is convinced that the pure 'I' does not include the non-Self like the physical body and other *upādhis* and who has accordingly stripped his Real Self of all the limitations ascribed to Him. Though he is yet to realise the Brahman–Ātman identity, this pure 'I' is manifested temporarily at the time of discrimination just as *ākāśa* is seen through the starlight to a limited extent—

विवेकसमये शुद्धं देहादीनां व्यपोहनात् ॥

यथान्तरिक्षं सङ्क्षिप्तनक्षत्रैः किञ्चिदीक्ष्यते ।

नैवात्मा कदापि भासत इत्याशङ्क्य, स्वभावतः सर्वेषां भानाभावेऽपि विचारितत्वंपदार्थतत्त्वस्य कदाचिद्भानं भवत्येवेत्यभिप्रेत्य तत्साधनं शुद्धमहङ्कारमुदाहरति—विवेकसमय इति । विवेकसमये देहादीनामनात्मत्वेनाहमवभास्यत्वस्य व्यपोहनात्, परिच्छेदकाभावात् शुद्धमेवात्मतत्त्वं ब्रह्म भासत इत्यर्थः ।

विवेकसमये भासमानमाकारं दृष्टान्तेन स्पष्टयन् अस्य साक्षाद्ब्रह्मभावाद्विशेषमाह —यथान्तरिक्षमिति ।

This is an echo of what Śrī Śrī Bhagavatpāda has said in the *Gītābhāsya* (XVIII–66)—

अविवेकिनां ह्यज्ञानकाले बालानां दृश्यते 'दीर्घोऽहं', 'गौरोऽहं' इति देहादिसङ्घातेऽहंप्रत्ययः; न तु विवेकिनाम्, 'अन्योऽहं देहादि-सङ्घातात्' इति ज्ञानवतां तत्काले देहादिसङ्घातेऽहंप्रत्ययो भवति ।

The undifferentiated or universal 'I' is the Supreme Brahman who is devoid of all distinctions, like unto *ākāśa*, absolutely free from dust, darkness, smoke and cloud—

निर्विकल्पं परंब्रह्म निर्धूताखिलकल्पनम् ॥
धूल्यन्धकारधूमाभ्रनिर्मुक्तगगनोपमम् । (Mā. IV-31, 32)

The Lord, quite deluded as it were by Māyā, manifests Himself by Vidyā in the plenary experience. Ātman shines in full when the undifferentiated 'I' is meditated upon. Therefore one's endeavour should be towards dispelling Māyā and realising the Pure Self. So say the *Mānasollāsa* (IV-35, 36) and the *tīkā* thereon—

माययाधिकसम्मूढो विद्ययेशः प्रकाशते ॥
निर्विकल्पानुसन्धाने सम्यगात्मा प्रकाशते ।

तस्मात् मायानिवृत्तये निर्विकल्पात्मावभासने यत्नः कार्यः ।

The purpose of stanza 4 of the hymn is being made clear by this *Mānasollāsa*. It is to provide the means to achieve the desired end by securing the knowledge of Brahman and abide in It, by enquiry into the nature of one's Real Self as revealed by the 'I' experience. The prima facie view on getting acquainted with the stanza is to regard it as showing the way to the understanding of *pratikarmavyavasthā*. The *Mānasollāsa* has shown that *pratikarmavyavasthā* is brought in

by the hymn only by way of *upalaksaṇa*. The question raised pertains in reality to all experiences—sensory and otherwise, outside the body as well as inside, the triad of states viz., the waking etc., yogic experience, even exit from the body, *Samādhi*, *Jīvanmukti*, contemplation on the *Nirvikalpaka* etc. The entire field of experiences is thus sought to be understood. In doing so, first of all, the empirical experiences pertaining to the impure 'I', the doer and the enjoyer as in 'I am the doer', 'I am the experiencer' अहं कर्ता, अहं भोक्ता are considered; then those pertaining to the Pure 'I', the Witness-self, and further the experience of the *Nirvikalpa* 'I' as revealed in *Samādhi* or *Akhaṇḍākāra-vṛttijñāna*, the threefold experience of 'I' thus relating, for example, to the *antaḥkaraṇāvacchinnacaitanya*, the *antaḥkaraṇo-pahitacaitanya* and the *antaḥkaraṇopalakṣitacaitanya*. With the experience of the last of these, the 'experienced' stands sublated showing that it is non-existent, *asat*, and had only been superposed and was only *avicāritasaṃsiddha*.

7.4.3 Analysis of Experience 'I know'

The *Mānasollāsa* provides the means by drawing attention to the experience of the Witness-self, in the first instance, culminating in the experience of the *Nirvikalpaka* by following the hymn which asks one to enquire into the '*jānāmi*' experience which is that of the Witness-self who shines by Himself '*tameva bhāntam*'. The *Naiskarmyasiddhi* points out the method, in the *śloka* (3–39) and the *ṭīkā* thereon—

जिघ्राणीममहं गन्धमिति यो वेत्त्यविक्रियः ।
स आत्मा तत्परं ज्योतिः शिरसीदं वचः श्रुतेः ॥

छन्दोगानां महावाक्यं तच्छेषभूतन्यायप्रदर्शकावान्तरवाक्य च श्लोकेन दर्शयति जिघ्राणीममिति ।

This is in tune with the description of *Aiśvarya* in relation to the *Uttamapurusa* i e., the liberated as given in the *Chāndogya-śruti* (8-12-3) and the *Bhāsya* thereon. As regards the *Uttamapurusa*, says the *Bhāsya*—

एवं च स उत्तमपुरुष उत्तमश्चासौ पुरुषश्चेत्युत्तमपुरुषः स एवोत्तम-पुरुषः। अक्षिस्वप्नपुरुषौ व्यक्ताव्यक्तश्च सुषुप्तः समस्तः संप्रसन्नोऽशरीरश्च स्वेन रूपेणेति। एषामेष स्वेन रूपेणावस्थितः क्षराक्षरौ व्याकृताव्याकृताव-पेक्ष्योत्तमपुरुषः कृतनिर्वचनो ह्ययं गीतासु।

[He is the *Purusa* that is the Highest. The *Purusa* associated with the eye and the *Purusa* associated with the dream are the manifest ones The one associated with deep sleep, with all his senses etc , withdrawn, wholly serene, is the unmanifest one. The one established in Himself is without any embodiment whatsoever Among these, this one established in Himself is the 'Highest' in comparison with the perishable and the imperishable i.e , with the manifest and the unmanifest The term '*Uttamapurusa*' is explained in the *Gitā* as is well known]

The *Gītāślokas* referred to here are—(XV–16, 17, 18)—

द्वाविमौ पुरुषौ लोके क्षरश्चाक्षर एव च।
क्षरः सर्वाणि भूतानि कूटस्थोऽक्षर उच्यते॥

उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः परमात्मेत्युदाहृतः।
यो लोकत्रयमाविश्य बिभर्त्यव्यय ईश्वरः॥

यस्मात्क्षरमतीतोऽहमक्षरादपि चोत्तमः।
अतोऽस्मि लोके वेदे च प्रथितः पुरुषोत्तमः॥

[There are these two *Purusas* in the world, the perishable and the imperishable, the perishable comprises of all creatures; the immutable is called the imperishable.

But distinct from these is the Highest *Purusa*, spoken of as the Supreme Self, the indestructible Lord who pervades and sustains the three worlds.

Because I transcend the perishable and am higher still than even the imperishable, therefore am I known in the world and in the Veda as 'Purusottama', the Highest *Purusa.*]

In respect of the *Aiśvarya* of the *Uttamapurusa* say the Śruti (Ch. U. 8–12–3) and the *Bhāsya*—

स उत्तमपुरुषः स तत्र पर्येति जक्षत्क्रीडन्रममाणः स्त्रीभिर्वा यानैर्वा ज्ञातिभिर्वा नोपजनꣳ स्मरन्निदꣳ शरीरꣳ स यथा प्रयोग्य आचरणे युक्त एवमेवायमस्मिञ्छरीरे प्राणो युक्तः ।

स संप्रसादः स्वेन रूपेण तत्र स्वात्मनि स्वस्थतया सर्वात्मभूतः पर्येति । क्वचिदिन्द्राद्यात्मना जक्षद्धसन्भक्षयन्वा भक्ष्यानुच्चावचानीप्सितान् क्वचिन्मनोमात्रैः सङ्कल्पादेव समुत्थितैर्ब्राह्मलौकिकैर्वा क्रीडन् स्त्र्यादिभी रममाणश्च मनसैव । नोपजनं स्त्रीपुंसयोरन्योन्योपगमेन जायत इत्युपजनम्, आत्मभावेन वात्मसामीप्येन जायत इत्युपजनम्, इदं शरीरम्, तन्न स्मरन् । तत्स्मरणे हि दु.खमेव स्यात् । दुःखात्मकत्वात्तस्य । नन्वनुभूतं चेन्न स्मरेदसर्वज्ञत्वं मुक्तस्य । नैष दोषः । येन मिथ्याज्ञानादिना जनितम्, तच्च मिथ्याज्ञानादि विद्ययोच्छेदितम्, अतस्तन्नानुभूतमेवेति न तदस्मरणे सर्वज्ञत्वहानिः । न ह्युन्मत्तेन ग्रहगृहीतेन वा यदनुभूतं तदुन्मादाद्यपगमेऽपि स्मर्तव्यं स्यात् । तथेहापि संसारिभिरविद्यादोषवद्भिर्यदनुभूयते तत्सर्वात्मानमशरीरं न स्पृशति । अविद्यानिमित्ताभावात् । ये तूच्छिन्नदोषैर्मृदितकषायैर्मानसाः सत्याः कामा अनृतापिधाना अनुभूयन्ते विद्याभिव्यङ्ग्यत्वात् त एव मुक्तेन सर्वात्मभूतेन संबध्यन्त इत्यात्मज्ञानस्तुतये निर्दिश्यन्ते । अतः साध्वेतद्विशिनष्टि 'य एते ब्रह्मलोके' इति । यत्र क्वचन भवन्तोऽपि ब्रह्मण्येव हि ते लोके भवन्तीति सर्वात्मत्वाद्ब्रह्मण उच्यन्ते ।

[He is the Highest Person There He moves about laughing, playing, rejoicing with women, vehicles or relations, not remembering this body in which he was born As an animal is yoked to a chariot even so is the *prāna* attached to this body

He, the wholly serene one, being the Self of all, 'moves about' in his own Self, ever abiding in himself. At one place

in the form of Indra etc., he makes merry through laughter or enjoyment of various dishes of his desire; elsewhere plays with women who present themselves by his mere wish, or those of Brahmaloka and rejoices in his mind, not in the least mindful of this worldly body the mere remembrance of which would indeed result only in grief, as it is the very embodiment of grief. If what has been experienced were to escape memory, would not the omniscience of the liberated be in jeopardy? No, by no means is this defective. Whatever had shown up because of illusory knowledge has been sublated by the recognition that it was all illusory, hence as not being experienced at all its non-recollection is not a slur on his omniscience. Whatever is experienced by the insane or the possessed is not expected to be related to memory, after the cure of the insanity etc. Likewise, here also, whatever is experienced by the ignorant involved in *samsāra* does not touch the unembodied Universal Self since the incidence of Avidyā is no longer there. The objects of desire that are at the mental level, real, and ordinarily concealed by Avidyā and which are enjoyed by those bereft of defects and impurity of mind, become manifest by Vidyā; hence they alone are related to the liberated who has attained Universal-Selfhood. This is mentioned here by way of eulogising Ātman-Knowledge. Thus rightly are they qualified as 'these in the Brahmaloka' All things, wherever they may be, are said to exist only in that abode which is verily Brahman, since Brahman is Self of all]

7.4.6 Chitsvarupa, The Supreme Bliss

The purport is this As pointed out in the *Sūtrabhāṣya* (4-4-3-6), the real nature of Self is Consciousness alone, so that it is proper that the liberated one should be established in that *Svarūpa* alone; and thus alone Śrutis like 'Even so, my dear, is Self without interior or exterior, Entire and Pure Consciousness alone' become duly accommodated Śrutis which describe the liberated as one with 'true desires' and as one 'delighting, playing and merry-making' etc., are to be

interpreted to mean only absence of sorrow and by way of eulogy, like the Śruti which describes him as 'delighting in his own Self', and not in the primary sense since all these presuppose the presence of a second entity—

चैतन्यमेव त्वस्यात्मनः स्वरूपमिति तन्मात्रेण स्वरूपेणाभिनिष्पत्तिर्युक्ता। तथा च श्रुतिः 'एवं वा अरेऽयमात्माऽनन्तरोऽबाह्यः कृत्स्नः प्रज्ञानघन एव' इत्येवजातीयकानुगृहीता भविष्यति। सत्यकामत्वादयस्तु . . . जक्षणादिसङ्कीर्तनमपि दुःखाभावमात्राभिप्राय स्तुत्यर्थम् 'आत्मरतिः' इत्यादिवत्। न हि मुख्यान्येव रतिक्रीडामिथुनान्यात्मनि शक्यन्ते वर्णयितुम्। द्वितीयविषयत्वात्तेषाम्।

That there would be no inconsistency if the first of these is understood as referring to the transcendental point of view which is that of the liberated, and the others from the point of view of common parlance, is shown by Śrī Śrī Bādarāyanācāryapāda in the next Sūtra (4-4-3-7), as already pointed out. The eulogy serves the purpose of not only establishing the *sādhaka* firmly in his endeavour but also of pointing out that the happiness of the liberated stems from his *Svarūpa*, Ātman-Bliss, as the Śruti (Br. U. 6-3-32) says—एषोऽस्य परम आनन्द एतस्यैवानन्दस्यान्यानि भूतानि मात्रामुपजीवन्ति। The *Pañcadaśī* (I-8) points out that this Ātman is the Supreme Bliss being the object of absolute love, as testified to by the universal aspiration expressible in the form 'May I never cease to be, but may I continue to exist always'—

इयमात्मा परानन्दः परप्रेमास्पदं यतः।
मा न भूवं हि भूयासमिति प्रेमात्मनीक्ष्यते॥

Sense objects are dear insofar as they subserve the interest of the individual, and not by themselves, because Ātman is by Its very nature the most beloved of all. Therefore Ātman is

ever Bliss and never tainted by misery. So says the *Viveka-cūdāmani* (108, 109)—

आत्मार्थत्वेन हि प्रेयान् विषयो न स्वतः प्रियः ।
स्वत एव हि सर्वेषामात्मा प्रियतमो यतः ॥
तत आत्मा सदानन्दो नास्य दुःखं कदाचन ।

The *Advaitamakaranda* (24) also says—'I alone am Bliss, and none else; anything other than me is never the Bliss since whatever is not for me is not dear to me, whatever is for me is not by itself dear to me'—

अहमेव सुखं नान्यदन्यच्चेन्नैव तत्सुखम् ।
अमदर्थं न हि प्रेयो मदर्थं न स्वत. प्रियम् ॥

Just as every item of happiness is a pointer to Ātman-Bliss, so is every item of knowledge a pointer to the Consciousness that is Ātman. Again, says the *Advaitamakaranda* (6, 7)—

अभारूपस्य विश्वस्य भानं भासन्निधेर्विना ।
कदाचिन्नावकल्पेत भा चाहं तेन सर्वगः ॥
न हि भानादृते सत्त्वं नर्ते भानं चितोऽचितः ।
चित्संभेदोऽपि नाध्यासादृते तेनाहमद्वयः ॥

[The shine of the non-effulgent universe can never be surmised to be due to anything other than the incidence of effulgence and that effulgence is none other than Myself, hence I am Omnipresent. Also there is no existence indeed without shine. The insentient shines not, but for the sentient. The insentient cannot be associated with the sentient except through superimposition. Therefore non-dual am I]

7.4.7 Purport of Fourth Stanza—Salvaging of Akhandakaravritti —Sarvatmabhava

In this fourth stanza of the hymn the physical body is conceived of as a pot with several holes viz., the sense organs. The light within which sustains and enlivens it and

enables the organs to function in their respective spheres is Self-effulgent Ātman, the Consciousness Such is the real nature of the divine Light which seems to inhere in the body and function through the senses of perception, go out through them into the external world and reach the objects there giving rise to the experience 'I now know'. When the pot obscuring the light is removed, the shine of the light has no limitation and illumines objects all round. Likewise the Shine of Ātman not individualised by the ego, the senses, the body etc., would be realised, as pointed out, to be the basic Shine, the Substratum, illumining the entire universe superimposed upon It. This is what is sought to be conveyed by the statement that the liberated is Omniscient—Sarvajña. The realisation that the shine of the universe is nothing but the Shine that is Ātman is spoken of as the attainment of *Sarvātmabhāva*, the Universal-Selfhood That this is a description from the standpoint of parlance and is a pointer to the *Svarūpa* of the liberated, that is Consciousness, the Brahman-Ātman, has already been made clear.

The purport of this fourth stanza of the hymn is this. Using the device of accommodating any item of experience in parlance, the most common experience of *pratikarma-vyavasthā* being an *upalakṣaṇa*, it is shown that a thorough investigation of the factors connected with the experience leads to the recognition that the essence of the experience is the very Self of the experiencer. This is ordinarily hidden, though expressed as 'I' which when purified leads to the Witness-self and when divested of all the *idam* aspect in it, leads to the *Sphuraṇa*, the *Jyotissvarūpa* which is All-pervading and Non-dual i e., Brahman-Consciousness. In the second stanza of the hymn the discussion centres round the *Sattā* or

the Existence aspect of the things of the world including that of oneself and it is shown, using the devices of the cause-effect relation, substratum in an illusion etc., that this is derived from the One Universal Existence that is Brahman. In the third stanza the question taken up pertains to the *Bhāna,* the Shine aspect of the universe, and it is shown that it stems from the Universal Consciousness, Brahman The *pramāna* in this respect is the Veda i e., the *Mahāvākya* which gives rise to the plenary experience as taught by the Master, the Veda as also the Master, like Īśvara, being the same Brahman-Consciousness as manifest through the respective *upādhis.* This Brahman-Consciousness is Jñāna shining all by Itself, *Prajñāna* unrelated to anything else whatever. The Master instructs the disciple through the *Mahāvākya* 'That thou art' तत्त्वमसि, the content of which, when realised, *sākṣātkaraṇāt,* would be an experience expressed by the *Mahāvākya* 'I am Brahman' अहं ब्रह्मास्मि. But prior to this state of attainment of plenary experience, however much it may be rendered plausible, the following difficulty is likely to be felt. This Brahman-Consciousness spoken of by resorting inevitably to language involving words like Brahman, Īśvara, *Tat* (inclusive of the world i e , the *idam* as also the seeker, i.e., the *aham*) etc., carries with it the tinge invariably associated with such words; It is mediate; and the immediate experience of It, to say the least, would be extremely difficult. The endeavour of the fourth stanza is to remove this doubt and fear on the part of the seeker, accommodating him, by taking his disposition into account. In other words, this stanza shows the way to direct realisation The method is this—to consider the situation from the standpoint of the experiencer and point out to him how the Consciousness in him, the awareness of the immediacy of which cannot be

questioned at all, is the Universal Consciousness which is regarded by him as not immediate. To accomplish this, to start with, his experience in ordinary matters where his *aham* is mixed up and clouded considerably by *idam* is analysed by pointing out to him that the *pramānas* that he leans upon involve basically his Self which is other than the three bodies—the gross, the subtle and the causal—and is Consciousness that is immediate. The next step is to point to the Witness-self, *Sāksī*, *Śuddhāham*, which had been rendered impure due to involvement in the subtle body From this stand-point all experience pertaining to the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep would be *mithyā*. Then it is pointed out that the *idam* does not exist at all, which provides him with the *apavādadrsṭi*. With this the seeker recognises that the *idam* is all *asat* and the language pertaining to it is all *vikalpa* Having already recognised that the *sattā* and *bhāna* of the *idam* are only those of the Substratum, he now realises that the *idam* is not at all there and delimiting of the true Self with body etc , is all a concoction. With this recognition and the *upadeśa* of the *Mahāvākya* 'That thou art' he has been blessed with already, the way is clear for the rising up of the *Akhaṇḍākāravrtti* that had been submerged, which removes the last vestiges of ajñāna by sublating both the *aham* and the *idam*. With this is seen that the *sphurana* and the *sattā* of both these *aham* and *idam* are the same ; this is Brahman-Ātman. The method thus consists in getting rid of the impurities in the *aham* in the first instance i.e., attaining the *Sāksisvarūpa* and thereafter sublating the *sāksya*, the witnessed, thereby securing the *nirvikalpaka ahamsvarūpa*. Delving deep into oneself, casting off all *upādhis* when one shines all by himself along with the realisation that the *idam* is mere *vikalpa* is the prior requirement which enables him to

realise that this *Svarūpa* of his is verily Brahman-Consciousness, as conveyed by the third line of the fourth stanza—

जानामीति तमेव भान्तमनुभात्येतत्समस्तं जगत्

This is the experience as expressed in the *Mahāvākya* अहं ब्रह्मास्मि, 'I am Brahman', which is secured when his very *Svarūpa* as *Prajñāna* of which he has direct awareness, is made known to be Brahman by the *Mahāvākya* अयमात्मा ब्रह्म. Thus the process consists in the salvaging of the *Akhaṇḍākāravṛtti* by removal of ajñāna veiling the *Svarūpa* as it were. Speaking of the attainment of Brahmanhood is only figurative; Brahman-Ātman which has ever been shining, now becomes manifest, as it were, in Its full glory. This *jñānasvarūpa* is verily the *Dakṣiṇāmūrtisvarūpa, Dakṣiṇā* meaning *jñāna* as per the *Dakṣiṇāmūrtyupaniṣad*—शेमुषी दक्षिणा प्रोक्ता—as already pointed out. So it is that the *Mānasollāsa* (III—36, 37) says—

अविद्याख्यतिरोधानव्यपाये परमेश्वरः ।
दक्षिणामूर्तिरूपोऽसौ स्वयमेव प्रकाशते ॥

The realisation of this *Sarvātmasvarūpa*, Universal-selfhood of the seeker i e , identity with the Brahman-Consciousness, the *Dakṣiṇāmūrtisvarūpa* is conveyed by the word नमः i.e., obeisance to the *Sphuraṇa* of Ātman, the resplendent *Dakṣiṇāmūrti* incarnate as one's own Guru—

तस्मै श्रीगुरुमूर्तये नम इदं श्रीदक्षिणामूर्तये ॥



8. FIFTH STANZA

ŚRĪGURU AS THE DESTROYER OF THE FALSE PERSONATIONS OF ĀTMAN

8.1 Introduction

By now it has been well established on the basis of Śrutis such as सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म and the *Mahāvākyas* as also by pointing to his experience that the *Svarūpa* of the seeker himself is what he is seeking viz., the *Saccidānandasvarūpa*, Existence, Consciousness, Bliss, the Brahman, which is also the *Svarūpa* of the entire universe of his experience. In doing so objections raised against the import of the *Mahāvākya* on the basis of the apparent *pramāṇas* like perception etc., have all been answered—

पूर्वश्लोकव्याख्यानेन प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणाभासनिबन्धना ब्रह्मात्मैकत्ववाक्यार्थे विरोधशङ्का परिहृता । as the *Mānasollāsaṭīkā* (V–1) says.

Inspite of pointing clearly to the real *Svarūpa* of the seeker, because of exposure to activity in parlance as also the views of other schools, erroneous notions harboured previously in respect of It which is extremely subtle to grasp, are not unlikely to persist. The hymn condescends to protect him from such influence and establish him firmly in the *Brahmātmaikyasvarūpa* by dispelling these wrong notions.

8.1.1 The Quest 'Who am I?'

It is the wide range of views in respect of 'I' from the mundane to the denial of its existence altogether, that makes it difficult for one to abide in one's essential *Svarūpa*. It is surprising that in this process of the search for Reality, one's knowledge of the fundamental entity viz., the 'I' is in doldrums. One has become elusive with respect to oneself!

Like the doubts that are entertained, there is also the experience of ignorance, ajñāna, in respect of the 'I' as 'I do not know myself'--मामहं न जानामि. Insofar as the real nature of 'I' is not known precisely, what is relative to it viz., the decision about the real nature of 'this' the *idam* i e., the rest of the universe, would not be precise either. It is the view that one holds about his very Self that influences the views about 'this' and the means for securing the knowledge about 'this' etc That the *idam* makes inroads into one's view of *aham* is also in evidence In this confusion one is lost to oneself without trace, as it were, and hence one has to search for oneself. Also, any notion of the *idam* based on the shifting views about *aham* without its precise knowledge would be futile It is imperative therefore that the view of *aham* should not be infected with ignorance, doubt or error.

8.1.2 Peculiar Nature of the Problem

What then is the way out ? It is obvious that the search is to be conducted within oneself to find out the unsublatable 'aspect' in the make up of the 'changing I' as hinted in the seventh stanza of the hymn. It is in the light of this that whatever is cognised as also the means of cognition must be understood There is the direct experience of the 'I' without any trace of doubt etc., as also the ignorance pertaining to the 'I' Evidently, it is by leaning on the former that the latter is to be discerned, and not the other way about. This Self-effulgence is what is self-established स्वे महिम्नि प्रतिष्ठित. This is unlike all else which requires to be established Neither can it be got rid of nor is it acquired afresh अहेयानुपादेय. One is forced to take note of this. It would be a misdirected fruitless adventure to seek to know this by leaning on anything else, as the several investigators often seek to do.

While trying to ascertain the real nature of any other thing the seeker is confronted by many a question of the type—What are the experiences pertaining to it? How are they produced? What are the means? Are they valid? And are not these experiences illusory? A suitable theory is to be set up which can answer all such questions in a consistent way involving no contradictions. But no such thing is required here i e., in the case of one's own *Svarūpa*. Though words have to be employed to speak even about this and this is referred to as if an object of knowledge, this is only indicated by the word 'I' alone. There is no doubt about its self-effulgence, existence and shine, and no assumption is necessary. The *Svarūpa* must be admitted even by him who denies it. The *Svarūpa* is direct experience itself and as such does not stand in need of any other testimony. While in order to ascertain the real nature of any other thing, all else (except this *Svarūpa*) that is employed by way of setting up a formalism involving postulates, hypotheses, axioms etc., is a mere concoction. However, in most cases the investigator makes no reference to this *Svarūpa* as he is not consciously aware that this *Svarūpa* is necessarily 'involved' very much in his formulation. The involvement is by way of the primary aim in all his ventures, the means employed to secure knowledge, immediacy and directness in perception, pervasion in inference, harmony, non-contradiction etc., as already shown. That these tenets are universally subscribed to by all investigators is indicative of the fact that they stem from the same source viz., Self just like the universal experience in respect of the Innermost Self. This is the verdict of the Vedānta. No other system is able to account for the situation. How can anyone ever deny the 'Light' that is Self-effulgent Ātman which bears witness to all experiences in

parlance—the three states of experience viz., the waking, the dream and the deep sleep—the absence of the observed in deep sleep, the observer, the observation and the observed in dream, the body, the senses, the mind, the intellect, happiness etc. as though they are external objects like a pot, the objects of cognition like sound etc., as also their absence as distinguished from their decisive knowledge, doubt or misapprehension, the knowledge arising in the knower, its means and object and the constructs fancied by each philosopher, as the *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣyavārtikasāra* (IV—3-6) of Śrī Vidyāraṇyacaraṇa points out—

अत्रोच्यते सर्वतीर्थदृशां स्वेष्टस्य वस्तुनः ।
सिद्धिर्यदभ्युपगमात्तत्सिद्धिर्वार्यते कुतः ॥ (54)
प्रमाणं मेयविषयं तत्फल मातृसंश्रयम् ।
इति यत्साक्षिक सिध्येत् स आत्मेत्यभ्युपेयताम् ॥ (62)
शब्दादींस्तदभाव च संशयानृतनिश्चयात् ।
विविच्य योऽनुगृह्णाति स आत्मेत्यभ्युपेयताम् ॥ (63)
देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिसुखादीन्यो घटादिवत् ।
वेत्त्येनमन्तरात्मानं स्वप्रकाश विनिश्चिनु ॥ (64)
द्रष्टृदर्शनदृश्यानि यः स्वप्ने प्रसमीक्षते ।
तदभाव सुषुप्ते च स आत्मेत्यभ्युपेयताम् ॥ (65)
सर्वेषा वादिना स्वस्वमतमेतत्प्रसादतः ।
सिध्यतीति विवादोऽस्मिन् कर्तुं शक्यो न केनचित् ॥ (66)

8.1.3 Admixture of 'Idam' and 'Aham'

Thus, though the *Svarūpa* impresses itself inevitably on everyone, permeating every activity of his and can never be set aside, still it cannot be said that there are no questions pertaining to it at all. This is evident from the answers

given ordinarily when one is asked as to who he is. In such replies as 'I am a man' etc., there is seen to be a lot of admixture of what is experienced as *idam* with *aham*. Also the *aham* is sought to be understood starting from somewhere else viz., some aspects of *idam* taken from parlance tentatively but whose real nature remains unknown as yet. This is verily an inverted process as all experience of the *idam* stems from *aham* as the starting point, the *aham* itself being self-established. In order to be relieved from such a situation, the *aham* must be rendered completely free of all aspects of *idam* that influence it even in respect of the seer-seen relationship. This 'detachment' is vital for being established in oneself first of all as also to take note of the *idam* without favour, prejudice or prepossessions. It being the very self of the investigator and self-established, there is no question of attaining It afresh by originating, securing, transforming or purifying it—उत्पत्ति, आप्ति, विकार, सस्कार—and as such, karma or *upāsana* which is also mental karma would be of no use in this respect. Though ever-attained, It is as if not wholly attained. One has to contend with experiences like those expressed as अहमस्मि, भामि 'I exist, I shine' etc., which are not infested with doubts etc , as also those expressed as मामहं न जानामि 'I know not myself', अहमज्ञः 'I am ignorant'. In other words the situation is this—while it might be said that there is awareness of oneself in a general sense, one does not know one's pure uncontaminated *Svarūpa* precisely with its distinguishing characteristics. Under such a circumstance, whatever one asserts about one's *Svarūpa* stems naturally from this ignorance. That there are so many views as put forward by different schools about the nature of Self, is also of this situation. The lure of the objects of he medley of views make it difficult

for the comparatively less competent individual to abide in Self even when made known clearly. Ever most patent as it is, astonishingly no account is taken of Self either by the lay or the learned It is veiled, as it were !

8.1.4 Various Views Regarding the Self—Fifth Stanza

The endeavour of the hymn is to enable the investigator to dispossess himself completely of the false personations of Ātman and to establish him firmly in his own pure innermost *Svarūpa*. Towards this end, the hymn specifically undertakes to consider the various views regarding Self, with pointed attention It is declared that the multiplicity of views about Self is due to ignorance, Māyā—

देह प्राणमपीन्द्रियाण्यपि चलां बुद्धिं च शून्यं विदुः
स्त्रीबालान्धजडोपमास्त्वहमिति भ्रान्ता भृशं वादिनः ।
मायाशक्तिविलासकल्पितमहाव्यामोहसंहारिणे
तस्मै श्रीगुरुमूर्तये नम इद श्रीदक्षिणामूर्तये ॥

[Obeisance to Him Who destroys the mighty delusion set up by the play of the power of Māyā because of which people like ignorant women and children, the blind and the stupid, regard the body, the vital air, the senses, the fleeting intellect or the void as Self and engage themselves in vain and violent disputations, to that resplendent Daksināmūrthy incarnate in the glorious figure of one's own Guru]

The *Sūtrabhāsya* (1-1-1-1) quoted already along with the relevant *Svārājyasiddhi ślokas* refers to these views—

देहमात्र चैतन्यविशिष्टमात्मेति प्राकृता जना लौकायतिकाश्च प्रतिपन्नाः । इन्द्रियाण्येव चेतनान्यात्मेत्यपरे । मन इत्यन्ये । विज्ञानमात्रं क्षणिकमित्येके । शून्यमित्यपरे । अस्ति देहादिव्यतिरिक्तः संसारी कर्ता भोक्तेत्यपरे । भोक्तैव केवल न कर्तेत्येके । अस्ति तद्व्यतिरिक्त ईश्वरः सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिरिति कचित् । आत्मा स भोक्तुरित्यपरे ।

In conformity with this says the *Siddhāntabindu* introducing the first of the *Daśaślokī*—

तत्र देहाकारेण परिणतानि चत्वारि भूतान्येव त्वपदार्थ इति चार्वाकाः। चक्षुरादीनि प्रत्येकमित्यपरे। मिलितानीत्यन्ये। मन इत्येके। प्राण इत्यपरे। क्षणिक विज्ञानमिति सुगताः। शून्यमिति माध्यमिकाः। देहेन्द्रियातिरिक्तो देहपरिमाण इति दिगम्बराः। कर्ता भोक्ता जडो विभुरिति वैशेपिकतार्किक-प्राभाकराः। जडो बोधात्मक इति भाट्टाः। भोक्तैव केवलबोधात्मक इति साङ्ख्याः पातञ्जलाश्च। अविद्यया कर्तृत्वादिभाक् परमार्थतो निर्धर्मकः परमानन्दबोध(रूप) एवेत्यौपनिपदा।

[The materialists, the followers of Cārvâka, hold that the sense of the term 'thou' is the four elements (earth, water, fire and air) combining to form the body Some followers of the same school hold that 'each of the organs, the eye and the others' is sentient and is Ātman Others think that It is all the sense organs taken collectively Some believe that It is the mind, others say that It is the vital air Some followers of Sugata (called Buddhist Idealists) hold that It is the momentary consciousness The followers of the Buddha, called Mādhyamikas hold that It is the void The Digambaras or Ārhatas believe that Ātman is different from the body, the organs etc , and is of the size of the body The Vaiśesikas, Naiyāyikas and the followers of Śrī Prabhākarapāda, the *Ācārya* of one of the two prominent schools of *Mīmāmsā*, hold that Ātman is an agent and therefore an experiencer too , He is inert by nature and is Omnipresent Others i e , the followers of Śrī Kumārilabhattapāda (the *Ācārya* of the other *Mīmāmsā* school) say that Ātman is an agent, an experiencer and is Omnipresent, but He is inert and yet of the nature of Consciousness The followers of the *Sāñkhya* and the *Yoga* schools (established according to tradition by sages Kapila and Patañjali) believe that Ātman is the enjoyer only (and not the agent) and is of the nature of Consciousness only. In addition the Pâtañjalas assert the existence of an Omnipotent Īśvara, as distinguished from the other *Purusas*. The followers of

the Upaniṣads hold that Ātman comes to be regarded as an agent, enjoyer etc, on account of Avidyā, but in reality, It is without qualities, and is Supreme Bliss and Consciousness]

Introducing this stanza five of the hymn, says the *Tattvasudhā*—

अत्र केचित्—सर्वमेतदभित्तिचित्रं देहव्यतिरिक्तस्य आत्मन एवाभावात्। देहस्यैव गच्छामि तिष्ठामि स्थूलोऽहं कृशोऽह इत्यात्मत्वानुभवादिति वदन्ति। अन्ये केचित्तान् हस्तेन वारयन्त आहुः—जीवात्मनिर्गमे शरीरमरणस्य दर्शनात्, वच्मि पश्यामि शृणोमि इत्यादिबुद्धिदर्शनात् इन्द्रियाण्येवात्मेति। ततोऽप्यन्ये केचित् ईषच्छुद्धबुद्धयः चक्षुरादीन्द्रियनाशेऽपि प्राणसत्त्वे जीवनदर्शनात्, अन्यथाऽदर्शनात्, बुभुक्षितोऽहं, पिपासितोऽहमित्यादिप्रतीतेश्च प्राण एवात्मेति भणन्ति। इतरे तु—प्राणस्य बाह्यवायुवज्जडत्वेन भोक्तृत्वाद्यसंभवात् मन एव चेतनं भोक्तृ च आत्मेति वदन्ति। योगाचारस्तु—मम मन इति भिन्नतया प्रतीयमानस्य आत्मत्वासंभवात् क्षणिकविज्ञानमहमिति प्रतीयमान बुद्धिशब्दापरपर्यायं संसारीति जल्पति। तद्धिक्कृत्य अन्यः कश्चित् विद्युदभ्रनिमेषादिवत् क्षणिकस्य तस्यात्मत्वानुपपत्तेः, सुषुप्तौ तस्याप्यभावादन्यस्याप्यनुलब्धेः शून्यमेवात्मेत्युद्गिरति। एते च स्वस्वपक्षदार्ढ्याय इतस्ततश्च यां काचित् श्रुतिमादायोदाहरन्ति। अन्ये चैतदन्यथा आत्मस्वरूप फणन्ति।

[Here some say—All that has been said so far is like a painting without a background wall, for there is no Ātman at all different from the body, and the experiences such as 'I go', 'I stand', 'I am stout', 'I am lean' point to the experience of the body itself as 'I', the Ātman. Brushing this school aside some others say—since on the departure of the *jīvātmā* the body is seen to be dead and also because experiences such as 'I speak, see, hear' are in evidence, the sensory and motor organs themselves are Ātman Still some others of somewhat clear intellect speak of the *prāna* itself as Ātman, since even though the organs are impaired, the individual is seen to be living when the vital

airs are in evidence, and not otherwise and also because of experiences such as 'I am hungry' and 'I am thirsty'. Others, however, hold that since just like the external air breath is also but insentient, it cannot be the experiencer etc , and as such mind itself as the sentient experiencer is Ātman. The Yogācāra on the other hand prattles—since the mind which is experienced as 'mine' cannot be Ātman, momentary knowledge which is experienced as 'I' and which is synonymous with the intellect is the transmigrating Ātman Refuting this, yet some other shouts—since the momentary knowledge is transitory like the flash of lightning among the clouds, it cannot be Ātman, and since in deep sleep even this knowledge is absent and nothing else is in evidence, Ātman is nothing but the void All these quote some Śruti or the other here and there in justification of their schools. Likewise, many others put forward different opinions about the nature of Ātman]

8.2.1 Charvaka View—Gross Body is Itself Atman, Perception the Only Pramana

In respect of the Cārvāka who holds that the body is Ātman, the *Mānasollāsa* says (V–1 to 6)—

प्रमाणमेकं प्रत्यक्षं तत्त्वं भूतचतुष्टयम् ।
मोक्षश्च मरणान्नान्यः कामार्थौ पुरुषार्थकौ ॥
न हि खल्वीश्वरः कर्ता परलोककथा वृथा ।
देहं विनास्ति चेदात्मा कुम्भवद्दृश्यतां पुरः॥
ह्रस्वो दीर्घो युवा बाल इति देहोऽभिदृश्यते ।
अस्ति जातः परिणतो वृद्धः क्षीणो जरन् मृतः ॥
इत्येवमुक्ताः षड्भावविकारा देहसंश्रयाः ।
वर्णाश्रमविभागश्च देहेष्वेव प्रतिष्ठितः ॥
जातकर्मादिसंस्कारो देहस्यैव विधीयते ।
[illegible] देहस्य प्रयुञ्जन्त्याशिषं शुभाम् ॥
[illegible]ार्वाको वाचयत्यल्पचेतनः ।

[Perception is the sole *pramāna*, the four elements alone are real, liberation is none other than death, gratification of desires and wealth are the goal of man.

There is indeed no Īsvara, the creator, vain is all talk of the other world.

If Ātman exists apart from the body, let it be seen like a pot in front It is the body that is perceived as short, or tall, as youth or child

The six changes of phenomenal existence—being, birth, growth, change of form, diminution or decay and death—all these pertain to the body

Distinctions of caste and religious orders are based on the bodies alone, such sacraments as birth ceremony are enjoined with reference to the body alone, and it is with reference to the body alone that the Śāstras pronounce benediction—'May thou live a hundred years' Thus does the small-witted Cārvāka delude the world]

8.2.2 Sentiency Result of Combination of the Four Elements

In respect of this Cārvāka, says the *Bhāsya* on the Sūtra (3-3-30-53)—

एक आत्मनः शरीरे भावात्।

अत्रैके देहमात्रात्मदर्शिनो लोकायतिका देहव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनोऽभाव मन्यमानाः समस्तव्यस्तेषु बाह्येषु पृथिव्यादिष्वदृष्टमपि चैतन्यं शरीराकारपरिणतेषु भूतेषु स्यादिति संभावयन्तस्तेभ्यश्चैतन्यं मदशक्तिवद्विज्ञान चैतन्यविशिष्टः कायः पुरुष इति चाहु। न स्वर्गगमनायापवर्गगमनाय वा समर्थो देहव्यतिरिक्त आत्मा अस्ति, यत्कृतं चैतन्य देहे स्यात्। देह एव तु चेतनश्चात्मा चेति प्रतिजानते। हेतु चाचक्षते शरीरे भावादिति। यद्धि यस्मिन् सति भवत्यसति च न भवति, तत्तद्धर्मत्वेनाध्यवसीयते यथाऽग्निधर्मावौष्ण्यप्रकाशौ। प्राणचेष्टाचैतन्यस्मृत्यादयश्चात्मधर्मत्वेनाभिमता आत्मवादिनाम्, तेऽप्यन्तरेव देह उपलभ्यमाना बहिश्चानुपलभ्यमाना असिद्धे देहव्यतिरिक्ते धर्मिणि देहधर्मा एव भवितुमर्हन्ति। तस्माद्व्यतिरेको देहादात्मन इति।

[Some deny the separate existence of Ātman on account of its existence being dependent on the existence of the body

Here now some Lokāyatikas (Cārvākas) who identify Ātman with the body itself are of the opinion that there is no Ātman distinct from the body. Under this belief they consider it possible that although sentience is not seen to belong to the external elements such as the earth, taken either severally or collectively, yet it may belong to the elements combined to form bodies and they say that sentience is but consciousness arising from them like the power of intoxication (which arises when certain materials are mixed in certain proportions) and that a man is nothing but the body endowed with the quality of sentience. They also assert that, apart from the body there is no Ātman capable of going to heaven or attaining liberation and that the body itself is what is conscious, Ātman. For this assertion, they adduce the reason—'its existence being dependent on the existence of the body'. Anything whose existence depends on the existence of another and which ceases to be when that other thing is not there is ascertained to be an attribute of the latter, as for instance, heat and light are attributes of fire. Attributes such as the vital force, activity, sentience and remembrance are held to belong to Ātman by those who believe in a separate Ātman These too are perceived as being in the body and not outside; and since an abode of these qualities different from the body cannot be established, they must be the attributes of the body itself Hence Ātman is not different from the body.]

The *Svārājyasiddhi* while introducing the *śloka* (1–29) says—

तत्र देहात्मवादिनस्तावदेवमाहुः—"अहमित्यनुभवे देह एव प्रथते, न देहान्तर्वर्त्यन्यः कुण्ड इव दधि। अत एव च 'अहं स्थूलो, गौरो, इच्छामि, जानामि' इत्यापण्डितपामरं स्थौल्यगौरतेच्छाज्ञानादेः सामानाधिकरण्यानुभवः। न हि धर्मिभेदे धर्माणां सामानाधिकरण्यानुभवः। न हि भवन्ति 'मधुरं कुण्डं कम्बुग्रीवादिमद्दधि' इति। लोहितस्स्फटिक इति धीस्तु स्फटिक-

लोहितद्रव्ययोः पृथक्करणे बाध्यते । न च नाहं मनुष्य इति कस्यचिद्वाधप्रत्ययोऽस्ति । विदुषामपि गच्छामि, तिष्ठामि, लंघयामि, ब्राह्मणो मनुष्योऽहमित्याद्यनुभवात् । यद्यपि समस्तेषु व्यस्तेषु च पृथिव्यादिषु न चैतन्य दृष्टम् । तथापि कायाकारपरिणतेषु भविष्यति मदिराकारपरिणतेष्विव किण्वादिषु मदशक्तिः, खदिरचूर्णादिसंवलिततांबूल इव च रागोदयः । देहाधीनोपलंभनियमाच्च ज्ञानादेर्देहधर्मत्वम् । तथा चाहु·—'चैतन्यविशिष्टः पुरुषः कायः' इति । तेषामन्यधर्मत्वे दृष्टहानिः, अदृष्टकल्पना च स्यादिति देह एव आत्मा" इति ।

[In this context those who hold that the body is Ātman say · "It is only the body that shows up in the 'I'–experience and not anything else inside the body like curd in a pot. And it is therefore that stoutness, fairness of complexion, desire, knowledge etc , are experienced by the learned and the lay alike as abiding in the same locus that is the body as evidenced by the expression of experiences such as 'I, the stout and fair-complexioned, desire, know etc ' Characteristics of different substantives are not experienced as abiding in one and the same locus. No experience such as 'sweet pot is conch-necked curd' is in evidence. The experience such as 'the crystal is red' is sublated when the crystal and the red substance are separated from each other. No one ever has the sublating experience as 'I am not a human being', for even the learned have experience such as–'I go, stand, jump, I am *brāhmana*, a human being' Even though sentiency is not perceived in the (four) elements, earth etc , either severally or collectively, yet it will be perceived in the elements combined to form the bodies, just like the power of intoxication which is perceived only when the drugs, seeds etc , are fermented into liquor , or like the appearance of redness in the betel mixed with lime, nut, bark etc Also knowledge etc , are attributes of the body, since, as a rule, they are seen to be dependent on the body. Therefore it is that they say ' the sentient individual is the body'. If they are regarded as attributes of any entity other than the body, it is tantamount to abandoning what is in evidence and concocting what is not, therefore the body alone is Ātman".]

8.2.3 Inference etc., not Valid

As against the standpoint brought out in the *Jyotir-brāhmaṇa* (Br. U. 6-3-6) and aided by inference as shown in the *Bhāṣya*—that the Light that is Ātman, which is quite unlike the physical lights such as the Sun that are outside of the body, is non-physical and is inside—objections are raised by the so-called materialist, Cārvāka, who maintains that the body itself is Ātman, as the inference employed by others is fallacious since the well-known fact of observation that the body and the aggregate of senses and the lights such as the Sun, which help them in respect of their parlance, are of the same physical nature and also that the 'lights' that are cited are all outside. The statement—that because the Light that is Ātman is internal and is not perceived, it is different from lights such as the Sun—is falsified in the case of the eye etc., for, these which are not perceived and are internal are also physical in nature.

Again, he continues to say that the existence of the Light in question is seen to depend on the existence of the body and the senses and as such, inference if resorted to can lead only to the conclusion that the 'Light' is only a quality of the aggregate. Moreover, perception cannot be nullified by inference and it is seen that this aggregate of body and organs, sees, hears, thinks and knows. If the other 'Light' helps this aggregate just as the Sun etc., do, it cannot be Ātman, any more than the Sun and the rest. Rather, it is the aggregate of the body and the organs which directly do the functions of seeing etc , that is Ātman, and none else, for inference is invalid when it contradicts perception—

न च प्रत्यक्षमनुमानेन बाधितुं शक्यते। अयमेव तु कार्यकरणसङ्घातः प्रत्यक्षं पश्यति श्रृणोति मनुते विजानाति च। यदि नाम ज्योतिरन्तरमस्योप-

कारकं स्यादादित्यादिवत्, न तदा आत्मा स्याज्ज्योतिरन्तरमादित्यादिवदेव। य एव तु प्रत्यक्ष दर्शनादिक्रियां करोति स एवात्मा स्यात् कार्यकरणसङ्घातो नान्यः। प्रत्यक्षविरोधेऽनुमानस्याप्रामाण्यात्।

Also says the *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣyavārtikasāra* (IV-3-6) pertaining to the *Jyotirbrāhmaṇa*—

अत्र लोकायतो वक्ति देहाभिन्नत्वमात्मनः।
अहं मनुष्य इत्येवं प्रत्यक्षेण तथेक्षणात्॥
चैतन्यं क्षितितोयाग्निमरुद्योगेन जायते।
सर्पादेरिव कार्ष्ण्यादिर्देहधर्मस्ततश्चितिः॥
चैतन्यं देहधर्मश्चेन्मृतावविकलस्य तत्।
कस्मान्नेति न मन्तव्य वायुना विकलत्वतः॥
यः स्वप्नदेहमद्राक्षं सोऽहं पश्याम्यदो वपुः।
इत्येषा प्रत्यभिज्ञाऽन्यमात्मान गमयेद्यदि॥
तन्न, स्वप्ने यतोऽभिज्ञा भ्रान्ता न प्रमितिस्ततः।
दूरापेता प्रत्यभिज्ञा नात्माऽतो भिद्यते तनोः॥
आत्मज्योतिः श्रुतौ यत्तु वर्णितं तच्च भौतिकम्।
देहाद्यनुग्राहकत्वादादित्यादिप्रकाशवत्॥
चाक्षुपत्वप्रसङ्गोऽस्य नान्तःस्थातीन्द्रियत्वतः।
अन्तःस्थातीन्द्रियं यत्तच्चक्षुरादि न चाक्षुपम्॥
तस्मात् प्रत्यक्षमानेन देहे चिद्धर्मकेऽञ्जसा।
गृह्यमाणे ततो भिन्नमात्मज्योतिर्न कल्प्यताम्॥ (46–53)

wherein is pointed out in addition, that sentiency must be regarded as the quality of the body in the same way as blackness etc , of a serpent is a quality of its body Death is explained as the exit of one of the elements forming the body viz , the air. The contention that self is different from the body as the basis of the recollection, *pratyabhijñā*, 'I who have seen the dream body am now seeing this body of the waking

state' is refuted by saying that dream being a delusion, so is the recollection based on it and therefore not a *pramāna*.

Cārvāka also holds that inference cannot be *pramāna* at all as it cannot be free from fallacies, and *vyāpti* cannot be established etc Even if it is accepted as *pramāna* inference only shows that the light that is Ātman is only physical in nature as has been pointed out. Even he who swears by Śruti (which being a human composition cannot be *pramāna*) should take note of Śrutis like—

विज्ञानघन ऐवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तान्येवानु विनश्यति। न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्ति।

(Br. U 6-5-13)

[The Self comes out of these elements and is destroyed with them, thereafter, there is no trace of him]

Also *upamāna* (comparison) etc., are no *pramānas* at all. Thus direct perception is the only *pramāna*. It is also pointed out as additional evidence in favour of the Cārvāka system that particular preparations of food and drink e.g, *brāhmīghrta*, develops the intellectual faculty (vide *Nyāyamañjarī*); also that starvation results in loss of memory which is regained on taking food, is in general experience. This is also alluded to in the Śruti (Ch U. 6), in relation to Śvetaketu; expressions of the type 'my body' मम देहः which may appear to convey that Ātman is different from the body, are not to be understood in the primary sense, but must be regarded as usages of the type 'The body of the girl carved in stone'— शिलापुत्रिकायाः शरीरम्. Again recollections as pertaining to other individuals such as 'This is that Devadatta' सोऽयं देवदत्तः refer to the person as the body itself. The verbal roots जीव् and मृङ् pertaining to living and dying refer to the retention in and exit of the vital air from the combination of the elements i e., the body जीव् प्राणधारणे, मृङ् प्राणत्यागे also

show that it is the body that is Ātman. In like manner, many other evidences are adduced in favour of the system and the criticisms against it answered as well.

The gist of what is given in the *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha* and what are said to be the Sūtras pertaining to this system is on these lines. There is no Ātman apart from the body. The body is made up of only the four elements viz , earth, water, fire and air, there being no fifth element like ether. There is no *pramāna* other than direct perception. There is no heavenly bliss apart from the material happiness. The sense organs are not apart from the body; the particular regions of the body themselves being referred to by the respective names like eye etc., *Prāna* is only the air moving about in the body. There is no liberation apart from death. There is no hell apart from the suffering caused from the prick of a thorn etc. There is no Lord apart from the king. There is no human goal apart from the assimilation of wealth and gratification of the senses. There is no Śāstra apart from *Arthaśāstra* and *Kāmaśāstra*. The observance of *varṇāśramadharmas* leads nowhere. Attainment of pleasure alone is what is prescribed. Prohibition pertains only to the warding off of suffering. There is no karma apart from eating and excretion. There is no birth other than the present one etc.

8.2.4 Lokayatikasutras

Some of the Sūtras may be quoted here—

अथ लोकायतम् ।

अर्थकामौ पुरुषार्थौ ।

पृथिवी जल तेजो वायुरिति चत्वारि भूतानि ।

तत्समुदाये शरीरेन्द्रियविषयसंज्ञा ।

तेभ्यश्चैतन्य किण्वादिभ्यो मदशक्तिवत् ।

अनिमित्ततो भावोत्पत्तिः कण्टकतैक्ष्ण्यादिवत् ।
चैतन्यविशिष्टः कायः पुरुषः ।
प्रत्यक्षमेवैक प्रमाणम् ।
नास्ति परलोकः ।
मरणमेवापवर्गः ।
दण्डनीतिरेव विद्या ।
धूर्तप्रलापस्त्रयी ।

8.2.5 Charvakamata Termed Variously

The name *Cārvākadarśana* is sometimes said to have originated because of the name of one of its expounders, Cārvāka. It is also understood as the equivalent of 'sweet-tongued'—*cāru vāka*—since its doctrine is characterised by so much of superficial attractiveness. Being in consonance with widely held opinions in the world, it is also called *Lokāyata-darśana* Because of the abolition of causality altogether, it is described as accidentalism, *Yadrucchāvāda* or *Animittavāda*. Since there is no external governing principle and everything is self-determined, being inherent in the very nature of a thing, it is termed Naturalism or *Svabhāvavāda*. Since there is no such thing like an efficient cause for anything, it is called *Nirapekṣāvāda*. Since the experiences of pleasure and pain occur without one's desire, effort or even anticipation, it is called *Prāsaṅgikavāda*, Occasionalism. Since like 'location', 'duration' is also associated with a thing, it is also referred to as *Kādācitkavāda*.

About the other views in respect of Ātman mentioned in the hymn, the *Mānasollāsa* (V—6, 7, 8) gives—

केचिच्छ्वसिमि जीवामि क्षुधितोऽस्मि पिपासितः ॥
इत्यादिप्रत्ययबलात् प्राण आत्मेति मन्वते ।
केचिच्छृणोमि पश्यामि जिघ्रामि स्पन्दयाम्यहम् ॥

इतीन्द्रियाणामात्मत्वं प्रतियन्ति ततोऽधिकम् ।
जानामिप्रत्ययबलाद्बुद्धिरित्यपरे जगुः ॥

[On the basis of experiences expressed as ' I breathe, I live, I am hungry, I am thirsty ' etc , some conclude that *prāna* is the Ātman From experiences of the type 'I hear, I see, I smell, I shake', some rise higher and look upon the sense organs as Ātman. On the strength of the notion 'I understand', others regard the intellect as Ātman]

These views are mentioned here by way of indicating various other views as well, which are discussed in the *Vivaranaprameyasangraha*, the *Nyāyaratnāvali* etc

8.2.6 Charvaka's Venture Based on Pratyakshabhasa etc.

The *Pañcadaśī* (VI–58 to 101) gives an account of the various views It is pointed out how the learned and the lay are deluded alike because they disregard Śruti and cling obstinately to their so-called rationalising powers alone. Without trying to understand the purport of the Śāstra, by picking a statement here and a statement there, some of them use the Śāstra to support their own preconceived notions, thereby distorting its intention—

भ्राम्यन्ते पण्डितं मन्याः सर्वे लौकिकतैर्थिकाः ।
अनादृत्य श्रुतिं मौर्ख्यात् केवलां युक्तिमाश्रिताः ॥
पूर्वापरपरामर्शविकलास्तत्र केचन ।
वाक्याभासान् स्वस्वपक्षे योजयन्त्यप्यलज्जया ॥
कूटस्थादिशरीरान्तसङ्घातस्यात्मता जगुः ।

8.3.1 Successive Developments by Refuting the Earlier Ones at Each Step

The *Vedāntasāra*, for example, says—

अतिप्राकृतस्तु 'आत्मा वै जायते पुत्रः' इत्यादिश्रुतेः स्वस्मिन्निव स्वपुत्रेऽपि प्रेमदर्शनात् पुत्रे पुष्टे नष्टे चाहमेव पुष्टो नष्टश्चेत्याद्यनुभवाच्च पुत्र

आत्मेति वदति। चार्वाकस्तु 'स वा एष पुरुषोऽन्नरसमयः' इत्यादिश्रुतेः प्रदीप्तगृहात्स्वपुत्रं परित्यज्यापि स्वस्य निर्गमदर्शनात् स्थूलोऽहं कृशोऽहमित्याद्यनुभवाच्च स्थूलशरीरमात्मेति वदति। अपरश्चार्वाकः 'ते ह प्राणाः प्रजापतिं पितरमेत्योचुः' इत्यादिश्रुतेरिन्द्रियाणामभावे शरीरचलनाभावात् काणोऽहं बधिरोऽहम् इत्याद्यनुभवाच्चेन्द्रियाण्यात्मेति वदति। अपरश्चार्वाकः 'अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा प्राणमयः' इत्यादिश्रुतेः प्राणाभाव इन्द्रियादिचलनायोगादहमशनायावानहं पिपासावानित्याद्यनुभवाच्च प्राण आत्मेति वदति। अन्यस्तु चार्वाकः 'अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा मनोमयः' इत्यादिश्रुतेर्मनसि सुप्ते प्राणादेरभावादहं सङ्कल्पवानहं विकल्पवानित्याद्यनुभवाच्च मन आत्मेति वदति। बौद्धस्तु 'अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा विज्ञानमयः' इत्यादिश्रुतेः कर्तुरभावे करणस्य शक्त्यभावादहं कर्ताहं भोक्तेत्याद्यनुभवाच्च बुद्धिरात्मेति वदति। प्राभाकरतार्किकौ तु 'अन्योऽन्तर आत्मानन्दमयः' इत्यादिश्रुतेर्बुद्ध्यादीनामज्ञाने लयदर्शनादहमज्ञोऽहं ज्ञानीत्याद्यनुभवाच्चाज्ञानमात्मेति वदतः। भाट्टस्तु 'प्रज्ञानघन एवानन्दमयः' इत्यादिश्रुतेः सुषुप्तौ प्रकाशाप्रकाशसद्भावान्मामहं न जानामीत्याद्यनुभवाच्चाज्ञानोपहितं चैतन्यमात्मेति वदति। अपरो बौद्धः 'असदेवेदमग्र आसीत्' इत्यादिश्रुतेः सुषुप्तौ सर्वाभावादहं सुषुप्तौ नास्मित्युत्थितस्य स्वाभावपरामर्शविषयानुभवाच्च शून्यमात्मेति वदति।

Similar accounts are given elsewhere as well. In the light of these, the situation in general may be portrayed thus—the too simple-minded says that the son is Ātman because there are Śrutis like 'Oneself is verily born as the son' because the son is as dear as oneself and also because when the son prospers or suffers one feels that one does prosper or suffer. The Cārvāka, on the other hand, says that the gross body is Ātman because there are Śrutis like 'That verily is Ātman which is made of the essence of food' because a person is seen to flee from a house on fire even leaving his son behind and also because of direct experience like 'I am stout', 'I am lean' In this connection says the *Pañcadaśī* (VI–60, 61)—

लोकायताः पामराश्च प्रत्यक्षाभासमाश्रिताः ।
श्रौतीकर्तुं स्वपक्ष ते कोशमन्नमय तथा ।
विरोचनस्य सिद्धान्त प्रमाणं प्रतिजज्ञिरे ॥

[Lokāyatas and ordinary persons, relying only on what is apparently perceived by the senses, cite also Śruti where the doctrine that Ātman is the sheath of food is declared, to make their theory appear plausible, they also cite as authority Virocana's view that Ātman is verily the body]

8.3.2 Refutation of the View That Body is Atman

But if the body be regarded as conscious, then the different parts of the body (hands, feet etc.) or its constituent atoms must be admitted to possess consciousness. And if different parts of the body be conscious, then every single body should consist of innumerable knowers as each individual part will be a knower. But this cannot be proved. On the other hand, the cognition 'the I who sees by the eye also hears by the ear' shows that there is only one knower in a single body, as is pointed out, for example, in the *Bhāsya* on the *Nyāyasūtra* (3-2-37) Śrī Vācaspatimiśra writes in the *Bhāmatī* (3-3-3-53) that no action can be performed by a body which has different knowers because the knowers have often different motives. It cannot be said that they must always have a unity of purpose. Further, the body as a whole will be in danger of losing its solidarity if the different parts or knowers move in different directions. This also refutes the contentions of modern scientists that 'thought is secretion of the brain', 'thought is as much a function of matter as motion is' and that 'thought is the effect of the conjoined action of many material entities endowed with forces like electrical and magnetic'. It may also be mentioned that the viewpoint of fundamental modern science

itself, particularly of physics, on which such contentions are supposed to be based, has changed beyond recognition to such an extent as to leave no scope for them

It is also pointed out by Śrī Udayanācārya in the *Kusumāñjali* (1-15) that if the body be the substratum of consciousness, then the phenomenon of memory will remain inexplicable, for, the body changes continually as it grows etc , and also because of contingencies such as the foetus remembering the experiences of the mother.

8.3.3 Senses as Atman

Dissatisfied with this view, other Lokāyatas apparently of better intellect, observing—that in the absence of the functioning of the senses, the body ceases to move etc , and there is no cognition of colour etc. ; that the co-presence and co-absence of the senses with cognition is explained more suitably by assuming that the senses are the material cause and not the instruments of cognition ; that death ensues i.e , the body perishes when the 'jīva' i.e., the senses, is no longer there (*Pañcadaśī* VI–62-64) ; that there are Śrutis like 'those senses indeed came to father Prajāpati and said' etc., and that there are experiences such as 'I hear, I speak' as also 'I am blind and I am deaf'—say that उपजीव्य the senses on which the activities of उपजीवक the body, depend, and which are different from the gross body, are Ātman—उपजीव्यत्वादिन्द्रियाणामात्मत्वमिति भावः । (*Vedāntasāraṭīkā* by Śrī Āpadeva) The experiences such as 'I am stout' are because of erroneous identification of oneself with the body, while the experience 'my body' points clearly that Ātman is different from the body. None, however, has the experience 'I am body' अह देह . They also say that it is not that the senses are non-sentient, since disputes among themselves etc., are

mentioned in Śrutis (Pra U. 2; Br. U. 3–5–21, 22; Br U 8–1–7; Chā U. 5–1–6)

The details in respect of this view viz, the consequences of regarding each sense organ as Ātman, which would mean many Ātmans in one and the same body, as also the view that Ātman is the aggregate of all the senses abiding in the body are discussed, for example, in the *Vivaranaprameyasangraha* (1) and the *Nyāyaratnāvali* (1) wherein their untenability is shown Again, memory, for example, of the taste of a sour fruit, which makes one's mouth water on its being seen or smelt cannot be explained on the basis of the senses as Ātman, as it is neither the sense of sight nor that of smell which had previously experienced the taste, so also the fact that an object may be remembered even when the concerned sense organ has been destroyed Also, if there are many selves in the same body, recognition of the type 'the same I that formerly saw the colour, now hears the sound' cannot arise. If it is said it is possible merely because of their being located in a single body, there would arise the contingence of such a recognition even among those located in the same house. The danger of the body losing its solidarity etc., in case there are many knowers in the same body, already pointed out, would arise here as well. Also, it is prolix to assume many selves if things can be accounted for on the basis of a single self in a body. Therefore, Ātman which cognises and remembers objects of all senses, and which is wholly distinct from the senses must be admitted (*Nyāyabhāsya* 3–1–13, 14).

8.3.4 Prana as Atman

Hence a third type of Cārvāka holds that *prāna* is Ātman and not the senses, since the jīva survives even though the sense of sight etc, may perish; and the *prāna* is wide awake

even when the senses go to sleep, whereas the senses उपजीवक do not function when *prāna* उपजीव्य is not vigorous because of loss of food—उपजीव्यत्वात्प्राणस्यैव आत्मत्वम् । (*Vedāntasāraṭīkā*) and also because of direct experiences 'I am hungry, I am thirsty' etc The experiences such as 'I am blind' are because of erroneous identification of oneself with eyes etc., while the experience 'my eyes' etc., and the absence of experiences like 'I am eyes' point clearly that Ātman is different from the senses. Śrutis also declare—'In the city of this body, the *prānas* are awake', 'the senses, during sleep, dissolve in *prāna* and arise from it to wakefulness; hence it is supreme', 'Another and yet inner self is made of *prāna*'—प्राणाग्नय एवैतस्मिन् पुरे जाग्रति (Pra. U. 4-3), तत्प्राणे प्रपन्न उदतिष्ठत्तदुत्थमभवत्तदेतदुत्थम् (Br.U 3-5-21), अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा प्राणमयः (Tai U.2-2). This is also the view of the worshippers of Hiranyagarbha (*Pañcadaśī* VI–55, 56). But when the *prāna* is active to the fullest extent in deep sleep, it does not direct the senses and there is no response of this *prāna* to a call from outside (Br.U. 4–1) which would never have been so if *prāna* were Ātman.

8.3.5 Manas as Atman

A fourth type of Cārvāka as also some other *upāsakas* say that *manas* is Ātman, the knower, because of Śrutis like 'Another and yet inner self is made of *manas*'; because when उपजीव्य *manas* is quiescent as in swoon etc., उपजीवक *prāna* is also not in evidence, the activities of *prāṇa* being dependent on the mind, as the *Vivarana* says मनोधीनत्वात् प्राणवृत्तेः and also because of direct experience such as 'I desire', 'I doubt'. *Prāṇa*, however, is erroneously regarded as Ātman; experience is 'my *prāna*' and not 'I am *prāna*'. Also *prāṇa* is not an enjoyer while the *manas* is; Smrti also says that *manas* alone is the cause of bondage (*Pañcadaśī* VI–67, 68)

8.3.6 Buddhi as Atman

Still some others point out that *manas* is only an organ of internal perception, of pleasure, pain etc. ; and this instrument of knowledge cannot be the knower (*Nyāyasūtra* 3-1-17) Hence *buddhi* is Ātman because of Śrutis like 'Another and yet inner self is made of *vijñāna*' because the experience is 'my mind' and not 'I am mind' and no instrument can function without an agent and also because of direct experience such as 'I am the doer', 'I am the enjoyer'. Also *manas* is the mode 'this'—इदवृत्ति, of the internal organ ; and is grounded in the mode 'I' अहवृत्ति, which is the *ālaya-vijñāna* which is cognised to be produced and destroyed every moment and it is this momentary consciousness that is Ātman. So say the Buddhist vijñānavādins. It is also declared that the entire *samsāra* including origination, destruction, pleasure etc., belongs to the *vijñānamaya* (*Pañcadaśī* VI–69 to 73).

Nor is this Buddhist conception of Ātman as a series of momentary consciousness tenable because it cannot account for the consciousness of Ātman as a permanent entity and as such, bondage would pertain to one and liberation to another. Again, cognition, desire, volitional effort, impression, memory etc , must all have the same locus, as for example, the seeing of a banana, experience of its taste, the resulting happiness, again the sight of another banana, remembrance of the pervasion, inference that the fruit is the cause of happiness, desire for it again and volitional effort to secure it. At all these eight moments one and the same permanent Ātman should persist, as the *Vivaraṇopanyāsa* (1-4) points out—

किञ्च कदलीफलदर्शनं, तद्रसानुभवः, ततः सुखं, पुनः फलान्तर-दर्शनं, व्याप्तिस्मरणं, फलत्वेन सुखहेतुत्वानुमितिः, ततो रागः, प्रयत्न इत्यष्टक्षणेष्वेक आत्मा स्थिरोऽङ्गीकार्यः ।

Moreover if both the knowing subject and the known object be fleeting ideas, the act of perception cannot take place and judgement, reasoning, self-conscious reflection etc , would be absolutely impossible.

8.3.7 Prabhakara and Tarkika View—Atman, Agent-Enjoyer

Therefore the followers of Śrī Prabhākara and the Tārkikas assert the existence of Ātman as a permanent entity which is the doer and the enjoyer and say that *buddhi* is not Ātman because no one has the experience 'I am *buddhi*'. The non-sentient is Ātman which according to them is pointed out by Śrutis like 'Another and yet inner self is constituted of bliss' because *buddhi* and other qualities are seen to merge in the non-sentient ; and also because there is direct experience such as 'I am ignorant', 'I am conscious' (*Pañcadaśī* VI–77). They say that consciousness is only a quality just like desire, aversion, effort, virtue, vice, pleasure, pain, their residual impressions etc., all of which arise in Ātman (whose real nature is insentience) owing to *adṛṣṭa*, and leave Ātman in deep sleep during which *adrsta* is destroyed when it is the *ānandamaya* that remains over. Ātman here is not, however, of the nature of bliss but is the substrate of happiness. According to *Nyāyavaiśesika*, the pure Ātman is not perceived (*Nyāyabhāsya* 1–1–9, *Vaiśesikasūtra* 8–1–2) but inferred as that substance, *dravya*, in which inhere qualities like knowledge, desire etc , which do not inhere in any other substance. Though perceived as the 'I' amidst the cognitions 'I am happy', 'I do', 'I enjoy' etc., still it is not perceived as the pure Ātman. According to Śrī Prabhākara, Ātman is insentient by nature, but is the substrate of consciousness (*Nyāyaratnāvali*-1). Cognition is a triune process at once revealing itself, Ātman as the agent and Ātman itself as the object of cognition.

8.3.8 Bhatta View—Atman, Consciousness-cum-Insentience

But the followers of Śrī Kumārilabhattapāda point out that Ātman can never be revealed even as the substrate of cognition just as the burning part of a fuel is identified with burning itself and not revealed separately as the substrate of burning (*Mānameyodaya*–92) Hence they say that consciousness associated with ajñāna is Ātman because there are Śrutis like the *Māndūkyopanisad* which, referring to deep sleep, say—'Solely the essence of consciousness and abounding in bliss', because there is consciousness as well as unconsciousness in deep sleep and also because there is direct experience 'I do not know myself'. Thus they say that the *ānandamaya* which is Ātman is consciousness-cum-insentience. The memory 'in sleep I was unconscious' can arise only because of experience of unconsciousness in sleep which shows that though not manifest, consciousness is inherent in Ātman even during sleep The Śruti declares that 'in deep sleep there is no loss of the seer's vision, being indestructible'—

न हि द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यतेऽविनाशित्वात् । (Br. U. 6-3-23)

Like the glow-worm, therefore, Ātman is a composite of consciousness and inertness. (*Pañcadaśī* VI. 94–97).

8.3.9 Sunyavada—Void is Atman

Another Buddhist says that 'void' is Ātman because there are Śrutis like 'This was only non-existence at first' because there is nought in deep sleep and also because of the feeling 'I was non-existent while asleep' which is reminiscent of non-existence of Ātman then The entire universe comprising of consciousness and its object is a fabrication in naught, a myth (*Pañcadaśī*—VI. 74, 75)

8.3.10 Sankhyavada—Consciousness as Atman

The Sānkhyas, however, assert that Ātman is of the nature of Consciousness since the dual nature is unintelligible in the case of Ātman which is homogeneous and without parts (*Pañcadaśī* VI 98-101). As such neither can Ātman assume doership by itself nor can doership be imposed on It. Unlike sentience, doership is not natural to Ātman as otherwise there would be no possibility of liberation.

Thus Ātman is unattached, self-luminous and immutable and for this very reason Ātman is not the doer but only the enjoyer; the quality of being the enjoyer is of the nature of experience generated from pleasures and pains which are attributes of *buddhi* owing to want of discrimination; and this experience is undoubtedly real—

सुखदुःखाभ्यां विद्यमानाभ्या बुद्धिधर्माभ्यामविवेकोपलक्षितानुभवस्वरूपं हि भोक्तृत्वम्, तच्च सत्यमेवेति भोक्तैवात्मा ॥ (*Nyāyaratnāvali*–1)

8.4.1 Size of Atman, Reality and Eternality

There is dispute also with regard to the size of Ātman. The Āntarālas assert that it is atomic since it runs even in the subtlest of veins and point to the Śrutis such as 'Ātman is smaller than atom'—अणोरणीयान् (Śve. U. 3-20) 'This atomic Ātman is to be known by the mind'—एषोऽणुरात्मा चेतसा वेदितव्यः (Mu U. 3-1-9), 'The jīva is to be understood as a hundredth of one hundredth part of the hair at the end of the tail'—वालाग्रशतभागस्य शतधा कल्पितस्य च भागो जीवस्स विज्ञेयः। (Śve. U 5-9).

The Digambarajainas argue that Ātman is of medium size since consciousness is observed to pervade the whole body from head to foot as there is the Śruti that Ātman entered the body upto the very ends of the nails—स एष इह प्रविष्ट आ

नखाग्रेभ्यः (Br. U 3-4-7) The travelling in the minute veins, however, is done by its parts just as the physical body when putting on a coat enters it by its hands Even the entering of smaller and larger bodies in various births is possible by the coming in and going out of the parts of Ātman.

If Ātman is of the size of the body and composed of parts, then like a pot, it would be subject to decay and destruction and therefore cannot be eternal, and there would be the contingency of destruction of karma done without yielding fruits, and other defects. Thus Ātman is neither atomic nor of medium size but partless and all-pervasive like the all-penetrating ether, as per the Śruti - आकाशवत्सर्वगतश्च नित्यः (*Śatapatha-brāhmana* 10–6–3–2) and निष्कलं निष्क्रियं (Śve. U. 6–19).

Also, in respect of reality and eternality of Ātman, it is pointed out in the *Siddhāntabindutīkā* by Śrī Abhayankara-vāsudevaśāstrī that there are two viewpoints viz., the one that Ātman is not eternal and the other that Ātman is eternal. Non-eternality is also of two kinds—real and false. According to the views of those right from the Cārvāka including those that hold that Ātman is of the nature of momentary consciousness, Ātman is real but not eternal, while according to the Mādhyamikas, Ātman is false. Even eternality is of two kinds, changing and unchanging. The Digambaras hold that Ātman is changing and eternal while the Vaiśesikas etc., and the Vedāntins hold that Ātman is unchanging, Eternal—

तत्र मतभेदेन जीवात्मस्वरूपं द्विविधमनित्यं नित्यं च। अनित्यमपि द्विविधम्, सत्यं मिथ्या च। देहात्मवादिप्रभृतीनां क्षणिकविज्ञानवादिपर्यन्तानां मते सत्यमनित्यं च। माध्यमिकमते मिथ्याभूतम्। नित्यमपि द्विविधं परिणामिनित्यं कूटस्थनित्यं च। दिगम्बराणां मते परिणामिनित्यत्वम्। वैशेषिकादीनामौपनिषदपर्यन्तानां मते कूटस्थनित्यमिति।

8.4.2 Refutation of Other Views by Vedanta

Vedānta, however, refutes all the other views outlined so far, in respect of Ātman. In this respect the *Vedāntasāra* says—

एतेषां पुत्रादीनामनात्मत्वमुच्यते । एतैरतिप्राकृतादिवादिभिरुक्तेषु श्रुतियुक्त्यनुभवाभासेषु पूर्वपूर्वोक्तश्रुतियुक्त्यनुभवाभासानामुत्तरोत्तरश्रुतियुक्त्यनुभवाभासैरात्मत्वबाधदर्शनात् पुत्रादीनामनात्मत्व स्पष्टमेव । किञ्च प्रत्यगस्थूलोऽचक्षुरप्राणोऽमना अकर्ता चैतन्य चिन्मात्रं सदित्यादिप्रबलश्रुतिविरोधादस्य पुत्रादिशून्यपर्यन्तस्य जडस्य चैतन्यभास्यत्वेन घटादिवदनित्यत्वादहं ब्रह्मेति विद्वदनुभवप्राबल्याच्च, तत्तच्छ्रुतियुक्त्यनुभवाभासाना बाधितत्वादपि पुत्रादिशून्यपर्यन्तमखिलमनात्मैव । अतः तत्तद्भासकं नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तसत्यस्वभावं प्रत्यक्चैतन्यमेवात्मवस्त्विति वेदान्तविद्वदनुभवः ।

[It will now be shown how these, son etc , are not Ātman. That son etc , are not Ātman is clear from the fact that among the misleading quotations from Śruti, fallacious reasonings and erroneous experiences mentioned by the too simple-minded and the others, the earlier one—Śruti, reasoning or experience—is seen to be untenable in the light of the later one. Moreover, all these, beginning with son and ending with the void are indeed other than Ātman because the Śruti cited, reasonings and experiences mentioned in favour of each one of them are opposed to the weightier Śrutis, reasonings and experiences The weightier Śrutis are 'the internal', 'not stout', 'not the eye', 'not *prāna*', 'bereft of *manas*', 'not a doer', 'Consciousness', 'Consciousness alone', 'Existence' etc The more rational reasoning is that son etc , upto the void are of transient nature, which like a jar are insentient and therefore depend for their revelation on Consciousness. Also there is the unsublatable experience of the enlightened as 'I am Brahman'. Thus the experience of those who have secured the Vedāntic enlightenment, is that the Inmost Self is Consciousness alone which reveals each one of these several things and which, in Its essential nature, is Eternal, Pure, Intelligent, Free and True.]

8.4.3 Body not Atman, Pratyaksha not the only Pramana—Refutation of Charvakamata

Refuting the view that the body is Ātman, says the *Bhāsya* on the Sūtra (3–3–30–54) — व्यतिरेकस्तद्भावाभावित्वान्न तूपलब्धिवत् ।

न त्वेतदस्ति यदुक्तमव्यतिरेको देहादात्मन इति । व्यतिरेक एवास्य देहाद्भवितुमर्हति । तद्भावाभावित्वात् । यदि देहभावे भावाद्देहधर्मत्वमात्मधर्माणां मन्येत, ततो देहभावेऽप्यभावादतद्धर्मत्वमेवैषां किं न मन्येत ? देहधर्मवैलक्षण्यात् । ये हि देहधर्मा रूपादयस्ते यावद्देहं भवन्ति । प्राणचेष्टादयस्तु सत्यपि देहे मृतावस्थायां न भवन्ति । देहधर्माश्च रूपादयः परैरप्युपलभ्यन्ते न त्वात्मधर्माश्चैतन्यस्मृत्यादयः । अपि च सति हि तावद्देहे जीवदवस्थायामेषां भावः शक्यते निश्चेतुम्, न त्वसत्यभावः । पतितेऽपि कदाचिदस्मिन्देहे देहान्तरसञ्चारेणात्मधर्मा अनुवर्तेरन् । संशयमात्रेणापि परपक्षः प्रतिषिध्यते । किमात्मकं च पुनरिदं चैतन्यं मन्यते, यस्य भूतेभ्य उत्पत्तिमिच्छतीति परः पर्यनुयोक्तव्यः । न हि भूतचतुष्टयव्यतिरेकेण लोकायतिकः किञ्चित् तत्त्वं प्रत्येति । यदनुभवनं भूतभौतिकानां तच्चैतन्यमिति चेत् । तर्हि विषयत्वात्तेषां न तद्धर्मत्वमश्नुवीत, स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधात् । न ह्यग्निरुष्णः सन् स्वात्मानं दहति । न हि नटः शिक्षितः सन् स्वस्कन्धमधिरोक्ष्यति । न हि भूतभौतिकधर्मेण सता चैतन्येन भूतभौतिकानि विषयीक्रियेरन् । न हि रूपादिभिः स्वरूपं पररूपं वा विषयीक्रियते । विषयीक्रियन्ते तु बाह्याध्यात्मिकानि भूतभौतिकानि चैतन्येन । अतश्च यथैवास्या भूतभौतिकविषयाया उपलब्धेर्भावोऽभ्युपगम्यत एवं व्यतिरेकोऽप्यस्यास्तेभ्योऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः । उपलब्धिस्वरूप एव च न आत्मेत्यात्मनो देहव्यतिरिक्तत्वम् । नित्यत्वं च । उपलब्धेरैकरूप्यात् । अहमिदमद्राक्षमिति चावस्थान्तरयोगेऽप्युपलब्धृत्वेन प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् । स्मृत्याद्युपपत्तेश्च ।

यत्तूक्तं शरीरे भावाच्छरीरधर्म उपलब्धिरिति तद्वर्णितेन प्रकारेण प्रत्युक्तम् । अपि च सत्सु प्रदीपादिषूपकरणेषूपलब्धिर्भवति, असत्सु न

भवति। न चैतावता प्रदीपादिधर्म एवोपलब्धिर्भवति। एवं सति देह उपलब्धि-र्भवत्यसति च न भवतीति, न देहधर्मो भवितुमर्हति । उपकरणत्वमात्रेणापि प्रदीपादिवद्देहोपयोगोपपत्तेः । न चात्यन्तं देहस्योपलब्धावुपयोगोऽपि दृश्यते, निश्चेष्टेऽप्यस्मिन्देहे स्वप्ने नानाविधोपलब्धिदर्शनात्। तस्मादनवद्यं देहव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनोऽस्तित्वम् ।

[But not so; there is separation of Ātman from the body, because Consciousness may not exist even when the body exists, as in the case of cognition

The assertion that Ātman is not separate from the body cannot be maintained Ātman can only be separate from the body since Consciousness does not exist even when the body is there. If, from the fact that the attributes of Ātman are there when the body exists, it is concluded that these attributes pertain to the body, then why should it not also be concluded that they are not the attributes of the body because of the fact that they are not there even when the body is present, they being different from the attributes of the body, for attributes like colour etc., which belong to the body last as long as the body persists but activities of the vital force are not there after death even though the body exists, and such attributes of the body such as colour are perceived even by others but not so are the characteristics of the Self such as Consciousness, memory etc.? Moreover the existence of these attributes can be conclusively determined as long as the body is in a state of living, but their non-existence cannot be so determined from the non-existence of the body, for, even when this body has fallen, it is possible that on transmigration to some other body, these attributes of Self may well persist Even a doubt in respect of the opponent's standpoint is sufficient to preclude it from being accepted

Again the opponent must be questioned as to what he regards the nature of this consciousness to be, which he assumes to spring from the elements, for the materialist does not admit the existence of any principle other than the four elements. Should he say that consciousness is nothing but the perception

*

of the elements and what springs from them, in that case these elements etc , being objects of perception, sentience cannot be their attribute since a thing cannot act on itself. Fire though hot cannot indeed burn itself, nor indeed does a dancer, trained though he be, mount on his own shoulder And certainly, consciousness which is an attribute of the elements etc , cannot render them objects of itself, for neither one's own colour nor of anything else is perceived by colour etc., whereas the elements etc , on the other hand, whether external or belonging to the body, are perceived by Consciousness Hence just as the existence of this consciousness of which the elements etc , are objects is admitted, so also must its separateness from them be admitted. Self, according to us, is of the very nature of Consciousness, and as such, separate from the body and It is eternal because Consciousness is uniform by nature and also because of the recognition of Self as the perceiving agent even when in association with another state as revealed by experience of the type 'I saw this', and it should be so if memory etc , are to be accounted for.

As for the argument that since consciousness occurs in the body it must be an attribute of the body, it is refuted in the manner already explained. Moreover perceptual knowledge occurs only where there are certain auxiliaries such as lamp and not where these are absent, but it does not follow from this that perception is an attribute, for example, of the lamp itself, or the like Analogously the fact that perceptual knowledge occurs where there is a body and not where there is none does not imply that it is an attribute of the body for, like lamps etc , the body may be used as a mere auxiliary Nor is it even true that the body is absolutely required as an auxiliary of perception for, in the state of dream while the body lies motionless, manifold perceptions are in evidence The view of Self being something separate from the body is therefore free of any objection]

The *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya* (6–3–6) having outlined the Cārvāka view as already mentioned, now proceeds to refute it on the following lines—If the perceiver were the

body as the Cārvāka says, in a dream one would not see things already seen in the waking which holds as well in the case of one who has become blind This proves that he alone who sees in a dream only familiar things, also saw things before while the eyes were there; and it is not the body that saw, in agreement with the recollection of even the blind as 'Today I saw in a dream the Himālayan peak I had seen before'. Similarly in the case of remembrance, he who remembers being also the one who saw, the two are identical. It is only in this manner that a person after shutting his eyes can remember the forms he has seen before just as he saw them. Therefore that which is shut is not the seer But that which, when the eyes are shut, sees forms in remembrance, must have been the seer even when the eyes were open. This is further proved by the fact that when the body is dead, no vision takes place although the body is intact. If the body itself were the seer even a dead body would continue to see and do similar functions. Therefore it is clear that the real agent of seeing etc , is not the body but that whose absence deprives the body of the power of vision and whose presence gives it that power—

तस्माद्यदपाये देहे दर्शन न भवति, यद्भावे च भवति, तद्दर्शनादि-क्रियाकर्तृ, न देह इत्यवगम्यते ।

If it is said that the eyes and other organs themselves are the agents of vision etc., even this is not correct, for the recollection that one is touching the very thing that one has seen, would be impossible if there were different agents for those two acts. Even the mind is not the seer, for, being an object like colour etc., mind cannot be the agent of vision, touch etc. Therefore the conclusion is that the 'Light' in

question is inside the body and yet different from it like the Sun etc.—

चक्षुरादीन्येव दर्शनादिक्रियाकर्तृणीति चेत्। न। यदहमद्राक्षं तत् स्पृशामीति भिन्नकर्तृत्वे प्रतिसन्धानानुपपत्तिः। मनस्तर्हीति चेत्। न। मनसोऽपि विषयत्वात् रूपादिवत् द्रष्टृत्वाद्यनुपपत्तिः। तस्मादन्तःस्थं व्यतिरिक्तमादित्यादिवदिति सिद्धम्।

The *Bhāsya* refutes in detail the other contentions of the Cārvāka—that if inference is resorted to, then some 'light' which is of the same class as the body and the organs must be inferred since the Sun and the like are of the same class as the things they help; but inference cannot be a *pramāna* at all — by pointing out that there is no hard and fast rule that what is helped must be of the same class as what helps; and if the validity of an inference of the kind not based on a causal relation is challenged, all our activities including eating and drinking would be impossible, which conclusion is undesirable even for him.

The *Vārtikasāra* pertaining to this *Bhāsya* says—

अहं मनुष्य इत्यस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य न मानता।
अज्ञातज्ञापकत्वाख्यमानलक्षणवर्जनात्॥
देहात्मत्वमविज्ञातं तद्बोधाच्चेत्प्रमाणता।
तदविज्ञातता केन सिध्यतीति निरूप्यताम्॥
जडत्वान्न स्वतःसिद्धिर्नापि मानाद्विरोधतः।
निहन्त्यज्ञाततां मान ज्ञातताजनकत्वतः॥
मानादज्ञातता चेत् स्यात् तन्निवृत्तिः कुतो भवेत्।
न दाहज्वरनुत्त्यर्थमग्निना स्याद्विषक्क्रिया॥
मा भूदज्ञाततासिद्धिरिति चेत् कस्य मेयता।
प्रमितभ्रान्तशून्यानां युज्यते न प्रमेयता॥

अज्ञातोऽर्थः प्रमेयोऽतो वक्तव्य तस्य साधकम् ।
स्वप्रकाशात्मनोऽन्यः को यथोक्तां धुरमुद्वहेत् ॥
प्रत्यक्षमेक मान चेत् सा प्रत्यक्षस्य मानता ।
यस्य प्रसादतः सिद्धा स आत्मेत्यभ्युपेयताम् ॥ (55–61)
सत्येव यत्तु चैतन्यं देहधर्मतयोदितम् ।
चिदाभासः स विज्ञेय आस्तामेव यथा तथा ॥
भूतेभ्यश्च चिदुत्पत्तिर्न प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणिका ।
स्वप्नेऽभिज्ञापि न भ्रान्ता ज्ञेयवद्बाधवर्जनात् ॥
स्वप्नदृष्टगजादीना बाधो जागरणे यथा ।
तद्दर्शनं तथाऽबाध्य प्रत्यभिज्ञा ततः प्रमा ॥
आदित्यादिसमत्वेन न च प्रत्यक्षमानिनः ।
ज्योतिस्साधयितु युक्तमनुमानद्विषस्तव ॥
अन्तस्स्थातीन्द्रियं तेऽस्ति न प्रत्यक्षैकमानिनः ।
अतश्चाक्षुषतापत्तिरात्मज्योतिषि भौतिके ॥
ग्राहकग्रहणग्राह्यभावाभावविभागवत् ।
स्वार्थमन्यानपेक्ष सच्चैतन्यं नाक्षमानकम् ॥
अतोऽक्षगम्यदेहस्य न चैतन्यात्मतोचिता ।
नाध्यात्मत्वे चक्षुरादेः प्रत्यभिज्ञोपपद्यते ॥
यमद्राक्ष पुरा कुम्भं तत्त्वचाद्य स्पृशाम्यहम् ।
इत्येतत्प्रत्यभिज्ञानं न भिन्नद्रष्टृक भवेत् ॥
प्रत्यभिज्ञानकृत्तर्हि मन आत्मेति चेन्मतम् ।
नैव, तस्यापि मनसो विषयत्वेन दर्शनात् ॥
शब्दादिखचितं साक्षात्स्मृतिस्वप्नगत मनः ।
कुम्भवद्वीक्ष्यते यस्मान्नात आत्मा मनोऽपि नः ॥
देहादिव्यतिरिक्तोऽतः प्रमात्रादिविलक्षणः ।
आत्मैव ज्योतिरित्यत्र विस्पष्टं सुविचारितः ॥ (66–77)

[The perceptual knowledge 'I am a man' has no validity since it is devoid of the characteristic of valid knowledge which makes known what has been unknown.

If it is said that Self as the body was what was 'unknown' and therefore, as making it known, it is *pramāna* then it must be made clear as to what is the means by which this 'unknownness' is revealed

This 'unknownness' cannot be self-revealed since it is insentient, nor revealed by any *pramāna*, they being mutually opposed to each other A *pramāna* on the other hand, far from being the revealer, destroys the 'unknownness' completely, by virtue of its being a generator of knownness If the 'unknownness' is established by *pramāna* then whence its destruction? Fire cannot be the antidote for thirst or fever.

If it is said that 'unknownness' need not be revealed then what is it that is to be made known? What is already known by valid knowledge, an object of illusion or what does not exist at all, cannot be an object of valid knowledge

What has been so far 'unknown' can become 'known' by means of *pramāna*, hence that which reveals the 'unknownness' must be spelt out What else other than the Self-effulgent Ātman can accomplish such a thing!

If perception were to be the only *pramāna*, know as Ātman That by means of which perception derives its validity

This being the case this consciousness, however, which is said to be an attribute of the body, is to be understood as the *cidābhāsa*, be it by mutual superimposition

The arising of consciousness from out of the elements is not revealed by direct perception Nor is the dream experience an illusion for it is not sublated like the objects of experience.

Objects like elephant etc., perceived in a dream are sublated in the waking state, but not so their perception; hence the recollection of dream experience is valid.

You for whom perception is the *pramāna* and inference is not, cannot establish with reason that consciousness is similar to the Sun etc.

Perception being the only *pramāna* for you, you cannot assert the existence of consciousness inside the body, which is beyond sense perception Hence there arises the contingency of Ātman-Consciousness which according to you would be physical in nature, being perceived by the eye.

The Self-effulgent Pure Consciousness which does not stand in need of anything else and which is the Witness of existence as well as non-existence of the perceiver, the perception and the perceived, is not perceivable by senses

Thus it is not proper to say that the body perceivable by the senses is of the nature of consciousness

Nor are the senses the Self because of the untenability, in that case, of recognition of the type 'I touch now the same pot which I saw before' which negates the existence of different perceivers.

If it is said that in that case, mind, the agent of recognition, is the self, this cannot be; even this mind is seen to be an object of knowledge

In association with sound etc , mind that pervades memory as also dream, is directly perceived like a pot Hence even mind is not Ātman, according to us.

Thus it is here well established by this discussion that Ātman Itself is Consciousness which is separate from the body etc , whose characteristics are entirely different from those of the perceiving agent etc]

Proceeding on similar lines the *Mānasollāsa* refutes the theories of those 'whose intellect is deluded by Māyā'—

मायाऽग्यामूढचित्तानां तेषा दूपणमुच्यते ।
देहादीनां जडार्थाना पापाणवदनात्मनाम् ॥
कथ भवेदहंभावः समावेशं विनेशितुः । (V–9, 10)

[How can the objects like the physical body which are insentient like stone and are thus different from Ātman can ever have the 'I' sense except by the entering of the Lord into them ?]

At the outset the view that the physical body is Ātman is refuted—

देहस्तावदयं नात्मा दृश्यत्वाज्जाड्यवत्त्वतः ॥
रूपादिमत्त्वात् सांशत्वाद्भौतिकत्वाच्च कुम्भवत् ।
मूर्छासुषुप्तिमरणेष्वपि देहः प्रदृश्यते ॥
देहादिव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् तदात्मा न प्रतीयते ।
यथा जगत्प्रवृत्तीनामादिकारणमंशुमान् ॥
पुमांस्तथैव देहादिप्रवृत्तौ कारणं परम् ।
मम देहोऽयमित्येवं स्त्री बालोऽन्धश्च मन्यते ॥
देहोऽहमिति नावैति कदाचिदपि कश्चन । (V–10–14)

[Now the physical body cannot be Ātman because like a pot it is v sible, insentient, endued with colour etc., made of parts and constituted by matter

Even in swoon, deep sleep and death, the physical body is seen, being distinct from the body, Ātman is not seen then.

The Sun is the primary cause of all activities in the world; just so is Ātman the chief cause of the activities of the physical body etc.

'This is my body' thus feels a woman, a child and even a blind man, none ever feels 'I am the body'.]

The various inferences mentioned here to establish the distinction of Ātman from the body have practically been discussed already.

It cannot be contended that the feeling 'I am a man' points to a valid experience of the body being Ātman, for man sometimes dreams of himself being a tiger. Here the 'I' sense persists unaffected by the different bodies with

which it has been associated in the waking and the dream states.

Other reasons for rejecting the view that the physical body is Ātman are given in the *Svārājyasiddhi* (1-29)—

कश्चिद्दुःखी स्वजन्मप्रभृति सुखयुतश्चापरः कस्य हेतोः
कस्मादाद्या प्रवृत्तिस्तनुरपि च कुतः किं न वेत्ति प्रमीतः ।
स्वाभाव्य हेतुसाम्ये सममिति विदितं दीपबीजाङ्कुरादौ
वैषम्यं कर्मजन्यं यदि गदसि जनेः पूर्वमप्यात्मसिद्धिः ॥

Any viewpoint that is advanced must be able to account for all the facts of experience in that realm. The Cārvāka is therefore called upon to explain the observed facts from his standpoint. How is it that one person is unhappy right from his birth while another is happy throughout? How is it possible to explain the first activity of the newborn viz., sucking, without any previous experience and the knowledge that it leads to the desired end? How is it possible to account for the formation of the body without the agency of the sentient which is evidently necessary as is seen in the fabrication e.g., of chariots, buildings etc.? How to account for the absence of knowledge on the part of the dead? It is a natural law that when the 'causal' ingredients are similar, the phenomena that arise therefrom are also similar as is evidenced in the case of the lamp giving heat and light when the wick soaked in oil is ignited, as also in the case of a particular type of seed giving rise to the particular type of sprout etc. Thus differences that are seen would have to be traced to differences in the prior set-up of things and cannot be merely disposed of by asserting that such is the nature, *svabhāva*, of things. Nor can they be explained away as being 'accidental', *yadṛcchā*, as that would

amount to one's confession of ignorance. If anything is sought to be explained as 'accidental', in the face of that, all other notions would be futile, as in every case and at every stage the notion of 'accident' can be brought in. The use of the word 'accident' in common parlance is to be understood as meaning merely the ignorance of the details of the causal set-up Other facts also viz , the memory of the previous births in case of some people, the experience of the enlightened, possession of some persons by evil spirits etc., call for explanation. The denial of the existence of such facts is no explanation. If the variety is said to be caused by previous karma, that would be tantamount to admitting 'Ātman' as different from the body.

Now as to the contention that inference, analogy, verbal testimony, implication and non-apprehension cannot be *pramānas* at all, it has already been pointed out that, in such a case, the daily routine cannot be carried out and all parlance in respect of imparting knowledge as also discussion etc., would not be possible. In this connection, the *Svārājya-siddhi* (1-30) says—

मानं प्रत्यक्षमेकं यदि, कथय कथ भापित ते प्रमाणं
सभाव्यार्थं सदोष यदि तदपि वली किं न वेदो विदोषः ।
न ह्यध्यक्ष विनाक्षैर्न च तव सुगमा मानताऽध्यक्षमात्रे
ज्ञान नान्यस्य बोद्धु प्रभवति च भवांस्तेन मिथ्याप्रलापी ॥

[If you say 'perception is the only *pramāna*' how can these 'words' of yours be taken as *pramāna*? If you assert, that though infected with defects, your statement which has only a very high probability of conveying the truth is powerful enough to be a *pramāna*, why not Śruti which is absolutely free from any fault? Perception is not possible without the senses, but the senses themselves become known not by perception, but by other means

like inference etc. Even the validity of perceptual knowledge cannot be established by perception alone, making it impossible to distinguish the illusory from the real Moreover you who swear by perception will never be able to know the mind of another person—his knowledge, desires etc. As such, while making use of the other *pramānas* all along, you are denying them verbally Thus you are uttering falsehood, making worthless statements which are unfit for any consideration whatsoever.]

Usual statements such as 'I am fair-complexioned, stout, young and skilled' show that people naturally identify themselves with the body and no special theory is required to teach them that the body is Ātman. Such experiences, however, are because of mutual superimposition of Ātman and the body which are different as is clear from the foregoing discussion as also because of the impossibility of Ātman, the 'illuminator', being an attribute of body, the 'illumined', just as a lamp cannot be an attribute of a pot; and as such your theory based on such illusory experiences serves no purpose. If it is your hatred for Śruti, that has prompted you to indulge in the formulation of your theory, what has come out because of hatred can never be a *pramāna*. Unfortunately you are doomed and are trying to ruin others also. As such your theory is not merely unacceptable but is to be rejected outright. So says the *Svārājyasiddhi* (1-31)—

गौरस्स्थूलो युवाहं पटुरिति च तनावात्मबुद्धिर्जनाना
स्वाभाव्यादेव सिद्धेत्यधिगमयदिदं निष्फल दर्शनं ते ।
वेदद्वेषात् प्रवृत्तं यदि वत न तरां द्वेषमूलं प्रमाणं
दैवान्नष्टस्त्वमेकः किमिति शठ ! परान् हन्त हन्तु प्रवृत्तः ॥

8.4.4 Sense Organs not Atman

Not even the sense organs are Ātman since they are mere instruments like a lamp etc. The *Mānasollāsa* (V–14 to 17)

establishes this by calling attention to what is evidenced in respect of each organ separately—

इन्द्रियाण्यपि नात्मानः करणत्वात् प्रदीपवत् ॥
वीणावादनवच्छ्रोत्रं शब्दग्रहणसाधनम् ।
चक्षुस्तेजस्त्रितयवद्रूपग्रहणसाधनम् ॥
गन्धस्य ग्राहकं घ्राणं पुष्पसंपुटकादिवत् ।
रसस्य ग्राहिका जिह्वा दधिक्षौद्रघृतादिवत् ॥
इन्द्रियाणि न मे सन्ति मूकोऽस्मि बधिरोऽस्म्यहम् ।
इत्याहुरिन्द्रियैर्हीना जनाः किं ते निरात्मकाः ॥

[Just as for example, the playing on vīnā, the three lights—the Sun, the Moon and fire—a flower-cup etc., and curd, honey and ghee are the necessary means for producing the respective cognitions, so are the senses—the ear, the eye, the nose and the tougue—the necessary means for the respective cognitions Again those who are deprived of the respective sense organs express 'I do not have the sense organs, I am dumb, I am blind, I am deaf' etc. But are they without Ātman?]

In this connection says the *Svārājyasiddhi* (1–33)—

खानामात्मत्ववादे प्रतिनियतगतौ स्वामिनानात्वदोषा-
द्देहोन्मन्थप्रसङ्गस्समुदितविषये त्वन्धमूका म्रियेरन् ।
उक्तिर्दृष्टश्रुतानामपि च न घटते नापि सङ्घो निरूप्य-
स्स्वप्नद्रष्टैव न स्याच्छयनमरणयोर्निर्विशेषाद्द्वयं स्यात् ॥

[Nor are senses the Ātman because, if each of them is Ātman, then due to the defect of there being many masters, there would arise the predicament of the body being torn asunder, a person should not be able to speak about what is heard or seen since the speaker-Ātman would not be the same as the hearer-Ātman etc. If all the senses together constitute Ātman the blind, the dumb etc, should, ipso facto, be dead Nor can a group be described as apart from its parts Since the senses are at rest when a man sleeps, there will be none to perceive the dream. Also as there

will be no distinction between sleep and death, one would be afraid to go to sleep Experiences such as 'I see, I hear, I smell, I am blind, I am deaf' are, however, because of superimposition of the attributes of the eye, the ear etc. on Ātman.]

8.4.5 Prana not Atman

Next, the view that *prāṇa* is Ātman is shown to be defective. Says the *Mānasollāsa* (V–18 to 21)—

प्राणोऽप्यात्मा न भवति ज्ञानाभावात् सुषुप्तिषु ।
जाग्रत्स्वप्नोपभोगोत्थश्रमविच्छित्तिहेतवे ॥
सुषुप्तिं पुरुषे प्राप्ते शरीरमभिरक्षितुम् ।
शेषकर्मोपभोगार्थं प्राणश्चरति केवलम् ॥
प्राणस्य तत्र चैतन्यं करणोपरमे यदि ।
प्राणे न्याप्रियमाणे तु करणोपरमः कथम् ॥
सम्राजि हि रणोद्युक्ते विरमन्ति न सैनिकाः ।
तस्मान्न करणस्वामी प्राणो भवितुमर्हति ॥

[Not even *prāna* is Ātman for there is no consciousness during deep sleep When one goes to sleep to gain respite from the worry caused by the waking and dream life, *prāna* acts for the mere preservation of the body wherewith to reap the fruits of karma yet unspent.

If *prāna* be Ātman seeking rest in deep sleep, then it should be inactive during sleep On the other hand, during sleep *prāna* is as active as before, the activity of *prāna* is evidenced by the phenomenon of breathing etc If *prāna* be really the sentient Ātman whose instruments of action and knowledge are the sensory and the motor organs, then it would be impossible for the latter to be inactive so long as the former remains active, and deep sleep would not then be a period of inactivity. For example, when a king is still engaged in a battle, the army cannot indeed cease to fight *Prāna* therefore cannot be the Lord of the sense organs]

Here the *Svārājyasiddhi* (1-34) says—

प्राणो नात्मा जडत्वादशनसिततया वृत्तिलाभात्सुषुप्ता-
वेतस्मिन्त्सञ्चरत्यप्यहमचर इति प्रत्ययादम्मयत्वात् ।
स्रष्टा स्वोत्क्रान्तयेऽस्याऽऽमरणमपि धृतेर्जीवशब्दाभिधेय-
स्तस्मादन्योऽस्ति रक्षन्स्वनिलयममुना दीप्तिमानेकहंसः ॥

[*Prāna* is not Ātman as it is insentient and dependent on food for vitalising the organs of sense etc It is found functioning in deep sleep, also one has the experience 'I am steady' even when the vital air is constantly in motion, being essentially made of subtle element, water, it is physical in nature. *Prāna* is created by Ātman as a means for transmigration An individual is called jīva as he holds on to *Prāna* throughout his life Thus as different from *prāna*, there is the One effulgent *Paramātman* who is spoken of as '*Hamsa*' because of passing through the triad of states or because of destroying the bondage or as the enlightened one, as the root meanings of the word *hamsa* indicate, or because of being spoken of as a bird, in association with *upādhis*, protecting His abode, the body, with the assistance of this *prāna*]

All this is based mainly on Śrutis a large number of which is quoted in the *tīkā* which also gives the correct interpretations of Śrutis misquoted by the opponent. The *Mānasollāsa* (V–22) says—

मनसः प्रेरके पुंसि विरते विरमन्त्यतः ।
करणानि समस्तानि तेषां स्वामी ततः पुमान् ॥

[The Lord, however, is the Indweller that controls the mind—यो मनोऽन्तरो यमयति. This mind as also the sense organs function only at His behest and not otherwise As such, Ātman the Lord, is different from *prāna*]

8.4.6 Manas not Atman

Incidentally, it is seen that the view that Ātman that is different from *prāna* is *manas* which directs the senses etc., is

refuted by pointing out that mind is also an instrument and is itself controlled by the Indweller. The *Svārājyasiddhi* (1-35) establishes that *manas* is not Ātman—

उद्भूतेस्साधनत्वादशनमयतया शुद्ध्यशुद्धिप्रतीते-
र्हेतुत्वाद्बन्धमुक्त्योस्तदनु तनुभृतेस्तन्मयत्वश्रुतेश्च ।
जाग्रत्स्वप्नप्रशान्तौ करणगणलये तत्प्रशान्तेः सुषुप्ते-
रुत्थाने सुप्तिसौख्यस्मृतिभिरपि मितं मानसं चापि नात्मा ॥

[*Manas* is inferred to be not Ātman because of the following reasons : it is produced, an instrument (of knowledge like eye etc.) and a product of food and as such the purity or otherwise of mind depends on food. It is the cause of bondage and liberation. The jīva enters such a body which is in tune with the ultimate mode of mind in the previous life. Ātman which is other than mind is described as *manomaya* in Śruti, only when in identification with mind. It is also quiescent in the absence of waking and dream (in deep sleep), when the organs are quiescent On waking there is the memory of the experience of deep sleep and happiness therein when the 'mind' experience was not there.]

The *ṭīkā* thereon quotes a large number of Śrutis and Smṛtis on which the above is based.

8.4.7 Momentary Consciousness not Atman

Now the *Mānasollāsa* (V–23 to 26) refutes the Buddhistic theory that momentary consciousness itself is Ātman—

बुद्धिस्तु क्षणिका वेद्या गमागमसमन्विता ।
आत्मनः प्रतिबिम्बे तु भासिता भासयेज्जगत् ॥
आत्मन्युत्पद्यते बुद्धिरात्मन्येव प्रलीयते ।
प्रागूर्ध्वं चासती बुद्धिः स्वयमेव न सिध्यति ॥
ज्ञानाच्चेत् पूर्वपूर्वस्मादुत्तरोत्तरसम्भवः ।
युगपद्बहुबुद्धित्वं प्रसज्येत क्षणे क्षणे ॥
बुद्ध्यन्तरं न जनयेन्नाशोत्तरमसत्त्वतः ।

[Be it known that momentary consciousness is but a thing which appears and disappears. It reveals the universe, only on being itself illumined by Ātman's reflection.

Consciousness arises in Ātman and dissolves in Ātman Itself, existing neither before it appears nor after it disappears; by itself it does not exist at all.

If each preceding consciousness should give rise to the next, then there would be the contingency of the presence of innumerable consciousnesses every moment.

No consciousness can give rise, subsequent to its own disappearance, to another consciousness, as it does not then exist at all.]

8.4.8 Buddhi not Atman ; Atman not Agent-Enjoyer

The view—that, instead of momentary consciousness, steady consciousness spoken of in the Śruti as *vijñāna*, a synonym of *buddhi*, is Ātman because of Śrutis विज्ञानं यज्ञं तनुते कर्माणि तनुतेऽपि च (Tai U 2-5) and the Sūtra कर्ता शास्त्रार्थवत्त्वात् (2–3–14–33) which point to the situation that as *kartā*, the doer of actions (both religious and secular), it is sentient—cannot also be held, for all the objections against the view of considering mind as Ātman hold equally in this case also since the steady consciousness is also a mode of *antaḥkarana*. There is a host of other Śrutis declaring that Ātman becomes bound because of identification with *vijñāna* and that *vijñāna* is the driver of the chariot that is the body, in jīva's pursuit of worldly enjoyment or release. Hence the witness of this *vijñāna* must be another viz., the inner Ātman, of the nature of Consciousness and with *vijñāna* as *upādhi* So says the *Svārājyasiddhi* (1–36)—

विज्ञान स्थायि यत्तत्समिह मनसा किंच नानाऽऽत्मता स्या-
त्तस्यानेकात्मकत्वात्तदभिमतिवशादात्मबन्धश्रुतेश्च ।

सारथ्यं तस्य क्लृप्तं यदपि तनुरथे स्वात्मनो भोगमुक्त्यो-
स्तस्मादन्योऽस्य साक्षी तदुपहिततनुश्चिन्मयोऽस्त्यन्तरात्मा ॥

8.4.9 Aggregate not Atman

Even if the aggregate of all these viz., the body etc., be accepted as Ātman, then, when one part is severed, there would be no sentiency because of the absence of the integrated whole.

If it be held that there are many sentiencies in the aggregate, then this composition of many sentiencies will at once break up, being pulled in different directions by the various parts, or the life functions would have to come to a standstill. Therefore even this aggregate cannot be Ātman as the *Mānasollāsa* (V–26 to 28) points out—

एषां सङ्घात आत्मा चेदेकदेशे पृथक्कृते ॥
न चैतन्य प्रसज्येत सङ्घाताभावतस्तदा ।
भिन्नदिग्गत्यभिप्रायो बहु चेत्तन्न पूजितम् ॥
सद्यो भिन्न भवेदेतन्निष्क्रियं वा भविष्यति ।

The apparent sentiency in respect of the aggregate is thus to be traced to the sentient Ātman.

8.4.10 Atman not Atomic

This Ātman cannot be atomic in size as the *Svārājya-siddhi* (1–37) points out—

अण्वात्मा चित्स्वरूपो यदि सकलतनौ शैत्यबोधो न ते स्या-
न्नावैधर्म्येऽस्य बोधः सकलतनुगतग्राहकोऽन्यो गुणश्च ।
वैधर्म्येऽणोर्गुणश्चेत्कथमखिलतनुं व्याप्नुयाद्गुणवं वा
सिद्ध केनात्मनस्ते श्रुतिभिरिति न यत्तास्तदानन्त्यनिष्ठाः ॥

[If Ātman which is of the nature of consciousness is atomic in size, one would not be able to feel cold (or heat) in all the

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parts of the body at the same time. If Ātman and consciousness have the same characteristics, then consciousness which cognises things in all the parts of the body cannot be a quality of Ātman different from Him. If the quality and the qualified have different characteristics, how can consciousness which is a quality of Ātman pervade the whole body? How is the atomic size of Ātman established? Certainly not by Śrutis for their purport is in the infinite nature of Ātman.]

8.4.11 Atman not Sentient-cum-Insentient

Nor should Ātman be considered to be sentient-cum-insentient. One Ātman cannot be both sentient and insentient. How can he be an object to himself? Which are the two parts and how are they related to each other? What is Ātman? To what is the non-sentience of the sentient due? What is the nature of his doership? How does he incorporate in himself the group of senses? Those who are engaged in performing sacrifices and are thus dear victims of the gods can hardly explain the nature of jīva. So says the *Svārājya-siddhi* (1–38)—

> नैकस्स्याच्चिज्जडात्मा कथमथ विषयः सस्स्वयं स्वस्य कौ ता-
> वशौ योगस्तथात्मा किमिति च जडता केन वा चेतनस्य ।
> कर्तृत्वं तस्य कीदृक्करणसमुदयं सैष धत्ते कथ वा
> तत्त्वं जीवस्य देवप्रियपशुभिरिदं कर्मठैर्दुर्निरूपम् ॥

8.4.12 Untenability of Many All-pervasive Atmans

Again, if jīvas are all-pervading, then the apportioning of the enjoyment (of fruits of karma) would not be explicable as the jīvas would be equally related to all bodies, actions, organs and *adṛṣṭas*. The mind also would be associated with all jīvas. If one means to explain this as due to the differences of *upādhis* that are the bodies, then the multiplicity of Ātman will be disproved. It is futile to concoct

special distinguishing qualities whether the difference in Ātman be proved or disproved, as pointed out by the *Svārājyasiddhi* (1–39)—

जीवाना वैभवं चेत्तनुकृतिकरणादृष्टसाधारणत्वा-
न्न स्याद्भोगव्यवस्था व्यतिकरमयते येन सर्वैर्मनोऽपि ।
नानात्म्यं निष्प्रमाणं गदसि यदि तनूपाधिभिस्त्वं व्यवस्थां
सिद्धेऽसिद्धेऽपि भेदे यत इह विफलाः कल्पनीया विशेषाः ॥

Moreover, the association of the mind which has no parts is not possible with Ātman which also has no parts. Matter can neither be partless nor eternal. Consciousness cannot be a quality of matter because in that case consciousness also would be non-sentient. So says the *Svārājyasiddhi* (1–40)—

किञ्चात्मन्यनवयवे न संप्रयोगः संभाव्यो निरवयवस्य मानसस्य ।
न द्रव्यं निरवयवं न शाश्वतं वा तद्धर्मो न च धिषणा यतो जडा स्यात् ॥

8.4.13 Atman not Enjoyer alone

The Sānkhya view is that Ātman is merely an enjoyer and not a doer. According to him, enjoyership is the experience as indicated by the involvement, due to non-discrimination of the *purusa* in pleasure and pain that arise in their locus, *buddhi*; and it is real, as the *Nyāyaratnāvali* (1) points out—

सुखदुःखाभ्यां विद्यमानाभ्यां बुद्धिधर्माभ्यामविवेकोपलक्षितानुभवस्वरूपं हि भोक्तृत्वम्, तच्च सत्यमेवेति भोक्तैवात्मा ।

Refuting this, the *Svārājyasiddhi* (1–18) says—

किञ्चाकर्तैव भोक्ता यदि बत कृतहानाकृताभ्यागमः स्या-
त्कीदृग्भोगोऽप्यसङ्गेऽनतिशयिनि भवेत्तेन भोग्यस्य कोऽर्थः ।
कीदृक् कस्याविवेकः कथमथ स भवेद्भोगहेतुर्विवेकः
कस्य स्यात्तेन किं स्यादिति हि विमृशतो दुर्वचं ब्रह्मणोऽपि ॥

[Moreover, if *purusa* who is the non-doer is the enjoyer, alas ! that means there is the accruing of the result of what is not done and the destruction of the result of what is done. What sort of enjoyment can there be for the *purusa* who is detached and attributeless ? *How is prakrti, the bhogya, concerned with it ?* What is non-discrimination and to whom does it belong ? How can non-discrimination be the cause of enjoyment ? To whom does discrimination belong ? What is its outcome ? If even God Brahmā ponders over such questions He too will not be able to answer them !]

8.4.14 Atman One, All-pervading

In respect of the size of Ātman, the *Mānasollāsa* says—

देहस्यान्तर्गतोऽप्यात्मा व्याप्त एवेति बुध्यते ॥
अणुप्रमाणश्चेदेष व्याप्नुयान्नाखिलं वपुः ।
देहप्रमाणश्चेन्न स्याद्बालस्य स्थविरादिता ॥
देहवत्परिणामी चेत् तद्वदेव विनङ्क्षयति ।
कर्मणा परिणामेन क्रिमिहस्त्यादिमूर्तिषु ॥
व्याप्तत्वात् प्रविशत्यात्मा घटादिष्वन्तरिक्षवत् ।
परमाणुप्रमाणेऽपि मनसि प्रतिभासते ॥
स्वप्ने चराचर विश्वमात्मन्येव प्रतिष्ठितम् । (V–28 to 32)

[Though dwelling within the body Ātman, to be sure, must be all-pervading. If He be of the size of an atom He cannot pervade the whole body

If Ātman be of the size of the body, one who is a boy cannot become an old man and so on If Ātman be subject to change like the body then He too shall perish like the body.

By the ripening of karma Ātman, all-pervading as He is, enters the body of a worm or of an elephant and so on like ether entering a pot etc.

He manifests even in the *manas* which is infinitesimally small. In dream the universe, animate and inanimate, abides in Ātman alone.]

8.4.15 Atman, the Witness, Pointed to only by Upanishads

This all-pervading Ātman is the Witness which shines by Itself and also makes known all else Says the *Svārājya-siddhi* (1-41, 43, 44)—

अज्ञानं स्वमथ सुखं सुषुप्त्यबुद्ध बुद्धस्त्वं स्मरसि कथं स्वतो जडात्मा ।
विज्ञानान्ययमयमित्यनेकसङ्ख्यान्यद्राक्षं चिरमिति केन वेत्स्यसाक्षी ॥

[How can you, being an insentient Ātman, recall after waking, the happiness and the absence of knowledge which according to you are not experienced in deep sleep? If you are not a witness (being insentient), how do you remember that you have observed for a long time the many *vijñānas* as 'this object', 'this object'? (Hence Ātman must be accepted as Eternal Consciousness)]

संशान्ते रविशशिवह्निवाक्प्रकाशे निर्वाणे करणगणे निरस्तसङ्गः ।
स्वज्योतिः प्रकटितवासनामयार्थश्चिद्धातुश्श्रुतिभिरुदीरितोऽन्तरात्मा ॥

[When the light of the Sun, the Moon, fire as well as speech sets and when all the senses become quiet, the Self-effulgent detached Ātman who is constituted of Consciousness, manifests the objects (in dream) according to the latent impressions Such is the nature of the Inner Ātman described by Śruti.]

बाह्यार्थान् करणगणेन तं च बुद्ध्या बुद्धिं यः प्रथयति सन्ततं स्वभासा ।
आत्मासावनधिगतः पराग्भिरेभिर्विज्ञेयस्तनुभवनाऽऽन्तरप्रदीपः ॥

[(In the waking state) Ātman always illumines the external objects with the group of senses, the senses with the intellect and the intellect with His own Light. Ātman cannot be perceived by the senses which are extrovert Ātman is to be known as the Inner Light in the abode of the body.]

It is clear from the foregoing that the 'sentient Ātman' is agreed upon as being made known in a general sort of way by the I-sense, *aham*. Yet divergent views are held in respect of It by various schools. It is surprising that none of these schools, not even the *Mīmāmsā* nor the *Tarka*, has taken note

of the Witness, that Self which is present in all, ever the same, the One, eternally unchanging, the Self of everything as distinct from the agent who is referred to by the I-sense. It is pointed out only by Vedānta which alone decides the exact nature of Ātman precisely wherefrom the I-sense springs. Says the *Sūtrabhāṣya* (1-1-4-4)—

नन्वात्माहंप्रत्ययविषयत्वादुपनिषत्स्वेव विज्ञायत इत्यनुपपन्नम् । न, तत्साक्षित्वेन प्रत्युक्तत्वात् । न ह्यहंप्रत्ययविषयकर्तृव्यतिरेकेण तत्साक्षी सर्वभूतस्थः सम एकः कूटस्थनित्यः पुरुषो विधिकाण्डे तर्कसमये वा केनचिदधिगतः सर्वस्यात्मा ।

8.5.1 Who Am I Then ?

So it is that all other systems are refuted Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda puts the whole thing in a nutshell in the opening verse of the *Daśaślokī*.

'I am neither the earth, nor the water, nor the fire, nor the air, nor the space, nor any organ, nor their aggregate, because they are variable by nature, while Ātman is that whose existence is proved by the unique experience of deep sleep. I am that One, Auspicious and Pure which alone remains over'—

एवं सामान्यतोऽहंप्रत्ययसिद्धे चिदात्मनि वादिविप्रतिपत्तिभिः सन्दिग्धे, अहंप्रत्ययस्यालम्बनविशेषनिर्णयायाह भगवानाचार्यः—

न भूमिर्न तोयं न तेजो न वायु-
र्न खं नेन्द्रियं वा न तेषां समूहः ।
अनेकान्तिकत्वात्सुषुप्त्येकसिद्ध-
स्तदेकोऽवशिष्टः शिवः केवलोऽहम् ॥

(*Siddhāntabindu*—1)

8.5.2 Stripping the 'I' of Its Accretions — Insistent Refutation of Other Schools to Save Seekers from Disaster

In elaboration of what is laconically expressed in the above *śloka*, the *Siddhāntabindu* continues to say—

अहम्—अहंप्रत्ययालम्बनम् । एकः—अद्वितीयः । अवशिष्टः—सर्वद्वैतबाधेऽप्यबाधितः । शिवः—परमानन्दबोधरूपस्तस्यैव मङ्गलरूपत्वात् । केवलः—निर्धर्मकः । तेनाद्वितीयस्सर्वप्रमाणाबाध्यः परमानन्दबोध एवाहंप्रत्ययालम्बनमित्यौपनिषदपक्ष एव श्रेयानित्यर्थः ।

एतदुपपादनायेतरवादिमतानि निराकरिष्यन् प्रथमं देहात्मवादं निराकरोति । न भूमिर्न तोयं न तेजो न वायुर्न खमिति । अत्राहमिति सर्वत्र प्रत्येक नञा संबध्यते । या भूमिः सोऽहं न भवामि योऽहं सा भूमिर्न भवतीति च परस्परतादात्म्याभावो द्रष्टव्यः ।

यद्यपि वादिना प्रत्येक भूम्यादिरात्मत्वेन नाभ्युपेयते सङ्घातस्यैव तदभ्युपगमात् तथापि तन्मतेऽवयव्यनङ्गीकारात् पञ्चमतत्त्वाभ्युपगमप्रसङ्गेन च संयोगादिसंबन्धानभ्युपगमात् संहन्तुरभावाच्च सङ्घातो नोपपद्यत इत्यभिप्रेत्य प्रत्येकं भूतनिराकरणेन भौतिकदेहात्मवादो निराकृतः ।

यद्यपि भूतचतुष्टयतत्त्ववादिनो मते आवरणाभावत्वेनाभिमतस्य स्थिरस्यासत आकाशस्य देहानुपादानत्वम्, तथापि सिद्धान्ते तस्य भावत्वम् । देहोपादानत्वाद्यङ्गीकारात् । तत्राप्यात्मत्वप्रसक्त्या तन्निराकृतम् । अथवा न वायुरित्यन्तमेव देहात्मवादस्य निराकरणम्, न खमिति तु शून्यवादस्य, खशब्दस्य शून्यवाचकत्वात् ।

नेन्द्रियमिति प्रत्येकमिन्द्रियाणामात्मत्वनिरासः । न तेषां समूह इति मिलितानां भूतानां देहावयव्याकारेण परिणतानामिन्द्रियाणां च मिलितानां निरासः । पूर्वं सङ्घातमनभ्युपगम्य प्रत्येकं भूतानि निराकृतानि । अधुना तु सङ्घातमभ्युपगम्यापि निराकृतानीति भेदः । भूतनिराकरणेन भौतिकयोः प्राणमनसोर्निरासः । मनोनिराकरणेन मनोवृत्तेः क्षणिकविज्ञानस्य, देहाति-

रिक्तस्य कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वादिविशिष्टस्य च निरासः। सिद्धान्ते ज्ञानेच्छासुखादीनामन्तःकरणाश्रयत्वाभ्युपगमात्, कामसङ्कल्पादीन् प्रकृत्य 'एतत्सर्वं मन एव' इति श्रुतेः। तेन देहमारभ्य केवलभोक्तृपर्यन्ताना तत्तद्वाद्यभ्युपगतानामनात्मत्वं प्रतिज्ञातं भवति।

Here *aham* means 'the seat of I-consciousness'. *Ekaḥ* means 'without a second' *Avaśiṣṭaḥ* means 'unsublated even on the sublation of all duality' *Śivaḥ* means 'of the nature of supreme joy and knowledge', that itself being of the nature of auspiciousness and *kevalah* means 'devoid of attributes'. Thereby it is meant that the only sound view is that of the *Aupaniṣadas* viz., that the seat of the I-consciousness is the One without a second which is unsublated by any of the *pramāṇas* and is supreme joy and knowledge. Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda, desiring to refute the view of the other schools in order to establish the above, first refutes the view that the body is Ātman by negating the selfhood in earth, water, fire, air and ether. Therein the word *aham* is related to each particle *na* It should be understood that there is no mutual identification of the type—that which is the earth cannot be the 'I' and that which is the 'I' cannot be the earth.

Although the opponent does not admit that each of earth etc, is individually Ātman but believes that their aggregate alone is, still a combination as admitted by him cannot be explained at all because of the following reasons—(1) he does not believe in collocation as an entity independent of the constituents (2) he does not believe in such a relation as conjunction because if he accepts, he would have to admit a fifth entity viz., conjunction and (3) there is none who could bring about the combination. And as such Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda refutes the physical body being Ātman by denying the Ātmanhood of each element.

In the view of those who believe in the existence of only four elements, ether—which is admitted to exist in the form of an absence of covering, is eternal and unreal—is not the material cause of the body. Still since it is accepted as existing and to be the material cause of the body by the Vedāntins, ether may be considered as Ātman. For this reason Ātmanhood of ether is expressly refuted. Or it may be that the view that the body is Ātman is refuted upto the words *na vāyuḥ* and that *na kham* refutes the view that the void is Ātman, because the word '*kha*' is indicative of the void.

The word *nendriyam* contains a refutation of the view that each one of the organs is Ātman *Na teṣām samūhaḥ* refutes the views (1) that the elements combined together, transformed into the composite whole viz., the body, is Ātman, as also (2) that the organs combined together is Ātman. The difference is that in the first instance each element was refuted without admitting a combination whereas now they are refuted even on admitting a combination By the refutation of the elements their products viz., the *prāna* and the mind also stand refuted. By the refutation of the mind, stands refuted the momentary consciousness which is a mode of the mind, and is distinct from the body and possessed of the qualities of being the doer, enjoyer etc., since in the view of the Vedānta, it is accepted that knowledge, desire, happiness etc , abide in the inner organ, as mentioned in the Śruti that all this desire, thought etc., is but the mind. Thus is declared that none of the various objects commencing with the body and ending with the 'mere enjoyer' believed by the various learned men to be Ātman, is Ātman.

8.5.3 Whatever Its Constitution, Form etc., Body is not I

From the tenor of the *Daśaślokī*, it is seen that it is of the nature of spontaneous outpourings of the realised one, declaring his experience that he is none other than the very Brahman Itself, as is evidenced by the repeated usage of the expression तदेकोऽवशिष्टः शिवः केवलोऽहम्. Again, शिवः केवलोऽहम् is the expression of the *Mahāvākyas* such as चिन्मात्रोऽहं सदाशिवः in the Śruti Thus, based upon Śruti and विद्वदनुभव, the plenary experience, the *śloka* proceeds to refute all other views of the lay and the learned, in respect of Ātman, as is seen from what is indicated by the expressions in the *śloka* as also from the lines (in the *Daśaślokī* itself)—

न साङ्ख्य न शैव न तत्पाञ्चरात्रं
न जैन न मीमांसकादेर्मतं वा ।

The word आदि here indicates that what is mentioned is by way of *upalaksana* for all other views as well. There is the usage in parlance as also the mention in various texts, of 'the earthy body', 'the watery body', 'the aerial body', 'the ethereal body' and 'the fiery body' as inhabiting various worlds—e.g , the *Bhāsya* (on Br. U. 6.4.5)—पार्थिवशरीरारम्भे, वरुणादिलोकेषु आप्यशरीरारम्भे, वायव्यशरीरारम्भे, आकाशशरीरारम्भे, तैजसानि देवशरीराणि. In addition, aided by what they believe is appropriate reasoning, various views are held by them in respect of the gross body. This is in addition to the commonly entertained notion that it is पञ्चभूतात्मक i.e., it is made of the five elements, and the predominant Cārvāka view that it is made of the four elements only. The *Nyāyaratnāvalī*, referring to the constitution of each of these ingredients, points out how, while talking of the various parts pertaining to each of these, the concerned school speaks of the particular ingredient as being made up of *truṭis* which in the parlance of the Kāṇādas would be *tryanukas*,

the triads of diatoms. In other words, such 'subtle elements' *sūksmabhūtas* are also spoken of sometimes as making up the respective gross bodies. It is also pointed out that these ultimate ingredients are momentary as also the conglomerations which go by the name of gross elements in accordance with their maxim यत् सत् तत् क्षणिक i.e., that which 'is' is momentary, while that which 'is not', like the son of a barren woman, is alone permanent; the 'being' of a thing is testified to by its pragmatic efficiency. Similar views in respect of the 'elements' as being conglomerates of finer parts that are transitory, are held by the Bāhyārthavādins' schools i.e., the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāsikas among the Buddhists, who speak of the existence of external objects as apart from the knowledge pertaining to them, and the Jainas who speak of atoms as *pudgalas* It may be noted in passing, that modern physics which is also concerned with 'matter' speaks in similar terms—viz., that the ultimate ingredients of matter, like proton, neutron, positron etc , have definite lifetimes, they being subject to radioactive decay and are also annihilated giving rise to radiation. Materialism said to be based on science has to contend with these 'findings of physics' as also the common belief in respect of matter that it is the conglomerate of eternally abiding entities, may be, atoms etc. Physicists have also advanced the view that the term 'particle' has only a metaphorical significance, being merely a convenient manner of speaking about some aspects of what must be considered to be 'fields' which, however, is also a halting description of a mathematical situation This view appears to be somewhat like the view of the Sāṅkhyas in respect of the *tanmātras* or those of the Vedāntins in respect of *sūksmabhūtas*. The terms in the *Daśaślokī* like भूमिः, तोय etc., when taken as referring to the gross elements,

pertain to the views ordinarily held in respect of them or as indicated by तेषां समूहः to the subtle ingredients in each case of which the gross ones are the conglomerates Whichever the view that is held in respect of the body—that it is made up of one gross element or four of them or a conglomeration of one type of subtle elements or combination of four such conglomerates or five ingredients, in each case being transitory or abiding, or combinations of *tanmātras* or *sūkṣmabhūtas*—the view that it is Ātman is thus seen to be rejected outright by the expressions—न भूमिर्न तोयं न तेजो न वायुर्न खं, न तेषां समूहः Thus it is seen that a 'body', whatever it is affirmed to be, is associated with a 'form'.

8.5.4 Untenability of 'Anuvada'

It is not easy to see on the basis of any of these views as to how this 'form' can come to be. If the body is that of a single gross element, how is the 'form' carved out of it ? If the body is a combination—be it a complete fusion of the elements or a chemical combination thereof or a mechanical mixture resulting in a new product like cloth from threads or a mixture in which the particles of the elements remain separate like a heap of grain—it is not intelligible as to how a combination itself can come to be. Non-acceptance by the opponent, of collocation, *avayavī*, of parts as an entity, non-acceptance of conjunction, *samyoga*, and non-acceptance of an abiding sentient entity other than these 'parts' which can bring about the combination, make it much more difficult to comprehend the so-called combination. Taking the parts as atoms that are abiding, says the *Svārājyasiddhi* (1-21)—

कस्मादण्वोः क्रिया स्यात् कथमथ मिलितौ निष्प्रतीकौ कथं वा

कार्यं ताभ्यां तृतीयं किमिति च न महत्पारिमाण्डल्यतः स्यात् ।

तेभ्यः कस्मान्महान्स्यात्किमिति पुनरसावेव नित्यो न ते स्या-
न्नित्यश्चाणुः कथं वा निरवयव इति ब्रूह्यसत्कार्यवादिन् ॥

[How can there be any movement in two atoms and how can the two impartite atoms come together to form the third (binary compound, *dvyanuka*)? Why does *dvyanuka* not attain the *mahat*, ponderable size, from the *pārimāndalya*, infinitesimal, which belongs to *anu*? How can there be the *mahat* size for the *tryanuka* which is formed from the *dvyanuka*? Why is your *tryanuka* itself not eternal? How can the atom be eternal and impartite? Speak out, Oh, Asatkāryavādī (who considers effect as different from the cause and not existing in it)!]

In respect of the atoms, held to be momentary, says the *Svārājyasiddhi* (1-23)—

सङ्घीभावः कथं वा चलनविरहिणां भङ्गुराणामणूनां
सङ्घोऽनन्यः कथं वा विषयपदमियात् कश्च सङ्घं विधत्ते ।
स्कन्धानां सन्निपातः कथमिव क्रियतां भोक्तृता का च धारा
कस्य स्तां भोगमोक्षौ वद जड सफलं केन वा दर्शनं ते ॥

[How can the motionless and momentary atoms come together (to form a body)? How can the body which is not different (from the atoms) become an object (of the senses)? Who brings the atoms together? How is an association of the *skandhas* (groups) formed? How many of them are the enjoyers? What is meant by the stream of consciousness (when *vijñāna* is said to be momentary) and to whom can enjoyment and liberation accrue? Such being the case, how can your doctrine, O fool! be fruitful?]

That the doctrine of the Bauddhas which speaks in terms of the two aggregates—the outside one, of the transitory atoms of earth, water etc., and the inner one, of the *pañca-skandhas*—is also bristling with the same difficulties as pointed out above, is shown in detail in the *Bhāṣya* on the Sūtras in the section beginning with—समुदाय उभयहेतुकेऽपि तदप्राप्तिः ।

(Sū. 2-2-4-18) (Even if the integration be supposed to arise from either of their causes, that cannot be).

In respect of the Jaina doctrine relating to the body, the *Sūtrabhāsya* (2-2-6-33) says—

यत्तु पुद्गलसंज्ञकेभ्योऽणुभ्यः सङ्घातास्संभवन्तीति कल्पयन्ति तत्पूर्वेणैवाणुवादनिराकरणेन निराकृतं भवति ।

[As for their imagination that the aggregation called *pudgala* (body) can result from the combination of the atoms, that stands discredited as a result of the refutation, already made, of the Vaiśesika theory of atoms]

8.5.5 'I'—Not Elements, nor Elementals, nor Clusters, nor Void

To obviate the difficulties pointed out, if the *vādin* who asserts that the body is Ātman gives up the view that the body is made of atoms and has recourse to a theory in which the body is to be conceived of as made up of *tanmātras* or the five elements which are extensive in character, in the manner of the Sānkhyas or the Vedāntins, even that would be untenable as, without an outside sentient agency, even the formation of, as also movements in etc., such a conglomeration would not be possible as has been shown in the *Sūtrabhāsya* on the *Adhikarana* (2-2-1) commencing with the Sūtras—

रचनानुपपत्तेश्च नानुमानम् । and प्रवृत्तेश्च ।

[The *pradhāna* that is inferred is not the cause, owing to the impossibility of explaining the design and tendency to act as also for other reasons]

Any view of the 'body' amongst these may be entertained depending upon one's predilections, intellectual development and acquaintance (in many cases cursory) of the Śāstra literature Such hasty views entertained by the uninformed as also those believed to be learned, are examined and shown to be inappropriate by Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda.

The word '*nendriyam*' in the *Daśaślokī* shows that not any of the organs can be Ātman; nor their assemblage न तेषां समूहः. Again, as the *Siddhāntabindu* points out, the rejection of the elements भूत implies the rejection of the elementals (derived from the elements) भौतिक which would mean the rejection of the views such as the *prāna* is Ātman, the mind is Ātman, the intellect is Ātman or the ego is Ātman. These have been dealt with at length already. If it is held that the assemblage of all these viz., the gross body, the organs, the *prāna*, the mind etc., is Ātman, even this is rejected by the expression न तेषां समूहः. The *Mānasollāsa* rejecting the Ātman-hood of such an assemblage has already been quoted. It becomes clear thereby that the cluster of the five sheaths—the physical, the vital, the mental, the intellectual and the blissful—all derived from *avidyā* and its evolutes, or the cluster of the three bodies—the gross, the subtle and the causal—all insentient, cannot be Ātman as there is no way of comprehending as to how these clusters can be brought about. This disposes off the case of such Nature-theorists among the moderns as well who by entertaining unexamined anthropomorphic notions etc., affirm without proper enquiry that it is the insentient 'Nature' that fashions out all forms, variety etc. Also if it is realised that any cluster, *saṅghāta*, subserves the purpose of a sentient being, *samhantā*, सङ्घातस्य परार्थत्वात् the futility of such half-baked views which try to account for the world on the basis of insentient nature will be seen. Even the admission of the sentient *purusas* who are only enjoyers भोक्तारः and unattached otherwise, alongside the insentient *prakṛti* (nature), the creatrix, कर्त्री, as the Sānkhya does, will not help in the designing of the variety, forms, bodies etc., in the world as has been amply shown in the *Adhikarana* (2-2-1) of the Sūtras and the *Bhāsya* already

referred to. Such being the case, what to speak of the schools which do not at all admit sentient entities ! Even the recognition of a *Tatasthesvara*, a mere efficient Cause, as the Kānādas, the Pātañjalas, the Pāśupatas, and the Pāñcarātras do, will not be of help, as shown already. The Vedāntin, however, has no difficulty as there is for him an Īśvara who is Omniscient, Omnipotent and the Wielder of Māyā—*Sarvajña*, *Sarvaśakti* and *Mahāmāyāvī*. The rejection of clusters like the *prāṇa*, the *manas*, the intellect and the ego and the cluster of these clusters would automatically mean the rejection of the views—that the momentary consciousness is Ātman, that Ātman is a doer as well as an enjoyer and that Ātman is merely an enjoyer The expression न खम् points to the rejection of the *Śūnyavāda* as well.

8.5.6 'I' Impartite

The Jaina view of Ātman apart from the body but as an assembly of parts, their number and thereby the dimension of Ātman being variable, stands obviously rejected as pointed out in the Sūtra (2-2-6-34)—एवं चात्माऽकार्त्स्न्यम्। (Similarly, also arises the defect of Ātman being devoid of All-pervasiveness i.e , of having a finite size which would mean It is perishable) and the *Bhāsya* thereon.

8.5.7 Manner of Refutation

Depending on the ease with which they can be refuted, the Nāstika schools are usually put in this order: the Cārvākas, the Jainas and the Bauddhas, and among the last, the Vaibhāsikas and the Sautrāntikas, both accepting the external objects, the Yogācāras who are the Kṣanikavijñānavādins who hold that there is only momentary consciousness and not the external objects which are only apparent and the Mādhyamikas, the Śūnyavādins who hold that the momentary

consciousness is also illusory and that there is no such thing as a reality, the last of these occupying the highest pedestal among them as being the most difficult to be dislodged. The *Nyāyaratnāvali* also points out that the *Siddhāntabindu* mentions the Āstika schools also in a particular order depending upon the closeness of the system to the Vedānta which is the supreme essence of them all —(i) the Vaiśeṣikas who do not accept verbal testimony and therefore Śruti as a separate *pramāna*, (ii) the Naiyāyikas who, while accepting Śruti as a *pramāṇa* also accept the Śrutis such as असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः (Bṛ. U. (4-3-15) (This *puruṣa* is unattached) which speak of jīva as pure, and तत्त्वमसि (Ch U.6) (That thou art) etc., as enjoining such meditations and Śrutis as इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा (Bṛ. U. 4-4-6) (Whatever is all this, is this Ātman), सर्वं खल्विद ब्रह्म (Ch. U 3-14-1) (All this verily is Brahman), ब्रह्मैवेदं सर्वम् (Nṛ.U.Tā. 7) (All this is verily Brahman) as meaning that this universe is created by Brahman, (iii) the Prābhākaras and then, (iv) the Bhāṭṭas who are unopposed to the Vedāntic viewpoint, the Bhāṭṭas declaring that firm conviction about Truth is only through Vedānta and the Prābhākaras declaring (quoting the *Gītā*) that those who are occupied with karma should not be dislodged. The Bhāṭṭas by stating that Ātman is of the nature of sentience-cum-insentience, indicate that Avidyā is the *upādhi* of sentient Ātman while the Prābhākaras hold that Ātman, the locus of self-effulgent knowledge, is insentient and do not even talk of illusion in respect of the knowledge of the world. Next in the order come the Sāṅkhyas who accept the non-attachment of Ātman and then the Pātañjalas who, in addition, admit Īśvara.

8.5.8 Negation in ... t This', 'Not This'

Another p ... ed here. The sentence 'not

the earth' taken with the word 'I' must be taken both ways viz., 'the earth is not I' and reciprocally 'I am not the earth'. Similarly in all cases viz., 'not the water' etc., and 'not their cluster'. The implication of this is brought out in the *ṭīkā* on the *Siddhāntabindu* by Śrī Vāsudevaśāstrī Abhayankar—

ननु यथा शुक्तौ रजतमिति प्रत्येति भ्रान्तस्तथा चार्वाको नात्मनि देह इति प्रत्येति । आत्मनः प्रतीत्यभावप्रसङ्गात् । नापि देह आत्मेति प्रत्येति । देहस्य प्रतीत्यभावप्रमङ्गात् । किन्तु देहात्मनोर्मिथो यो भेदस्तत्राभेद इति प्रत्येति । तथा च यथा रजतभ्रमनिवृत्त्यर्थं नेदं रजतमित्युच्यते तथात्र नानयोरभेद इति वक्तव्यमिति कथमाचार्यैर्न भूमिरित्याद्युच्यतेऽत आह—या भूमिरिति । अयं भावः । न भूमिरित्येक वाक्यम् । एवं न तोयमित्यादीन्यपि भिन्नानि वाक्यानि । अहमित्यस्य च सर्वेषु वाक्येषु संबन्धः । या भूमिः स नाहमित्यर्थः । भूमिमुद्दिश्याहमर्थाभेदो निषिध्यते । अस्यैव वाक्यस्यावृत्त्योद्देश्यविधेयभाववैपरीत्येन च योऽह सा न भूमिरिति द्वितीयोऽर्थः । अत्राहमर्थमुद्दिश्य भूम्यभेदो निषिध्यते । तथा च नानयोरभेद इति फलित भवति । न तोयमित्यादिवाक्येष्वप्येवमेव व्याख्येयम् ।

[One might object that the Cārvāka does not experience the body in Ātman just as a deluded man perceives silver in a shell, for in that case there would not be the consciousness of Ātman at all, nor does he experience Ātman in the body, because in that case there would not be the consciousness of the body, but what he experiences is that there is identity in place of the apparent difference between the body and Ātman. That being so, just as in order to shake off the delusion as to the existence of silver, it is said 'this is not silver', it ought, in this case, to have been said 'there is not the identity of the two' Why then does Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda say 'I am not the earth' etc ? In order to remove this objection Śrī Śrī Madhusūdanasarasvatipāda has made this remark which means that neither any of the earth etc., and their cluster is identical with Ātman, nor is Ātman identical with any of them]

By this exposition, it is to be noted that Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda in His infinite grace instructs the seeker to seek out Ātman, by showing him that It is not to be acquired afresh (as the subsequent use of the word '*avaśiṣṭaḥ*' shows); but one has only to abide in the pure Ātman by negating all superimpositions in the manner 'not this, not this' नेति नेति adopted by Śruti itself and shown to be the best and the only method for the purpose. Throughout the *Daśaślokī* this method is adopted wherein it is also declared that to affirm anything about Ātman, is to attempt the impossible as It is beyond the pale of words—कथं सर्ववेदान्तसिद्धं ब्रवीमि. It is by not realising this that all other *vādins* have floundered by attempting to secure a concept of Ātman by means of words. Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda has shown in His other works that the outpourings of the experience of an Ātmajñānī are like unto the *Daśaślokī*, in the language of negation which is also instruction for the seeker—

नाहं देहो नेन्द्रियाण्यन्तरङ्गो नाहङ्कारः प्राणवर्गो न बुद्धिः ।
दारापत्यक्षेत्रवित्तादिदूरः साक्षी नित्यः प्रत्यगात्मा शिवोऽहम् ॥

(*Advaitapañcakam*)

मनोबुद्ध्यहङ्कारचित्तानि नाहं न च श्रोत्रजिह्वे न च घ्राणनेत्रे ।
न च व्योम भूमिर्न तेजो न वायुश्चिदानन्दरूपः शिवोऽहं शिवोऽहम् ॥
न च प्राणसञ्ज्ञो न पञ्चानिला मे न वा सप्तधातुर्न वा पञ्चकोशः ।
न वाक्पाणिपादौ न चोपस्थपायू चिदानन्दरूपः शिवोऽहं
शिवोऽहम् ॥ (*Nirvāṇaṣaṭkam*)

These lines negate the Selfhood of each one of the elements, the body, the organs, the vital airs, the mind, the intellect, the ego or their clusters or the cluster of all these i.e., the five sheaths; and proclaim tha[illegible]s Consciousness, Bliss, the Auspicious.

8.6.1 Renunciation of Wrong Identification—Vichara the Easy Means

This insistent refutation of the other schools again and again is indicative of the consideration—on the part of Śruti, *Brahmasūtra*, the *Bhāsyas*, the commentaries and other Advaita works—for the seeker who might be misled by their wrong quotations and fallacious arguments. Says Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda in the *Sūtrabhāsya* (1–1–1–1)—

एवं वहवो विप्रतिपन्ना युक्तिवाक्यतदाभाससमाश्रयाः सन्तः । तत्राविचार्य यत्किञ्चित्प्रतिपद्यमानो निःश्रेयसात् प्रतिहन्येतानर्थं चेयात् । तस्माद्ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपन्यासमुखेन वेदान्तवाक्यमीमांसा तदविरोधितर्कोपकरणा निःश्रेयसप्रयोजना प्रस्तूयते ।

[Thus there are many, holding divergent views, some based on sound arguments and texts properly understood, and others based on fallacious reasonings and texts misunderstood. One who accepts any one of these views without proper enquiry would bar himself from emancipation and incur misery Therefore the first of the *Brahmasūtras* proposes under the designation of an enquiry into Brahman, to commence an ascertainment of the exact meaning of Vedānta texts with the help of reasonings not opposed to them, for the purpose of leading the aspirant to emancipation]

Says the *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha* (1–4) pertaining to this—

निर्लेपब्रह्मात्मवादे तु सर्वाणि वेदान्तवाक्यान्यवगन्तव्यानि । तत्र निर्लेपब्रह्मात्मवादिनाऽभिहितयोर्युक्तिवाक्ययोः समीचीनत्वमन्योक्तयोस्त्वाभासत्वमित्येतत्सूत्रकार एव तत्र तत्र स्पष्टीकरिष्यति । एवं च सत्येतद्विचारशास्त्रमश्रुत्वा पण्डितंमन्यतया देहादितटस्थेश्वरान्तेष्वन्यतमं यं कञ्चिदात्मानमवलम्बमानो मुमुक्षुर्न मोक्षं प्राप्नुयात्, तत्त्वज्ञानलभ्यस्य मोक्षस्य विपरीतज्ञानेन संपादयितुमशक्यत्वात् । न च तस्य पापिष्ठस्य कदाचिन्निष्कृतिरस्ति । अतस्तस्य अन्यथाप्रतिपत्तिर्हि महत्तरं पापम्—

योऽन्यथासन्तमात्मानमन्यथा प्रतिपद्यते ।
किं तेन न कृतं पापं चोरेणात्मापहारिणा ॥

इति न्यायात् । अतः सत्यज्ञानानन्दादिरूपस्यात्मनोऽसत्कल्पनामापादयतस्त-स्यात्मघातिनः कष्टलोकप्राप्तिः श्रूयते—

'असुर्या नाम ते लोका अन्धेन तमसावृताः ।
तांस्ते प्रेत्याभिगच्छन्ति ये के चात्महनो जनाः ॥' इति ।

[All the Vedānta texts are to be understood as having the taintless Brahman-Ātman as their purport. Bhagavān Bādarāyaṇa, the aphorist Himself, will make clear in various places that the reasonings and texts mentioned by those who maintain that Ātman is taintless Brahman are valid and those mentioned by others are fallacious And this being the case, a person seeking liberation, not having 'heard' and studied this Śāstra through enquiry, thinks himself learned and clings to one or the other of the views—viz., that the body is Ātman etc., ending with the view that Īśvara is different from Ātman. Such a seeker will not attain liberation, for liberation which is to be attained by true Knowledge cannot be obtained through erroneous knowledge. Nor is there expiation for that most sinful person. Thus erroneous knowledge is the most heinous sin according to the dictum—'He who understands Ātman not as It actually is, but otherwise, by that thief who has robbed himself of his own Self, is there any sin that has not been committed !'. Therefore Śruti declares that he who imposes the unreality of Ātman which is of the nature of Existence, Consciousness and Bliss and thus kills himself, attains miserable worlds—'Those worlds are called demoniac, enveloped in blind darkness ; to these worlds go after death, those people who are killers of their own Self'.]

In particular, considerable attention is given to the denunciation of the Selfhood of the gross body, as this is the view that is almost universally held by the lay as also the so-called learned. The *Svārājyasiddhiṭīkā* (1–31) quotes the Smṛti—

देहाभिमानाद्यत्पापं न तद्गोवधकोटिभिः ।
प्रायश्चित्ताद्भवेच्छुद्धिर्नृणां गोवधकारिणाम् ॥

[Even the sin of killing crores of cows is nothing in comparison with the sin of identifying oneself with the body, since the killer of cows becomes redeemed through expiation.]

Says the *Vivekacūdāmani* (397)—

शवाकारं यावद्भजति मनुजस्तावदशुचिः
परेभ्यस्स्यात्क्लेशो जननमरणव्याधिनिरयाः ।
यदात्मानं शुद्धं कलयति शिवाकारमचलं
तदा तेभ्यो मुक्तो भवति हि तदाह श्रुतिरपि ॥

[So long as a man identifies himself with his body that is but a corpse, he is impure and also thereby suffers from his enemies as also from birth, death and disease here and goes to hell hereafter But when he realises beyond doubt himself to be the Pure Auspicious one of the nature of Bliss, then indeed does he become free from those sufferings Śruti also says so]

There is not even the talk of emancipation even for the learned one who does not give up his mistaken identity with the body, organs etc., which are unreal, be he ever so erudite in the ultimate reaches of the *Vedāntaśāstra* Even such a one is not qualified for liberation as long as he does not renounce this wrong identification. Hence by incessant contemplation all misapprehensions must be got rid of, as the *Vivekacūdāmani* (164) and the *ṭīkā* thereon say—

देहेन्द्रियादावसति भ्रमोदितां विद्वानहंतां न जहाति यावत् ।
तावन्न तस्यास्ति विमुक्तिवार्ताप्यस्त्वेष वेदान्तनयान्तदर्शी ॥

सोऽप्यभिमानत्यागं विना न मुक्तिमर्हति । अतो निरन्तरनिदिध्यासनेन विपरीतभावना त्यक्तव्येति भावः ।

The disciple is directed to adopt the method of enquiry which is the easy means for this purpose—

तस्याः त्यागे विचारं सुलभोपायमाह—छायेति ।—

छायाशरीरे प्रतिबिम्बगात्रे यत्स्वप्नदेहे हृदिकल्पिताङ्गे ।
यथात्मबुद्धिस्तव नास्ति काचिज्जीवच्छरीरे च तथैव मास्तु ॥

द्रष्टुः स्वस्माद्भिन्नत्वेन प्रतीतेः सर्वत्राविशिष्टत्वादिति भावः ।

(*Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* (165) and the *ṭīkā*)

[Just as you do not identify yourself with the shadow of your body, with its reflection (in a mirror), with the dream body or the body which you imagine in your mind, so too, do not identify yourself with the living body.

The idea is that the knowledge that these are seen to be different from Ātman, the Seer, is common in all these cases]

Such reasonings which are in conformity with the experience of the enlightened are pointed to in the *Advaita-makaranda* (8)—

न देहो नेन्द्रियं चाहं न प्राणो न मनो न धीः ।
ममतापरिरब्धत्वादाक्रीडत्वादिदधियः ॥

[It is a matter of direct experience that none of these—the body, the organs, the vital airs, the mind and the intellect—is Ātman. Inferences also show that they are not Ātman since they are being embraced as 'mine' and are cognised as 'this', like a pot etc. Also no organ, being an instrument like an axe, is Ātman]

8.6.2 'I' Alone the Satsvarupa, not Destructible

The *Daśaślokī* (1) itself accomplishes the same by adducing the reason (which is also in tune with experience)—अनैकान्तिकत्वात् (owing to their variability i.e., destructibility). So says the *Siddhāntabindu* (1) on this—

तत्र हेतुमाह—अनैकान्तिकत्वादिति । व्यभिचारित्वाद्विनाशित्वादिति यावत् ।

and Śrī Brahmānanda derives the word विनाशः thus—विविधो देशकालवस्तुगतो नाशोऽदर्शनं यतः स विनाशः। Destruction would mean non-appearance in any one of its various aspects viz, non-appearance somewhere or somewhen or in something. The *Siddhāntabindu* explains—

आत्मनो देशकालापरिच्छिन्नत्वात् तत्परिच्छिन्नानां घटादिवदनात्मत्वात् तद्ध्वंसप्रागभावयोश्च ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वादनात्मनां जडत्वात् स्वभिन्नस्य चात्मत्वाभावादात्मन एकत्वेऽपि सुखदुःखाद्याश्रयाणामन्तःकरणानां भेदाभ्युपगमाद् व्यवस्थोपपत्तेः। स्वेनैव स्वाभावग्रहणे विरोधाद्ग्राह्यकाले ग्राहकासत्त्वाद् ग्राहकसत्त्वे ग्राह्याभावात् कृतहान्यकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गाच्च न तस्य ध्वंसप्रागभावौ।

सद्रूपस्यात्मनः सर्वत्रानुगमाच्च नात्यन्ताभावसंभवः। द्वैतस्य मिथ्यात्वेनाधिष्ठानतादात्म्यापन्नतयैव शुक्तिरजतादिवदध्यस्तत्वेन तस्याधिष्ठानभूततत्तादात्म्यापन्नतयैव सिद्धत्वात् तत्तादात्म्याभावानुपपत्तिः। तेनात्मा नाभावप्रतियोगी। अभावप्रतियोगिनश्च देहेन्द्रियादयः। तेनामी नात्मानः। किन्तु स्वप्रकाशबोधरूप आत्मन्यद्वैतेऽप्यनिर्वचनीयानाद्यविद्याकल्पिता अनिर्वचनीया एवेति सिद्धान्तरहस्यम्।

[Ātman is unlimited in space or in time Whatever is limited in them is therefore non-Ātman like a pot. First of all, it is impossible to apprehend the prior non-existence or the destruction of Ātman, for these, if at all, should be apprehended either by something other than Ātman or by Ātman itself. In the first case, the extraneous entity may be either an inert substance like the mind or another self-luminous entity like Ātman. Of these the first cannot be the knower because it is inert. The existence of another Ātman is not possible because Ātman is only one and indivisible It is not necessary to predicate the existence of a plurality of Ātmans because it is possible to explain the phenomenal existence of separate individuals on the basis of the oneness of Ātman and the plurality of *antaḥkaraṇas* which are the seats of individual experiences in

respect of pleasure, pain etc. In the second case, there arises a contradiction because when there is Ātman, the knower, the thing to be known (viz., the prior non-existence or destruction of Ātman) would not be there; and when the latter is present, the former would not be there. Moreover, if it is believed that Ātman is liable to destruction and that there was a time when It did not exist, then there would be the contingency of the destruction of actions done and the enjoyment of the fruits of actions not done. Thus the unlimitedness of Ātman in time is shown.

Further there is no possibility of absolute non-existence of Ātman which is of the nature of Existence Itself, because it persists everywhere. And duality being unreal its existence can be accounted for only because of false identification by its superimposition on Ātman, the Existence, its Substratum, like silver on a shell. It is therefore impossible that there should be the absence of identification with Ātman at any time; Ātman is not the counter-correlate of reciprocal non-existence either. Hence, Ātman is not the counter-correlate of non-existence of any type, while the body, the senses etc., are so; these—being of a nature opposed to that of Ātman because they cease to exist after destruction—were not in existence sometime ago, exist at particular places only and are distinguishable from one another. Therefore they are not Ātman but indescribable entities concocted by the beginningless Avidya (which is itself indescribable) as existing in Ātman which is of the nature of Self-effulgent Consciousness, the Secondless This is the secret of the Vedânta doctrine. Hence Ātman is not limited in space either.]

Says the *Advaitamakaranda* (13, 14, 15, 22)—

षड्विकारवतां वेत्ता निर्विकारोऽहमन्यथा ।
तद्विकारानुसन्धानं सर्वथा नावकल्पते ॥
तेन तेन हि [illegible] ते लीयते मुहुः ।
विकारिवस्तु [illegible] धातृता कुतः ॥

न च स्वजन्म नाशं वा द्रष्टुमर्हति कश्चन ।
तौ हि प्रागुत्तराभावचरमप्रथमक्षणौ ॥
स्वरूपमेव मे सत्त्वं न तु धर्मो नभस्त्ववत् ।
मदन्यस्य सतोऽभावान्न हि सा जातिरिष्यते ॥

[I, the cogniser of the external objects which are subject to the six-fold changes, am changeless; otherwise the cognition of the changing objects would be impossible.

A changing object appears and disappears along with those changes, again and again; this being so, how can it be a witness of these changes?

None can be a witness of one's own origination or destruction, they being the last and the first moments of one's own prior non-existence and destruction, respectively.

Existence is my very nature, just like the skyness of the sky and not an attribute nor the category termed universal, since nothing else other than Myself, exists.]

8.6.3 'I' alone the Chitsvarupa, the Invariable

Continues the *Siddhāntabindu*—

ननु बोधरूप आत्मेति तवाभ्युपगमात् सुषुप्तौ च बोधाभावाद्गाढं मूढोऽहमास न किंचिदवेदिषमिति सुप्तोत्थितस्य परामर्शात् कथमव्यभिचारिता तस्येत्याशङ्क्याह—सुषुप्त्येकसिद्ध इति । अयमर्थः । आत्मनः सुषुप्तिसाक्षित्वान्न तत्र तदभावः । अन्यथा मूढोऽहमासमिति परामर्शानुपपत्तेः । मातृमानमितिमेयानां व्यभिचारित्वेऽपि तद्भावाभावसाक्षिणः कालत्रयेऽप्यव्यभिचारात् ।

ननु प्रमाश्रयः प्रमाता स एव कर्ता भोक्ता प्रदीपवत् स्वपरसाधारणसर्वाभासकश्चेति, न घटादिवत् साक्षिसापेक्ष इति चेन्न । विकारित्वेन स्वविकारसाक्षित्वानुपपत्तेर्दृश्यस्य द्रष्टृत्वानुपपत्तेः प्रमातुश्च परिणामित्वेन दृश्यत्वादेकस्य कूटस्थस्यैव सर्वसाक्षित्वात् ।

नन्वेकः कूटस्थो निर्धर्मकः साक्षी नाद्रियते, अप्रामाणिकत्वादिति चेन्न । 'तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति', 'न दृष्टे-

द्रष्टारं पश्येः', 'अदृष्टो द्रष्टा', 'नान्योऽतोऽस्ति द्रष्टा' इत्यादि वदता वेदान्त-प्रमाणराजेन तस्यैव सर्वसाक्षित्वेनाभिषिक्तत्वात् ।

[The *Siddhāntabindu* now raises an objection and answers it. You believe that Ātman is of the nature of Consciousness But in deep sleep there is no Consciousness at all since one who wakes up from deep sleep recollects that he was completely ignorant and knew nothing ; as such how can Ātman be said to be invariable? The expression सुषुप्त्येकसिद्धः in the *Daśaślokī* is in answer to this objection The meaning is this—Ātman being the witness of the state of deep sleep, He is not non-existent in that state, otherwise the recollection 'I was ignorant' cannot be accounted for, though the knower, the means of knowledge, knowledge and the object of knowledge all vary, the witness of their presence as also their absence remains invariable in all the three times.

If argued—Verily the *pramātā* is the support of knowledge ; he himself is the doer as well as the enjoyer and, like a lamp, is the illuminator of everything, both himself and things distinct from himself; that being so he does not stand in need of a witness, as a pot, for instance, does—the reply is: this is not so. The *pramātā*, as the one subject to modifications, can only be the perceived ; the perceived is never the perceiver, and as such the *pramātā* cannot be the witness of his own modifications Therefore the One that is invariable alone can be the witness of everything.

Further it is not that the One invariable attributeless Witness cannot be accepted owing to His not being established by any *pramāna*, because He alone has been anointed and installed as the Witness of everything by Śruti, the King of *pramānas*—'Everything shines after Him who alone shines', 'All this shines by His light', 'Thou canst not see the Seer of the sight', 'He is the unseen Seer', 'There is no Seer other than He'.]

Thus it is of utmost importance to realise that the ego which is the *pramātā*, the doer and the enjoyer, is not at all

Ātman. In fact, just like the identification of the gross body at one extremity with Ātman, this identification with the ego at this extremity is also a serious hurdle to cross over, nay, the most serious one, since the ego is not cognised as 'mine' or 'this'. The two—Ātman and the ego—are not one and the same since Ātman abides in such states as deep sleep, *samādhi* etc., while the ego does not. Say the *Advaita-makaranda* (9) and the *ṭīkā* thereon—

नन्वहङ्कारस्यात्मत्वमस्तु तस्य ममेदंबुद्धिविषयत्वाभावादित्याशङ्क्य, सुषुप्त्यादावात्मनि विद्यमानेऽप्यहङ्काराभावान्न तयोरैक्यमित्यभिप्रेत्य प्रकारान्तरेण तयोर्भेदं साधयति—

साक्षी सर्वान्वितः प्रेयानहं नाहं कदाचन ।
परिणामपरिच्छेदपरितापैरुपप्लवात् ॥

[I am the All-pervading Witness and, being Bliss Itself, dearest to myself; I am never the ego which is subject to changes like attachment and hatred, which is finite and subject to misery.]

8.7.1 'I' Not the Ego; Distinction Recognised

In respect of the distinction between Ātman and the ego, the *Naiskarmyasiddhi* discusses in detail—

By perception itself it is ascertained that external objects like a pot are non-Self, being objects of perception, and that they presuppose the seeing Self By these examples the distinguishing characteristics of non-Self are discerned; these characteristics like objecthood and subjection to origination and cessation are found in the body, the organs, the mind and the intellect. From this fact it is determined that they are non-Self. Even the ego shares the attribute of being an object and hence it is also classed as non-Self. It also presupposes the Transcendent Witness as is made out. This is pointed out now—

Just as the objects like a pot become ultimately inferential clues to the ego through several links leading upto the latter, even so the ego, being an object of experience, becomes an inferential clue to the Witness-self. So say the *Naiskarmyasiddhi* (3–56) and the *ṭīkā* thereon—

तत्र घटादीनां दृश्यानामनात्मव द्रष्ट्रात्मपूर्वक प्रत्यक्षेणैव प्रमाणेनोपलभ्यानात्मनश्चासाधारणान् धर्मानवधार्य तैर्दृश्यत्वागमापायादिभिर्धर्मैः शरीरेन्द्रियमनोनिश्चयादिवृत्तीरनात्मनया व्युदस्याहवृत्तिमतोऽपि दृश्यत्वाविशेषाद्द्रष्टृपूर्वकत्वमवसीयते । तदेतदाह—

घटादयो यथा लिङ्गं स्युः परंपरयाहमः ।
दृश्यत्वादहमप्येव लिङ्ग स्याद्द्रष्टुरात्मनः ॥

The statement—'The ego also, being an object, becomes an inferential clue to the Witness-self' — is objected to as illogical. On what grounds? Because the distinction between the ego and the knower of the ego is not a well-known fact. We know clearly that a pot and Devadatta who sees it are mutually different, one being the object seen and the other, its seer. The same is not the case with the ego and its Seer. Hence the statement referred to is untrue. We say the following in reply:

The object that is being burnt and the agency that burns co-exist in the fuel and the fire. In the same way, the property of being the knower and that of being the object known co-exist in the knower and the ego—

कश्चिदतिक्रान्तं प्रतिस्मृत्य 'दृश्यत्वादहमप्येवं लिङ्गं स्याद्द्रष्टुरात्मनः' इति निर्युक्तिकमभिहितमित्याह । किं कारणम्? अहंतज्ज्ञात्रोर्विवेकाप्रसिद्धेः । यथेह घटदेवदत्तयोर्ग्राह्यग्राहकत्वेन स्फुटतरो विभागः प्रसिद्धो लोके, न तथेहाहङ्कारतज्ज्ञात्रोर्विभागोऽस्तीति । तस्मादसाध्वेतदभिहितमिति । अत्रोच्यते—

दाह्यदाहकतैकत्र यथा स्याद्वह्निदारुणोः ।
ज्ञेयज्ञातृकतैवं स्यादहंज्ञात्रोः परस्परम् ॥ (3–59)

Thus the modification of the nature of the ego comes into being in the mind which is a product of Avidyā for determining the specific form of it induced by the external object. This modification of the mind becomes directly the object of an awareness which is a product of the Eternal Self. Between the knowing Self and the ego, there can be no relation other than that of the illuminer and the illumined Appropriating the ego to Itself and putting on the coat of the ego, the Self assumes the forms of the helped and the helper. In connection with external objects, favourable and adverse, It attributes to Itself appropriate relations towards them. This is brought out now—

The knowledge of 'this' arises in the knower and the knowledge of 'mine' arises in the ego. 'This' is a product of ignorance and 'mine' is a product of the modification of the nature of the ego thereof—

एवं तावदविद्योत्थस्यान्तःकरणस्य वाह्यविषयनिमित्तरूपावच्छेदायाहंवृत्तिर्व्याप्रियते। तयावच्छिन्नं सत् कूटस्थप्रत्यगात्मोपादानावबोधरूपस्याऽव्यवधानतया विषयभावं प्रतिपद्यत इति। तत्र तयोर्ज्ञात्रहन्तारूपयोरवभासकावभास्यत्वसंबन्धव्यतिरेकेण नान्यत्संबन्धान्तरमुपपद्यते। अहंतारूपं त्वात्मसात्कृत्वाऽहंकञ्चुकं परिधायोपकार्यत्वोपकारकत्वक्षमः सन् वाह्यविषयेणोपकारिणापकारिणा वात्मात्मीयं संबन्धं प्रतिपद्यते। तदभिधीयते—

इदंज्ञानं भवेज्ज्ञातुर्ममज्ञानं तथाहमः।
अज्ञानोपाधिनेद स्याद्विक्रियातोऽहमो मम॥ (3–60)

In the same Knower, two units of knowledge with regard to the object arise as 'this' and as 'mine', owing to the differences of causes, internal and external. The object is known as 'mine' in relation to the Knower supposed to be helped or injured by the object. In the absence of that

relation of help or injury, it is simply felt as 'this'. How is this construed? This is construed by rational discrimination. It is this way—the ego never presents itself as 'mine' to the Knower, for the pure Knower is neither helped nor injured by anything. Since he is covered by ignorance only, it appears as 'this'—

एकस्यैव ज्ञातुरन्तर्बाह्यनिमित्तभेदाद्विभिन्नेऽपि विषय इदं ममेति ज्ञानं द्वैरूप्यं जायत इत्युक्तम् । अत्रोपक्रियमाणापक्रियमाणस्यैव ज्ञातुर्विषये ममप्रत्ययो भवति विपर्यये चेदप्रत्यय इति कथमवगम्यते । अवगम्यतामन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्याम् । तत्कथमित्याह—

अनुपक्रियमाणत्वान्न ज्ञातुः स्यादहं मम ।
घटादिवदिद तु स्यान्मोहमात्रव्यपाश्रयात् ॥ (3–61)

It was shown earlier that the Knower and the ego, owing to ignorance and the resulting modifications, come to be associated with 'this' and 'mine' respectively in their knowledge. Now the contrary is pointed out—

In sleep, as Ātman is without ignorance and modification, there is neither 'this' nor 'mine' After one wakes up he reasons out the presence of ignorance on the basis of the fact that he knew nothing in that state.

The *ṭīkā* raises the question—it being established that ajñāna exists in deep sleep state, how can it now be asserted that Ātman is without ajñāna in that state—and answers it by pointing out that it has been said so now for this reason that there is no explicit experience of ajñāna in that state in a patent form as 'I am ignorant', as in the waking state—

मोहतत्कार्याश्रयत्वाज्ज्ञातृत्वविक्रिययोः पूर्वत्रेदममज्ञानान्वयः प्रदर्शितः । अथाधुना तद्व्यतिरेकेण व्यतिरेकप्रदर्शनार्थमाह—

विक्रियाज्ञानशून्यत्वान्नेदं न च ममात्मनः ।
उत्थितस्य सतोऽज्ञान नाहमज्ञासिषं यतः ॥ (3–62)

8.7.2 Samsara Pertains only to Ego; Havoc Caused by Ego

The co-presence of the ego and the *samsāra* in the waking and the dream states and their co-absence in the deep sleep state, which is a matter of experience, is to be recognised, while Ātman abides in all these three states as the unchanging Witness Says the *Advaitamakaranda* (10)—

सुप्तेऽहमि न दृश्यन्ते दुःखदोषप्रवृत्तयः ।
अतस्तस्यैव संसारो न मे संसर्तृसाक्षिणः ॥

[When the ego is dissolved in deep sleep, swoon etc., then misery, attachment etc., and the resulting motivation for action etc , are not in evidence Hence *samsāra* pertains only to the ego and not to Me, the Witness of the ego which is subject to *samsāra*.]

Joy, sorrow, fear, anger, greed, ignorance, desire as also birth and death are for the ego alone and not for Ātman ; so says the *Bhāgavataśloka* quoted by Śrī Vāsudevaśāstrī Abhayankar in his *ṭīkā* on the *Siddhāntabindu* (1)—

हर्षशोकभयक्रोधलोभमोहस्पृहादयः ।
अहङ्कारस्य चैवैते जन्म मृत्युश्च नात्मनः ॥

The *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* pointing out the havoc caused by the ego, says—

अहबुद्ध्यैव मोहिन्या योजयित्वावृतेर्बलात् ।
विक्षेपशक्तिः पुरुषं विक्षेपयति तद्गुणैः ॥ (344)

[Aided by the concealing power, the diversifying power of Māyā connects *purusa* with the ego which brings about fall from one's real nature, and distracts him through its attributes like *samkalpa* etc]

समूलकृत्तोऽपि महानहं पुनर्व्युल्लेखितः स्याद्यदि चेतसा क्षणम् ।
सञ्जीव्य विक्षेपशतं करोति नभस्वता प्रावृषि वारिदो यथा ॥ (310)

[Even though completely uprooted i e , though cut asunder along with its source (the ajñāna) by discriminative knowledge,

if it is allowed to sprout in the mind even for a moment, it becomes vitalised and strikes terror by creating hundreds of perplexities like a cloud ushered in by the wind during the rainy season.]

तस्मादहङ्कारमिमं स्वशत्रुं भोक्तुर्गले कण्टकवत्प्रतीतम् ।
विच्छिद्य विज्ञानमहासिना स्फुटं भुङ्क्ष्वात्मसाम्राज्यसुखं यथेष्टम् ॥ (308)

[Therefore destroying, with the great sword of realisation, this ego, thy enemy, which presents itself like a thorn in the throat of a man taking his meal, enjoy to your heart's content, the Bliss of thy own empire, the majesty of Ātman.]

In this manner, one should behold Ātman which is indivisible and Infinite like the sky, free from all limiting adjuncts such as the body, the organs, the *prānas*, the *manas* and the ego which are creations of one's own ignorance.

It should ever be borne in mind that all these—the body, the organs, the *prānas*, the *manas*, the ego etc., all modifications, the sense objects, pleasure, pain etc., the gross elements such as ether—in fact, the whole universe upto and even inclusive of the unmanifest, all this is non-Self—

देहेन्द्रियप्राणमनोऽहमादिभिः स्वाज्ञानक्लृप्तैरखिलैरुपाधिभिः ।
विमुक्तमात्मानमखण्डरूपं पूर्णं महाकाशमिवावलोकयेत् ॥
देहेन्द्रियप्राणमनोऽहमादयः सर्वे विकारा विषयास्सुखादयः ।
व्योमादिभूतान्यखिलं च विश्वमव्यक्तपर्यन्तमिदं ह्यनात्मा ॥
(Vi. Cū. 385, 124)

To drive home the idea that all these are non-Self, mention is made of them in the reverse order, attention being drawn at the same time to the fact that all these effects along with their cause Māyā are, like the mirage in a desert, unreal—

माया मायाकार्यं सर्वं महदादिदेहपर्यन्तम् ।
असदिदमनात्मतत्त्वं विद्धि त्वं मरुमरीचिकाकल्पम् ॥
(Vi. Cū. 125)

*

8.7.3 'I' not Pramata—not Knower, not Doer, not Enjoyer

Thus the pseudo-self, the *pramātā*, the knower who is the doer and the enjoyer as well, is unreal and non-Self unlike the abiding unchanging Ātman Here the *Siddhāntabindu* (1) raises a question and answers it—

ननु महदेतदिन्द्रजाल प्रमाश्रयानकूटस्थान्विहाय कूटस्थमप्रमाश्रयमेव प्रमाणराजः सर्वसाक्षिणं करोतीति । बाढम् । इन्द्रजालमेवैतत् स्वप्नवदविद्याविलासितत्वात् । तथापि दृश्यस्य घटादिवज्जडत्वेन कथं प्रमाश्रयत्वमिति चेन्न । दर्पणादिवत् स्वच्छत्वेन चित्प्रतिबिम्बग्राहकत्वाच्चित्तादात्म्याध्यासात् ।

[Verily this is a great jugglery that Vedānta, the King of *pramānas*, should set aside the minds which are the support of valid knowledge and which are changing, *akūtastha* (meaning also not fraudulent) and put forth as the witness of everything, one who is immutable, *Kūtastha* (also meaning fraudulent) and who, according to Vedānta, is the support of false knowledge. Well It is no doubt a jugglery, being a play of Māyā, like a dream Here a doubt may arise as to how, in that case, the mind which is an 'observed' and insentient like a pot can be the support of valid knowledge But the mind is not like a pot because, being by itself very clear like a mirror, it is capable of taking the reflection of Brahman-Consciousness which results in the identification due to superimposition with Brahman-Consciousness]

Having delineated non-Self in its entirety, the *Viveka-cūdāmani* (126, 127) proceeds to point out Ātman—

अथ ते संप्रवक्ष्यामि स्वरूप परमात्मनः ।
यद्विज्ञाय नरो बन्धान्मुक्तः कैवल्यमश्नुते ॥
अस्ति कश्चित् स्वयं नित्यमहंप्रत्ययलम्बनः ।

[Now I am going to tell you clearly of the real nature of the Supreme Ātman on the realisation of which man is freed from bondage and attains liberation There does exist an Absolute entity, the eternal Substratum of the I-sense]

The eternality of Ātman which transcends time is to be distinguished from the apparent eternality associated with what is continually changing. This is pointed out in the *Sūtrabhāsya* (1–1–4–4)—

तत्र किञ्चित्परिणामिनित्यं स्यात् यस्मिन्विक्रियमाणेऽपि तदेवेदमिति बुद्धिर्न विहन्यते । यथा पृथिव्यादि जगन्नित्यत्ववादिनां यथा वा साङ्ख्यानां गुणाः । इदं तु पारमार्थिकं कूटस्थनित्यं व्योमवत् सर्वव्यापि सर्वविक्रियारहितं नित्यतृप्तं निरवयवं स्वयंज्योतिःस्वभाव, यत्र धर्माधर्मौ सह कार्येण कालत्रयं च नोपावर्तेते । तदेतदशरीरत्वं मोक्षाख्यम् । 'अन्यत्र धर्मादन्यत्राधर्मादन्यत्रास्मात् कृताकृतात् । अन्यत्र भूताच्च भव्याच्च' इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः ।

[Among the eternal things, some indeed may be 'apparently eternal' although changing in respect of which the idea 'that very thing is this one' is not sublated even though the thing goes on changing, as for instance, the earth etc, in the opinion of those who maintain that the world is eternal or the three *gunas* in the opinion of the Sânkhyas But this One is eternal in the absolute sense i e., eternal without undergoing any change, Omnipresent like ether, free of all modifications, ever content, partless and self-effulgent by nature This Ātman—the Bodiless within the bodies, the Unchanging among the changing, the Great and Omnipresent, without breath, without organs, without mind, Pure and Unattached (अशरीरं शरीरेष्वनवस्थेष्ववस्थितम्, महान्तं विभुमात्मानम्, अप्राणो ह्यमनाः शुभ्रः, असङ्गः) — is that Unembodiedness called liberation to which merit and demerit with their consequences and three-fold time do not apply, as stated in Śrutis like 'Different from merit and demerit, different from effect and cause, different from past and future'.]

In respect of this I-sense, the knower, the doer and the enjoyer and in respect of the Substratum, Ātman, says the *Siddhāntabindu* (1)—

अहं मनुष्यः कर्ता भोक्तेत्यादिप्रतीतिस्तावत् सर्वजनप्रसिद्धा । सा च न स्मृतिः । अपरोक्षावभासत्वाद्भेदाग्रहपूर्वकत्वाच्च । नापि प्रमा । श्रुतियुक्तिबाधितत्वात् ।

तथा च श्रुतयः 'योऽय विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु हृद्यन्तर्ज्योतिः पुरुषः', 'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म', 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म', 'विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म', 'य आत्माऽपहतपाप्मा', 'यत्साक्षादपरोक्षाद्ब्रह्म', 'य आत्मा सर्वान्तरः', 'योऽशनायापिपासे शोकं मोहं जरां मृत्युमत्येति', 'स यत्तत्र किञ्चित् पश्यत्यनन्वागतस्तेन भवत्यसङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः'—इत्याद्या अकर्त्रभोक्तृपरमानन्दब्रह्मरूपतामात्मनो दर्शयन्ति ।

युक्तयश्च—विकारिणः परिच्छिन्नत्वेनानात्मत्वापत्तेः, स्वेनैव स्वस्य ग्रहणे कर्तृकर्मविरोधात्, दृग्दृश्यसंबन्धानुपपत्तेर्भेदेनाभेदेन वा धर्मिधर्मभावानुपपत्तेश्च, ज्ञानानित्यत्वपक्षे तत्तद्व्यक्तिभेदध्वंसप्रागभावसमवायज्ञानत्वजात्याद्यभ्युपगमे गौरवात्, एकत्वाभ्युपगमे चातिलाघवात्, घटज्ञानं न पटज्ञानमित्युपाधिभेदपुरस्कारेणैव ज्ञानभेदप्रतीतेः, स्वतस्तु ज्ञानं ज्ञानमित्येकस्वरूपावगमात् तदुत्पत्तिविनाशप्रतीत्योश्चावश्यकल्प्यविषयसंबन्धविषयतयाप्युपपत्ते, उपाधिपरामर्शमन्तरेण स्वत एव घटाद्घटान्तरस्य भेदप्रतीतेः तत्प्रतिबन्दीग्राहासभवात्, आकाशकालदिशामपि नानात्वापत्तेश्च, कर्तृत्वादेर्वास्तवत्वेऽनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गात्, स्वप्रकाशानभ्युपगमे च जगदान्ध्यप्रसङ्गात्, परमप्रेमास्पदत्वेन च तस्यानन्दरूपत्वात्, निर्धर्मकनित्यस्वप्रकाशसुखात्मक एक एवात्मा —इत्याद्याः ।

तस्मात् परिशेषाद्भ्रान्तिरियमिति स्थिते तत्कारणमपि योग्यं किञ्चित् कल्पनीयम् । कल्प्यमान च तदद्वितीयात्मनि अध्यस्ततयैव धर्मिग्राहकमानेन सिध्यतीति 'न जानामि' इति साक्षिप्रतीतिसिद्धमनिर्वाच्यमज्ञानमेव तत् ।

The consciousness 'I am a man, an agent, an experiencer etc,' is well known as a universally established fact. This consciousness is not memory because it does not pertain to a past event; it is of the nature of immediate experience and preceded by a non-cognition of the difference between 'I' and 'man etc.' Nor is it valid knowledge, because of sublation by Śruti and reasoning. Śrutis such as

the following point out that Ātman is no agent, no experiencer but is Itself Supreme Bliss, Brahman—'He, the *Purusa* who is the *vijñānamaya* inside (subtler than) the organs, the Inner Effulgence in the heart', 'This Ātman is Brahman', 'Brahman is Truth, Consciousness, the Infinite', 'Brahman is Knowledge and Bliss', 'The Ātman devoid of all sin', 'Brahman that is directly immediate by nature', 'Ātman, the Innermost of everything', 'He who transcends hunger, thirst, sorrow, delusion, senility and death', 'Whatever he sees there (in any of the waking, dream and deep sleep states), He is not followed by it, this *Purusa* is unattached to anything'.

The reasonings in this respect are as follows: The *pramātā*, being subject to change, is limited (by space, time etc) and hence non-Self (and therefore incapable of knowing itself). If it is argued that it can know itself, there is a contradiction, as one cannot be both the subject and the object of the same knowledge, the relation of the perceiver and the perceived cannot be established and also the relation between the quality and the qualified cannot be established on the assumption either of difference or of non-difference. If knowledge is perishable then various individual items of knowledge (e.g. that of a pot, that of a cloth), mutual distinction among them, the antecedent and consequent non-existence of those items of knowledge and the genus (viz , the 'knowledgeness' and the relation called inseparable inherence by which the genus will be connected with the individual) etc., will have to be admitted; and it would be prolix to assume all these. On the contrary, if it is assumed that knowledge is one, then there is the advantage of simplicity. And the admission of oneness of knowledge means the admission of the indestructi-

bility of knowledge. Cognition of the difference between knowledge of a pot and that of a cloth is based upon the difference between the limitations of knowledge viz., the pot and the cloth. In itself, knowledge is one and the same e.g., the 'knowledge' of a pot or of a cloth etc The cognitions of the origination and destruction of knowledge are to be explained by the fact that production and destruction pertain to the connection with objects, which must take place before the knowledge arises. If it is assumed that the difference of one pot from another becomes manifest automatically without the knowledge of the attendant circumstances then it would be impossible to comprehend their counterparts, and space, time and the quarters would also be diverse. If the doership etc , are accepted as real there arises the contingency of the jīva never being liberated. If Ātman is not admitted as self-effulgent there would be darkness in the entire universe. Ātman, as the object of highest love, is Itself Bliss. Thus reasoning leads to the conclusion that Ātman is Attributeless, Eternal, Self-effulgent Bliss.

Therefore it being established, by the method of exclusion, that this consciousness 'I am a man, etc.' is an erroneous cognition, something suitable must be postulated as the cause of this error. This cause, if inferred, can be established to exist as falsely superimposed on the secondless Ātman, by reasoning based on implication This cause is therefore nothing but the indescribable ajñāna revealed by the Witness-self as 'I do not know'.

8.8.1 Ajnana : Series of Superimpositions

The consequent series of superimpositions is mentioned thus—

तेनाज्ञानाध्यासविशिष्टचैतन्येऽहङ्काराध्यासः। तद्विशिष्टे कामसङ्कल्पा-

दीनामहङ्कारधर्माणामिन्द्रियधर्माणां च काणत्वबधिरत्वक्लीबत्वादीनामध्यासः। इन्द्रियाणां तु परोक्षत्वान्नापरोक्षधर्म्यध्यास इति सिद्धान्तः। तद्विशिष्टे स्थूल-देहाध्यासो धर्मपुरस्कारेणैवाह मनुष्य इत्याद्याकारो न तु स्वरूपतोऽह देह इत्यध्यासः। तथाप्रतीत्यभावात्। तद्विशिष्टे च स्थौल्यादीना देहधर्माणा-मध्यासः। तद्विशिष्टे बाह्याना पुत्रभार्यादीनां साकल्यवैकल्यादिधर्माध्यासः। एवं चैतन्यस्याप्यहङ्कारादिषु देहपर्यन्तेष्वध्यासः संसर्गत। अध्यासव्यवधान-तारतम्याच्च प्रेमतारतम्यम्। तदुक्तं वार्तिकामृते—

वित्तात्पुत्रः प्रियः पुत्रात्पिण्डः पिण्डात्तथेन्द्रियम्।
इन्द्रियेभ्यः प्रियः प्राणः प्राणादात्मा परः प्रियः॥

...तेनान्योन्याध्यासाच्चिदचिद्ग्रन्थिरूपोऽध्यास एकतरस्याध्यासाङ्गीकारेऽन्य-तरस्याभानप्रसङ्गादध्यस्तस्यैव भ्रमे भाननियमात्.....।

(*Siddhāntabindu*–1)

Ajñāna being posited thus as superimposed on Ātman, on Ātman as qualified by ajñāna, there occurs the superimposition, *adhyāsa*, of ego, the individualising principle, the mind. On Ātman as qualified by ego, there occurs the *adhyāsa* of the attributes of the ego such as desire and formative will, and also of the attributes of the organs such as one-eyedness, deafness and eunuchism. The organs, however, not being directly perceivable, cannot be superimposed on the *dharmī* i e, Ātman as qualified by ajñāna, as also the ego that are directly perceived. On Ātman qualified by those attributes, the gross body is superimposed. This *adhyāsa* of the gross body is only through the *adhyāsa* of such of its attributes as manhood and assumes the form 'I am a man', but not through the *adhyāsa* of bodyhood in the form 'I am the body' because there is no such experiential evidence. And on Ātman as qualified by the *adhyāsa* of the gross body are superimposed stoutness etc., which are the attributes of

the gross body On Him thus qualified, are superimposed the attributes of the external ones such as prosperity and nobility, or otherwise, of the son, the wife and others. Reciprocally, there is the *adhyāsa* of the appropriate relationship of Consciousness with the ego etc., up to the gross body. The difference in the degree of love is due to the difference in the intervening obstruction by way of *adhyāsa*. The *Vārtikāmṛta* (Br. Vā. 1-4-1031) says—A son is dearer than wealth; the body is dearer than the son; in the same way, an organ is dearer than the body; the *prāna* is dearer than even the organs; and Ātman is by far dearer than even the *prāṇa*.

Hence there being this reciprocal *adhyāsa* of each on the other, *adhyāsa* is of the nature of a knot of Self and non-Self. If we would accept the *adhyāsa* of only one of these two on the other (and not their reciprocal ones), then this would mean that the other should not appear at all, since in an erroneous cognition, only what is superimposed appears.

8.8.2 Reciprocal Superimposition—Five Aspects

A few salient points taken from the *ṭīkās* in respect of *adhyāsa* may be brought in here—

The experience 'I am ignorant' arises as a consequence of the *adhyāsa* of the I-sense i.e., the mind, on Ātman as qualified by ignorance. Here the question is raised as to how, in this experience, the Substratum i.e., the Consciousness as qualified by ajñāna can appear for, in the experience 'this is silver', the Substratum that is the shell on which the silver is superimposed does not appear. This is accounted for on the basis of the idea of reciprocal superimposition. That is, after the *adhyāsa* of the ego which is the evolute of ajñāna on its Substratum viz., the Consciousness as qualified

by ajñāna, on this superimposed ego, is superimposed reciprocally the Consciousness as qualified by ajñāna. Thus the experience 'I am ignorant' arises as a result of the totality of these two *adhyāsas* in the manner of the experience 'these are borax and silver', when referring to the totality of borax and silver, each mistaken for the other. The difference is only in this, that in the example cited, the two, viz., borax and silver, the two substrata have each an individual existence of its own in parlance, whereas here the ego, the substratum of the second *adhyāsa*, being itself superimposed on the Consciousness as qualified by ajñāna, has no existence of its own; and as such is not seen as distinct from what in turn is superimposed upon it viz., the Consciousness as qualified by ajñāna. Likewise, in respect of shell-silver, silver is superimposed on the shell; and on this superimposed silver, 'thisness' pertaining to the shell is again superimposed, the two together giving rise to the experience 'this is silver'. Here it must be noted that the Substratum, the shell aspect, is concealed and does not appear in the erroneous experience 'this is silver', while the 'this' aspect of the shell, the *ādhāra*, the support, if it may be so termed, shows itself. Thus the *adhisthāna*, the Substratum and the *ādhāra*, the support pertaining to the content in any *adhyāsa*, are distinguished—यन्निष्ठतया यत् स्फुरति तत्तस्याधारः, यद्विषयाज्ञानाच्च यद्भवति तत्तस्याधिष्ठानम् । (*Tattvabodhinī* p. 52 on *Sankṣepaśārīraka*). Necessarily there would be the *adhyāsa* of *dharmī*, the locus of the attributes, on the *adhiṣṭhāna* of the *adhyāsa* of *dharmas*, the attributes, but not on the *ādhāra* of the *adhyāsa* of *dharmas* as the *Nyāyaratnāvalī* (1) says—धर्मा य [illegible] धर्म्यध्यासः, न तु धर्माध्यासाधारे, in answer to the qu [illegible] यास विना कथं धर्माध्यासः ? (How can there be the *adh* [illegible] ttributes without the *adhyā*[illegible] of their locus ?) [illegible] perience 'I am ign [illegible]

अज्ञोऽहम्, Ātman as qualified by ajñāna would be the *ādhāra* of the *adhyāsa* of the ego, the mind, and similarly Ātman as qualified by the mind would be the *ādhāra* of the *adhyāsa* of desire, volition etc., which are the attributes of the mind, as also the *ādhāra* of the *adhyāsa* of one-eyedness etc., which are the attributes of the organs, while the *adhiṣṭhāna* of the *adhyāsa* of the mind is the same as the *adhiṣṭhāna* of the *adhyāsa* of its attributes (viz., desire etc.), that is, the Pure Consciousness In the same way the *adhiṣṭhāna* of the *adhyāsa* of the organs as well as their attributes is the Pure Consciousness, Brahman, which in fact is the *adhiṣṭhāna* of the *adhyāsa* of the entire universe. While experiences like 'I am eyed' are in evidence, no one ever gets experiences of the type अज्ञश्चक्षुः, 'the ignorant is the eye', or अहं चक्षुः, 'I am the eye'. It is on the basis of such experiences that *adhyāsa* could be analysed. Whatever aspect appears in any *adhyāsa* is sublated on the dawn of right knowledge which removes the veil concealing the *adhiṣṭhāna*; hence these aspects originate during the illusory experience. Says the *Sankṣepaśārīraka* (1-36)—

अध्यस्तमेव हि परिस्फुरति भ्रमेषु नान्यत्कथञ्चन परिस्फुरति भ्रमेषु ।
रज्जुत्वशुक्तिगकलत्वमरुक्षितित्वचन्द्रैकताप्रभृतिकानुपलम्भनेन ।

[In erroneous cognitions of serpent, silver, mirage, two moons etc., there is not the apprehension of the rope, the shell, the desert and the uniqueness of the Moon etc Only the superimposed object appears therein and none else]

Five component *adhyāsas* are involved in any erroneous cognition. The *Laghucandrikā* (1-2) says—

इदमाद्यवच्छेदेन रजतादिकम् तत्तादात्म्यम् रजतत्वादेः संसर्गश्च रजताद्यवच्छेदेनेदमादेस्तादात्म्यम् इदन्त्वादेः संसर्गश्च जायते भ्रमस्थले भ्रमकाले बाध्यस्योत्पत्तिस्वीकारात् ।

[In the example of the shell-silver illusion etc, the erroneous cognition is consequent on (1) the arising of silver as qualified by the delimitation, *idam*, 'this', (2) its false identity with *idam*, (3) the relationship of silverness with *idam*, as also reciprocally (4) the false identity of *idam* with silver and (5) the relationship of 'thisness' with silver. All these being subject to subsequent sublation, they must necessarily be regarded as having originated.]

8.8.3 Chidachidgranthi

All this must be borne in mind in the consideration of the series of *adhyāsas* as also the 'knot' that is referred to—the *cidacidgranthi* This knot in its multifarious aspects is brought out in the Śruti (Bṛ. U. 4-4-5) and the *Bhāsya* thereon—

स वा अयमात्मा ब्रह्म विज्ञानमयो मनोमयः प्राणमयश्चक्षुर्मयः श्रोत्रमयः पृथिवीमय आपोमयो वायुमय आकाशमयस्तेजोमयोऽतेजोमयः काममयोऽकाममयः क्रोधमयोऽक्रोधमयो धर्ममयोऽधर्ममयः सर्वमयस्तद्यदेतदिदंमयोऽदोमय इति . . . . . ।

येऽस्य बन्धनसंज्ञका उपाधिभूताः, यैः संयुक्तस्तन्मयोऽयमिति विभाव्यते, ते पदार्थाः पुञ्जीकृत्येहैकत्र प्रतिनिर्दिश्यन्ते। स वा अयं य एवं संसरत्यात्मा ब्रह्मैव पर एव, योऽशनायाद्यतीतः। विज्ञानमयो विज्ञान बुद्धिस्तेनोपलक्ष्यमाणस्तन्मयः। 'कतम आत्मेति योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु' इति ह्युक्तम्। विज्ञानमयो विज्ञानप्रायो। यस्मात् तद्धर्मत्वमस्य विभाव्यते 'ध्यायतीव लेलायतीव' इति। तथा मनोमयो मनस्सन्निकर्षान्मनोमयः। तथा प्राणमयः। प्राणः पञ्चवृत्तिस्तन्मयो येन चेतनश्चलतीव लक्ष्यते। तथा चक्षुर्मयो रूपदर्शनकाले। एवं श्रोत्रमयः शब्दश्रवणकाले। एव तस्य तस्येन्द्रियस्य व्यापारोद्भवे तत्तन्मयो भवति। एवं बुद्धिप्राणद्वारेण चक्षुरादिकरणमयः सञ्शरीरारंभकपृथिव्यादिभूतमयो भवति . . . तत्प्रतिपद्यमानस्तन्मयो भवति।

[All those that are the limiting adjuncts of Ātman, Its bonds, in association with which Ātman is regarded as identified with

them, are here gathered together and pointed out. That very Ātman which thus transmigrates is indeed Brahman Itself The Supreme Self, that is beyond hunger etc, as identified with intellect and made known through it, is *vijñānamaya*, for it has been said in Śruti, 'Which is Ātman? This that is identified with the intellect and is in the midst of organs'. Self is called *vijñānamaya*, resembling the intellect, because It is conceived of as possessing the attributes of the intellect, as in Śruti 'It thinks, as it were, and moves, as it were'. Likewise It is *manomaya* as identified with *manas* because of Its proximity to that. Also as identified with *prāna* with its five-fold function because of which It appears as moving, It is *prānamaya* Likewise It is *caksurmaya* as identified with the eyes when It sees forms, and *śrotramaya* as identified with the ears when It hears sounds. Thus as each particular organ functions, Self becomes identified with that. Similarly as identified with the eyes and other organs through the intellect and *prāna*, Self becomes identified with the elements such as earth, water, air, ether and fire, likewise Self is identified with what is other than the fire, with desire and absence of desire, with anger and absence of anger, with righteousness and unrighteousness; with everything—identified as is well known with this (what is perceived) and with that (what is inferred) . . the Self becomes identified with whatever It secures by desiring and striving for it]

Alluding to this superimposition, the *Gītābhāsya* (XVIII-50) points out the reason as to how Self is conceived of variously by the different schools—

बुद्धेश्चात्मसमनैर्मल्याद्युपपत्तेरात्मचैतन्याकाराभासत्वोपपत्तिः। बुद्ध्याभासं मनः, तदाभासानीन्द्रियाणि, इन्द्रियाभासश्च देहः। अतो लौकिकैर्देहमात्रे एवात्मदृष्टिः क्रियते।

देहचैतन्यवादिनश्च लोकायतिका 'चैतन्यविशिष्टः कायः पुरुषः' इत्याहुः। तथान्ये इन्द्रियचैतन्यवादिनः, अन्ये मनश्चैतन्यवादिनः, अन्ये बुद्धिचैतन्यवादिनः। ततोऽप्यन्तरमव्यक्तमव्याकृताख्यमविद्यावस्थमात्मत्वेन प्रति-

पन्नाः केचित्। सर्वत्र हि बुद्ध्यादिदेहान्ते आत्मचैतन्याभासता आत्मभ्रान्ति-कारणम्।

[*Buddhi* being as pure (clear and subtle) as Ātman, it can put on the semblance of the Consciousness-'aspect' of Ātman. *Manas* puts on a semblance of *buddhi*, the organs put on a semblance of *manas*; and the gross body again puts on a semblance of the organs wherefore the common people look upon the mere gross body as Self And the Lokāyatikas who argue that the gross body is endued with Consciousness declare that *Purusa*, Self, is identical with the gross body endued with Consciousness. Similarly some argue that the organs are endued with Consciousness, others argue that the *buddhi* is endued with Consciousness. There are a few who hold that there is something within even beyond the *buddhi* viz, the unmanifest, also called *avyākrtā*, the undifferentiated, in the form of Avidyā; and they say that *avyākrtā* is the Self Everywhere, from *buddhi* down to the gross body, the cause of the illusory identification of each with Self is its wearing a semblance of Ātman-Consciousness]

The *Adhyāsabhāsya* (Sū. Bhā. 1-1-1-1) cites examples from experience for a more definite understanding of this superimposition—

अध्यासो नाम अतस्मिंस्तद्बुद्धिरित्यवोचाम। तद्यथा पुत्रभार्यादिषु विकलेषु सकलेषु वाहमेव विकलः सकलो वेति बाह्यधर्मानात्मन्यध्यस्यति, तथा देहधर्मान्—स्थूलोऽहम्, कृशोऽहम्, गौरोऽहम्, तिष्ठामि, गच्छामि, लङ्घयामि चेति। तथेन्द्रियधर्मान्—मूकः, काणः, क्लीवः, बधिरः, अन्धोऽहमिति। तथाऽन्तःकरणधर्मान् कामसङ्कल्पविचिकित्साध्यवसायादीन्। एवमहंप्रत्ययिनमशेषस्वप्रचारसाक्षिणि प्रत्यगात्मन्यध्यस्य तं च प्रत्यगात्मान सर्वसाक्षिण तद्विपर्ययेणान्तःकरणादिष्वध्यस्यति। एवमयमनादिरनन्तो नैसर्गिकोऽध्यासो मिथ्याप्रत्ययरूपः कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वप्रवर्तकः सर्वलोकप्रत्यक्षः। अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणायात्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते।

[We have already explained that by 'superimposition' is to be understood the knowledge of something as some other thing. Extra-personal attributes are superimposed on Ātman when a man considers himself sound and entire or otherwise, as long as his wife, children etc , are sound and entire or otherwise. Attributes of the body are superimposed on Ātman as seen from statements such as 'I am stout', 'I am lean', 'I am fair-complexioned', 'I am standing, walking, jumping' etc Similarly the attributes of the organs, from the statements such as 'I am mute', 'I am one-eyed', 'I am deaf', 'I am eunuch', 'I am blind' etc , likewise the attributes of the internal organ, such as desire, intention, doubt, determination etc. Thus one superimposes the internal organ, possessed of the notion of ego, on the Inner Self which is the Witness of all the modifications of the internal organ, and vice versa the Inner Self which is the Witness of everything, on the internal organ etc In this way there goes on this natural superimposition that has neither beginning nor end, that appears as the manifested universe and its apprehension, that conjures up agency and enjoyership and that is perceived by all persons It is with this end in view viz., the eradication of this source of evil and the acquiring of the knowledge of the unity of Ātman, that all the Vedāntas proceed]

8.8.4 All Parlance, Worldly and Vedic, even Emancipation—Based on Reciprocal Superimposition of Self and non-Self

As pointed out by the *Adhyāsabhāṣya*, it must be borne in mind that it is this mutual superimposition of Self and non-Self, termed Avidyā, that is the presupposition on which is based all parlance, worldly as well as Vedic and all Śāstras dealing with injunction, prohibition and even emancipation—

तमेतमविद्याख्यमात्मानात्मनोरितरेतराध्यास पुरस्कृत्य सर्वे प्रमाणप्रमेय-व्यवहारा लौकिका वैदिकाश्च प्रवृत्ताः सर्वाणि च शास्त्राणि विधिप्रतिषेध-मोक्षपराणि ।

Here it must be noted carefully that this Ātman directly presents Itself most immediately, being the most well-known, verily as oneself—अपरोक्षत्वात् प्रत्यगात्मप्रसिद्धेः. In the face of this, it is surprising that no account is taken of It by any of the non-Vedāntic schools. Says the *Gītābhāsya* (XVIII–50)—

अविद्याकल्पितनामरूपविशेषाकारापहृतबुद्धीनाम् अत्यन्तप्रसिद्धं सुविज्ञेयम् आसन्नतरमात्मभूतमपि, अप्रसिद्धं दुर्विज्ञेयमतिदूरमन्यदिव च प्रतिभात्यविवेकिनाम् ।

[Though thus quite self-evident, quite easy of comprehension, quite near and forming the very Self, Brahman appears—to the unenlightened, to those whose intellect is carried away by the differentiated phenomena of names and forms conjured up by Avidyā—as unknown, difficult to comprehend, very remote and as though It were a separate entity.]

8.9.1 The Deluded Contend Atman as Otherwise

It is therefore that the hymn says that those who contend that Ātman is one or the other of what belong to the province of non-Self, are all ignorant and no better than women, children, the blind and the insentient—स्त्रीबालान्धजडोपमास्त्वहमिति भ्रान्ता भृशं वादिनः. There are a host of Śrutis which point to the utter worthlessness of those who revel in the non-Self, for example—

अविद्यायामन्तरे वर्तमानाः स्वयं धीराः पण्डितमन्यमानाः ।
दन्द्रम्यमाणाः परियन्ति मूढा अन्धेनैव नीयमाना यथान्धाः ॥
(Ka. U. 1–2–5)

[Engulfed in ignorance which is like unto thick darkness, regarding themselves as intelligent and well versed in the Śâstras, the ignorant go round and round in many crooked ways like the blind led by the blind]

8.9.2 'I' Verily the 'Purusha'

The way out of this vicious circle is by securing the

realisation that the true 'I', Ātman, is verily the Supreme Person, the self-effulgent *Purusa* by whom all 'this' is filled, who transcends the body, the senses, the subtle rudiments of the objects, the mind, the intellect, the *mahat* and even the unmanifest. Beyond this *Purusa* there is nothing; That is the Ultimate; That is the Supreme Goal. The purport is that this *Purusa* is Ātman and that all else is non-Self. This *Purusa* is made known only by the Upanisads—

अत्राऽयं पुरुषः स्वयंज्योतिः। (बृ. उ. 6–3–9)

तेनेदं पूर्णं पुरुषेण सर्वम्। (तै. उ. 4–13)

इन्द्रियेभ्यः परा ह्यर्था अर्थेभ्यश्च परं मनः।
मनसस्तु परा बुद्धिर्बुद्धेरात्मा महान् परः॥
महतः परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात्पुरुषः परः।
पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित्सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः॥
(क. उ. 1–3–10, 11)

प्रकृतं पुरुषमात्मेत्याह, अतश्चानात्मत्वमितरेषां विवक्षितम्।
(सू. भा. 3–3–7–15)

स वा अयं पुरुषः सर्वासु पूर्षु पुरिशयः। (बृ. उ. 4–5–18)

परात्परं पुरिशयं पुरुषम्। (प्र. उ. 5–5)

असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः। (बृ. उ. 4–3–15)

तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि। (बृ. उ. 3–9–26)

पुरुषः स परः पार्थ (गी. VIII–22)

उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः (गी. XV–17)

In parlance, he alone is *Purusa*, the 'Man', in the true sense of the word, who realises his identity with this Supreme *Purusa*, the true 'I', says the *Yogavāsistha* (5–76–14)—

अपारावारमाक्रम्य प्रमेयीकृत्य सर्वतः।
संसाराब्धिं गाहते यः स एव पुरुषः स्मृतः॥

[The one, the intelligent and undaunted, who, even as he enters the endless ocean of *samsāra,* is alive to the consciousness that everything is truly Brahman Itself that is sought after, he alone is entitled to be called *Purusa*]

8.9.3 Outlook of the Deluded is Feminine, Childish, Blind and Dunce-like as spoken of ordinarily

This reminds one, of the use by Śrī Bhagavān, of expressions such as पुरुषर्षभ (गी. II–15), पुरुषव्याघ्र (गी. XVIII–4), to drag Arjuna out of the depression to which he has apparently succumbed. Śrī Bhagavān further demands that he should cease to be effeminate and give up this trifling faintheartedness which are unbecoming of a 'man' like him, and brace up to the situation—

क्लैब्यं मा स्म गमः पार्थ नैतत्त्वय्युपपद्यते ।
क्षुद्रं हृदयदौर्बल्य त्यक्त्वोत्तिष्ठ परन्तप ॥ (गी. II–3)

It is to be noted that Śrī Bhagavān commences His instruction by pin-pointing to the lack of discriminatory knowledge between Self and the non-Self, as the root cause of the muddle in which Arjuna finds himself. It is in the same manner that the hymn declares that those who identify themselves with anything other than the true Self are woman-like. However dexterous they may be in formulating their theories with suitable adjustment in respect of the details thereof, these philosophers can at best be compared to an ideal housewife who is all engrossed only in housekeeping; that is, they are only स्त्रीप्रज्ञाः i.e., of feminine outlook, as described by Śruti (Bṛ.U. 6–5–1) while referring to Kātyāyanī, one of the two spouses of the Sage Yājñavalkya. The *Ātmapurāna* (7-75 to 82) gives a vivid description of the unsurpassed efficiency of Kātyāyanī in the art of housekeeping in all its aspects, which is summarised by the *ṭīkā* on it—

तस्य मुनेर्या कात्यायनीनाम भार्या सा नारीणां प्रज्ञायां नीतिं कौशल-मास्थिता सती, गृहकर्मणि विचक्षणाभूत्। . . . तया सदृशी चापरा नाभूत्।
This endeavour on her part to remain the best housewife for all times is stemming from her firm conviction 'I am a woman'. The enquiry as to how this conviction has come to be, is totally absent in her case. The result is that the involvement is so deep that there is not the least suggestion of even an attempt to transcend this state. So is each one of the philosophers involved in one or the other in the realm of non-Self, affirming it as his own Ātman accommodating all else in a manner suitable to it, not concerning, however, as to how that idea of oneself came to be revealed. They are like kids who revel in their concoctions and conjectures in a playful manner, each of them considering himself as a king, a priest, a teacher, a driver or even an engine etc., depending on the role in the fanciful play he sets for himself, any object being made to stand for what he desires it to be, without the least concern for what it really is; that is, they are *bālāh* meaning अज्ञानिनः, अविवेकिनः, अयथार्थदर्शिनः, वेदान्तशास्त्रार्थरहस्या-वेदिनः केचिद्विद्वांसः। i.e., ignorant, lacking in discrimination, not knowing the thing as it is, 'scholars' who have no knowledge of the profound Truth revealed by Vedānta, as the Śruti says:

पराचः कामाननुयन्ति बालास्ते मृत्योर्यन्ति विततस्य पाशम्।
अथ धीरा अमृतत्वं विदित्वा ध्रुवमध्रुवेष्विह न प्रार्थयन्ते ॥

(Ka. U. 2-1-2)

[The childish (the ignorant) pursue external objects of desire, they get into the meshes of widespread death, but the intelligent, knowing Brahman, the sure Immortality, do not covet the uncertain things here]

अविद्यायां बहुधा वर्तमाना वयं कृतार्था इत्यभिमन्यन्ति बालाः।
यत्कर्मिणो न प्रवेदयन्ति रागात्तेनातुराः क्षीणलोकाश्च्यवन्ते ॥

(Mu. U. 1-2-9)

[The ignorant following the diverse ways of ignorance, flatter themselves that their objects have been accomplished As these devoted to karma do not realise the truth, owing to their attachment, they grow miserable, and after the fruits of their karma are consumed, fall from heaven.]

Also says the *Gaudapādakārikā* (3-8)—

यथा भवति बालानां गगनं मलिनं मलैः ।
तथा भवत्यबुद्धानामात्मापि मलिनो मलैः ॥

[As the sky appears to the ignorant children to be dirty with cloud, dust and smoke, similarly Ātman also is regarded by the ignorant as affected by the evils of misery, action and the fruits thereof]

Their theories are like the fanciful fairy tales concocted to amuse children. Like the blind who grope in the dark in respect of all their activities, subject to disasters like falling into a pit or a well, these philosophers are blind to the Light that illumines all that they are about. Into blinding darkness enter these who practise rites ; into greater darkness, as it were, enter these who are devoted to the knowledge concerning these rites, disregarding the teachings of the Upanisads. Miserable are those worlds enveloped by that blinding darkness of ignorance. To them, after death, go those people who are ignorant and unwise, devoid of the knowledge of Self Says Śruti—

अन्धं तमः प्रविशन्ति येऽविद्यामुपासते ।
ततो भूय इव ते तमो य उ विद्यायां रताः ॥
अनन्दा नाम ते लोका अन्धेन तमसाऽऽवृताः ।
तांस्ते प्रेत्याभिगच्छन्त्यविद्वांसोऽबुधो जनाः ॥ (बृ. उ. 6-4-10, 11)

In their frantic search for Self, some of them are lost to themselves to [illegible] extent that they even proclaim that there is no [illegible] Again, entrenched in their own way

of thinking which has become an obsession with them, they are impervious even to a suggestion of the Upanisadic declaration in respect of Ātman. They behave like dunces, so inert. Even when their attention is drawn to It, they obstinately deny the Existence and Shine of the abiding Ātman; says the *Pañcadaśī* (VI-27)—

अज्ञानी विदुषा पृष्टः कूटस्थं न प्रबुध्यते ।
न भाति नास्ति कूटस्थ इति बुद्ध्वा वदत्यपि ॥

Entangled as they are so much in the mesh of the non-Self, their ways of thinking have been conditioned to such an extent that some of them declare Ātman to be an inert entity; some, that It is not abiding; some, that there is no such thing; and even those who declare Ātman as sentient or talk of Īśvara as well, bring in the notion of enjoyership, as also difference and multiplicity into this realm, which are ideas carried over from the insentient non-Self. The proper procedure would be to examine and understand the non-Self in the light of self-effulgent Ātman. How can the Śāstra enlighten him who denies the experience of his own Consciousness which brings about the consciousness of everything else? He is a dunce, a clod of mud in human form. A statement which is the denial of such an experience of one's own Consciousness would be like an utterance 'have I a tongue or not?' which leads only to shame So says the *Pañcadaśī* (III-19, 20)—

बोधेऽप्यनुभवो यस्य न कथञ्चन जायते ।
तं कथ बोधयेच्छास्त्रं लोष्ठ नरसमाकृतिम् ॥
जिह्वा मेऽस्ति न वेत्युक्तिर्लज्जायै केवलं यथा ।
न बुध्यते मया बोधो बोद्धव्य इति तादृशी ॥

Thus are the *vādins* wedded to the non-Self, playing in the

realm of non-Self that is imaginary, oblivious of their own true Self and showing no concern towards the call of Self as also the instruction in Śruti pertaining to It.

8.9.4 The Great Among Women etc., Hailed and Pointed to as Exemplary

When women, children, the blind and the dunce, are referred to by way of illustration, Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda does not mean to deride them. Say Śruti itself (the *Kṛṣṇayajurvedīyataittirīyāraṇyaka*) and the *Śrī Vidyāraṇyabhāṣya* thereon (1–11–3–14)—

स्त्रियः सतीः । ता उ मे पुंस आहुः । पश्यदक्षण्वान्न विचेतदन्धः । कविर्यः पुत्रः स इमा चिकेत । यस्ता विजानात्सवितुः पिता सत्, इति ।

या लोके प्रसिद्धाः स्त्रियः सतीः सद्रूपा गुरुकटाक्षेण 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' इत्यादिश्रुत्युक्तं सद्वस्तु बुद्ध्वा तदनुभवेन तद्रूपा वर्तन्ते ता उ ता अपि स्त्रियो मे मते पुंस आहुर्ब्रह्मविदः पुरुषान् कथयन्ति । यद्यपि शरीरे स्तनवृद्ध्यादि स्त्रीलक्षणं दृश्यते, तथापि पुरुषस्योचितं तत्त्वज्ञानमस्तीति पुरुषलक्षणसद्भावात् पुरुषत्वं तासामभिज्ञाः कथयन्ति । ये तु शरीरे श्मश्रुप्रभृतिभिः पुरुषलक्षणैर्युक्ता अपि पुरुषस्योचित तत्त्वज्ञानं न सम्पादयन्ति ते स्त्रीणामुचितेन मोहेनोपेतत्वात् स्त्रिय एवेत्यभिप्रायः । यथा स्त्रीपुरुषविभागो लोकविपरीत एवमन्धानन्धविभागोऽपि द्रष्टव्यः । अक्षण्वांश्चक्षुरिन्द्रिययुक्तः पश्यन्नीलपीतादिरूपं पश्यन्नपि न विचेतद्विवेकेन सद्वस्तुतत्त्वं न जानाति चेत् सोऽयमन्ध एव । मांसदृष्टिरहितोऽपि स्वरूपतत्त्वाभिज्ञश्चेत् सोऽयं चक्षुष्मानेवेत्यपि द्रष्टव्यम् । यथाऽयमलौकिकान्धानन्धविभागः, एवं पितृपुत्रविभागोऽप्यलौकिकः कश्चिद्द्रष्टव्यः । लोके यत्र पिता न जानाति पुत्रस्तु कविर्वेदशास्त्रपारङ्गतस्तत्र स पुत्र इमा, एतानि दृश्यमानानि सर्वाणि भूतानि विवेकेन स्वात्मत्वेन जानाति, तदानीं यः पुत्रस्ता विजानात् तानि सर्वाणि भूतानि स्वात्मतया जानाति स पुत्रः सवितुरुत्पादकस्यापि पिता सत् पिता भवति ।

ज्ञानोपदेशेन पालयितुं समर्थत्वात्। किं बहुना तत्त्वज्ञानमेव प्रशस्तम्, अज्ञान निकृष्टमिति तात्पर्यार्थः।

[Women who have realised Brahman-Ātman by the grace of the Guru are truly men—*puruṣāḥ*—in spite of their outward womanly form, since they have secured enlightenment worthy of a *puruṣa*. Those men who have not secured Self-realisation are considered by the wise as women in spite of their male appearance. Similarly the terms 'blind' and 'non-blind' also have meanings which are entirely contrary to the common meaning attributed to them. He who sees things only through his physical eyes and does not attain Self-realisation, is called the blind one On the contrary, a person who, though deprived of physical eyes, attains the true knowledge of Ātman is considered to be endowed with the faculty of 'sight'. In the same way fatherhood and son-hood are distinguished extraordinarily. A boy who is able to see Ātman in all things and does not perceive difference is really the 'father' to his father, if the latter has not attained Self-realisation, since such a son is able to save the father by imparting true knowledge. What more! The purport is that Self-knowledge is the supreme, all other knowledge is inferior.]

Also Śruti (Br U. 6–5–1) refers to Maitreyī as a *Brahmavādinī*—मैत्रेयी ब्रह्मवादिनी बभूव. Elaborating on this, the *Ātmapurāṇa* (7–83 to 86) says—

द्वितीयाप्यस्य भार्याऽभून्मैत्रेयीति च विश्रुता।
प्रमत्तसदृशी नित्यमुद्विग्ना दुःखदर्शनात्॥
काहं किमात्मिका कस्मादेनँल्लोकमुपागता।
कुत्र स्थिता मया किञ्च गन्तव्यं मरणे सति॥
कोऽयं पतिरिति प्रोक्तः के सुताः काश्च कन्यकाः।
किं दुःख किञ्च मे तद्वत्सुखं के चक्षुरादयः॥
कोऽयं जनो मया दृश्य एवमादि सदैव सा।
चिन्तयन्ती भृशं क्लिन्ना मृतवत्सेव वर्तते॥

[The other spouse of Yājñavalkya, well known as Maitreyī, was like one who is indifferent and anxious; overpowered by grief and always contemplating on questions such as 'Who am I?', 'Of what nature?', 'From where did I come into this world?', 'Where am I?', 'Where am I to go after death?', 'Who is this that is spoken of as husband?', 'Who are these sons and daughters?', 'What is sorrow?', 'Likewise what is my happiness?', 'What are these—eyes etc ?', 'Who are these people that I see?' etc Thus grief-ridden she was suffering silently like unto a cow with its calf no more.]

The *Bṛhadvārtika* (2-4-67, 68, 69) says that, commending her on her stand, sage Yājñavalkya gives expression to his appreciation of her thus—

मोक्ष यान्तं नरं सर्वे मुञ्चन्ति सहजा अपि ।
अतिभक्तितया मां त्वं मोक्षेऽपि न जिहाससि ॥
विभागमसहन्तीव मदतिस्नेहकारणात् ।
मुक्तावनुयियासि त्व मदैकात्म्यपरीप्सया ॥
अतिस्नेहापकृष्टोमा देहार्धं शूलिनः श्रिता ।
त्वन्तु सर्वात्मनात्मानं कृत्स्नं मामाप्तुमिच्छसि ॥

[All including one's own brothers desert one who takes to the path of liberation. But you, out of extreme devotion, do not wish to be separate from me even in liberation.

As though you cannot bear separation from me, because of your deep attachment to me, you are following me even in liberation wishing to merge in me

Umā, overpowered by Her supreme love for Her consort, Śūlin, was united with Him, becoming half of His body. You, however, want to become entirely one with me by pervading me completely—by becoming my very Ātman]

By way of Yājñavalkya's instruction to Maitreyī, the profoundest of truths are revealed by Śruti. On enlightenment, what she does after Yājñavalkya's renunciation is described by the *Ātmapurāṇa* (7-538, 539)—

मैत्रेयी सकलं त्वेतद्वेद यस्मात् ततोऽत्र सा ।
पत्युः संप्राप्तविज्ञाना ब्रह्मचर्यादिसंयुता ।
चतुर्थाश्रमलिङ्गेन शून्या भूमिं चचार सा ॥
याज्ञवल्क्यस्य मैत्रेय्या वैषम्य लिङ्गधारणम् ।
अभून्नैवापरं किञ्चिच्चतुर्थाश्रमधर्मतः ॥

[Having learnt all these from her husband and securing enlightenment, equipping herself with *brahmacarya* etc , she led the life of renunciation and wandered about in the world, the difference between Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī being only in this that he held the insignia of *saṃnyāsa,* and not she. Otherwise, in their internal make-up, there was no difference whatsoever]

Again, the well-known case of Vācaknavī Gārgī who plays a leading role in the discussions of the *Brāhmaṇas,* the erudite Vedic scholars, with sage Yājñavalkya in the court of King Janaka, is mentioned by Śruti (Bṛ. U. 5-1-1). Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda makes reference in the *Sūtrabhāṣya* (3-4-9-36) to Śruti which mentions Vācaknavī Gārgī as a knower of Brahman—

रैक्वाचक्नवीप्रभृतीनामेवंभूतानामपि ब्रह्मवित्त्वश्रुत्युपलब्धेः ।

Also the instance of Śrī Ubhayabhāratīdevī, the erudite umpire presiding over the discussions between Śrī Śrī Ācaryapāda and Śrī Viśvarūpācārya (Maṇḍanamiśra), may be recalled. Thus in the manner of Śruti, no irreverence is meant when a comparison with women is made in the hymn. Similarly in the case of comparison with children, the instances of Naciketas, Dhruva, Prahlāda, Śuka etc., and above all, Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda Himself, are well known. Taking the case of the blind, even a born-blind, a person like Dhrtarāṣṭra, far from being neglected, was favoured with the faculty to see the *Viśvarūpa* by Lord Kṛṣṇa Himself. Noteworthy among the people previously regarded as dunces and later becoming

famous as jñānis due to the grace of the Guru are Jadabharata, the boy Śrī Śrī Hastāmalakācārya, Śrī Śrī Totakācārya etc. These famous cases also indicate that what are considered 'deficiencies' ordinarily, stand sublimated in the enlightened who is wedded to and therefore confined to his Self alone, who enjoys sporting in Ātman alone—आत्मरतिः, आत्मक्रीडः (Mu. U. 3-1-4)—shuts his eyes to the non-Self—

यस्यां जाग्रति भूतानि सा निशा पश्यतो मुनेः ॥ (*Gītā* II–69)

and who is silent in respect of and impervious to the tales relating to non-Self—नातिवादी (Mu. U. 3-1-4); thus there is an inversion. So it is that Śruti ordains—पाण्डित्यं निर्विद्य बाल्येन तिष्ठासेत् (Br. U. 5-5-1). The topic discussed in the *Bhāsya* on the Sūtra—अनाविष्कुर्वन्नन्वयात् (3-4-15-50) (Childlike, without display of wisdom, learning etc., in accordance with the context) wherein is quoted—

यं न सन्त न चासन्त नाश्रुतं न बहुश्रुतम् ।
न सुवृत्तं न दुर्वृत्तं वेद कश्चित् स ब्राह्मणः ॥
गूढधर्माश्रितो विद्वानज्ञातचरित चरेत् ।
अन्धवज्जडवच्चापि मूकवच्च महीं चरेत् ॥

[He whom nobody knows as either noble or ignoble, as either ignorant or learned, as either well-conducted or ill-conducted, he is a 'Brāhmana'. Devoted quietly to his pursuit without ostentation, let him go about in the world like the blind, the unconscious and the dumb.]

This childlike unconcern, बाल्य, stems from बल, the strength, that is the total elimination of the vision of objects, by Self-knowledge—

बल नाम आत्मविद्ययाऽशेषविषयदृष्टितिरस्करणम् । अतस्तद्भावेन बाल्येन तिष्ठासेत् । (*Bhāsya* on Br. U. 5-5-1)

These characteristics of the enlightened are necessarily to be acquired through steadfast effort by seekers as per the dictum—

कृतार्थलक्षणानि यानि तान्येव साधनानि (*Gītābhāsya* II-55)

The direction is provided as done by Bhagavān Śrīkṛṣṇa to the gopīs and cowherds who realised that their familiar Śrīkṛṣṇa is not merely the child of a gopī but the inner perceiving Self of the embodied—न खलु गोपिकानन्दनो भवानखिलदेहिनामन्तरात्मदृक्। (*Bhāgavata* 10-31-4). It is not infrequently that people lose sight of the importance of what is most familiar taking it to be normal and usual, without anything extraordinary in it, and are swayed by the lure of what appears as abnormal and extraordinary. The Sun, for example, which is so well known to all (women, cowherds etc., even to animals) and enables all parlance, is hardly realised as such, much less as Bhagavān, the Saviour, who presents Himself in the Orb in this form in His infinite mercy, to those who are not fortunate enough to realise either the Absolute, the *Nirguna*, by Jñāna, or the *Saguṇa* as revealed in Kailāsa etc., by *upāsana*. When this familiar Sun is enquired into and the True Nature realised, It confers Bliss So says the *Śrīrudrādhyāya*—

उतैनं गोपा अदृशन्नदृशन्नुदहार्यः। उतैनं विश्वा भूतानि स दृष्टो मृडयाति नः।

In the same manner all creatures are familiar with the Innermost Lord only as 'I', without realising, because of Māyā, that He is the All-pervasive Brahman, Lord Śiva Himself—

तमहंप्रत्ययव्याजात् सर्वे जानन्ति जन्तवः ॥
तथापि शिवरूपेण न विजानन्ति मायया।

(*Sūtasamhitā* 1-8-36, 37)

8.9.5 Purport of Comparison—Warning to Seekers

It is clear from this that the comparisons are not brought in, in a spirit of derisiveness. Women, children and

the blind are taken to illustrate generally those who do not study the Veda, are not capable of abstract reasoning and are not alive to the truths which even the world can teach. The dunce is included in this list as he cannot in the least profit by the study of the Veda or reason out coherently or perceive things as they are, but is, however, not free from hallucinations of his own When Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda gives such illustrations, He refers only to ordinary people bereft of the advantages mentioned and not to the extraordinary He laments that the philosophers, in spite of all these advantages, have lost the sense of direction and missed the truth completely and thus are no better than women etc. Being sticklers, in accordance with their dispositions to their own point of view, they argue vehemently in favour of it, as Śrī Bhagavān says—

सत्त्वानुरूपा सर्वस्य श्रद्धा भवति भारत ।
श्रद्धामयोऽयं पुरुषो यो यच्छ्रद्धः स एव सः ॥ (*Gītā* XVII-3)

Since परतन्त्रप्रज्ञाः, people who blindly follow them, would also be ruined thereby, warnings are given to save them as for example—

तस्मादसंप्रदायवित् सर्वशास्त्रविदपि मूर्खवदेवोपेक्षणीयः ।
(*Gītābhāṣya* XIII-2)

[Therefore, though learned in all Śāstras, one who is not acquainted with traditional interpretation is to be shunned as an ignorant man.]

Similarly, the comparisons given in the hymn serve to warn the seekers as to what is in store for them much in the same way as the warning administered by Śrī Bhagavān to Arjuna while demanding that he shed his faintheartedness and rise to the occasion—क्लैब्यं मा स्म गमः etc. While this, as coming from the enlightened who is verily Īśvara, serves to

align the seeker and uplift him, it turns out, though unintended, to be a curse to an obstinate adversary as pointed out by Śruti in the case of those who hold on to the non-Self dearly as if it were their own Self—

स योऽन्यमात्मनः प्रियं ब्रुवाणं ब्रूयात् प्रियꣳ रोत्स्यतीति । ईश्वरो ह तथैव स्यादात्मानमेव प्रियमुपासीत । स य आत्मानमेव प्रियमुपास्ते न हास्य प्रियं प्रमायुकं भवति । (Br. U. 3-4-8)

He finds himself in a vale of tears over many births, what is regarded as dear turning out to be the cause of misery. Him, however, who resorts to the witness-Self as the most dear, that most dear Ātman never fails Says the *Pañcadaśī* XII—

आत्मनोऽन्यं प्रियं ब्रूते शिष्यश्च प्रतिवाद्यपि ।
तस्योत्तरं वचो बोधशापौ कुर्यात्तयोः क्रमात् ॥ (63)

प्रियं त्वां रोत्स्यतीत्येवमुत्तरं वक्ति तत्त्ववित् ।
स्वोक्तप्रियस्य दुष्टत्वं शिष्यो वेत्ति विवेकतः ॥ (64)

आग्रहाद्ब्रह्मविद्वेषादपि पक्षममुञ्चतः ।
वादिनो नरकः प्रोक्तो दोषश्च बहुयोनिषु ॥ (69)

ब्रह्मविद्ब्रह्मरूपत्वादीश्वरस्तेन वर्णितम् ।
यद्यत्तत्तथैव स्यात्तच्छिष्यप्रतिवादिनोः ॥ (70)

यस्तु साक्षिणमात्मानं सेवते प्रियमुत्तमम् ।
तस्य प्रेयानसावात्मा न नश्यति कदाचन ॥ (71)

8.10.1 'I'—The Wrong Views Because of Avidya and Absence of Grace of Isvara

The *Tattvasudhā* on stanza V of the hymn says—

नन्वेते वादिनः परीक्षका अपि किमित्येवं नास्तिकास्सन्तोऽन्यथान्यथा तत्त्वं प्रतिपद्यन्ते ? इति चेत्, ईश्वरानुग्रहाभावात् ।

[Why is it that these *vādins* who are investigating, are still agnostics and delineate the truth differently? It is because of the absence of the Grace of Īśvara.]

Śrī Bhagavān's caution to Arjuna in the *Gītā* (XVIII-58)—

मच्चित्तः सर्वदुर्गाणि मत्प्रसादात्तरिष्यसि ।
अथ चेत्त्वमहङ्कारान्न श्रोष्यसि विनङ्क्ष्यसि ॥

Says the *Bhāṣya*—

सर्वदुर्गाणि–सर्वाणि दुस्तराणि संसारहेतुजातानि । न श्रोष्यसि–मदुक्तमहङ्कारात् पण्डितोऽहमिति न ग्रहीष्यसि ।

[Fixing the mind on Me, thou shalt, by My Grace, cross over all difficulties i e , the impassable obstacles arising from Avidyā, the cause of *samsāra*; but if from egoism i e., vanity that thou art learned, thou wilt not hearken unto Me, thou shalt be ruined]

Also pointing out that Self-effulgent Ātman, far from being any of those held by the other *vādins* as Self, is the witness thereof, transcends them and is ever of the nature of liberation, as proclaimed in the *Upaniṣads*, the *Brahmasūtra*, and the *Gītā*; and anything other than this is bondage, says Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda in the *Upadeśasāhasrī* (XVI–64 to 67)—

तस्माद्भ्रान्तिरतोऽन्या हि बन्धमोक्षादिकल्पनाः ।
साङ्ख्यकाणादबौद्धानां मीमांसाहतकल्पनाः ॥

शास्त्रयुक्तिविहीनत्वान्नादर्तव्याः कदाचन ।
शक्यन्ते शतशो वक्तुं दोषास्तासां सहस्रशः ॥

अपि निन्दोपपत्तेश्च यान्यतोऽन्यानि चेत्यतः ।
त्यक्त्वातो ह्यन्यशास्त्रोक्तीर्मतिं कुर्याद्दृढां बुधः ॥

श्रद्धाभक्ती पुरस्कृत्य हित्वा सर्वमनार्जवम् ।
वेदान्तस्यैव तत्त्वार्थे व्यासस्याभिमतौ तथा ॥

The *ṭikā* on it quotes—

यान्यतोऽन्यानि शास्त्राणि पृथिव्यां विविधानि वै ।
शङ्कनीयानि विद्वद्भिर्धर्मशुद्धिमभीप्सुभिः ॥
या वेदबाह्याः स्मृतयो याश्च काश्च कुदृष्टयः ।
सर्वास्ता निष्फलाः प्रेत्य तमोनिष्ठा हि ताः स्मृताः ॥

[Therefore the conception of bondage and liberation different from the Vedāntic view, is wrong. The conceptions of the Sānkhyas, the Kānādas and the Buddhists about them are not tenable to reason They should never be accepted as they are not supported by reason and Śāstras. Hundreds and thousands of errors on their part can be pointed out As scriptures differing from Śruti have been condemned in the ancient sacred tradition, they should not be accepted. A wise one should reject them and giving up all crookedness and with faith and devotion, should have a firm understanding of the true import of the Vedāntas as accepted by Bhagavān Śrī Vyāsa The learned intending to tread the path of pure *dharma*, should not heed to any and every Śāstra other than Śruti, since these other Śāstras misdirect and are therefore suspect; they lead nowhere; they are engulfed in dense darkness.]

It is to retrieve all such, that Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda while drastically criticising all the non-vedāntic systems, points out in His infinite mercy, the appropriate direction for each, accommodating him to the utmost possible extent, laying all the blame at the doors of Avidya i.e., Māyā, towards the removal of which He endeavours everywhere. The person who has transcended all delusion and knows the truth can understand, even appreciate and tolerate the views of those who are still under delusion, for the mistake is not due to them but only to the delusion under which they are labouring. The Knower of truth dispels Avidyā and the delusion of earnest aspirants who seek his guidance, for he alone can

do it and not any other person who is equally deluded or a victim of a delusion of another variety.

8.10.2 Avidya—'Positive' Entity, 'Veil', Material Cause of Error

This Māyā, Avidyā, as already delineated at length, must be deemed to be not mere absence of Consciousness, but a positive something because, Consciousness being eternal, its non-existence cannot be established. Also the knowledge of non-existence of Consciousness would imply along with it the existence of the knowledge of the locus in which this non-existence is posited as also the knowledge of the counter-entity of this non-existence, which would be a contradiction in terms. Nor is it of the nature of a series of errors or of doubts or of the impressions of either of them on the mind, for the errors, doubts etc., pertaining to the past and the future in these series as also the impressions themselves are not available for direct cognition, while there is direct experience of this Avidyā as 'I do not know Ātman'. In addition this Avidyā which conceals Ātman is of the nature of a veil as also the material cause of error; Ātman being immutable and *antaḥkaraṇa* being a product of Avidyā, neither of these can be the cause of the error. It is this Avidyā, also termed Māya, which is indescribable, unreal and destroyed by true knowledge, that is the cause of its own superimposition as well as that of others, as per Śrutis like—'The inherent power of Īśvara made up of its own three *guṇas*' which speaks of this power, Māyā, as possessed of *guṇas*, 'Know the Māya to be the primordial matter, and the Supreme Lord, the weilder of Māyā', 'The Lord assumes a multiplicity of forms through His powers of Māyā', 'They are enveloped by the unreal Avidyā indeed', 'They are covered over by mist'

and 'Again finally there is the cessation of the illusion of the universe'. Nor is there the defect of self-dependence as, being beginningless, Avidyā is devoid of origination and also, it is cognised by the self-effulgent Ātman. So says the *Siddhāntabindu* (1)—

न चेदमभावरूपम् । ज्ञानस्य नित्यत्वेन तदभावानुपपत्तेरित्युक्तत्वात् । धर्मिप्रतियोगिज्ञानाज्ञानाभ्यां च व्याघातापत्तेः । नापि भ्रमसंशयतत्संस्कारपरम्परारूपम् । अपरोक्षत्वात्, अतीतानागतभ्रमसंशयतत्संस्काराणां चापरोक्षत्वेन ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वात् । आवरणात्मकत्वाद्भ्रमाद्युपादानत्वाच्च आत्मनो निर्विकारत्वादन्तःकरणादेश्च तज्जन्यत्वात् 'देवात्मशक्तिं स्वगुणैर्निगूढाम्' इति गुणवत्त्वश्रुतेश्च । 'मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम्', 'इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते', 'अनृतेन हि प्रत्यूढाः', 'नीहारेण प्रावृताः', 'भूयश्चान्ते विश्वमायानिवृत्तिः' इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यश्च मायाऽविद्याऽनिर्वाच्यमनृतं तत्त्वज्ञाननिवर्त्यं चाज्ञानमेव स्वपराध्यासे कारणम् । न चात्माश्रयादिदोषप्रसङ्गः । अनादित्वेन तन्निरासात्, अनादित्वेनोत्पत्त्यभावात्, स्वप्रकाशात्मन एव तज्ज्ञप्तिरूपत्वात् ।

8.10.3 'I'—Disputations because of Vikshepasakti of Maya

It is under the spell of this Māyā that these *vādins* who believe Ātman to be other than what It really is, engage themselves in vain and violent disputations—भ्रान्ता भृशं वादिनः. Māyā with its concealing power and diversifying power in its myriad aspects concocts the display of the universe in its multifarious forms as also the delusion in respect of Ātman.

8.10.4 Destruction of The Mighty Delusion—The One Endeavour of Sriguru, Verily Atman

It is in the very nature of Śrīguru, verily Ātman Itself, as transcending all these, to destroy this mighty delusion—मायाशक्तिविलासकल्पितमहाव्यामोहसंहारिणे. The *Tattvasudhā* on it says—

ये त्वास्तिकाः श्रुतिस्मृत्युक्तमार्गेण कर्मानुष्ठानेन भगवन्तं परमेश्वरं सेवन्ते, तेषां परमेश्वरप्रसादान्नैतादृशो व्यामोह इत्यभिप्रेत्याह—मायेत्यादिना। भगवतः परमेश्वरस्यानाद्यनिर्वचनीया या मायाशक्तिः परव्यामोहिका तस्या विलासेन एकदेशेन कल्पितो यो महाव्यामोहो महानन्तोऽपरिमाणश्च व्यामोहो देहाद्यात्मत्वभ्रमः, तं संहर्तुं नाशयितुं शीलमस्येति स तथोक्तः। तस्मै नमः। तथा चोक्तं श्रीभागवते (2–7–42)—

येषां स एव भगवान् दययेदनन्तः सर्वात्मनाश्रितपदो यदि निर्व्यलीकम्।
ते दुस्तरामतितरन्ति च देवमायां नैषां ममाहमिति धीः श्वसृगालभक्ष्ये॥

The *Gītā* (VII–14) also says—मामेव ये प्रपद्यन्ते मायामेतां तरन्ति ते॥

[Those who have faith in the Veda and worship the Lord by performance of Karma as ordained in Śruti and Smrti, they are not overpowered by delusion since they have secured the grace of the Supreme Lord The beginningless indescribable power, *Māyāśakti*, of the Supreme Lord deludes all. The endless unfathomable mighty delusion concocted by one aspect viz., the diversifying power of Māyā, produces the false identification of Ātman in the body etc. It is the very nature of Śrīguru to destroy this delusion. Obeisance to Him. So says the *Bhāgavata* (2-7-42) also—Those on whom the Lord that transcends all limitations whatsoever bestows His Grace, since they surrender wholeheartedly and cling with might and main to His feet, it is they that transcend His power of Māyā which is difficult to overcome. They do not entertain the notions of 'I' and 'mine' in this body which is fit to be the food of dogs and jackals. The *Gītā* says—Whoever seek Me alone, they cross over this illusion.]

Says the *Vivekacūḍāmani* (40)—

अयं स्वभावः स्वत एव यत्परश्रमापनोदप्रवणं महात्मनाम्।
सुधांशुरेष स्वयमर्ककर्कशप्रभाभितप्तामवति क्षितिं किल॥

[It is the very nature of the enlightened to endeavour, on their own, towards destroying the troubles of others They are

*

like unto the pleasant Moon which by its ambrosial rays volunteers as is well known to save the earth parched by the burning rays of the Sun]

That the Guru takes on this as His sole function is brought out in the opening verse of the *Pañcadaśī*—

नमः श्रीशङ्करानन्दगुरुपादाम्बुजन्मने ।
सविलासमहामोहग्राहग्रासैककर्मणे ॥

[Obeisance to the lotus feet of the illustrious Śrīguru, Śrī Śrī Śankarānandapâda who is Bliss Itself, whose sole function is to destroy the alligator that is the veil of ignorance along with its offshoots, the mighty delusion]

But to those whose intellect has turned away from external phenomena, who have secured the grace of Śrīguru and attained serenity of mind, there is nothing else so blissful, so well-known, so easily knowable and quite so near as Brahman. Accordingly, the knowledge of Brahman is said to be immediately comprehended and unopposed to *dharma*. So says the *Gītābhāṣya* (XVIII–50)—

बाह्याकारनिवृत्तबुद्धीनां तु लब्धगुर्वात्मप्रसादानां नातः परं सुखं सुप्रसिद्धं सुविज्ञेयं स्वासन्नतरमस्ति । तथा चोक्तं 'प्रत्यक्षावगमं धर्म्यम्' इत्यादि ।

8.10.5 'Aham' and 'Idam'—Mithyatma, Their Admixture—Cause of all Havoc

The situation, in brief, is what is given expression to in the opening sentences of the *Adhyāsabhāṣya*. One's own Self as indicated by the *aham* or अस्मत् is self-luminous, प्रकाशस्वभावः, immediately apprehended and well-known without any uncertainty whatsoever, अपरोक्ष and प्रसिद्ध. This being always the observer, विषयी, cannot at all be defiled by way of being connected in any manner with anything in the realm of objects, विषय, which is signified by *idam* or युष्मत् and is

insentient and thus of the nature of darkness. Still, the two are superimposed on each other as seen in the experiences in parlance viz., 'I am this', 'This is mine', 'अहमिदं', 'ममेदम्'. This knot of Consciousness and insentiency, चिदचिद्ग्रन्थि, the basis of all calamity, is what is to be torn asunder by the grace of Śrīguru, towards which end the entire Vedānta endeavours—अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणाय... सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते।

This must be ever borne in mind. Towards the achievement of this end, it is evident that what are signified by *idam* and *aham* must be carefully gone into so that they may clearly be distinguished by appropriate enquiry. The *Sūta-samhitā* (4) *Sūtagītā* (5-2 to 8) proceeds to do this—

रुद्रविष्णुप्रजानाथप्रमुखाः सर्वचेतनाः ।
स्वरसेनाहमित्याहुरिदमित्यपि च स्वतः ॥
इदंबुद्धिश्च बाह्यार्थे त्वहंबुद्धिस्तथात्मनि ।
प्रसिद्धा सर्वजन्तूनां विवादोऽत्र न कश्चन ॥
इदमर्थे घटाद्यर्थेऽनात्मत्वं सर्वदेहिनाम् ।
अहमर्थे तथात्मत्वमपि सिद्ध स्वभावतः ॥
एवं समस्तजन्तूनामनुभूतिर्व्यवस्थिता ।
भ्रान्ता अपि न कुर्वन्ति विवादं चात्र सत्तमाः ॥
एवं व्यवस्थिते ह्यर्थे सति बुद्धिमतां वराः ।
संसारविषवृक्षस्य मूलच्छेदनकाङ्क्षिभिः ॥
यत्र यत्रेदमित्येषा बुद्धिर्दृष्टा स्वभावतः ।
तत्र तत्र त्वनात्मत्वं विज्ञातव्यं विचक्षणैः ॥
यत्र यत्राहमित्येषा बुद्धिर्दृष्टा स्वभावतः ।
तत्र तत्र तथात्मत्वं विज्ञातव्यं मनीषिभिः ॥

[Starting from the triad—Rudra, Viṣṇu and Brahmā—all the living beings speak spontaneously in terms of *aham* and *idam*. Of these, that the notion of *idam* pertains to outside objects and

the notion of *aham* pertains to oneself is well-known to all and there is no quarrel about it. The non-selfhood of all objects like pot etc., referred to as *idam* and the selfhood of what is referred to as *aham* by all the embodied ones is established naturally. Thus is the experience categorised in the case of all the creatures and even the deluded do not quarrel about it. Things being thus classified the non-selfhood of whatever is made known as *idam* and likewise the selfhood in whatever is signified in the notion of *aham* in a spontaneous manner, must be understood decisively by those of sharp intellect who desire to cut at the root of the poison tree of *samsāra*]

It must also be noted that while in the realm of the *gauṇātmā* (wealth, friend, son, wife etc.,) it is easy to see the distinction of *idam* from *aham*, enabling one to shut out the *gaunātmā* from the realm of *aham*, the *Naiskarmyasiddhi* (4) proceeds to show that all the trouble that is experienced is in the realm of *mithyātmā* (body, senses, vital airs, mind, intellect and ego). Much like the case of one who is so much engrossed with women, that he can entertain no thought whatsoever without relating it to women—स्त्रीमयो देवदत्तः as the *Sūtrabhāsya* (2-3-13-30) says, not merely is there the confusion, but the influence of this *mithyātmā* is very considerable. Hence even though the Self-effulgent Ātman that is directly and immediately apprehended and also pointed to as such, the one in the throes of the *mithyātmā* has his ways of thinking conditioned, his capacity for enquiry stifled to such an extent that he is not only unable to recognise the situation but also refuses to do so, argues against it and proceeds to establish that some entity in the realm of the *mithyātmā* is itself Ātman—

आत्मानात्मा च लोकेऽस्मिन् प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणतः ।
सिद्धस्तयोरनात्मा तु सर्वत्रैवात्मपूर्वकः ॥ (3)

अनात्मत्वं स्वतःसिद्धं देहाद्भिन्नस्य वस्तुनः ।
ज्ञातुरप्यात्मता तद्वन्मध्ये संशयदर्शनम् ॥ (4)
असाधारणास्तयोर्धर्मान् ज्ञात्वा धूमाग्निवद्बुधः ।
अनात्मनोऽथ बुद्ध्यन्तान् जानीयादनुमानतः ॥ (5)
इदमित्येव बाह्येऽर्थे ह्यहमित्येव बोद्धरि ।
द्वयं दृष्टं यतो देहे तेनायं मुह्यते जनः ॥ (6)
न्यायः पुरोदितोऽस्माभिरात्मानात्मविभागकृत् ।
तेनेदमर्थमुत्सार्य ह्यहमित्यत्र यो भवेत् ॥ (7)
त्यक्तकृत्स्नेदमर्थत्वात् त्यक्तोऽहमिति मन्यते ।
नावगच्छाम्यहं यस्मान्निजात्मानमनात्मनः ॥ (9)
अनुच्छिन्नबुभुत्सश्च प्रत्यग्घेतोरनात्मनः ।
डोलायमानचित्तोऽयं मुह्यते भौतवन्नरः ॥ (10)
यैरद्राक्षीत् पुरात्मानं यमनात्मेति वीक्षते ।
दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारमात्मानं तैः प्रसिद्धैः प्रमित्सति ॥ (11)
चक्षुर्न वीक्षते शब्दमतदात्मत्वकारणात् ।
यथैवं भौतिकी दृष्टिर्नात्मानं परिपश्यति ॥ (12)
धीविक्रियासहस्राणां हानोपादानधर्मिणाम् ।
सदा साक्षिणमात्मानं प्रत्यक्त्वान्नाहमीक्षते ॥ (13)
अनुमानप्रदीपेन हित्वा सर्वाननात्मनः ।
संसारैकावलम्बिन्या तदभावं धियेप्सति ॥ (15)
संसारबीजसंस्थोऽय तद्धिया मुक्तिमिच्छति ।
शशो निमीलनेनेव मृत्युं परिजिहीर्षति ॥ (16) (Nai. Si. 4)

[In our ordinary experience, two principles, the Self and the non-Self, stand established by perception and other *pramānas*. Of these two, the non-Self invariably presupposes the Self.

That objects external to our bodies are other than Self is self-evident That the knower is the Self, is also equally

self-evident. There is uncertainty only with regard to what lies between the two.

A wise one should determine precisely the distinctive characteristics of Self and the non-Self. On that basis he must understand through inference, like fire from smoke, that all the factors upto the intellect are of the nature of non-Self

The external objects are identified only as 'this'. The knower is identified only as 'I'. But the body is regarded both ways. Hence people are deluded.

The ground for discriminating Self and the non-Self has already been stated by us. An intelligent one must take his stand on that ground and discard the objective element in the ego also as non-Self and understand the non-objective element in the ego

As the entire realm of the non-Self representing 'this' is eliminated, one thinks that he himself i e., his Self, has been eliminated. He thinks 'I do not understand my real Self apart from the non-Self'.

Because he seeks to know the Self apart from the non-Self, a man's mind is vacillating and he is deluded like one possessed

Formerly he saw 'himself' through the senses and such *pramānas* Now he realises that the 'Self' he was seeing all along is really not the Self But he continues to search for the Self, the Inner witness of even the knower, through the very same *pramānas*; hence his failure.

Surely the eye cannot see sound. That is because it is not constituted of matter having the sound-quality. On the same principle the physical eye cannot perceive the super-physical Self

The cognising machinery *aham,* cannot grasp Ātman, the Eternal Witness, who, being more inward than *aham,* witnesses the thousands of modifications of the mind which arise and disappear.

He rejects the entire non-Self through the light of reason; and through intelligence based on relative existence, which is therefore illusory, he seeks the unreality of the non-Self.

The one enmeshed in relative existence and seeking to achieve liberation through discrimination within that existence, is like a rabbit seeking to avoid death by shutting its eyes]

8.10.6 Forest of Idam—Way Out by Grace of Sriguru

One that is thus entangled in the forest of *idam* (the objective world, the *gauṇātmā* and *mithyātmā* infested with ferocious beasts of grief, delusion, likes, dislikes, fear etc.,) attains one's own Innermost Self only on emerging out of this forest, like the man of the country of Gandhāra who crosses the forest by the grace of the Guru who restores the 'sight' and points out the direction. So says the *Upadeśa-sāhasrī* (2-4)—

इदं वनमतिक्रम्य शोकमोहादिदूषितम् ।
वनाद्गान्धारको यद्वत् स्वात्मानं प्रतिपद्यते ॥

Pointing out the stupid obstinacy of such a one steeped in Avidyā, the *Pañcadaśī* (VI–25 to 31) shows that the way out is to make one's reasoning subserve one's experience and not base it on die-hard predisposition—

अयं जीवो न कूटस्थ विविनक्ति कदाचन ।
अनादिरविवेकोऽयं मूलाऽविद्येति गम्यताम् ॥
विक्षेपावृतिरूपाभ्यां द्विधाऽविद्या व्यवस्थिता ।
न भाति नास्ति कूटस्थ इत्यापादनमावृतिः ॥
अज्ञानी विदुषा पृष्टः कूटस्थं न प्रबुध्यते ।
न भाति नास्ति कूटस्थ इति बुद्ध्वा वदत्यपि ॥
स्वप्रकाशे कुतोऽविद्या तां विना कथमावृतिः ।
इत्यादितर्कजालानि स्वानुभूतिर्ग्रसत्यसौ ॥

स्वानुभूतावविश्वासे तर्कस्याप्यनवस्थितेः ।
कथं वा तार्किकमन्यस्तत्त्वनिश्चयमाप्नुयात् ॥
बुद्ध्यारोहाय तर्कश्चेदपेक्षेत तथा सति ।
स्वानुभूत्यनुसारेण तर्क्यतां मा कुतर्क्यताम् ॥
स्वानुभूतिरविद्यायामावृतौ च प्रदर्शिता ।
अतः कूटस्थचैतन्यमविरोधीति तर्क्यताम् ॥

[This jiva does not ever distinguish the *Kūtastha* from himself. Know this beginningless non-discrimination as the primordial ignorance, *Mūlāvidyā*

This Avidyā is shown to be two-fold, of the nature of covering and of the nature of diversifying Covering is the producing of the impression that the *Kūtastha* neither shines nor exists

An ignorant one, questioned by a knower 'do you not know the *Kūtastha*?' answers 'the *Kūtastha* neither shines nor exists'; so he has known.

Personal experience swallows the meshes of arguments like 'How can there be ignorance in the self-luminous ?', 'How can there be covering in the absence of ignorance?'.

If the logician does not have faith in his own experience and if logic also has no finality, how will he arrive at the firm knowledge of truth?

If it is said that logic is required for a proper grasp by the mind, in that case reason must be used in consonance with one's own experience and not in a perverse way

Personal experience has been pointed out as proof in respect of Avidyā and its covering power. Therefore conclude by reasoning, that *Kūtasthacaitanya* is not inconsistent with them]

The proper thing to do is therefore to regard all the so-called experiences pertaining to *aham* in the realm of the *mithyātmā* as illusory and expel them from the fold of *aham* as shown by the *Sūtasamhitā*, *Sūtagītā* 5—

शरीरे दृश्यते सर्वैरिदंबुद्धिस्तथैव च ।
अहंबुद्धिश्च विप्रेन्द्रास्ततस्ते भिन्नगोचरे ॥
शरीरालम्बनाबुद्धिरिदमित्यास्तिकोत्तमाः ।
चिदात्मालम्बना साक्षादहंबुद्धिर्न संशयः ॥
इदमर्थे शरीरे तु याहमित्युदिता मतिः ।
सा महाभ्रान्तिरेव स्यादतस्मिंस्तद्ग्रहत्वतः ॥
अचिद्रूपमहंबुद्धेः पिण्डं नाऽऽलम्बनं भवेत् ।
मृत्पिण्डादिष्वदृष्टत्वात्ततोऽनात्मैव विग्रहः ॥
अचित्त्वादिन्द्रियाणां च प्राणस्य मनसस्तथा ।
आलम्बनत्वं नास्त्येव बुद्धेश्चाहमतिं प्रति ॥ (9–13)
सर्वप्रत्ययरूपेण सदाहङ्कार एव हि ।
विवर्ततेऽतोऽहङ्कारस्त्वनात्मैव शरीरवत् ॥
परिणामस्वभावस्य क्षीरादेर्द्विजपुङ्गवाः ।
अचेतनत्वं लोकेऽस्मिन् प्रसिद्धं खलु सन्ततम् ॥
तस्माच्चिद्रूप एवात्माऽहंबुद्धेरर्थ आस्तिकाः ।
अचिद्रूपमिदंबुद्धेरनात्मैवार्थ ईरितः ॥ (16–18)

[It is universally admitted in parlance that the body is referred to both as *'idam'* an object of cognition and also as *aham* indicative of the cogniser; as explained before, these pertain to two different entities There is no doubt that the *idam* experience here concerns itself with the body while the *aham* experience directly concerns itself with Ātman, the Consciousness The *aham* experience, however, in the body which is not *aham* but an object in the realm of *idam*, is a mighty illusion since it shows up one thing as quite another. Just like a mud ball, the body which is insentient cannot be what is signified by the *aham* experience Therefore the body is not Ātman Likewise the organs, *prāna*, *manas* and intellect which are all insentient cannot be what is signified by the *aham* experience Indeed it is always the ego that transforms itself in the form of the

modes of the mind pertaining to the various experiences. Hence the ego is also non-Self like the body. It is ever well-known in parlance that whatever is by nature subject to transformation like milk etc , is insentient Decisively thus, the content in the *aham* experience is the sentient Ātman alone; and the content of the *idam* experience is only the insentient non-Self.]

8.10.7 'I' Pure Consciousness, 'Idam'–free 'Aham'

Thus what remains over cannot be negatived. It is best indicated in the manner नेति नेति meaning इदं न, इदं न 'not this, not this' as shown by Śruti (Bṛ. U. 6–5–3). This is the best, nay, the only way, as has already been shown for the purpose. *Says the Upadeśasāhasrī* (2-1 to 3)—

प्रतिषेद्धुमशक्यत्वान्नेति नेतीति शेषितम् ।
इदं नाहमिदं नाहमित्यद्धा प्रतिपद्यते ॥

अहंधीरिदमात्मोत्था वाचारम्भणगोचरा ।
निषिद्धात्मोद्भवत्वात्सा न पुनर्मानतां व्रजेत् ॥

पूर्वबुद्धिमबाधित्वा नोत्तरा जायते मतिः ।
दृशिरेकः स्वयं सिद्धः फलत्वात् स न बाध्यते ॥

[Impossible to be negated, Self is left over after negating all else as 'not this, not this'. So Self becomes clearly known on the reflection 'I am not this, I am not this'.

The ego sense (the false identification of Self with body etc.,) has for its origin the intellect and has for its object what is based on words only. As its very nature and origin are negated by Śruti, egoism can never again be founded on *pramāna*.

In the case of an illusion, a subsequent knowledge does not arise without negating the previous one The One Pure Consciousness, Self, which is self-established, is never negated as It is the result of *pramāna*]

Says the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* (2-45, 53, 95)

न पृथङ्नात्मना सिद्धिरात्मनोऽन्यस्य वस्तुनः ।
आत्मवत्कल्पितस्तस्मादहङ्कारादिरात्मनि ॥
दृश्यानुरक्तं तद्द्रष्टृ दृश्य द्रष्टृनुरञ्जितम् ।
अहंवृत्योभयं रक्तं तन्नाशेऽद्वैततात्मनः ॥
अवगत्यात्मनो यस्मादागमापायि कुम्भवत् ।
साहङ्कारमिद विश्वं तस्मात् तत्स्यात् कचादिवत् ॥

[A thing other than Self has no existence apart from that of Self, it does not have existence of its own like Self Therefore the ego etc., are concocted as existing in Self.

The seer is relative to the seen and the seen, to the seer Both are relative to the 'I' sense of the mind On the elimination of the ego, the non-duality of Self becomes established.

Like a pot, this universe along with the ego appears and disappears in Self which is of the nature of Consciousness. Hence it is only false presentation like a tiny cluster of hair imagined to be seen in the sky]

Say the *Pañcadaśī* (III-32, 33) and the *ṭīkā*—

अत एव श्रुतिर्बाध्यं बाधित्वा शेषयत्यदः ।
स एष नेति नेत्यात्मेत्यतद्व्यावृत्तिरूपतः ॥

नेति नेतीति श्रुतिर्बाध्ययोग्य बाधित्वा बाधितुमशक्यमवशेषयतीत्युक्तम् । तत्र कीदृशं बाधितु शक्यम्, कीदृशमशक्यमिति विवक्षायां तदुभयं विभज्य दर्शयति—

इद रूप तु यद्यावत्तत्त्यक्तु शक्यतेऽखिलम् ।
अशक्यो ह्यनिद रूपः स आत्मा बाधवर्जित ॥

[It is therefore that the Śruti 'Ātman is not this, not this', by negating all that can be negated, retains the residue, by the method of segregating It from all else.

It is said that the Śruti negating all that is capable of being negated retains that which is never capable of being negated But what is it that can be negated and what is it that

cannot be? The two are discriminated thus— All that is capable of being categorised as 'this' in any way, is capable of being rejected; but not that which can never be 'this'; That is Ātman that transcends sublation]

Says the *Sūtrabhāṣya* (3-2-6-22) in this connection—

वीप्सायां तु सत्यां समस्तस्य विषयजातस्य प्रतिषेधादविषयः प्रत्यगात्मा ब्रह्मेति जिज्ञासा निवर्तते ।

[Repeated negation 'not this, not this' shows the rejection of the entire object world. Thereby on the realisation that the Inner Self which is never an object is Brahman, enquiry comes to an end.]

Also says the *Upadeśasāhasrī* (5-5)

चैतन्यभास्यताऽहमस्तादर्थ्यं च तदस्य यत् ।
इदमंशप्रहाणे न परः सोऽनुभवो भवेत् ॥

[The last vestige of *idam* is thus to be removed The *aham*, the seeming-Self, the one that falsely parades as Self, is accounted for by recognising that it is the object of Pure Consciousness and exists for It Pure Consciousness, the Supreme Self, is what remains over when the object portion is rejected]

The *Naiskarmyasiddhi* (3-40) also says that Śrutis (such as Br U. 6-3-7), in conformity with reason, proclaim again and again that the *aham* divested of all the thou-aspect i.e., the *idam* aspect, has for its meaning the Innermost Self—

अहमः प्रत्यगात्मार्थो निरस्ताशेषयुष्मदः ।
वभ्भणीतिश्रुतिर्न्याय्या योऽयमित्यादिनाऽसकृत् ॥

This *idam*-free *aham*, the Pure Consciousness, the Seer, is different from the individual who is subject to suffering, who is made known by the *aham-vrtti* as also by the mental mode itself, just as the seer of a pot is different from the pot as also the mental mode which makes it known. So says the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* (2-100)—

घटबुद्धेर्घटाच्चार्थाद्द्रष्टुर्यद्वद्विभिन्नता ।
अहंबुद्धेरहंगम्याद्दुःखिनश्च तथा दृशेः ॥

Self and the non-Self, One being the Seer and the other, the seen, One being Real and the other, false, are quite distinct from each other; and as such there can be no factual relation of any type between them. Still the ego which bears within itself both of them viz , the objects that are concoctions as also the Seer of them, i e , the attributeless Brahman, sets up false superimposition in Ātman, just as a face and the red colour of some other object mirrored together give rise to the illusion that the face is red.

8.10.8 'I' The Pure Consciousness, One and the same in All

Besides, this false relationship between Self and the non-Self, the ego, brings about also the illusion of multiplicity of Consciousness, the Seer, which though only one, appears as many owing to association with the multiplicity of inner organs which are Its objects, like the one Sun appearing as many owing to reflection in water in many vessels. So says the *Naiskarmyasiddhi* (2-46, 47)—

दृश्याः शब्दादयः क्लृप्ता द्रष्टृ च ब्रह्म निर्गुणम् ।
अहं तदुभयं बिभ्रद्भ्रान्तिमात्मनि यच्छति ॥

दृगेका सर्वभूतेषु भाति दृश्यैरनेकवत् ।
जलभाजनभेदेन मयूखस्रग्विभेदवत् ॥

One individual appears as an object, *idam*, to another only because of the differences traceable to *upādhis* viz., the inner organs etc What is indicated by the *idam*-free *aham* pertaining to any individual is ever the Pure Consciousness that is never an object All the *idam*-free *aham* as pertaining to all individuals is therefore one and the same Ātman. The *Sūtra*-

bhāsya (3-3-22-35) points out the Śruti एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा (Śv. U. 6-11) (The One effulgent Lord hidden in all beings is All-pervasive and the Innermost Self within all beings) and says—इत्यस्मिन् मन्त्रे समस्तेषु भूतग्रामेष्वेक एव सर्वान्तर आत्माम्नायते। (The Innermost Self in all beings is one and the same.) Says the *Sūtasamhitā* (4) *Sūtagītā* (5, 27 to 38)

सर्वदेहेष्वहंरूपः प्रत्ययो यः प्रकाशते ।
तस्य चिद्रूप एवात्मा साक्षादर्थो न चापरः ॥

गौरिति प्रत्ययस्यार्थो यथा गोत्वं तु केवलम् ।
तथाऽहंप्रत्ययस्यार्थश्चिद्रूपात्मैव केवलम् ॥

व्यक्तिसंबन्धरूपेण गोत्वं भिन्नं प्रतीयते ।
चिदहङ्कारसंबन्धाद्भेदेन प्रतिभाति च ॥

यथैवैकोऽपि गोशब्दो भिन्नार्थो व्यक्तिभेदतः ।
तथैवैकोऽप्यहंशब्दो भिन्नार्थो व्यक्तिभेदतः ॥

यथा प्रतीत्या गोव्यक्तिर्गोशब्दार्थो न तत्त्वतः ।
तत्त्वतो गोत्वमेवार्थः साक्षाद्वेदविदां वराः ॥

तथा प्रतीत्याऽहङ्कारोऽहशब्दार्थो न तत्त्वतः ।
तत्त्वतः प्रत्यगात्मैव स एवाखिलसाधकः ॥

एकत्वेऽपि पृथक्त्वेन व्यपदेशोऽपि युज्यते ।
अन्तःकरणभेदेन साक्षिणः प्रत्यगात्मनः ॥

रुद्रविष्णुप्रजानाथप्रमुखाः सर्वचेतनाः ।
चिन्मात्रात्मन्यहशब्दं प्रयुञ्जन्ते हि तत्त्वतः ॥

सुषुप्तोऽस्मीति सर्वोऽयं सुषुप्तादुत्थितो जनः ।
सुषुप्तिकालीनस्वात्मन्यहंशब्द द्विजोत्तमाः ॥

प्रयुङ्क्ते तत्र देहादिविशेषाकारभासनम् ।
न हि, केवलचैतन्यं सुषुप्तेः साधक स्वतः ॥

प्रतिभाति ततस्तस्मिंश्चिन्मात्रे प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
अहंशब्दप्रवृत्तिः स्यान्न तु सोपाधिकात्मनि ॥

यथाऽयो दहतीत्युक्ते वह्निर्दहति केवलम् ।
नायस्तद्वदहंशब्दश्चैतन्यस्यैव वाचकः ॥

[In respect of every body the experience that shines as *aham* reveals only the sentient Ātman that shines directly by Itself, and none else Just as the knowledge as 'cow' makes known on enquiry the cowness alone and not the individual cow as is regarded in parlance without enquiry, similarly the *aham* reveals only Ātman that is Consciousness that is one and the same in all. Just as by its relation with individuals, the cowness is seen as though it pertains to individuals and the word 'cow' is employed in respect of each of them, likewise by Its relation with the *ahankāra*, the *aham* (Pure Consciousness) is regarded as pertaining to individuals, and the word *aham* is used by every individual as referring to himself to the exclusion of others. Just as the word 'cow' has apparently come to mean an individual, similarly the word *aham* has apparently come to mean the *ahankāra*, in customary usage. In actuality, however, as enquiry shows, just as the word 'cow' means cowness alone, likewise the word *aham* reveals only the Inner Ātman, the Witness-Self, who bears testimony to everything and though One, is spoken of differently because of the relationships with the inner organs that are different. All the sentient beings, including the prominent among them viz, Rudra, Visnu and Brahmā use the word '*aham*', in fact, as referring to Ātman, the Pure Consciousness. Again everyone on waking up refers to his deep sleep experience when the particulars like the body etc., were not in evidence, as 'I was asleep', by the use of the word 'I', *aham*. It is Consciousness as such, bereft of all particulars that testifies to the deep sleep experience Thus it is seen that the word *aham* refers to the Inner Self, the Pure Consciousness as such, and not to Ātman with *upādhi*. When it is said 'the iron burns', it is only the fire that burns and not the iron; similarly although

mixed up, as it were, with others, the *aham* refers only to the Pure Consciousness.]

8.10.9 'I'—Salvaged from the Five Sheaths

Aham, thus purified and salvaged from all its entanglements in the realm of *idam*, signifies the Pure Ātman. In the language of Śruti (Ka U 6–17), the *Puruṣa* of the size of a thumb, the Innermost Ātman, is always seated in the heart of all living creatures. One should draw Him out from one's own body courageously, like a stalk of grass from its enveloping sheath. One should know Him as Pure and Immortal, merge the superimposed objective universe in Him, the Substratum and remain one with Him, which is deliverance—

अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषोऽन्तरात्मा सदा जनानां हृदये सन्निविष्टः तं स्वाच्छरीरात्प्रवृहेन्मुञ्जादिवेषीकां धैर्येण । तं विद्याच्छुक्रममृतं तं विद्याच्छुक्रममृतमिति ॥

Says the *Vivekacūḍāmani* (155)—

मुञ्जादिषीकामिव दृश्यवर्गात्प्रत्यञ्चमात्मानमसङ्गमक्रियम् ।
विविच्य तत्र प्रविलाप्य सर्वं तदात्मना तिष्ठति यः स मुक्तः ॥

Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda points out in the *Sūtrabhāṣya* (1-1-6-12) as to how the *Brahmānandavallī* (Tai U. 1-2) endeavours to secure for the seeker this end viz , the separation from the five sheaths (*pañcakośas*)—

मुख्यमेव ह्यात्मानमुपदिदिक्षु शास्त्रं लोकबुद्धिमनुसरत्, अन्नमयं शरीरमनात्मानमत्यन्तमूढानामात्मत्वेन प्रसिद्धमनूद्य मूषानिषिक्तद्रुतताम्रादिप्रतिमावत्ततोऽन्तरं ततोऽन्तरमित्येवं पूर्वेण पूर्वेण समानमुत्तरमुत्तरमनात्मानमात्मेति ग्राहयत्, प्रतिपत्तिसौकर्यापेक्षया सर्वान्तरं मुख्यमानन्दमयमात्मानमुपदिदेशेति श्लिष्टतरम् । यथारुन्धतीनिदर्शने बह्वीष्वपि तारास्वमुख्यास्वरुन्धतीषु

दर्शितासु यान्त्या प्रदर्श्यते सा मुख्यैवारुन्धती भवति, एवमिहाप्यानन्दमयस्य सर्वान्तरत्वान्मुख्यमात्मत्वम् ।

[Desirous of instructing about the primary Self, the Śāstra does it by adopting the line of understanding of common people. Thus it first adopts as Self the gross body constituted of food and regarded as Self by the extremely dull people. The Śāstra then proceeds from the body to another Self which is similar to the preceding one—just as the idol possesses the form of the mould into which the molten copper has been poured—then again to another one, always at first representing the non-Self as Self, for the purpose of easier comprehension. It finally teaches that the real Self is the Innermost Self which consists of Bliss This is the more appropriate interpretation Just as one, desirous of pointing out the star Arundhatī to another, at first points to several stars that are not the real Arundhatī, the real Arundhatī being the star pointed to in the end, similarly here also the Blissful one is the primary Self, being the Innermost of all]

Subsequently the *Bhāṣya* itself points out that the above considerations are to be applied to the *Ānandamaya* which also is a sheath and Brahman the *puccha*, the support of the sheath, ब्रह्मपुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा (Tai. U 2-5), which transcends these, is the real Ātman.

8.10.10 'I', The Substratum of 'Idam'—Mahavakya—Sarvatmatva

Each of what is put forward by the other schools as Self is thus seen to be in the realm of sheaths that belong to the *drśyavarga*, the objective world, the *idam*, or the *yuṣmad* aspect. Incidentally it may be pointed out that starting from the Cārvāka view, each of these is accommodated by the Śruti which arranges them suitably. By taking one inward step by step and at the same time from *vyaṣṭi*, the individual, to *samaṣṭi*, the cosmic aspect, of each sheath, Śruti

*

enables one to dispossess oneself of all of them. Self of the enquirer is thus rendered free of all the sheaths of which He is the Witness. Thereafter, on the dawn of enlightenment ensuing from the *Mahāvākya*—स यश्चायं पुरुषे। यश्चासावादित्ये। स एकः (Tai. U. 2 and 3) (This who is in *Puruṣa*, and That who is in the Sun, He is one)—each of the five sheaths previously regarded falsely as Self, is sublated, *upasaṃkrāmati*, and one is firmly established in the supreme *Ākāśa*, the real Self, परमे व्योमन् (Tai. U. 2 and 3). The *Bhṛguvallī* shows as to how by enquiry, *vicāra*, the most important penance, this end is attained; and also proclaims the Universal Selfhood that is attained thereby, in the hymnal song हा ३ वु ... अहमन्नम्... । अहमन्नादो... सुवर्न ज्योतीः । In this connection, says the *Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣyavārtika* (34) on *Bhṛguvallī*—

> युष्मदस्मद्विभागोऽयं यत्र व्यावर्ततेऽञ्जसा ।
> स आत्मा तत्परं व्योम तत्र विद्या प्रतिष्ठिता ॥

[The Supreme *Ākāśa* is Ātman wherein all distinctions of 'You' and 'I' disappear completely straightaway; therein is this knowledge firmly established]

Thus what is signified by *yuṣmad* is seen to be none other than what is signified by *asmad*. The *Ātmapurāṇa* (7-349 to 362) pertaining to the Śruti—मैत्रेय्यात्मनि खल्वरे दृष्टे श्रुते मते विज्ञात इदं सर्वं विदितम् (Br.U. 6-5-6) (When Self, my dear Maitreyī, is realised by *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*, all 'this' is known) also shows this. The word *asmad* is employed by one to denote what one regards as oneself, while the word *yuṣmad* denotes the other regarded as different from oneself. These words are employed reciprocally by the two individuals, which shows that in respect of the usage in the world, the two words have no fixity of denotation except that either of

them indicates the *caitanya* with the *upādhis*, the gross body and other vestments, to which the words are related directly. What is directly meant by the word *yusmad* is also the meaning of words like *idam*, *etat* etc., and the meaning conveyed by the words *aham*, *mama*, *anidam* etc., is what is directly related to *asmad*. Though this distinction is ordinarily maintained, there is no hard and fast dividing rule to that effect as usage shows. When an inert substance spoken of as *idam* e g , a conch, is employed as an accessory by one for blowing, it is spoken of as included in the make-up of oneself in statements such as 'I am blowing' So also the bodies etc., of wife, children etc., deemed as oneself come to be spoken of by the term *asmad*, though fit for the usage of the term *yuṣmad*. So also in the case of the five vestments. In fact there is no entity which the sentient one does not include within Its fold for being spoken of as *asmad*. In the make-up of Īśvara is included Māyā, the Avidyā, the cause of everything; in the make-up of Hiranyagarbha, the cosmic totality of all subtle bodies and in *Virāṭ*, the cosmic totality of all gross bodies. This shows, that though what is directly denoted varies in parlance, the *Caitanya* that is indicated by *asmad* and *yusmad* is the same, as also the *Adhiṣṭhānacaitanya* of what is denoted by *idam* etc. This is the One, Existence, Shine and Bliss. The variety of usages of words in different languages is concomitant on the experiences of the objects specified by them which in turn are concomitant on the direct experience of the underlying Shine, the differences being traceable to the three *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, much in the same way as the experience of the variations in the quality of the sounds arising from the beating of a drum is concomitant on the experience that it is the sound of a drum. Thus underlying all specific experiences is the direct immediate

experience of the Shine, which is therefore said to be the Light of lights—

युष्मदोऽर्थः समुद्दिष्ट इदमादिरनेकधा ।
अहंममादिभिर्भावैरस्मदोऽप्यर्थ ईरितः ॥
युष्मच्छब्दोऽत्र यं ब्रूते ह्यस्मच्छब्दोऽपि त पुनः ।
अर्थमाह यतो नेमौ भिन्नार्थौ स्तो विचारतः ॥
वागादियोगतः शब्दश्चेतनो देहसङ्गतः ।
अस्मदर्थं विजानाति मनसा भिन्नमेव सः ॥
युष्मदर्थात्परोऽप्येवमवगच्छति देहभाक् ।
अधिष्ठितं जडं सर्वं केनचिच्चेतनेन हि ॥
न यदात्मतया जन्तुर्गृह्णीयादस्ति नात्र तत् ।
अविद्यामीश्वरः स्वात्मबुद्धया गृह्णाति निर्द्वयः ॥
अविद्याकार्यमखिल सूक्ष्मं स्वात्मतया प्रभुः ।
हिरण्यगर्भो गृह्णाति विराजो जनकः पुमान् ॥
अविद्याकार्यमखिलं स्थूलं स्वात्मतया विराट् ।
महाभूतादिसहितं ब्रह्माण्डं प्रतिपद्यते ॥
जडजात परं सर्वं कश्चित् किञ्चित् प्रपद्यते ।
जन्तुरात्मतया तस्मात् सर्वं चेतनपालितम् ॥
एकैकापेक्षया सर्वं युष्मदर्थो भवेत्सदा ।
गृहीतं स्वतयाऽन्यत्र स्वग्रहे चास्मदर्थता ॥
अवाङ्मनसगम्योऽयमात्मा कस्यापि नैव सः ।
अर्थः शब्दस्य किन्त्वत्र स्फुरणं परिकीर्तितम् ।
शब्दार्थज्ञानरूपस्य प्रपञ्चस्यानपायि तत् ॥
एकार्थौ तत एवेमौ शब्दौ यौ युष्मदस्मदौ ।
इदमाद्यास्ततः शब्दास्तयोरर्थस्य वाचका' ।
एकार्थास्तेऽपि विज्ञेयास्तमस्सत्त्वरजोभिधाः ॥

सर्वत्र चैक एवायं ज्योतिषाञ्ज्योतिरव्ययः ।
आनन्दात्मा स्फुरत्यस्मिन् विशेषोऽध्यस्यते नृभिः ॥
यथा भेर्यादिसामान्ये स्फुरत्यविरते सति ।
भैरादिकस्ततो ज्ञेयो विशेषो मन्दबुद्धिभिः ॥
अहं त्वमयमित्यादिव्यवहारो न संभवेत् ।
असति स्फुरणे तच्च ज्योतिषाञ्ज्योतिरीरितम् ॥ (349–362)

Thus everything is Ātman alone and is to be seen as such. Otherwise it would be a wrong approach based on error and the consequence would be that he will be ousted by whatever he sees as other than Ātman—सर्वं तं परादाद्योऽन्यत्रात्मनः सर्वं वेद । ...इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा (Bṛ. U. 4–4–6). The hymn itself is seen to negate the status of 'I', *aham*, to the five sheaths, the erroneous personifications of 'I' and instruct that the real Self transcends all these which are but limitations, hindrances in the path of realising the innate Bliss, Ātman.

As the mind proceeds gradually towards the Innermost Self, to that extent are the desires for the external objects given up; and when all such desires have been eliminated the realisation of Ātman is rendered free of all obstructions. So says the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* (277)—

यथा यथा प्रत्यगवस्थितं मनस्तथा तथा मुञ्चति बाह्यवासनाः ।
निःशेषमोक्षे सति वासनानामात्मानुभूतिः प्रतिबन्धशून्या ॥

As one approaches the Innermost Self progressively rejecting the non-Self, aspect by aspect, from the body onwards, exactly concomitant with the process is the tendency of the meaning of 'That' to merge in the meaning of 'thou'. So says the *Naiskarmyasiddhi* (3–28)—

यावद्यावन्निरस्याय देहादीन् प्रत्यगञ्चति ।
तावत्तावत्तदर्थोऽपि त्वमर्थं प्रविविक्षति ॥

Say the *Mānasollāsa* (V–32, 33) and the *ṭīkā* thereon—

देहादिष्वहमित्येवं भ्रमः संसारहेतुकः ॥

अन्तःप्रविष्टः शास्तेति मोक्षायोपादिशच्छ्रुतिः ।

सृष्टेषु देहादिष्वात्मनोऽन्यस्य प्रवेशश्रुतेरपि सङ्घातादन्य आत्मैव एष्टव्य इत्यभिप्रेत्याह—अन्तःप्रविष्ट इति । तथा च श्रुतिः—'अन्तःप्रविष्टः शास्ता जनानाम् । एकस्सन् बहुधा विचारः' इति । मोक्षायेति—सङ्घातविवेकायेत्यर्थः ।

[The illusion that the physical body or the like is Ātman arises because of Avidyā which is the cause of *samsāra*. The Śruti 'The Lord has entered within' instructs with a view to liberation from this illusion i.e., discriminating Ātman from the conglomerate that is non-Self]

Again the Śruti declaring that after creating the body etc., the Creator-Ātman entered into them also shows that Ātman, the Creator, is distinct from the cluster, the created. Says the *Vidyāranyabhāṣya* on the Śruti (Tai. Ā. 3–11)—

सोऽयमेवंविधः परमात्मा जनानां सर्वेषां शास्ताऽन्तर्यामिरूपेण नियामकः सन् हृदये प्रविश्यावस्थितः । तथा च स्मर्यते—

'ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशेऽर्जुन तिष्ठति ।

भ्रामयन् सर्वभूतानि यन्त्रारूढानि मायया ॥'

इति । स चान्तर्यामी स्वकीयेनेश्वररूपेणैक एव सन् पुनर्जीवरूपेण बहुधा भूत्वा विचारो विविधचरणवान् भवति । अत एवान्यत्रोपनिषदि श्रूयते—

'एक एव हि भूतात्मा भूते भूते व्यवस्थितः ।

एकधा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत् ॥' इति ।

[He, the Supreme Lord described thus, entering the heart, abides there as the Inner Controller of all individuals So says the *Gītā* also—'The Lord, the Inner Controller, abides in the heart of all beings directing, by His Māyā, their movements as if they are mounted on a machine'. And this Inner Controller,

being only One by Himself as the Lord, becomes many, as it were, in the form of jīvas and performs many activities Hence it is that the Upanisad says elsewhere—'Indeed the Self of all beings is one alone, but is seen as many, as abiding in the various beings, like the one Moon appearing as many being reflected in waters']

Commenting on the *Praveśaśruti* (Tai. U. 2-6) तत् सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत्। (Having created the universe, into that very thing He then entered) says Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda—

. . . अतः परमानन्दमयलिङ्गाधिगमद्वारेणानन्दविवृद्ध्यवसान आत्मा ब्रह्म पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा सर्वविकल्पास्पदो निर्विकल्पोऽस्यामेव गुहायामधिगन्तव्य इति तत्प्रवेशः प्रकल्प्यते। न ह्यन्यत्रोपलभ्यते ब्रह्म निर्विशेषत्वात्। विशेष-सम्बन्धो ह्युपलब्धिहेतुर्दृष्टः। यथा राहोश्चन्द्रार्कविशेषसम्बन्धः। एवमन्तः-करणगुहात्मसम्बन्धो ब्रह्मण उपलब्धिहेतुः। सन्निकर्षादवभासात्मकत्वाच्चान्तः-करणस्य। यथा चालोकविशिष्टा घटाद्युपलब्धिरेवं बुद्धिप्रत्ययालोकविशिष्टाऽऽत्मोपलब्धिः स्यात्। तस्मादुपलब्धिहेतौ गुहायां निहितमिति प्रकृतमेव तद्वृत्तिस्थानीये त्विह पुनः "तत् सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत्" इत्युच्यते। तदेवेदमाकाशादिकारणं कार्यं सृष्ट्वा तदनुप्रविष्टमिवान्तर्गुहायां बुद्धौ द्रष्टृ श्रोतृ मन्तृ विज्ञातृत्येव विशेषवदुपलभ्यते। स एव तस्य प्रवेशः।

[Further on, seeing that it is only through cognising His manifestation of the *ānandamaya*, that Ātman—the culmination of ever-increasing Bliss, Brahman, the tail, the support, the basis of all differentiated manifestation, in Himself devoid of all differentiation—can be recognised in that very cave, He is represented to have entered into it (the cave *vijñānamaya*). Not elsewhere, indeed, is Brahman cognised because He is in Himself devoid of all special manifestation. Experience shows that it is only association with a specific condition that enables one to cognise Him. Just as Râhu, the eclipsing shadow, is cognised only when in association with a specific object such as the Sun or the Moon, so also it is the association of Ātman with the cave of intelligence, the *antahkarana*, that causes the cognition of

Brahman because of the proximity of *antahkarana* and its transparency in respect of Ātman's luminosity. And just as the cognition of pots and other objects is associated with light, so also the cognition of Ātman is associated with the light of a *buddhi-pratyaya* or intellectual state. So the theme with which the Upanisad commences in the passage 'the one hid in the cave' i.e., in the cave which causes cognition of Brahman, is again treated of in the words 'Having created this universe, into that very thing, He then entered'—this latter passage forming a commentary, as it were, on the former. He who created *ākāśa* etc., created this universe around us and then entered into it. He is cognised within, in the cave of intellect (*buddhi*), in such specific forms of manifestation as seer, hearer, thinker, knower and so on. It is this which constitutes His 'entering'.]

Says the *Sūtasamhitā* (4), *Sūtagītā* (5-19 to 26)—

सत्यपि प्रत्ययार्थत्वे प्रत्यगात्मा स्वयंप्रभः ।
वृत्त्यधीनतया नैव विभाति घटकुड्यवत् ॥

स्वच्छवृत्तिमनुप्राप्य वृत्तेः साक्षितया स्थितः ।
वृत्त्या निवर्त्यमज्ञानं ग्रसते तेन तेजसा ॥

अनुप्रविष्टचैतन्यसंबन्धाद्वृत्तिरास्तिकाः ।
जडरूपं घटाद्यर्थं भासयत्यात्मरूपवत् ॥

अतोऽहंप्रत्ययार्थोऽपि नानात्मा स्याद्घटादिवत् ।
स्वयंप्रकाशरूपेण साक्षादात्मैव केवलम् ॥

यत्संबन्धादहंवृत्तिः प्रत्ययत्वेन भासते ।
स कथं प्रत्ययाधीनप्रकाशः स्यात्स्वयंप्रभः ॥

अहंवृत्तिः स्वतःसिद्धचैतन्येद्धाऽवभासते ।
तत्सबन्धादहङ्कारः प्रत्ययीव प्रकाशते ॥

आत्माहंप्रत्ययाकारसंबन्धभ्रान्तिमात्रतः ।
कर्ता भोक्ता सुखी दुःखी ज्ञातेति प्रतिभासते ॥

वस्तुतस्तस्य नास्त्येव चिन्मात्रादपरं वपुः ।
चिद्रूपमेव स्वाज्ञानादन्यथा प्रतिभासते ॥

[Even though the mental mode *aham*, the I-sense, indicates the Inner Self, He is Self-effulgent and His Shine does not depend on the mental mode as is the case of a pot or a wall. On the other hand, Consciousness remains as the Witness of it when in association with the pure clear mental mode and destroys by that effulgence the ajñāna that is to be removed by this mental mode. It is by the association of Consciousness that has entered into it that the mental mode illumines the insentient objects like pot etc., and makes them shine as though by themselves in the manner of Ātman Thus though signified by the *aham* mode of the mind as though it were its content, yet Consciousness is never non-Self like a pot etc. It is ever verily the pure Self-effulgent Ātman How can that—by the association with which the *aham* mode of the mind shines as knowledge—derive its effulgence from the mode? The *aham* mode shines as illumined by the self-effulgent Consciousness. It is by this association that the ego shines as the knower. As a result of the illusion arising from this relationship, Ātman apparently seems to be the doer, the enjoyer, the knower, happy, unhappy etc. In truth, He is Pure Consciousness alone and has no other form. It is Consciousness Itself that appears otherwise in various forms because of ajñāna]

8.10.11 'I' the 'Eye' of Wisdom

It may be pointed out here that what in essence is a similar exposition has been adopted by Śrī Bhagavān in the *Gītā*, for example, in the thirteenth chapter where starting from the distinction between *idam*, the body, the *ksetra*, and its cogniser, the *Ksetrajña*, it is declared that this *Ksetrajña* is One and none other than Himself, the Light of all lights, the Supreme Goal—

इदं शरीरं कौन्तेय क्षेत्रमित्यभिधीयते ।
एतद्यो वेत्ति तं प्राहुः क्षेत्रज्ञ इति तद्विदः ॥ (XIII–1)

क्षेत्रज्ञं चापि मां विद्धि सर्वक्षेत्रेषु भारत । (XIII–2)

ज्योतिषामपि तज्ज्योतिस्तमसः परमुच्यते । (XIII–17)

यथा प्रकाशयत्येकः कृत्स्नं लोकमिमं रविः ।

क्षेत्रं क्षेत्री तथा कृत्स्नं प्रकाशयति भारत ॥ (XIII–33)

क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञयोरेवमन्तरं ज्ञानचक्षुषा ।

भूतप्रकृतिमोक्षं च ये विदुर्यान्ति ते परम् ॥ (XIII–34)

ज्ञानचक्षुषा शास्त्राचार्यप्रसादोपदेशजनितमात्मप्रत्ययिकं ज्ञानं चक्षुः, तेन ।

(*Gītābhāṣya* XIII–34)

[This, the 'body', O son of Kunti ! is called *ksetra*. He, the cogniser of the *kṣetra* as an object, is called *Ksetrajña* by the knowers of these.

And do thou also know Me as *Ksetrajña* in all *ksetras*, O Bhārata ! It is the Light even of lights, it is said to be beyond darkness.

As the one Sun illumines all this world, so does the In-dweller, O Bhārata ! illumine all bodies.

They who, by the 'eye of wisdom', perceive the distinction between *ksetra* and *Kṣetrajña*, and the dissolution of *prakrti*, the cause of all beings, they attain the Supreme.

The 'eye of wisdom' is the knowledge of Ātman, generated by the teachings of Śāstra and Śrīguru, the Gracious]

The experience of those gifted with the eye of wisdom तत्त्वविदा is mentioned in the *Sūtasamhitā* (4), *Sūtagītā* (5, 43-45)

रुद्रविष्णुप्रजानाथप्रमुखाः सर्वचेतनाः ।

अहमेव परंब्रह्मेत्याहुरात्मानमेव हि ॥

ते तु चिन्मात्रमद्वैतमहमर्थतया भृशम् ।

अङ्गीकृत्याहमद्वैतं ब्रह्मेत्याहुर्न देहतः ॥

चिन्मात्रं सर्वगं सत्यं संपूर्णसुखमद्वयम् ।

साक्षाद्ब्रह्मैव नैवान्यदिति तत्त्वविदां स्थितिः ॥

[When Rudra, Visnu, Brahmā etc., say 'I alone am the Supreme Brahman', the term *aham* is used as meaning Consciousness only. When they identify themselves with Brahman and say 'I am Brahman', the word *aham* is taken to mean Witness Consciousness alone that is bereft of all *upādhis* like the body etc , and not as Consciousness with these attributes as this latter is the transmigrating individual and as such cannot be identified with the untainted Brahman The position of the knower of truth is decisively this—that the Consciousness which is omnipresent, unsublated, full, non-dual Bliss, is Itself Brahman and none other.]

This is what is established by Śāstra and proclaimed by it, as the *Sūtrabhāsya* (3-3-22-35) shows pointing to the Śruti—यत्साक्षादपरोक्षाद्ब्रह्म । य आत्मा सर्वान्तरः (बृ. 5-4-1, 5-5-1). The *Sūtasamhitā* continues to say—

शास्त्रं सत्यचिदानन्दमनन्तं वस्तु केवलम् ।
शुद्धं ब्रह्मेति सश्रद्धं प्राह वेदविदां वराः ॥ (46)
प्रत्यगात्माऽयमद्वन्द्वः साक्षी सर्वस्य सर्वदा ।
सत्यज्ञानसुखानन्तलक्षणः सर्वदानघाः ॥ (47)
अतोऽयं प्रत्यगात्मैव स्वानुभूत्यैकगोचरः ।
शास्त्रसिद्ध परंब्रह्म नापरं परमार्थतः ॥ (48)

[The Śāstra which has its purport in driving home this identity of Ātman with the Supreme Brahman proceeds to accomplish this by declarations such as 'Brahman is Existence, Consciousness, Infinite' (Tai U. 2-1). This Inner Self, the One without a second, devoid of all pairs of opposites like happiness and misery pertaining to *samsāra*, and the Witness of all these i e , the direct observer without any mediation, and realised as such only by direct experience, is in reality verily the Supreme Brahman made known by Śāstra and It is no other]

The *Sūtrabhāsya* (1-1-4-4) draws attention to the modus operandi employed by Śāstra for this purpose—

न हि शास्त्रमिदन्तया विषयभूतं ब्रह्म प्रतिपिपादयिषति । किं तर्हि ? प्रत्यगात्मत्वेनाविषयतया प्रतिपादयदविद्याकल्पितं वेद्यवेदितृवेदनादिभेदमपनयति ।

[The aim of Śāstra is not to establish Brahman as *idam* i e., as an object of knowledge What is it then? On the other hand, the Śāstra declares emphatically that Brahman, being the Eternal Subject, the Innermost Self, is never an object; and thereby removes the differences like the known, the knower, the knowledge etc , which are fictitiously concocted by Avidyā.]

Therefore all that is to be done is only to eliminate what is falsely ascribed to Brahman-Ātman by Avidyā No more effort is to be made to acquire the knowledge of Brahman as It is the best known, as the *Gītābhāṣya* (XVIII–50) says—

तस्मादविद्याध्यारोपितनिराकरणमात्रं ब्रह्मणि कर्तव्यम्, न तु ब्रह्मविज्ञाने यत्नोऽत्यन्तप्रसिद्धत्वात् ।

When this knowledge of Brahman-Ātman identity is established as firmly as the previously held notion of the identity of oneself with the body which is now sublated, one attains liberation even without the desire for it. So says the *Upadeśasāhasrī* (4–5)—

देहात्मज्ञानवज्ज्ञानं देहात्मज्ञानबाधकम् ।
आत्मन्येव भवेद्यस्य स नेच्छन्नपि मुच्यते ॥

A person like the *vādins*, however, referred to in the hymn, who have not known that Ātman is none other than Śiva as established by enquiry based on the *Śrutipramāṇa* and as per the instruction of the Guru, gets entangled in *saṁsāra* under the sway of illusion—

एवं तर्कप्रमाणाभ्यामाचार्योक्त्या च मानवः ।
अविज्ञाय शिवात्मैक्यं संसारे पतति भ्रमात् ॥ (*Sūtagītā* 5-49)

8.10.12 The Grace of Sriguru The Saviour From 'Fall'

How only by the grace of Śrīguru, one is saved from such a fall, is also shown in the *Sūtasaṁhitā* (4), *Sūtagītā* (5-50 to 54, 71, 74)—

शास्त्राचार्योपदेशेन तर्कैः शास्त्रानुसारिभिः ।
सर्वसाक्षितयात्मानं सम्यङ्निश्चित्य सुस्थिरः ॥
स्वात्मनोऽन्यतया भातं समस्तमविशेषतः ।
स्वात्ममात्रतया बुद्ध्वा पुनः स्वात्मानमद्वयम् ॥
शुद्धं ब्रह्मेति निश्चित्य स्वयं स्वानुभवेन च ।
निश्चयं च स्वचिन्मात्रे विलाप्याविक्रियेऽद्वये ॥
विलापनं च चिद्रूप बुद्ध्वा केवलरूपतः ।
स्वयं तिष्ठेदयं साक्षाद्ब्रह्मवित्प्रवरो मुनिः ॥
ईदृशी परमा निष्ठा श्रौती स्वानुभवात्मिका ।
देशिकालोकनेनैव केवलेन हि सिध्यति ॥
श्रुतौ भक्तिर्गुरौ भक्तिः शिवे भक्तिश्च देहिनाम् ।
साधन सत्यविद्यायाः सत्यमेव मयोदितम् ॥
ज्ञानलाभाय वेदोक्तप्रकारेण समाहितः ।
महाकारुणिकं साक्षाद्गुरुमेव समाश्रयेत् ॥

[The spiritual ascent is described in a stepwise manner :

(1) The instruction of the Ācārya based on Śāstra and enquiry at His feet in conformity with the Śāstra.

(2) Acquiring the knowledge with utmost certainty that Ātman is the Witness of everything.

(3) Being firmly established in this knowledge, realising whatever was seen as different from Self as nothing but his own Self

- (4) Thereupon himself deciding with certainty that the Secondless Ātman is Pure Brahman.

(5) By dint of this experience dissolving of even the mental mode pertaining to this certainty, in Himself, the Pure Consciousness that is changeless and non-dual.

Recognising this dissolution also as merely the Consciousness Itself, this *muni* who is firmly established in this direct immediate realisation of Brahman should remain by himself, supremely singular. Such supreme abidance of the nature of one's own direct experience testified to by Śruti is attained only by the Gracious glance of Śrīguru. The means for this realisation of Truth by the embodied, is devotion to Śruti, devotion to Guru and devotion to Śiva, so do I swear. To secure this knowledge one should, as directed by Śruti, after being well equipped with the necessary means, seek refuge directly at the feet of the immensely compassionate gracious Sadguru]

8.10.13 Dawn of Knowledge—Maya fled for Ever

Thus once True Knowledge dawns by the grace of Śrīguru, ignorance vanishes for ever and can no more delude the sage either with its charms or ugly features. This is the refrain in the *Praudhānubhūti* of Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda—

मुनिर्न व्यामोहं भजति गुरुदीक्षाक्षततमाः ॥

The Master is termed Guru since He destroys the darkness of ajñāna as the *Advayatārakopanisad* says—अन्धकारनिरोधित्वाद्गुरुरित्यभिधीयते।

Says also the *Gurugītā* (30)—

गुकारश्चान्धकारो हि रुकारस्तेज उच्यते ।
अज्ञानग्रासकं ब्रह्म गुरुरेव न संशयः ॥

[The letter *Gu* signifies the darkness that is ajñāna and the letter *ru* stands for Consciousness Brahman that swallows up ajñāna is verily the Guru There is no doubt whatever in this respect.]

अज्ञानतिमिरान्धस्य ज्ञानाञ्जनशलाकया ।
चक्षुरुन्मीलितं येन तस्मै श्रीगुरवे नमः ॥ (*Gurugītā* 66)

[Obeisance to the Gracious Śrīguru who has opened, with the stick by means of which the collyrium that is jñāna is applied, the eye of one who is blinded by the darkness that is ajñāna]

भवारण्यप्रविष्टस्य दिङ्मोहभ्रान्तचेतसः ।
येन सन्दर्शितः पन्थास्तस्मै श्रीगुरवे नमः ॥ (*Gurugītā* 62)

[Obeisance to Śrīguru who has clearly shown the way out to one who was deluded not knowing as to how to emerge out of the forest of *samsāra* which he had entered]

देहे जीवत्वमापन्नं चैतन्यं निष्कलं परम् ।
त्वपदं दर्शित येन तस्मै श्रीगुरवे नमः ॥ (*Gurugītā* 45)

[Obeisance to that Śrīguru who has shown that the real nature of *aham* i e , *tvam* which has acquired jīvahood in the body is indeed the Supreme Impartite Consciousness, Brahman]

Say the *Manasollāsa* (V–33, 34) and the *ṭīkā* thereon that immediately on realisation of Īśvara as one's own Self, vanishes the mighty Māyā, the power of the Lord, which is responsible for all concoctions on the part of the *vādins* Obeisance to the Self-Effulgent Lord Śrīdakṣiṇāmūrti who is without body, organs or *prāna*, who is never an object of any *pramāṇa* and who, in essence, is Consciousness and Bliss

एवमेषा महामाया वादिनामपि मोहिनी ॥
यस्मात् साक्षात्कृते सद्यो लीयते च सदाशिवे ।

ईश्वरशक्तिकृतव्यामोहनिबन्धनैव वादिनां कल्पनेत्यत्र नियामकमाह यस्मादिति ।

देहेन्द्रियासुहीनाय मानदूरस्वरूपिणे ॥
ज्ञानानन्दस्वरूपाय दक्षिणामूर्तये नमः ।
(*Mānasollāsa* V-34, 35)

Hence the refrain—

तस्मै श्रीगुरुमूर्तये नम इद श्रीदक्षिणामूर्तये ॥



9. SIXTH STANZA

ŚRĪGURU AS THE TRANSCENDENT

9.1.1 Negation of Entire Universe—Sunyavada—Deep Sleep

As has been seen, the discussion in the fifth stanza of the hymn centres round the quest 'Who am I?' pertaining to oneself It has been shown that all the views about Ātman, starting from the gross body and leading upto the *vijñāna*, are to be discarded. It has been pointed out that the investigator cannot negate himself and as such there is no question of the *Śūnyavāda* being accepted. Nevertheless, till unshakable certitude is secured in this regard, there is the possibility of the seeker being susceptible to doubt as to whether this *vāda* also will not be refuted. Also, the influence of those who entertain the *Śūnyavāda* and proclaim it vigorously through reasonings etc , cannot be minimised, particularly in view of the veneration with which they are held because of their renunciation, erudition, their extraordinary powers and other noble traits However, when everything, the five 'sheaths' etc , has been eliminated as unreal, it appears as though there is nothing left over in the universe but a void, the absence of everything. The seeker finds nothing, indeed, with which he could realise his identity This is the question raised by the disciple, which demands a decisive unequivocal reply which at once sets at rest all his misgivings in this respect. Says the *Vivekacūdāmani* (214)—

मिथ्यात्वेन निषिद्धेषु कोशेष्वेतेषु पञ्चसु ।
सर्वाभाव विना किञ्चिन्न पश्याम्यत्र हे गुरो ।
विज्ञेयं किमु वस्त्वस्ति स्वात्मनात्र विपश्चिता ॥

The Master appreciates the appropriateness of the question in the situation—

सत्यमुक्तं त्वया विद्वन् निपुणोऽसि विचारणे । (Vi.Cū. 215)

Again, consideration of the state of deep sleep wherein it is believed that nothing whatsoever is experienced, apparently lends support to the *Śūnyavāda.* The *Mānasollāsa* (VI-1) raises this question of experience pertaining to deep sleep. Even if it is granted that as in dream, the whole universe of the waking state also exists as superimposed on Brahman-Ātman, Īśvara, whose display of Māyā it is, yet, in deep sleep, who is there to experience, what is there to be experienced and who persists there as a conscious entity?—

स्वप्ने विश्वं यथा तत्स्थं जाग्रत्यपि तथेति चेत् ।
सुषुप्तौ कस्य किं भाति कः स्थायी तत्र चेतनः ॥

The idea is that there is no entity whatever, conscious of anything in deep sleep.

Again, Śrutis like—असदेवेदमग्र आसीत् (Ch U. 6–2–1) असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत् (Tai U. 2–7) seem to declare that in the beginning there was indeed only void These Śrutis are quoted by the *Śūnyavādins* in their favour. In this connection says the *Pañcadaśī* (II–26 to 29)—

. . . . अत्र तु केचन ।
विह्वला असदेवेद पुरासीदित्यवर्णयन् ॥
मग्नस्याब्धौ यथाक्षाणि विह्वलानि तथास्य धीः ।
अखण्डैकरसं श्रुत्वा निष्प्रचारा बिभेत्यतः ॥
गौडाचार्या निर्विकल्पे समाधावन्ययोगिनाम् ।
साकारब्रह्मनिष्ठानामत्यन्तं भयमूचिरे ॥
अस्पर्शयोगो नामैष दुर्दर्शः सर्वयोगिभिः ।
योगिनो बिभ्यति ह्यस्मादभये भयदर्शिनः ॥

[Some seekers are so firm in their belief—that the purport of the Śruti is in the void—that they are alarmed at the prospect of the destruction of their Self

*

Just as the senses of a person immersed in an ocean become distressed, the intellect of this person on hearing about an Entity which is partless and homogeneous is unable to grasp It and is afraid of It.

Śrī Gaudapādācārya has pointed out the great fear entertained by those other aspirants who are attached to the formful Brahman, in respect of *Nirvikalpa Samādhi* i.e , the realisation of That which is devoid of any attribute whatsoever. This *Samādhi* which is unrelated to anything is very difficult to be attained by all *Yogis* who are devoid of the knowledge of the Vedāntic wisdom. The *Yogis* shrink from it though it is free from all fear, for they think that this brings about the annihilation of their Self]

9.1.2 Sunyavada—Negative Terminology in Sruti in Respect of Brahman

Again, the declaration by the *Mahāvākya* of the identity of Ātman with Brahman adds apparently to the difficulty since Brahman Itself is described in such terms as निर्गुणम्, निष्क्रियम्, अपूर्वमनपरमनन्तरमबाह्यम् etc., (Attributeless, devoid of all activity, causeless, effectless, having no interior, no exterior), declared as 'That' whence speech and mind return—यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते । अप्राप्य मनसा सह । (Tai. U. 2-4) and taught only as नेति नेति (Not this, not this). This looks so perilously a contentless abstraction that is very easily mistaken for the void of the Buddhist. Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda points to this danger in the introductory *Bhāsya* to the *Chāndogyopanisad* (8–1–1) — Brahman, Existence Absolute, the One without a second, verily free from space, attributes, motion, fruition and difference, seems to the dull-witted to be no more than non-existence—

दिग्देशगुणगतिफलभेदशून्य हि परमार्थसदद्वय ब्रह्म मन्दबुद्धीनामसदिव प्रतिभाति ।

9.1.3 Refutation of Sunyavada—The Sixth Stanza

Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda, in His infinite grace, proceeds to save the seeker from such a peril by directing his attention to the proper understanding of one's own experience of deep sleep, unobsessed by other view-points. This is the purpose of the sixth stanza of the hymn—

राहुग्रस्तदिवाकरेन्दुसदृशो मायासमाच्छादनात्
सन्मात्रः करणोपसंहरणतो योऽभूत्सुषुप्तः पुमान् ।
प्रागस्वाप्समिति प्रबोधसमये यः प्रत्यभिज्ञायते
तस्मै श्रीगुरुमूर्तये नम इदं श्रीदक्षिणामूर्तये ॥

[Obeisance to Him who, by going to deep sleep on withdrawal of all organs (of cognition and action as also the internal one etc.,), becomes the One Existence enshrouded by Māyā like the Sun or the Moon eclipsed, which he recalls when he wakes up, as 'I have slept hitherto', to that resplendent Śrīdaksinā-mūrti incarnate in the glorious figure of one's own Guru.]

The stanza refutes the *Śūnyavāda* in unequivocal terms by establishing the existence of Ātman in deep sleep. Says the *Tattvasudhā* (6)—

ननु शून्यवादिना सुषुप्तौ कस्याप्यनुपलम्भात् शून्य एवात्मेति यदुक्तम् तस्य किं समाधानम्? इत्याशङ्क्य सुषुप्तौ आत्मास्तित्व साधयन् समाधत्ते —राहुग्रस्तेति ।

Mānasollāsa, by way of introducing the stanza, starts with the refutation of the *Śūnyavāda* For this purpose, it begins by recalling the Supreme teaching of the Buddha with its purport in the *Śūnyovāda*. सर्वं च क्षणिकं शून्यं सर्वमेव स्वलक्षणम्। (Mā. VI–2) (Everything is momentary, everything is void; and everything is self-defined.)

9.1.4 Sunyavada—Preliminary

As a preliminary to *Śūnyavāda*, the Buddhist who does

not accept the authority of the Vedās seeks to establish that the external objective world of parlance is constituted of *paramānus*, and that the experiencer is none other than the cluster of the five internal *skandhas*, both being momentary He is now called to explain how it can be so (vide the *Svārājyasiddhi*)—

वाह्य भोग्य प्रजल्पन् क्षणिकमणुचय भोक्तृसङ्घातमन्त:
स्कन्धाना पञ्चकश्चेदशमिति सुगतः पृच्छयता वेदबाह्यः । (1-22)

The topic is discussed in the *Brahmasūtras* (2–2–5–18 to 32) and the *Bhāsya* thereon. Because of differences in the competency of the seekers, there are different expositions, the purport, however, being always in leading them to the doctrine of Nihilism—*Śūnyavāda.* So has it been said—

देशना लोकनाथाना सत्त्वाशयवशानुगाः ।
भिद्यन्ते वहुधा लोक उपायैर्वहुभिः पुनः ॥
गम्भीरोत्तानभेदेन क्वचिच्चोभयलक्षणा ।
भिन्ना हि देशनाऽभिन्ना शून्यताद्वयलक्षणा ॥

(*Sarvadarśanasangraha*-2)

The different expositions are *Sarvāstitvavāda*, *Vijñānavāda* and *Śūnyavāda*. Among the *Sarvāstitvavādins* who accept alongside of the internal ones, external objects, *bāhyārtha*, as well, the *Sautrāntikās* are of the opinion that the existence of external objects is inferred from the differences in the variety that is experienced in respect of knowledge, while the *Vaibhāsikās* are of the opinion that they are to be regarded as existing because of direct perception as also inference in respect of the mediate ones So says the *Sūtrabhāsya* (2-2-5-18)—

(सर्ववैनाशिकराद्धान्तः) स च वहुप्रकारः प्रतिपत्तिभेदाद्विनेयभेदाद्वा । तत्रैते त्रयो वादिनो भवन्ति—केचित् सर्वास्तित्ववादिनः केचित् विज्ञानास्तित्वमात्रवादिनः अन्ये पुनः सर्वशून्यत्ववादिन इति ।

9.2.1 Sarvastitvavada—External World—Aggregates of Paramanus

According to the *Sarvāstitvavādins* also termed *Bāhyārtha-vādins*, the external world is made up of an aggregation of *paramāṇus* which are of four kinds — earth, water, fire and air, which are characterised respectively by hardness, viscidity, hotness and mobility. These are the *bhūtas* and what is born of them is spoken of as *bhautika*. A pot, for example, is not what is originated afresh nor is it a transformation, but it is merely a collection of *paramāṇus* ; similarly a plate etc. The *Sūtrabhāṣya* (2-2-4-18) continues to say—

तत्र ते सर्वास्तित्ववादिनो बाह्यमान्तरं च वस्त्वभ्युपगच्छन्ति, भूत भौतिक च, चित्त चैत्त च, तांस्तावत्प्रतिब्रूमः। तत्र भूतं पृथिवीधात्वादयः। भौतिकं रूपादयश्चक्षुरादयश्च। चतुष्टये च पृथिव्यादिपरमाणवः खरस्नेहोष्णेरण-स्वभावास्ते पृथिव्यादिभावेन संहन्यन्त इति मन्यन्ते।

Says the Mānasollāsa (VI-2)—सङ्घातः परमाणूना मह्यम्ब्वग्निसमीरणाः।

9.2.2 Internal World—Five Skandhas

The five *skandhas* meaning the five *prabhedas* or groups, constitute the internal world, the *ādhyātmika* set-up which goes through the journey of life. They are the *rūpaskandha* ; the *vijñānaskandha*, the *vedanāskandha*, the *saṁjñāskandha* and the *saṁskāraskandha*.

तथा रूपविज्ञानवेदनासंज्ञासंस्कारसंज्ञकाः पञ्चस्कन्धाः। तेऽप्याध्यात्मं सर्वव्यवहारास्पदभावेन संहन्यन्त इति मन्यन्ते। (*Sū. Bh* 2-2-4-18)

मनुष्यादिशरीराणि स्कन्धपञ्चकसंहतिः।
स्कन्धाश्च रूपविज्ञानसंज्ञासंस्कारवेदनाः॥ (*Mā* VI-3)

Of these, the *vijñānaskandha* is spoken of as *cittam*, Ātmā, etc., and the other four as *caitta*—

तत्र विज्ञानस्कन्धः चित्तमात्मेति गीयते । अन्ये चत्वारः स्कन्धाः चैत्ताः ।

The *rūpaskandha* comprises of the senses and their objects, by the two derivatives of the word *rūpa*—

रूप्यन्त एभिरिति, रूप्यन्त इति च व्युत्पत्त्या सविषयेन्द्रियाणि रूपस्कन्धः ।

रूप्यन्त इति रूपाणि विषयाश्चेन्द्रियाण्यपि । (*Mā* VI-4)

Though the objects are external, still as being in the body and as related to the senses, they are spoken of as internal—

यद्यपि विषया बाह्याः तथापि शरीरस्थत्वादिन्द्रियसंबन्धाच्च आन्तरस्थतया व्यपदेशमर्हन्ति ।

9.2.3 Alayavijnana, The 'Aham'

The *vijñānaskandha* comprises of the series of indeterminate cognitions involving the Self, *aham*, the *ālayavijñāna* and those pertaining to sense experience, *idam*, *pravṛttivijñāna*, the originator of activity—

तत्र अहमिदमिति च निर्विकल्पकरूपो विज्ञानस्कन्धो द्विविधः, आलयविज्ञानप्रवृत्तिविज्ञानभेदात् । तत्र अहमित्याकारमालयविज्ञानम्, इन्द्रियादिजन्यं रूपादिविषय च प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानम्, प्रवृत्तिजनकत्वात्, निरन्तरप्रवाहापन्नम् ।

विषयेन्द्रिययोर्ज्ञानं विज्ञानस्कन्ध उच्यते ॥ (*Mā*. VI–4)

तत्स्यादालयविज्ञान यद्भवेदहमास्पदम् ।

तत्स्यात्प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानं यन्नीलादिकमुल्लिखेत् ॥

(*Sarvadarśanasangraha*-2)

The *vedanāskandha* comprises of pleasure, pain etc.—

सुखदुःखाद्यवस्था चित्तस्य वेदनास्कन्धः ।

सुख दुःखं च मोक्षश्च स्कन्धः स्याद्वेदनाह्वयः ॥ (*Mā*. VI-8)

The *Samjñāskandha* comprises of determinate cognition of things by names as 'he is a man'—

डित्थः, कुण्डली, गौरो, ब्राह्मणो गच्छतीत्येवंरूपः सविकल्पकप्रत्ययः संज्ञास्कन्धः ।

Says the *Mānasollāsa* (VI–5 to 7)—

संज्ञागुणक्रियाजातिविशिष्टप्रत्ययात्मिका ।
पञ्चधा कल्पना प्रोक्ता संज्ञास्कन्धस्य सौगतैः ॥
गवां गौरिति संज्ञोक्ता जातिर्गोत्वं तु गोगतम् ।
गुणाः शुक्लादयः तस्य गच्छत्याद्याः तथा क्रियाः ॥
शृङ्गी चतुष्पाल्लाङ्गूली विशिष्टप्रत्ययो ह्यसौ ।
एव पञ्चविधा क्लृप्तिः संज्ञास्कन्ध इतीर्यते ॥

[The *samjñāskandha* is said to consist of five aspects viz., name, quality, act, species and the idea of composite whole, in the manner used in parlance.

The name of the cow, for example, is 'cow', the specific attributes of a cow abiding in all cows constitute the species, whiteness etc , are her qualities; going etc., are her acts; the horned animal, the four-footed animal, the tailed animal—each of these is an idea of a composite whole Thus five-fold is the *samjñāskandha* said to be]

The *samskāraskandha* comprises of attachment and aversion, merit and demerit, their off-shoots etc.—

रागाद्याः क्लेशा उपक्लेशाश्च मदमानादयः धर्माधर्मौ चेति संस्कारस्कन्धः ।
(*Avaidikadarśanasaṅgraha*)

रागाद्याः पुण्यपापे च संस्कारस्कन्ध उच्यते । (*Mā*. VI-8)

9.2.4 No Isvara—Pratyabhijna an Illusion

Beyond the five *skandhas* there is no other entity such as Ātman. There is no Īśvara, no Maker. The universe is self-made. It is born of the fleeting *skandhas* and *paramānus*. From one momentary existence alone comes the next momentary existence. From the previous cognition itself arises the subsequent cognition. The cognition that this is the same as

that, is an illusion, like the cognition that this flame is the same as that (i.e., the previous) one. Says the *Mānasollāsa*–

पञ्चभ्य एव स्कन्धेभ्यो नान्या आत्मास्ति कश्चन ।
न कश्चिदीश्वरः कर्ता स्वगतातिशयं जगत् ॥
स्कन्धेभ्यः परमाणुभ्यः क्षणिकेभ्योऽभिजायते ।
पूर्वपूर्वक्षणादेव क्षणः स्यादुत्तरोत्तरः ॥
पूर्वस्मादेव हि ज्ञानाज्जायते ज्ञानमुत्तरम् ।
स एवायमितिज्ञानं सेयं ज्वालेव विभ्रमः ॥ (VI–9 to 11)

In this manner, there are two types of clusters viz., the cluster of the elements and the elementals formed of the external *paramānus* of the earth etc., and the internal cluster of the five *skandhas*—

तदेवं समुदायद्वयात्मकः प्रपञ्चो बाह्यपृथिव्यादिपरमाणुहेतुको भूतभौतिकसमुदायो, रूपविज्ञानादिस्कन्धहेतुक आध्यात्मिकसमुदायश्चेति ।

(*Avaidikadarśanasangraha*)

9.2.5 Chain of causes—Avidya etc.

Further, even if no sentient permanent experiencer or ruler be admitted as the agent bringing about a cluster, still the transmigratory existence is possible, each one of Avidyā and the rest being the cause of another, so that there remains no need to look for any other combining principle. The series beginning with Avidyā comprises the following members—Avidyā (the idea of permanence with regard to things momentary), *samskāra* (attachment, aversion and delusion arising from Avidyā), knowledge, name (the four elements, the earth, the water etc), form (rudimentary ingredients of the body), the abode of the six (egoism, the four elements and the body), contact, sensation, longing, activity (caused by the longing), merit etc , (the sources of birth), birth (of the body), decay, death, grief, lamentation, pain and misery.

All these constitute a chain of causes ; these are described by the Buddhists sometimes briefly and sometimes elaborately. These categories cannot be denied by any school whatever. These constitute an uninterrupted chain of cause and effect revolving like a water wheel unceasingly and this cannot take place without clusters. So says the *Sūtrabhasya* (2-2-4-19) delineating the *sarvāstittvavāda* of the *Bauddhas*—

यद्यपि भोक्ता प्रशासिता वा कश्चिच्चेतनः संहन्ता स्थिरो नाभ्युपगम्यते, तथाप्यविद्यादीनामितरेतरकाणत्वादुपपद्यते लोकयात्रा । तस्याञ्चोपपद्यमानाया न किञ्चिदपरमपेक्षितव्यमस्ति । ते चाविद्यादयोऽविद्यासंस्कारो विज्ञानं नाम रूपम्, पडायतनम्, स्पर्शो, वेदना, तृष्णा, उपादान, भवो, जातिर्जरा, मरणम्, शोकः, परिदेवना, दुःख दुर्मनस्तेत्येवंजातीयका इतरेतरहेतुकाः सौगते समये क्वचित्संक्षिप्ता निर्दिष्टाः क्वचित्प्रपञ्चिताः । सर्वेषामप्ययमविद्यादिकलापोऽप्रत्याख्येयः । तदेवमविद्यादिकलापे परस्परनिमित्तनैमित्तिकभावेन घटीयन्त्रवदनिशमावर्तमानेऽर्थाक्षिप्त उपपन्नः सङ्घातः . . . ।

9.2.6 Hetupanibandha, Pratyayopanibandha

Śrī Annambhatta points out in his *Brahmasūtravṛtti-Mitākṣarā* (2-2-4-19), that according to the Buddhists the production of an effect may be in either of the two ways, *hetūpanibandha* and *pratyayopanibandha*. If the effect arises from a single entity, it is *hetūpanibandha* as in the case of the sprout arising from the seed, the leaf from the sprout, the stem from the leaf, the hollow stalk from the stem, the bud from the hollow stalk, the tip from the bud, the flower from the tip, and the fruit from the flower. The arising of the effect from an aggregate of causal ingredients is *pratyayopanibandha*, as in the case of the arising of a pot by means of the rod, the wheel, etc.

Likewise Avidyā, defect, tendency to act, birth etc.,

each being the cause of the next one, the transmigratory existence is accounted for; and as such there is no need of a sentient principle. Avidyā is illusory knowledge. Since the birth, etc., of the *skandhas* cannot be accounted for otherwise, the existence of clusters is perforce to be accepted. Because of this reason also there is no need of a sentient principle. The *Bhāmatī* points out in this context that neither is the cause conscious that it is producing the effect, nor is the effect conscious that it is being produced. Says the *Brahmasūtravṛtti—Mitākṣarā* of Śrī Annambhaṭṭa—

तन्मते हेतूपनिबन्धात् प्रत्ययोपनिबन्धाद्वा कार्योत्पादः । एकस्मादेव कार्योत्पादो हेतूपनिबन्धः । यथा बीजादङ्कुरः, अङ्कुरात्पत्रं, पत्रात्काण्डम्, काण्डान्नालम्, नालाद्गर्भः, गर्भाच्छूकः, शूकात्पुष्पम्, पुष्पात्फलमिति । कारणसमुदायात् कार्योत्पादः प्रत्ययोपनिबन्धः । यथा दण्डचक्रचीवरकादिभिर्घटोत्पत्तिः । एवमविद्यादोषप्रवृत्तिजन्मादीना बीजाङ्कुरवत् परस्परहेतुत्वेनैव संसारयात्रोपपत्तेर्न चेतनापेक्षा । अविद्या मिथ्याज्ञानम् । जन्माद्यनुपपत्त्यैव स्कन्धानां सङ्घातभावोऽप्याक्षिप्यत इति न तदर्थमपि चेतनापेक्षा ।

9.2.7 Momentariness—Pratisamkhyanirodha, Apratisamkhyanirodha, Akasa

Moreover, the Bauddhas who maintain that destruction is going on constantly, fancy that whatever becomes an object of knowledge and is different from the three categories, has origination and is momentary. As for the three, they say, they are these—*pratisaṅkhyānirodha* (artificial annihilation), *apratisankhyānirodha* (natural annihilation) and *ākāśa* They think that all these three are non-substantial, non-existent and illusory The annihilation of a thing brought about deliberately is technically called *pratisaṅkhyānirodha*; the opposite of that is *apratisaṅkhyānirodha*; and *ākāśa* is the mere

absence of any obstruction or veiling. So says the *Sūtrabhāsya* (2-2-4-22)—

अपि च वैनाशिकाः कल्पयन्ति बुद्धिबोध्यं त्रयादन्यत् संस्कृतं क्षणिक चेति। तदपि च त्रयं प्रतिसङ्ख्याऽप्रतिसङ्ख्यानिरोधावाकाशं चेत्याचक्षते। त्रयमपि चैतदवस्त्वभावमात्रं निरुपाख्यमिति मन्यन्ते। बुद्धिपूर्वकः किल विनाशो भावानां प्रतिसङ्ख्यानिरोधो नाम भाष्यते तद्विपरीतोऽप्रतिसङ्ख्यानिरोधः, आवरणाभावमात्रमाकाशमिति।

9.2.8 Existence Arises From Non-Existence

They also show that existence comes out of non-existence when they assert, 'the effect cannot arise without the previous destruction of the cause', for they say that from the destroyed seed alone does the sprout spring, curd is produced only on the destruction of milk and a pot on the destruction of the lump of clay. Were a product to come out of an unchanging cause, anything could come out of anything, for the cause is common to all. Thus since the sprout etc., emerge from the seed etc., when these latter get swallowed up by non-existence, it is concluded that existence comes out of non-existence as the *Sūtrabhāsya* (2-2-4-26) points out—

दर्शयन्ति चाभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिम्—'नानुपमृद्य प्रादुर्भावात्' इति। विनष्टाद्धि किल बीजादङ्कुर उत्पद्यते, तथा विनष्टात् क्षीराद्दधि, मृत्पिण्डाच्च घटः। कूटस्थाच्चेत्कारणात्कार्यमुत्पद्यते अविशेषात्सर्वं सर्वत उत्पद्येत। तस्मादभावग्रस्तेभ्यो बीजादिभ्योऽङ्कुरादीनामुत्पद्यमानत्वादभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिरिति मन्यन्ते।

9.2.9. Refutation of Bahyarthavada—Clusters not possible

As has already been mentioned in connection with the stanza five of the hymn, this theory of the *Bāhyārthāvādins* among the Buddhists is to be rejected on the grounds of

reason itself which is regarded as the supreme *pramāna* by the Buddhists themselves who do not accept Śruti. The *Brahmasūtras* (2-2-4 and 5-18 to 32) and the *Bhāsya* thereon accomplish this. For this purpose the *Bhāsya* has delineated their system. What is postulated by them viz., the *bhūta* and the *bhautika* clusters of *paramānus* or the *ādhyātmika* clusters of the five *skandhas* cannot come into existence at all. This is because the individual constituents of the clusters are insentient. Arising of knowledge i.e., the flashing of the *citta* depends upon the coming into being of the clusters of body, senses etc. No sentient principle—an enjoyer or an ordainer—is recognised which can form clusters of the respective insentient ingredients, the constituents of these clusters. If activity be deemed natural, independent of the agency of any sentient principle, then there would be the contingency of the activity never ceasing Moreover the abode of the knowledge, the *citta*, *ālayavijñānapravāha*, defies determination as to whether it is the same as the individual *ālayavijñāna* or different from this. Also as everything inclusive of the *ālayavijñāna* is accepted to be only momentary, it cannot put forth the effort required to generate action to bring about the clusters. For these reasons the formation of clusters cannot be accounted for; and in their absence, all mundane existence dependent on them will be nullified as per the *Bhāsya* on the *Sūtra* (2-2-4-18) – समुदाय उभयहेतुकेऽपि तदप्राप्तिः ।

Even if each of Avidyā, *samskāra* etc, is regarded as the cause of the next member in the series, still they cannot be the cause of the clusters mentioned If it is asserted that the clusters will have to be accepted by way of implication, then the question will arise as to how the individuals of the series, Avidyā etc, depend upon the cluster or vice versa.

In the former case, it is to be accounted for as to how a cluster comes to be. That this cannot be without the acceptance of an abiding sentient entity even if the individual members of the cluster be themselves abiding, and much less can it be if they are momentary, has already been established in discussing the fifth stanza of the hymn. If it be said that the clusters themselves recur continually like a current in this beginningless world and Avidyā etc., are sustained by them, even then, when one cluster originates from another (clusters also being momentary like all else), it will be either, as a rule, similar to the previous one or without any rule whatsoever, similar or dissimilar. In the former case a human being, for example, cannot become a god or an animal or even go to hell. In the latter case, a human being can become any moment an elephant, a god or again a man. But these are against the accepted doctrine of the Bauddhas. Again if there is no abiding sentient experiencer for whose enjoyment would be the clusters, then enjoyment would have to be for its own sake, and likewise liberation for its own sake and as such there would be none seeking liberation Or, if there is one, he would have to be abiding during the times of enjoyment and liberation, which goes against the doctrine of momentariness. Thus even if each of Avidyā etc., is accepted as the cause of the succeeding member in that series, in the absence of a sentient experiencer, clusters cannot be accounted for—*Bhāsya* on the *Sūtra* (2-2-4-19)—इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वादिति चेन्नोत्पत्तिमात्रनिमित्तत्वात्। In fact, however, each of these as being only of instantaneous existence cannot be the cause of even the succeeding member in the series, because the former momentary existence which is ceasing or has ceased to be, and thus becoming non-existent, cannot be the cause of the latter momentary existence. Mere previous existence does

not entitle an entity to be the material cause, *hetu*; it must also continue to exist in the effect like the mud in the case of a pot. Again, in whatever manner be postulated the influence of the cause on the effect without which it would not be the cause, whether as some type of originating activity on the part of the cause or its mere presence, then the causal entity would have to persist for more than one moment, which militates against the hypothesis of momentariness If the 'cause-effect' relation is accepted even without any basic relation whatsoever of the 'cause' with the 'effect', there arises the contingency of anything becoming the 'cause' of anything else. Again considering as to what is meant by origination and cessation, it is clear that they cannot be the very nature of the entity as in that case, the three terms—'entity', 'origination' and 'cessation'—would be synonymous. If they are the states of the entity, then the entity would be connected with the three moments—the initial, the intermediate and the final If origination and cessation are altogether different from the thing as much as a buffalo is from a horse, then as not having any connection with origination and cessation the entity would be eternal. And the same conclusion would result if it is understood by the origination and cessation of an entity merely as its perception and non-perception; they, being the attributes of the perceiver, would not pertain to the entity, as is clear from the *Sūtra* (2-2-4-20)—उत्तरोत्पादे च पूर्वनिरोधात्। and the *Bhāsya* thereon If it be said that a thing can come into existence even without a cause, this would violate their own stand viz., that the *citta* and the *caitta* are produced as a result of four causes i e —आलम्बनप्रत्यय i.e , विषय (object), समनन्तरपूर्वप्रत्यय i.e., विज्ञान which is past knowledge, अधिपतिप्रत्यय, the senses like the eye and सहकारिप्रत्यय, accessories like light And if

origination be without any cause, then anything may originate from anything for there is nothing to hinder this. If it is accepted that an effect presupposes a cause which persists till the origination of the effect, then the cause and the effect will become simultaneous; even so their assertion of momentariness in respect of every entity would be discredited as the Sūtra (2-2-4-21) असति प्रतिज्ञोपरोधो यौगपद्यमन्यथा and the *Bhāsya* thereon show.

9.2.10 Pratisankhyanirodha Apratisankhyanirodha Untenable

Neither *pratisankhyānirodha* (deliberate annihilation) nor *apratisaṅkhyānirodha* (annihilation by itself) is possible, as there can be no cessation of either the series or the individuals forming the series. The former alternative is impossible because in all series of momentary existences, the members of the series stand in an unbroken relation of cause and effect so that the series cannot be interrupted. A series of momentary existences constituting a chain of causes and effects can never be entirely stopped, for the last momentary existence must be supposed either to produce its effect or not to produce it. In the former case the series is continued and in the latter case it is implied that the last link does not really exist, since the Bauddhas define the *sattā* of a thing as its causal efficiency—अर्थक्रियाकारित्व—and the non-existence of the last link would retrogressively lead to the non-existence of the whole series The latter alternative is likewise inadmissible for, since it is observed that a thing is recognised in the various states through which it may pass and thus has a connected existence it is impossible to maintain that any momentary existence should undergo complete annihilation, be entirely undefinable and disconnected with the previous state of existence. Thus clay is recognised as such whether

it appears in the form of a pot or the potsherds into which the pot is broken or of the powder into which the potsherds are ground. Analogously it is inferred to be so in those cases where a thing is not clearly recognised as persisting For these reasons the two kinds of cessations fancied by the Buddhists is untenable as pointed out in the Sūtra (2-2-4-22) —प्रतिसङ्ख्याप्रतिसङ्ख्यानिरोधाप्राप्तिरविच्छेदात् and the *Bhāsya* thereon.

The cessation of nescience (viz , the illusion of persistence in what are momentary) included in *pratisaṅkhyānirodha* by the Bauddhas must take place as a result of the right knowledge with its auxiliaries (viz., *yama*, *niyama* etc.,) or of its own accord. But the former alternative would imply the abandonment of the Bauddha doctrine that destruction takes place without a cause ; and the latter alternative would imply the uselessness of the instruction as to the path which, as taught by the Buddhist, is that everything is by itself only, is momentary, is ridden with grief, and is void—सर्वं स्वलक्षणं क्षणिकं दुःखं शून्यम् as pointed out in the Sūtra (2-2-4-23)—उभयथा च दोषात् and the *Bhāsya* thereon.

9.2.11 Akasa not Non-entity

In the case of *ākāśa* also, the doctrine of its being a non-entity is untenable. That *ākāśa* is not a non-entity follows from Śrutis like '*ākāśa* sprang from Ātman'. To those like the Bauddha who do not accept the authoritativeness of Śruti, it is pointed out that the existence of *ākāśa* as an entity is to be inferred from the quality, sound, as in the case of the earth etc., which are observed to be the abodes of qualities, viz., smell etc Moreover if it is said that *ākāśa* is merely an absence of obstruction (or covering), then when one bird flies in *ākāśa*, there is the presence of obstruction

thereby offering no scope for the flight of another. If it be said that it can fly where there is absence of obstruction, then that very thing which thus stands as an attribute to the absence of covering would itself be *ākāśa*, a positive entity, and not a mere absence of obstruction. Further, the assertion that *ākāśa* is a mere absence of obstruction would land the Saugata in self-contradiction for, according to him, the chain of questions starting with 'What is the support of earth?', ends with the question 'Sir, what is the support of air?' to which it is replied '*ākāśa* is the support of air' which reply would be inconsistent if *ākāśa* be a non-entity. Besides, it is contradictory to say that these three—the two kinds of annihilation and *ākāśa*—are non-entities and yet they are eternal, for that which is non-existent can neither be eternal nor non-eternal, for all judgements about relationship, as between a quality and the qualified, are based on an existing entity. Such a relationship would inevitably mean that the thing itself is as much real as a pot, for instance, and it cannot be an undefinable non-entity This is discussed in the Sūtra (2-2-4-24)—आकाशे चाविशेषात् and the *Bhāsya* thereon. Taking this illustration of *ākāśa* which has been shown to be not a non-entity, as it has a purpose to serve, the *Mānasollāsa* (VI-20) and the *ṭīkā* thereon point out that since Ātman also has a purpose as the doer and the cogniser, this abiding existence must be admitted—

अवकाशप्रदातृत्वमाकाशार्थक्रिया यथा ।
तथैवार्थक्रिया पुंसः कर्तृत्वज्ञातृतादिका ॥

अतोऽर्थक्रियाकारित्वात् सत्त्वसिद्धौ प्रागुक्तयुक्त्या सिद्धमस्य स्थायित्वमिति भावः ।

*

9.2.12 Refutation of Momentariness of Self—Pratyabhijna Not Illusion

Now the momentariness that is asserted of Self is refuted. Remembrance consequent on experiential knowledge compels the acceptance of the abiding nature of Ātman because what is experienced by one cannot be recalled by someone else. Nor can the hypothesis of mere similarity being cognised account for such an experience in parlance, for the experience pertains to that very entity and not to another which is merely similar to it. In respect of external things, however, as there is scope for delusion, a doubt may sometimes arise as to whether 'it is that' or merely 'it is similar to that'. But in the case of the cogniser himself there can never be such a doubt as 'Am I that very person or similar to him?', for there occurs a definite recognition of identity as in 'I who saw yesterday am remembering today' which is not sublated, as shown in the Sūtra (2-2-4-25) अनुस्मृतेश्च and the *Bhāsya* thereon.

In respect of recognition of identity, *pratyabhijñā*, the *Mānasollāsa* (VI-18, 19) observes that if *pratyabhijñā* be an illusion, why should one eat or do any such thing. It is only in the belief that today's food will satisfy the craving as yesterday's food did, that even a child resorts to eating. This would be impossible if one and the same individual were not the subject of the experiences of the two days—

प्रत्यभिज्ञा यदि भ्रान्तिर्भोजनादि कथ भवेत् ॥
इष्टसाधनमेवैतदन्नं गतदिनान्नवत् ।
इति निश्चित्य बालोऽपि भोजनादौ प्रवर्तते ॥

9.2.13 Origination Not from Non-existence

Again the assertion of the Bauddha that entities spring out of non-existence, *abhāva*, is not valid since it does not

accord with experience. *Abhāva* cannot be particularised in any manner since the *abhāva* pertaining to the destruction of a seed, for example, cannot in any manner be distinguished from the *abhāva* such as the horns of a hare. As such, quest for particular causes like seeds in the case of plants, or milk to secure curds, would be purposeless; and sprouts etc., would have to originate from horns of a hare etc. All this has no sanction whatsoever in experience. If *abhāva* be particularised in any manner as a lotus by the blueness, then the so-called *abhāva* would be a positive entity. Nor can *abhāva* be the cause of origination of anything by virtue of its being *abhāva*, like the horns of a hare. Also if entities spring out of *abhāva* then all these as effects of *abhāva* would be imbued with *abhāva* just as the products of mud like pot etc., are always experienced as imbued with mud, their material cause. That is, the experience pertaining to a pot that is being seen would have to be of the type 'this pot is not' instead of 'this pot is'. Again since it is observed that ornaments etc., originate from gold etc., that remain unchanged and are recognised as such throughout, the assertion that effects arise from the destruction of an entity does not stand. Even in the case of a seed, it is the persisting entities, the ingredients of the seed etc., which are the ones that are accepted as the cause of the sprout etc. Since entities are seen to arise only from existing ones like gold etc., and not from *abhāva* such as the horns of a hare, the assertion of something coming out of nothing cannot be substantiated. Moreover, the assertion by the Buddhists of the causehood for the *paramānus* in respect of the outside world and the four types of causes in respect of the internal one, and at the same time the assertion that *abhāva* is the cause of everything would result only in perplexing people, as brought out by the Sūtra (2-2-4-26)—नासतोऽदृष्टत्वात् and the *Bhāsya* thereon.

This doctrine of anything coming out of nothing would lead to the undesirable consequences such as the sanctioning of indifference and inactivity in respect of anything that is desired to be secured, earthly or heavenly, as *abhāva*, the cause, is always there and no effort need be made towards liberation ! This is pointed out by the Sūtra (2-2-4-27)—उदासीनानामपि चैव सिद्धिः and the *Bhāsya* thereon.

9.3.1 Vijnanavada

In this context, wherein the *bāhyārthavādins* have been refuted, comes up the *vijñānavādin* who, agreeing with the said refutation, asserts that the exposition of the *bāhyārthavāda* was meant only as a concession to those who have predilections for external things, while the Buddha subscribes only to the *vijñānavāda* i.e., the doctrine of series of momentary cognitions only and nothing else. According to this *vijñānavāda*, since all factors pertaining to knowledge viz , the means of knowledge, its objects and its result depend only on knowledge i.e., consciousness, parlance relating to them must be deemed to be only internal. This would be so even if external objects were to be accepted. So says the *Bhāsya* on the Sūtra (2-2-5-28)—नाभाव उपलब्धेः।

एवं बाह्यार्थवादमाश्रित्य समुदायाप्राप्त्यादिषु दूषणेषूद्भावितेषु विज्ञानवादी बौद्ध इदानीं प्रत्यवतिष्ठते । केषाचित्किल विनेयानां बाह्ये वस्तुन्यभिनिवेशमालक्ष्य तदनुरोधेन बाह्यार्थवादप्रक्रियेयं विरचिता । नासौ सुगताभिप्रायः । तस्य तु विज्ञानैकस्कन्धवाद एवाभिप्रेतः । तस्मिंश्च विज्ञानवादे बुद्ध्यारूढेन रूपेणान्तस्थ एव प्रमाणप्रमेयफलव्यवहारः सर्व उपपद्यते । सत्यपि बाह्येऽर्थे बुद्ध्यारोहमन्तरेण प्रमाणादिव्यवहारानवतारात् ।

9.3.2 No object Apart From Cognition

If it is asked as to how this doctrine comes to be entertained, an account of the circumstances leading to the

impossibity of positing the existence of external objects is given—

कथ पुनरवगम्यतेऽन्तस्थ एवायं सर्वव्यवहारो न विज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तो बाह्योऽर्थोऽस्तीति। तदसंभवात्।

(a) First of all the question is raised as to whether, in experiences pertaining to a pillar, a wall etc., such objects are *paramānus* themselves or clusters of *paramāṇus*. In the former case it would not be possible to account for experiences such as—चक्षुषा स्तम्भं पश्यामि, स्तम्भो दीर्घः, स्तम्भो महान् (I see the pillar with the eye, the pillar is tall, the pillar is big) as the *paramānus* are not supposed to have such characteristics. In the latter case where it is said to resemble a large heap of corn, then since each individual is not an object of perception, the heap also cannot be so, like a group of ghosts. Further if the cluster is considered non-different from the individual *paramāṇus*, it goes back to the previous case. If otherwise, then the pillar etc., should be perceivable even when the *paramānus* are not there. Thus it cannot be formulated as to what exactly an object is, apart from the cognition. Thus are to be rejected genus, quality etc., as well. Says the *Sūtrabhāṣya* (2-2-5-28)—

स हि बाह्योऽर्थोऽभ्युपगम्यमानः परमाणवो वा स्युस्तत्समूहा वा स्तम्भादयः स्युः। तत्र न तावत्परमाणवः स्तम्भादिप्रत्ययपरिच्छेद्या भवितुमर्हन्ति (परमाण्वाभासज्ञानानुपपत्तेः)। नापि तत्समूहाः स्तम्भादयः, तेषां परमाणुभ्योऽन्यत्वानन्यत्वाभ्यां निरूपयितुमशक्यत्वात्। एवं जात्यादीनपि प्रत्याचक्षीत।

(b) Moreover, the particularities in respect of cognitions (all of which are of a uniform nature in so far as they are states of consciousness) are to be accounted for by associating

the particular forms such as the cognition of a pillar, cognition of a wall etc., with the respective cognitions; and as such it would be meaningless to postulate the existence of external objects, as the *Bhāṣya* (2-2-5-28) continues to say—

अपि चानुभावमात्रेण साधारणात्मनो ज्ञानस्य जायमानस्य योऽय प्रतिविषय पक्षपातः स्तम्भज्ञानं कुड्यज्ञानं घटज्ञानं पटज्ञानमिति नासौ ज्ञानगतविशेषमन्तरेणोपपद्यत इत्यवश्यं विषयसारूप्य ज्ञानस्याङ्गीकर्तव्यम् । अङ्गीकृते च तस्मिन्विषयाकारस्य ज्ञानेनैवावरुद्धत्वादपार्थिका बाह्यार्थसद्भावकल्पना ।

(c) Again from the fact of the simultaneous awareness always of the cognition and its objects, it follows that they are not different; hence also the non-existence of external objects apart from their cognition. So says the *Bhāṣya*—अपि च सहोपलम्भनियमादभेदो विषयविज्ञानयोरापतति ।

9.3.3 The Bauddhakarikas—Kshanikavijnana, the Self, Appears by Illusion as the Triad

The *Bauddhakārikās* in respect of this are quoted in the *Sarvadarśanasangraha* wherein it is declared that the difference that is seen as between the object and its knowledge is illusory like the two Moons that are seen though there is but one Even though consciousness is undivided, it appears by illusion as if three-fold—the experienced, the experiencer and the experience—

सहोपलम्भनियमादभेदो नीलतद्धियोः ।
भेदश्च भ्रान्तिविज्ञानैर्दृश्येतेन्दाविवाद्वये ॥
अविभागोऽपि बुद्ध्यात्मा विपर्यासितदर्शनैः ।
ग्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्तिभेदवानिव लक्ष्यते ॥

(d) Again it should be accepted that the various states of consciousness are not to be associated with external objects since as states of consciousness they are on a par with

those in dream, magic, mirage, phantom-city in the sky etc –

स्वप्नादिवच्चेद द्रष्टव्यम् । यथाहि स्वप्नमायामरीच्युदकगन्धर्वनगरादि-प्रत्यया विनैव बाह्येनार्थेन ग्राह्यग्राहकाकारा भवन्ति, एवं जागरितगोचरा अपि स्तम्भादिप्रत्यया भवितुमर्हन्तीत्यवगम्यते । प्रत्ययत्वाविशेषात् ।

(*Sūtrabhāsya* 2-2-5-28)

9.3.4 Cognitions and Vasanas—Reciprocal Cause-effect Relationship

(e) The question as to how the variety in the form of cognitions comes to be without external objects is answered by tracing it to the variety in the impressions—*vāsanās* (as admitted in the case of a dream etc.,) which, along with the cognitions, have reciprocal cause-effect relationship in the beginningless *samsāra*, as in the case of the chain of the seeds and the sprouts—

कथ पुनरसति बाह्यार्थे प्रत्ययवैचित्र्यमुपपद्यते ? वासनावैचित्र्यादित्याह । अनादौ हि संसारे बीजाङ्कुरवद्विज्ञानानां वासनानां चान्योन्यनिमित्तनैमित्तिक-भावेन वैचित्र्य न विप्रतिषिध्यते । अपिचान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां वासनानिमित्तमेव ज्ञानवैचित्र्यमित्यवगम्यते । स्वप्नादिष्वन्तरेणाप्यर्थं वासनानिमित्तस्य ज्ञानवैचि-त्र्यस्योभाभ्यामप्यावाभ्यामभ्युपगम्यमानत्वात्। अन्तरेण तु वासनामर्थनिमित्तस्य ज्ञानवैचित्र्यस्य मयानभ्युपगम्यमानत्वात् । तस्मादप्यभावो बाह्यार्थस्य ।

(*Sūtrabhāsya* 2-2-5-28)

Declares the *Bauddhakārikā* (vide *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*)—just as the cotton that eventually comes out of the plant from a seed that had been soaked in molten lac would be coloured red, the fruit also occurs eventually in that series in which are implanted the impressions of *karmas*—

यस्मिन्नेव हि सन्ताने आहिता कर्मवासना ।
फलं तत्रैव बध्नाति कार्पासे रक्तता यथा ॥

Under these circumstances, says the *vijñānavādin* that there is

no need whatsoever for postulating the existence of external objects.

9.3.5 Refutation of Vijnanavada—Experience of Object External to Cognition

Having delineated the *vijñānavāda*, the *Bhāsya* on the Sūtras starting with (2-2-5-28)—नाभाव उपलब्धेः (The non-existence of external objects cannot be maintained on account of their being cognised) shows that this *vāda* is to be rejected It is given in fair detail particularly because of its seeming similarity with the Vedānta in spite of fundamental differences. Indeed, the very circumstance which compels the acceptance of cognitions viz., that one is conscious of them, compels likewise the acceptance of the external objects such as a pillar, a wall, a pot or a cloth for the same reason that one is conscious of these as well along with the respective cognitions as is seen in the experience 'I cognise the pot' etc. So says the *Sūtrabhāsya* (2-2-5-28)—

न खल्वभावो बाह्यार्थस्याध्यवसातु शक्यते। कस्मात्? उपलब्धेः। उपलभ्यते हि प्रतिप्रत्यय बाह्योऽर्थः स्तम्भः कुड्य घटः पट इति। न चोपलभ्यमानस्यैवाभावो भवितुमर्हति।

No one experiences the cognition itself as the pot; the pot is experienced as different from the cognition, as its object. This is how even he who denies the existence of external objects also experiences, as is clear from his very statement—'That which is the content of a cognition that is internal, appears as though external'. Otherwise he could not use the phrase 'as though external'. No one ever says 'Visnumitra appears like the son of a barren woman'. Hence faithfulness to experience demands that the objects are revealed 'external to the cognition' and not 'as though external', as pointed out by the *Sūtrabhāsya* (2-2-5-28)—

यत उपलब्धिव्यतिरेकोऽपि बलादर्थस्याभ्युपगन्तव्य उपलब्धेरेव । नहि कश्चिदुपलब्धिमेव स्तम्भः कुड्यं चेत्युपलभते । उपलब्धिविषयत्वेनैव तु स्तम्भकुड्यादीन्सर्वे लौकिका उपलभन्ते । अतश्चैवमेव सर्वे लौकिका उपलभन्ते यत्प्रत्याचक्षाणा अपि बाह्यार्थमेव व्याचक्षते यदन्तर्ज्ञेयरूप तद्बहिर्वदवभासत इति । तेऽपि हि सर्वलोकप्रसिद्धां बहिरवभासमानां संविद् प्रतिलभमानाः प्रत्याख्यातुकामाश्च बाह्यमर्थं बहिर्वदिति वत्कारं कुर्वन्ति । इतरथा हि कस्माद्बहिर्वदिति ब्रूयुः । नहि विष्णुमित्रो वन्ध्यापुत्रवदवभासत इति कश्चिदाचक्षीत । तस्माद्यथानुभव तत्त्वमभ्युपगच्छद्भिर्बहिरेवावभासत इति युक्तमभ्युपगन्तुं नतु बहिर्वदवभासत इति ।

9.3.6 Other Reasons

If his stand is that, since there is no possibility of the existence of an external object, it is decided that it appears 'as though external', it is pointed out that it is an improper decision, for possibility or otherwise is to be determined in consonance with the operation or otherwise of the appropriate *pramāṇa* and not that the operation or otherwise of *pramāṇa* be made dependent on possibility or impossibility. Possible is whatever is apprehended by any one of the *pramānas* such as perception and impossible is what is not so apprehended. So points out the *Bhāsya* (2-2-5-28)—

ननु वाह्यस्यार्थस्यासम्भवाद्बहिर्वदवभासत इत्यध्यवसितम् । नायं साधुरध्यवसायो यतः प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्तिपूर्वकौ सम्भवासम्भवाववधार्येते न पुनः सम्भवासम्भवपूर्विके प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्ती । यद्धि प्रत्यक्षादीनामन्यतमेनापि प्रमाणेनोपलभ्यते तत्सम्भवति । यत्तु न केनचिदपि प्रमाणेनोपलभ्यते तन्न सम्भवति ।

Nor again does the non-existence of objects follow from the fact of the cognition having the form of the object, for if there were no object, that the cognition has the form of the

object is untenable and the objects are actually apprehended as external, as pointed to by the same *Bhāsya*—असति विषये विषयसारूप्यानुपपत्तेः. For the same reason the invariable simultaneous apprehension of the cognition and the object has to be considered as proving only that the object causes its cognition by way of offering incidence for it and not that the two are identical, as the *Bhāsya* continues to say—

अत एव सहोपलम्भनियमोऽपि प्रत्ययविषययोरुपायोपेयभावहेतुको नाभेदहेतुक इत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् ।

Again in such forms of cognitions as 'the knowledge of a pot' and 'the knowledge of a cloth', the difference pertains only to the two attributes of knowledge, pot and cloth, and not to the substantive, the knowledge. Hence also an object and its knowledge are different—

अपि च घटज्ञानं पटज्ञानमिति विशेषणयोरेव घटपटयोर्भेदो न विशेष्यस्य ज्ञानस्य । . . . तस्मादर्थज्ञानयोर्भेदः । (*Sūtrabhāsya* 2-2-5-28)

Further, two cognitions, each self-revealing and momentary, at different moments of time, cannot apprehend each other. From this it follows that the Bauddha doctrines—such as the distinction among cognitions, momentariness and other attributes, individual characteristics, common characteristics, bequeathing of *vāsanās* from one cognition to the other, misery consequent on Avidyā, existents and non-existents, bondage and liberation—all become invalidated, as shown by the *Bhāsya* (2-2-5-28)—

अपि च द्वयोर्विज्ञानयोः पूर्वोत्तरकालयोः स्वसंवेदनेनैवोपक्षीणयोरितरेतरग्राह्यग्राहकत्वानुपपत्तिः । ततश्च विज्ञानभेदप्रतिज्ञा क्षणिकत्वादिधर्मप्रतिज्ञा स्वलक्षणसामान्यलक्षणवास्यवासकत्वाऽविद्योपप्लवसदसद्धर्मबन्धमोक्षादिप्रतिज्ञाश्च स्वशास्त्रगतास्ता हीयेरन् ।

If it is said that a cognition must be accepted because one is conscious of it, then the external object also must be accepted since one is conscious of the external object as well, as the *Bhāṣya* (2-2-5-28) says—

विज्ञानमनुभूयत इति चेत्। बाह्योऽप्यर्थोऽनुभूयत एवेति युक्तमभ्युपगन्तुम्।

If it is said that cognition is accepted as it is self-revealing, meaning thereby that it is conscious of itself, while the so-called external object is not so, it should be pointed out that this would be absurd since, whether the cognition be the same as the object or otherwise, the cognition cannot be an object of its own activity—so the *Bhāṣya* continues—

नचार्थव्यतिरिक्तमपि विज्ञानं स्वयमेवानुभूयते, स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधादेव।

9.3.7 Sakshi to be Taken Note of—Difficulties Overcome

There is no such difficulty in the Vedāntic set-up as it takes note of what is self-established and cannot therefore be denied viz., *Sākṣī*, the Immutable Eternal Witness-self, which is never an object, whereas the so-called cognitions with the forms of objects are themselves objects perceived by the *Sākṣī*. Also these cognitions are associated with origination, destruction, manifoldness etc.—

साक्षिप्रत्यययोश्च स्वभाववैषम्यादुपलब्धुपलभ्यभावोपपत्तेः। स्वयंसिद्धस्य च साक्षिणोऽप्रत्याख्येयत्वात्। . . . विज्ञानस्योत्पत्तिप्रध्वंसानेकत्वादिविशेषवत्त्वाभ्युपगमात्। (*Sūtrabhāṣya* 2-2-5-28)

The situation including the avoidance of infinite regress and reciprocal dependence discussed in the *Bhāṣya* is put succinctly by the *Svārājyasiddhiṭīkā* (1-25)—

ननु साक्षिभास्यत्वत्वादेऽपि तस्य साक्षिणोऽपि स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधादन्यवेद्यत्वमित्यनवस्था, अन्योन्याश्रयो वा। दीपस्य दीपान्तरेणेव विज्ञानस्य साक्षिभास्यत्वानुपपत्तिश्चेति चेन्न। अनागन्तुकप्रत्यक्चैतन्यैकरसे निर्विशेषे

स्वप्रकाशे साक्षिणि प्रकाशान्तरापेक्षाभावात् । मन्मते बुद्धिपरिणामस्य विज्ञानस्य चिद्रूपत्वाभावेऽपि स्वच्छत्वादुत्पत्तिसमकालमेव व्योमवत्सर्वगतचित्प्रतिबिम्बग्राहितया स्फुरणमित्यदोषात् । तथा चोक्तं वार्तिके—

वियद्वस्तुस्वभावानुरोधादेव न कारकात् ।
वियत्संपूर्णतोत्पत्तौ कुम्भस्यैव दृशा धियाम् ॥ इति ।

[Even in the system which accepts the *Sākṣī* as the illuminator, if it is said that there arises the difficulty of infinite regress or reciprocal dependence, since even the *Sākṣī* cannot be an object of Itself, and the contingency of the *Sākṣī* illuminating the cognitions which would be like unto one lamp illuminating another, the answer is—no. The innermost Self, by its very nature Consciousness of one consistency without any particularities whatsoever, the Self-effulgent Witness which cannot at all be denied, doubted or mistaken, is thus not in need of any other shine Also the modes of the intellect, though not sentient, being pellucid, are able to catch, even as it comes into existence, the reflection of the Witness-Consciousness which like the sky is everywhere and it is this that is ordinarily spoken of as the shine of the cognition So says the *Vartika*—"Just as a pot, along with its coming into existence, is filled with the sky without the need of any other means for the purpose, even so are the modes of the intellect permeated by the Witness-Consciousness".]

9.3.8 Difference Between 'Dream-Vision' and 'Cognitive Experience in the Waking'

Again, the parallelism that is sought to be drawn between the dream and the waking states is not to the point because of the difference between the characteristics of the two states viz , while one is subject to sublation, the other is not, as shown by the *Sūtrabhāṣya* (2-2-5-29)—

न स्वप्नादिप्रत्ययवज्जाग्रत्प्रत्यया भवितुमर्हन्ति । कस्मात् ? वैधर्म्यात् । वैधर्म्यं हि भवति स्वप्नजागरितयोः । किं पुनर्वैधर्म्यम् ? बाधाबाधाविति ब्रूमः ।

Moreover, dream-vision is a kind of memory relating to what arises from the contents of the mind, whereas the cognitions of the waking state are forms of cognitions through *pramānas*. And the difference between cognition and memory, consisting in the presence and absence of objects, is actually experienced—

अपि च स्मृतिरेषा यत्स्वप्नदर्शनम्। उपलब्धिस्तु जागरितदर्शनम्। स्मृत्युपलब्ध्योश्च प्रत्यक्षमन्तरं स्वयमनुभूयतेऽर्थविप्रयोगसंप्रयोगात्मकम्।

(*Sūtrabhāsya* 2-2-5-29)

Also, anything that cannot be the characteristic of something in its own right, cannot certainly be so because of a similarity with another, as pointed to by the *Bhāsya*—

न च यो यस्य स्वतो धर्मो न संभवति सोऽन्यस्य साधर्म्यात्तस्य संभविष्यति।

With reference to the *Bhāsya* says the *Brahmavidyābharaṇa*—

यद्यपि 'अथात आदेशो नेति नेति' इत्यागमेन विद्वदनुभवेन च जाग्रदवस्थमपि वस्तु बाध्यत एव, तथापि, यथा स्वप्नस्य निःस्वरूपतापत्तिरूपो बाधो विद्यमान एव प्रमातरि भवति नैव जाग्रत्प्रपञ्चस्य निःस्वरूपतापत्तिरूपो बाधो विद्यमान एव प्रमातरि भवति, अपि तु प्रमात्रा सहैव भवतीति विशेषः।

यद्यपि सिद्धान्ते शुक्तिरजतादितुल्यतात्कालिकस्वाप्नपदार्थगोचरं ज्ञानं साक्षिरूपमनुभवः, न तु तत्कालासतः स्वाप्नस्य पदार्थस्य ज्ञानं स्मृतिः। तथापि यथा प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणजन्यत्वे सति संस्कारजन्यत्व स्मृतेर्वर्तते, एवं स्वाप्नज्ञानस्यापीति स्मृतिपद तत्र गौण द्रष्टव्यम्।

Also says the *Svārājyasiddhiṭīkā* (1-25)—

वस्तुतस्तु स्वाप्नप्रत्ययस्यानिर्वचनीयप्रातिभासिकार्थविषयकत्वान्न निरालम्बनत्वमिति बोध्यम्।

[It may be pointed out that like the sublation of the dream state that is experienced, the Śruti 'Now therefore, the instruction :

not this, not this' speaks of the sublation of even the waking state, and this is testified to by the experience of the enlightened. However, there is this difference—the dream state is sublated without the *pramātr* being sublated, while the waking state is sublated along with the *pramātr* Also according to Vedānta, the dream is not the case of memory of objects which are not present then, but like the experience of shell-silver, it pertains to direct experience of the *Sākṣī*, of *prātibhāsika* objects presented then which are the transformation of the mind or Avidyā laden with the *samskāras* It is because, as in the case of memory, the knowledge of objects in a dream is produced by *samskāras* that produce the objects as well, and not by *pramānas*, like perception etc , that the dream is termed as memory in a secondary sense]

The absence of objects spoken of in the dream thus pertains to the absence of the *vyāvahārika* objects of everyday parlance. Thus the effort to establish, on the dream analogy, that the cognitions of the waking state are without objective content is rendered futile.

9.3.9 Necessity for accepting External Objects Apart from Vasanas

Again the assertion of the Bauddha that the diversity in experience, as that of the pot, the cloth etc., can be accounted for on the basis of the variety of tendencies, *vāsanās*, is not based on reason, there being, according to him, no external objects as the content of cognitions which would give rise to the respective *vāsanās* So says the *Sūtrabhāṣya* (2-2-5-30)—

न भावो वासनानामुपपद्येत । त्वत्पक्षेऽनुपलब्धेर्बाह्यानामर्थानाम् । अर्थोपलब्धिनिमित्ता हि प्रत्यर्थं नानारूपा वासना भवन्ति । अनुपलभ्यमानेषु त्वर्थेषु किंनिमित्ता विचित्रा वासना भवेयुः ?

Unlike the case of *prāmānikī anavasthā*, the beginningless infinite series sanctioned by experience such as that of seeds and sprouts, this hypothesis of a beginningless series of

vāsanās would here lead, like the blind leading the blind, only to a baseless infinite regress, sublative of the entire phenomenal world, and would in no way establish his position—

अनादित्वेऽप्यन्धपरंपरान्यायेनाप्रतिष्ठैवानवस्था व्यवहारलोपिनी स्यान्नाभिप्रायसिद्धिः। (*Sūtrabhāṣya* 2-2-5-30)

Moreover (a) from the admission that the apprehension of objects is possible even in the absence of *vāsanās* as in the case of every new experience which is therefore necessarily to be traced only to the existence of external objects and (b) from the non-admission of the possibility of *vāsanās* in the absence of apprehension, it follows that the external objects do exist. Moreover *vāsanā* is a kind of *samskāra*, impression, and cannot be thought of without an abode for it, as is seen in common experience; but according to his doctrine there is no such abode—

अपि च वासना नाम संस्कारविशेषाः। संस्काराश्च नाश्रयमन्तरेणावकल्पन्ते। एवं लोके दृष्टत्वात्। न च तव वासनाश्रयः कश्चिदस्ति प्रमाणतोऽनुपलब्धेः।

If it is said that the *ālayavijñāna* is the abode of the *vāsanās*, that cannot be, for it is momentary. The *Sūtrabhāṣya* (2-2-5-31) proceeds to say—

यदप्यालयविज्ञान नाम वासनाश्रयत्वेन परिकल्पितं तदपि क्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमादनवस्थितस्वरूपं सत् प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानवन्न वासनानामधिकरण भवितुमर्हति।

And because of the momentariness of the *ālayavijñāna*, it also would be subject to all the objections pointed out against the theory of momentary existence as pertaining to external objects, as the *Bhāṣya* continues to say—

अपि च विज्ञानवादेऽपि क्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमस्य समानत्वाद्यानि वाह्यार्थ-

वादे क्षणिकत्वनिबन्धनानि दूषणान्युद्भावितानि 'उत्तरोत्पादे च पूर्वनिरोधात्' इत्येवमादीनि तानीहाप्यनुसन्धातव्यानि ।

Unless there be some principle running through everything and abiding through all the three periods of time, or an absolutely unchanging Self which cognises everything, there can be no human dealing involving remembrance, recognition etc., which are contingent on past impressions that are stored up in conformity with place, time and circumstances. Thus are refuted both the *Bāhyārthavādipaksa* and the *Vijñānavādipaksa*. In this connection says the *Svārājyasiddhi* (1-25)—

नापोद्य मानसिद्धं कथमिव विविधज्ञानमर्थापलापे
बाधोऽर्थानां न दृष्टो बहिरिति च पद न प्रसिद्धार्थमृच्छेत् ।
वेद्या विज्ञानभेदाः कथमथ विविधा वासना वा कुतस्स्युः
किञ्च प्रागुक्तदोषाः क्षणिकचिति हतस्तेन विज्ञानवादः ॥

The objects of the external world established by *pramāṇas* cannot be negated. If external objects are negated, how can there be different cognitions? The sublation of the external objects, as in the case of a dream, is not in experience. And the word 'external' loses its usual significance How is the variety in cognitions to be accounted for? To what are the various *vāsanās* to be traced? Moreover, the *Ksanikavijñānavāda* would be subject to all the objections mentioned previously against the *Bāhyārthavādin.* Thus the *Vijñānavāda* stands refuted.

9.4.1 Sunyavada (nihilism); Void the Ultimate

As regards the *Śūnyavāda*, nihilism, mentioned in the *Sūtrabhāsya* (2–2–5–31), observes the *Brahmavidyābharana*—

शून्यवादिपक्षस्त्विति ।

ते हीत्थ वर्णयन्ति—बाह्यार्थः परमाणुर्वा तत्समूहो वेत्येवमादिभिर्विज्ञान-

वाद्युद्भावितैरेव दूषणैर्न संभवति। एवं विज्ञानवाद्यभिमतं क्षणिकविज्ञानमपि न संभवति। तेनापि ये बाह्याः पदार्थाः परेषामभिमतास्त आन्तरा इत्युच्यन्ते। तथात्रापि त आन्तराः किं परमाणुरूपा उत तत्समूहरूपा इत्यादिविकल्पासहत्व स्थितमेव। आन्तरं बाह्यं वा सर्वं वस्तु युक्त्यसहत्वान्न सत्। नाप्यसत्, अपरोक्षतया प्रतीतेः। नापि सदसत्, विरोधात्। नापि सदसद्विलक्षणम्, सद्विलक्षणत्वेऽसत्त्वावश्यम्भावात्, असद्विलक्षणत्वे सत्त्वावश्यम्भावात्, उभयविलक्षणं नैकं वस्तु संभवति। अतश्चतुष्कोटिविनिर्मुक्तमेव बाह्यमाभ्यन्तरं न परमार्थः। परमार्थतत्त्वं तु सर्वशून्यतैव। सैव सुगतस्य मुख्यसिद्धान्तः, अन्ये तु त्रयोऽपि वादा मन्दबुद्धिसमाधानाय निरूपिताः —इति।

[The *Śūnyavādin* adopts this posture—The viewpoint of the *Bāhyārthavādin* stands shattered as a result of the criticism by the *Vijñānavādin* levelled against his conception of the external objects as *paramānus* or their aggregates etc. On the same grounds, the momentary-consciousness theory of the *Vijñānavādin* also stands refuted, his declaration that the so-called outside objects accepted by the *Bāhyārthavādin* are really inside, does not also brook enquiry as to whether these inside objects are of the nature of *paramānus* or their aggregates Thus being unable to survive the onslaught of reason, the objects, be they external or internal, cannot be considered to be existent Nor can they be considered to be non-existent, as they are directly apprehended. Nor can they be existent-cum-non-existent, they being opposites. Not even are they other than existent and non-existent; if they are other than existent, necessarily they will have to be non-existent, if other than non-existent, they will have to be necessarily existent One and the same entity cannot be other than both existent and non-existent Thus, as not conforming to any of these four categories, the objects, external or internal, are not the ultimate reality The ultimate reality, however, is absolute nothingness, void, *sarvaśūnya* This is the principal doctrine of the Buddha The other three theories are delineated in order to accommodate those of inferior intellect]

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Criticising the view that an effect is produced by an abiding material cause, questions are asked such as—whether that so-called material cause is or is not in need of accessory factors for producing the effect; to which of these should the potency, if it were to be so explained, to produce the cause, must be traced; whether the so-called material cause remains the same throughout, in which case, like the sky, it will be a non-existent, or does it undergo changes, in which case, like a piece of leather exposed to rain and sun, it will be a changing phenomenon and thus evanescent—

वर्षातपाभ्यां किं व्योम्नश्चर्मण्यस्ति तयोः फलम् ।
चर्मोपमश्चेत्सोऽनित्यः खतुल्यश्चेदसत्फलः ॥

(*Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*-2)

Again, criticising the Naiyāyika view of existence, *sattā*, as a universal, *sāmānya*, it is pointed out that a host of difficulties arise on the acceptance of this view, such as—no motion can be ascribed to the universal; it was not there before but now it is; it is bereft of parts. Also on the destruction of a pot—(a) does the universal, the potness, continue to exist or (b) is it also destroyed or (c) does it go somewhere else? In the first case the potness exists without support In the second case there arises the contingency of its being ephemeral. In the third case there arises the contingency of the universal being categorised as *dravya*—

न याति न च तत्रासीदस्ति पश्चान्न चांशवत् ।
जहाति पूर्वं नाधारमहो व्यसनसन्ततिः ॥ etc.

(*Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*-2)

By such arguments, it is concluded that—where there is existence, there is momentariness as well, as in a cloud; that existence would mean practical efficiency is what is testified to by *pramāna*, existence is not to be found in abiding entities. So says the *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha* (2)—

यत्सत्तत्क्षणिकं यथा जलधरः सन्तश्च भावा अमी
सत्ता शक्तिरिहार्थकर्मणि मितेः सिद्धेषु सिद्धा न सा। etc.

9.4.2 Ingredients in Bahyarthavada and Vijnanavada Leading Eventually to Sunyavada

The prolific use by the three schools, of ideas—such as (i) momentariness, *kṣaṇikatva* (ii) individualistic nature, *svalakṣaṇatva*, (iii) the acceptance of an existent as only that which leads to human endeavour to secure or to avoid it, thus relating it only to parlance and not to Reality, (iv) the eventual acceptance of only indeterminate knowledge, *nirvikalpakajñāna*, as *pramāna* and all determinate knowledge, *savikalpakajñāna*, as illusion, (v) acceptance of *apohavāda* viz., that a word conveys its meaning only by rejecting all else, as 'a cow' meaning 'a not-non-cow', and that as referring to universals that are purely imaginary, names are illusory, (vi) total annihilation of an entity, (vii) *ākāśa* as a non-entity, (viii) origination from non-existence—अभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिः, (ix) memory and recognition being regarded as illusory, (x) the subsequent outright refutation of the existence of outside objects by the *Vijñānavādin*, (xi) the dream comparison given by him to show that there are no objects, (xii) the incorporation of the aspects of the other theories, which he himself has refuted, into his own theory, (xiii) the general acceptance of the dictum 'everything is void, void' —सर्वं शून्यं शून्यम्, (xiv) non-acceptance of any abiding entity whatsoever and (xv) non-acceptance of any sentient principle by itself—shows that these theories contain the ingredients leading eventually to the *Śūnyavāda*.

9.4.3 Delineation of Sunyavada—'Paranirvana', The State of Void

The *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha* (2) delineating these topics, after pointing out the meditations as taught by the Buddha

such as 'Everything is misery, misery', 'Everything is individualistic, individualistic, as each is momentary' and 'Everything is void, void', proceeds to speak about the *Śūnyavāda*—

एवं शून्यं शून्यमित्यपि भावनीयम्। स्वप्ने जागरणे च न मया दृष्टमिदं रजतादीति विशिष्टनिषेधस्योपलम्भात्। यदि दृष्टं सत्तदा तद्विशिष्टस्य दर्शनस्येदंताया अधिष्ठानस्य च तस्मिन्नध्यस्तस्य रजतत्वादेस्तत्सम्बन्धस्य च समवायादेः सत्त्वं स्यात्। न चैतदिष्टं कस्यचिद्वादिनः। न चार्धजरतीयमुचितम्। न हि कुक्कुटया एको भागः पाकायापरो भागः प्रसवाय कल्प्यतामिति कल्प्यते। तस्मादध्यस्ताधिष्ठानतत्सम्बन्धदर्शनद्रष्टृणाम् मध्य एकस्यानेकस्य वा असत्त्वे निषेधविषयत्वेन सर्वस्यासत्त्व बलादापतेदिति भगवतोपदिष्टे माध्यमिकास्तावदुत्तमप्रज्ञा इत्थमचीकथन्—भिक्षुपादप्रसारणन्यायेन क्षणभङ्गाद्यभिधानमुखेन स्थायित्वानुकूलवेदनीयत्वानुगतत्वसर्वसत्यत्वभ्रमव्यावर्तनेन सर्वशून्यतायामेव पर्यवसानम्। अतस्तत्त्वं सदसदुभयानुभयात्मकचतुष्कोटिविनिर्मुक्तं शून्यमेव। तथा हि यदि घटादेः सत्त्वं स्वभावस्तर्हि कारकव्यापारवैयर्थ्यम्। असत्त्वं स्वभाव इति पक्षे प्राचीन एव दोषः प्रादुःष्यात्। यथोक्तम्—

> न सतः कारणापेक्षा व्योमादेरिव युज्यते।
> कार्यस्यासम्भवी हेतुः खपुष्पादेरिवासतः॥ इति।

विरोधादितरौ पक्षावनुपपन्नौ। तदुक्तं भगवता लङ्कावतारे—

> बुद्ध्या विविच्यमानाना स्वभावो नावधार्यते।
> अतो निरभिलप्यास्ते निःस्वभावाश्च दर्शिताः॥ इति।
>
> इद वस्तुबलायात यद्वदन्ति विपश्चितः।
> यथा यथार्थाश्चिन्त्यन्ते विशीर्यन्ते तथा तथा॥ इति च।

न क्वचिदपि पक्षे व्यवतिष्ठत इत्यर्थः। दृष्टार्थव्यवहारश्च स्वप्नव्यवहारवत्संवृत्या सगच्छते। ... तदेवं भावनाचतुष्टयवशान्निखिलवासनानिवृत्तौ परनिर्वाण शून्यरूपं सेत्स्यति।

[In this manner it is to be understood that everything is void since the experience of negation is in evidence when there is denial of the objects of the dream, as also the objects of illusory experience such as shell-silver etc , in the waking state. If what is seen e g., silver etc , is an existent then there will arise the contingency of accepting the existence of—the particular experience, the thisness pertaining to the substratum, the silverness etc., of the superimposed, the relations such as *samavāya* pertaining to them This is not accepted by any school. Rejecting the existence of only some but not all of these, would be like using one half of a hen for cooking and retaining the other half for laying eggs ! The teaching of the Bhagavān Buddha is 'The acceptance—of the non-existence of one or more of the superimposed, the substratum, their relation, the experience and the experiencer—would compel the acceptance of the non-existence of all these'. In respect of this, those of the best calibre viz , the *Mādhyamikas*, say — In the manner of the *bhiksu-pādaprasāranan yāya* i.e., the maxim 'give him an inch, he will take an ell', the enunciation of momentariness etc , and the dispelling of illusions of permanence, happiness, universality and reality of everything, would culminate in the instruction that everything is void. Thus the ultimate is only the void bereft of the four-fold aspect viz , existence, non-existence, existence-cum-non-existence and neither existence nor non-existence So it is that, if a pot, for example, is of the nature of an existent, then there would arise the contingency of the futility of the operations of the causal factors. If by nature a pot is non-existent then all the other four pertaining to it would also be non-existent as pointed out So has it been said — Like the sky, an existent is not in need of a cause; and there is no question at all of a cause of a non-existing entity such as a sky-flower.

The other two aspects are untenable, as each is self-stultifying, being inclusive of contradictory ingredients.

In the *Lankāvatāra* it is said that the process of intellectual analysis of any entity will only result in the conclusion that its

nature cannot be determined; hence nothing can be said about it, nor does it have anything like a nature of its own.

Whatever be the manner in which the scholars delineate the nature of a thing, pointing to the compelling circumstances leading to it, it is seen that the same procedure leads not to the determination of its nature, but only to its disruption That means, it will not conform to any viewpoint Intellectual analysis can be likened to the removal of the threads, one by one, from a piece of cloth, at the end of which there would be neither the threads nor the cloth, since every time it does away with one or the other of the concepts that have been concocted, resulting ultimately in the dissolution of the so-called entity, as the *Nyāyabhāsya* explains. Objects of experience have only a parlance reality as in a dream

Thus when all the impressions are removed by means of the four-fold meditation that has been taught, the state of 'void' termed *paranirvāna* is attained]

The *Mānasollāsa* (VI–12) introducing the *Śūnyavāda* by way of refuting the *Vijñānavāda* etc., says—

अस्ति भातीति धीभ्रान्तैरात्मानात्मसु कल्प्यते ।
हानोपादानराहित्यादाकाशः किं प्रकाशते ॥

[Concepts such as Self and the non-Self, which, like the *ākāsa*, do not lead to any human endeavour either to secure or to avoid it, have been concocted by the deluded as endowed with existence and shine.]

9.4.5 Sunyavada, An Apparently Powerful Purvapaksha—Its Refutation

This *Śūnyavāda* delineated by the Buddha is apparently a powerful *pūrvapakṣa* which the hymn refutes Says the *Mānasollāsa* (VI–13 to 16)—

इत्येवं बौद्धसिद्धान्ती भाषमाणो निषिध्यते ।
शून्यं चेज्जगतो हेतुर्जगदेव न सिध्यति ॥

घटश्शून्यः पटश्शून्य इति कैः प्रतिपाद्यते ।
नैव भासेत शून्यं चेज्जगन्नरविषाणवत् ॥
वस्त्वर्थी किमुपादद्याद्भारार्तः किं परित्यजेत् ।
को विदध्यान्निपिद्धयेद्वा शून्यत्वात्स्वस्य चात्मनः ॥
अवसीदेन्निराकृत तस्मात्सर्वमिदं जगत् ।

[If the cause of the universe be void, the universe cannot be as it is found to be.

None ever says 'the pot is void', 'the cloth is void'; on the other hand, in parlance one asserts 'the pot exists', 'the cloth exists'.

If the universe were void, it would never have appeared any more than a man's horn; it could not even be a subject of illusion.

What would one, seeking to secure a thing, resort to? What would one, who is afflicted by a burden, cast aside? When one's own self is a non-entity, who is there to command or prohibit?

This whole universe, therefore, having no cause for its existence, could never be there.]

In respect of this situation, says the *Pañcadaśī* (II-30 to 35)–

भगवत्पूज्यपादाश्च शुष्कतर्कपटूनमून् ।
आहुर्माध्यमिकान्भ्रान्तानचिन्त्येऽस्मिन्सदात्मनि ॥
अनादृत्य श्रुतिं मौर्ख्यादिमे बौद्धास्तमस्विनः ।
आपेदिरे निरात्मत्वमनुमानैकचक्षुषः ॥
शून्यमासीदिति ब्रूषे सद्योगं वा सदात्मताम् ।
शून्यस्य न तु तद्युक्तमुभयं व्याहतत्वतः ॥
न युक्तस्तमसा सूर्यो नापि चासौ तमोमयः ।
सच्छून्ययोर्विरोधित्वाच्छून्यमासीत्कथं वद ॥
वियदादेर्नामरूपे मायया सुविकल्पिते ।
शून्यस्य नामरूपे च तथा चेज्जीव्यतां चिरम् ॥

सतोऽपि नामरूपे द्वे कल्पिते चेत्तदा वद ।
कुत्रेति निरधिष्ठानो न भ्रमः क्वचिदीक्ष्यते ॥

[Revered Śrī Bhagavatpāda also observes in respect of these *Mādhyamikas* who are adepts in dry logic, that they are deluded in the matter of this Ātman that is Existence which transcends all thought.

The ignorant Bauddhas with inference as their only 'eye', stupidly disregarding Śruti, arrive at the conclusion that there is no Ātman.

You say that void existed. Then it must mean either that existence was associated with it or it was itself of the nature of existence. But both these are illogical in respect of void by reason of self-contradiction.

The Sun is not associated with darkness nor is he of the nature of darkness. As existence and void are mutually contradictory, tell me how 'void' could 'exist'.

The name and form of *ākāśa* etc., are clear superimpositions on Brahman due to Māyā. If you say that in the same manner name and form of 'void' are also superimposed, may you live long! (whereby inadvertently you are admitting a substratum on which the 'void' is superimposed).

If you assert that the name and form of even the Existent Reality is a superimposition, tell me then, on what are they superimposed. No illusion without a substratum is anywhere in experience.]

Putting the matter briefly the *Svārājyasiddhi* (1-26) says—

नाभावाद्भावजन्म क्वचिदपि कलितं निर्विशेषाद्विचित्रं
न स्यात्ते नानुविद्धे ह्यसदसदिति च प्रत्ययः स्यादशेषे ।
केनाभावप्रथा ते किमिति न सकलं सर्वतस्स्यादभीष्टं
सर्वेषां स्यादयत्नं किमिति जड भवानात्मघाते प्रवृत्तः ॥

[An existent coming out of non-existence is nowhere in evidence. The variegated world cannot arise out of void to

which no variety can be ascribed. Also the experiences in the world would have to be of the type 'the pot is not', 'the cloth is not'. How is the *abhāva* that is spoken of, established? If *abhāva* can be the cause, since *abhāvas* are not distinguishable, why is not anything and everything produced from the *abhāva* of anything? Again there arises the contingency of any desired object being secured without any effort This viewpoint implicative of one's own destruction is entertained only by one that is ignorant of his or other's welfare]

9.4.5 Refutation of Sunyavada Implied in Sutras Refuting Vijnanavada

In respect of the *Śūnyavāda* says the *Sūtrabhāsya* (2-2-5-31) that, being opposed to all *pramānas*, it deserves no special attention—

शून्यवादिपक्षस्तु सर्वप्रमाणविप्रतिषिद्ध इति तन्निराकरणाय नादरः क्रियते ।

Taking the hint as provided in this *Bhāsya*, other commentators have shown how the Sūtras (2-2-5-28 to 31) refuting the *Vijñānavāda*, can themselves be re-read and employed to refute the *Śūnyavāda* as well. Śrī Annambhatta, for example, in his *Mitākṣara* on the *Brahmasūtra* says—नाभावो ज्ञानार्थयोः प्रमाणैरुपलब्धेः। (There is no non-existence of objects as also of the knowledge in respect of them, they being cognised by *pramāṇas*.)

स्वप्नवन्न शून्यत्वं जाग्रति संभवति, ततो वैधर्म्यस्योक्तत्वादित्यर्थः । वस्तुतस्तत्रापि अनिर्वचनीयविषयस्य ज्ञानस्य च स्वीकारान्न दृष्टान्तता ।

[Non-existence cannot be attributed to the objects of the waking state, unlike as in dream, the difference between them having been pointed out The dream cannot be cited as an illustration since, in actuality, objects which are indescribable as real or unreal, as well as the knowledge pertaining to them, are accepted]

अतात्त्विकत्वं प्रपञ्चस्य व्यवस्थापयितुमबाधितमधिष्ठानं वस्तुभूतं वाच्यम् । तस्य च भावस्तव मते न संभवति । प्रमाणैस्तदनुपलब्धेः । त्वया सर्वशून्यत्वाङ्गीकारादित्यर्थः ।

[In order to establish the non-existence of the universe, a non-sublatable abiding existent must be admitted as the substratum This would not be possible in your system, *Śūnya-vāda*, since it cannot be cognised by means of *pramānas*, as everything is only void in your system]

अस्मिन्सूत्रे (क्षणिकत्वाच्च) उपदेशादिति पूरणीयम् । तेन क्षणिकपदार्थसत्त्वोपदेशात् सर्वशून्यत्वोपदेशाच्च व्याहतवचनस्सुगतो नादेयवचन इत्यर्थः ।

[Since the Bauddha teaches the existence of momentary entities and in the same breath teaches that everything is void, his teaching being self-contradictory, it cannot be accepted.]

9.4.6 Sunyavada opposed to all Pramanas—Necessity for Recognising Abiding Substratum

The *Sūtrabhāsya* (2-2-5-31) summarily disposes off this *Śūnyavāda* by observing that this worldly parlance which, as is well known, is established by all *pramānas* cannot be negated without recourse to another unsublatable entity as the substratum since this general rule prevails, there being no exception to it—

न ह्ययं सर्वप्रमाणप्रसिद्धो लोकव्यवहारोऽन्यत्तत्त्वमनधिगम्य शक्यतेऽपह्नोतुमपवादाभावे उत्सर्गप्रसिद्धेः ।

In respect of this *Bhāṣya* says the *Brahmavidyābharaṇa*—

शून्यपदेन सर्वप्रपञ्चातीत भावरूपं किञ्चित्तत्त्वं विवक्षितमुताभावरूपम् । नाद्यः । तथा सति वाचोयुक्त्यन्तरेण ब्रह्मवाद एवाश्रितः । यदि द्वितीयः पक्षः, तदा सर्वप्रमाणविरोधः, सर्वप्रमाणै. प्रपञ्च उपलभ्यमाने तदभाव एव तत्त्वमिति निरूपयितुमशक्यमिति दूषणस्य स्फुटतया तन्निराकरणाय न सूत्रकृता सूत्राण्यारचितानि ।

ननु प्रत्यक्षादिप्रतीतिर्भ्रमरूपा भविष्यति युक्तिबाधितत्वादिति चेन्न । प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणविरोधे युक्तीनामेवाभासत्वोपपत्तेः । अपि च यद्युक्तिबाधितं तदनृतमिति क्व दृष्टम् । शुक्तिरजतादौ दृष्टमिति चेत्, तर्हि यदनृतं शुक्तिरजतादिकं दृष्टं तत् साधिष्ठानमेव दृष्टं यश्चाभावो दृष्टः स सद्रूपया प्रतियोग्यधिकरणाभ्यां निरूप्यमाण एव दृष्ट इति, प्रपञ्चस्यानृतत्वे तदधिष्ठानं परमार्थभूतं किञ्चिदुपेयम् । तदिदमाह — न ह्ययं सर्वप्रमाणसिद्ध इत्यादि । अन्यत्तत्त्वं परमार्थभूताधिष्ठानम् । न चाभाव एवाधिष्ठानम् । तस्यापि धर्मिप्रतियोगिसापेक्षत्वेन तन्मात्रपरिशेषानुपपत्तेः ।

अपि चापवादबलेन प्रतीतेर्भ्रमत्वं वक्तव्यम् । अपवादश्च इदमिह नेति इदमिदं नेति वा अधिष्ठानपरिशेषेणैव । न च शून्यवादिनस्तत्सम्भवति, अभावाधिकरणानुपगमात् । अत उत्सर्गप्राप्तं प्रत्यक्षादिप्रतीतिप्रामाण्यं कथमपवाधितुं शक्यम् । तदाहुरपवादाभाव इति । तथाच प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणोपजीविनीनामेव युक्तीनामर्थसाधकत्वात्तद्विरोधिनीनामाभासत्वात् प्रबलस्य च प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणबाधकस्य शून्यवादानुसारिणोऽसम्भवान्न शून्यमेव तत्त्वमिति ।

[What is it that is intended to be conveyed by the word *śūnya*? Is it some existent entity transcending the entire universe? Or is it non-existence? Not the former for, in that case, it would be tantamount to expounding the *Brahmavāda* itself skilfully in different terms In the second case it would be opposed to all *pramānas*. It is impossible to establish that the negation of the entire universe which is made known by all *pramānas*, is verily the ultimate reality. This defect being too patent, no separate Sūtras for refuting it have been composed. If it be said that the knowledge provided by *pramānas* like perception is illusory, this being sublated by reasoning, it cannot be, since the reasonings which are opposed to the *pramānas* like perception would themselves be false. Again where has it been seen that what is refuted by mere reasoning is false? If it be said that it is seen to be so in the case of shell-silver etc., then it is also seen that there is a substratum for this illusory shell-silver Also whenever a negation is in evidence,

it is also in evidence that this negation is always related to a counter-entity and a locus which are existents In the same way, if the world be false, a real unsublatable substratum must be accepted This is what is conveyed by the *Bhāsya* And this substratum cannot be non-existence, since it cannot be by itself as it will have to be related to a locus and a counter-entity Also an experience is declared an illusion only on the strength of its negation Negation which is of the form—'this' is not here, or this is not 'this'—is verily the remaining over of the substratum This is not possible in the *Śūnyavāda* which does not accept a locus for non-existence How then is it possible for the *Śūnyavādin* to refute the general rule that the knowledge arising from perception and other *pramānas* is valid? Thus, since only those reasonings are purposeful which are based on perception and other *pramānas*, and those that are opposed to *pramānas* are false, and also since a powerful *pramāna* that can sublate the experiences arising from perception etc., is not available for the *Śūnyavādin* (who does not accept Śruti) it cannot be that *śūnya* alone is the ultimate.]

Also the *Mānasollāsa* (VI–17, 18) and the *ṭīkā* thereon point to the untenability of the momentariness and more so of the non-existence, of Ātman, since even the deluded Bauddha thinks 'I shall become an exalted one' If Ātman were momentary, the doer cannot be the same as the enjoyer of the fruits thereof; and in that case observances of austerities like *caityavandana*, resulting in happiness in the other worlds, would be futile Thus his Śāstras prescribing them would not be *pramāna* at all—

महानुभावो भूयासमिति भ्रान्तश्च मन्यते ॥
आत्मापलापको बौद्धः किमर्थं चरति व्रतम् ।

क्षणिकात्ममते कर्तुर्भोक्तुश्च एकस्याभावाद्व्रताचरणं व्यर्थमिति । तस्य तद्विधानशास्त्रं न प्रामाणिकमिति भावः ।

And what to say if Ātman does not exist at all!

9.4.7 Not Revelation but Concealment of Atman by wrong Postulates—Chatushkoti

As to how false attachment to anything whatever in the world of duality, on the part of the laity, as also to their postulates in respect of categories etc , on the part of the scholars, results automatically in the concealment of Ātman, thereby rendering Its revelation difficult in spite of exposition in various ways by the Vedānta and the Masters—is brought out in the *Māndūkyakārikās* (4-82 to 84), the *Bhāsya* and the *ṭīkā* on it, wherein the fourfold dialectic, *catuskoṭi*, is employed with advantage

In respect of Ātman, the Naiyāyikas etc., the *Vijñānavādins*, the Jainas and the *Śūnyavādins* assert respectively that (1) 'It is', (2) 'It is not', (3) 'It is and is not', and that (4) 'It is not, not at all', basing their considerations respectively on (1) changeability (because of arising and disappearing of qualities like knowledge etc., in It), (2) unchangeability (in respect of Its never being different from the *vijñāna* though different from the body etc., and by virtue of Its momentary nature which is unchanging), (3) changeability-cum-unchangeability and (4) total negation. These disputants succeed not in revealing Ātman as It is, but only in concealing Its real nature by such false premises in a childish manner. These are the four different theories regarding the nature of Ātman, on account of attachment to which It always remains concealed from one's view. He who has known that Ātman is ever untouched by any of these predicates, indeed sees all—

सुखमाव्रियते नित्यं दुःख विव्रियते सदा ।
यस्य कस्य च धर्मस्य ग्रहेण भगवानसौ ॥

अस्ति नास्त्यस्ति नास्तीति नास्ति नास्तीति वा पुनः ।
चलस्थिरोभयाभावैरावृणोत्येव बालिशः ॥

कोटयश्चतस्र एतासु ग्रहैर्यासां सहावृतः ।
भगवानाभिरस्पृष्टो येन दृष्टः स सर्वदृक् ॥

9.4.8 Atman, The Witness of 'Void'

In respect of the question—as to whether what remains over at the end of enquiry is not negation of everything, a mere void—raised by the aspirants, the Master instructs—

अहमादिविकारास्ते तदभावोऽयमप्यथ ॥

सर्वे येनानुभूयन्ते यः स्वयं नानुभूयते ।
तमात्मानं वेदितारं विद्धि बुद्ध्या सुसूक्ष्मया ॥

तत्साक्षिकं भवेत्तत्तद्यद्येनानुभूयते ।
कस्याप्यननुभूतार्थे साक्षित्वं नोपपद्यते ॥

असौ स्वसाक्षिकोऽभावो यतः स्वेनानुभूयते ।
अतः परं स्वय साक्षात्प्रत्यगात्मा न चेतरः ॥

(Vi. Cū. 215 to 218)

[That by which all those modifications such as the ego as well as their subsequent absence (in deep sleep) are perceived, but which Itself is not perceived, know thou by very sharp intellect that Ātman, the Knower.

That which is perceived by something has for its witness the latter What is not experienced by any one, cannot be spoken of as being witnessed at all

The Master points out that it should be realised that it is also a matter of one's experience that the absence of everything referred to by the disciple is witnessed by Self Hence this 'Witness' Self is Itself the supreme Ātman that is immediate, Brahman]

9.4.9 Srutis Misquoted by Sunyavadin—Brahman Indicated by 'Asat'

In respect of the Śrutis quoted by the *Śūnyavādın* in his favour, it must be noted that they have been misquoted without taking into account the context and the complementary passages, as the Śruti itself and the *Bhāṣya* show—

सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् । तद्धैक आहुरसदेवेदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयं तस्मादसतस्सज्जायत ।

कुतस्तु खलु सोम्यैवꣳस्यादिति होवाच कथमसतस्सज्जायेतेति । सत्त्वेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् । (Ch. U. 6-2-1, 2)

[In the beginning, O amiable one! this was *Sat* (Existence) alone, the One only, without a second Some say that in the beginning this was *asat* (non-existence) alone, one only, without a second; from that non-existence arose existence.

Āruni said 'But how, indeed O amiable one! could it be so? How could existence arise from non-existence? In truth, O amiable one! in the beginning (before creation) there was Existence alone, the One only, without a second'.]

असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत् । ततो वै सदजायत । तदात्मानꣳ स्वयमकुरुत ।
(Tai. U. 2-7-1)

As the *Bhāṣya* shows this means—In the beginning i e, prior to creation, this was verily *asat* i.e., the unmanifest Brahman, as distinguished from the universe with specific names and forms manifested. It does not mean absolute non-existence. 'This' refers to the universe composed of specific names and forms. From that *asat* arose *sat* i.e, the one with specific names and forms distinctly marked. That *asat* created Itself by Itself—

असदिति व्याकृतनामरूपविशेषविपरीतमव्याकृतं ब्रह्मोच्यते । न पुनरत्यन्तमेवासत् । न ह्यसतः सज्जन्मास्ति । इदमिति नामरूपविशेषवद्व्या-

कृतं जगत् अग्रे पूर्वं प्रागुत्पत्तेर्ब्रह्मैवासच्छब्दवाच्यमासीत् । ततोऽसतो वै सत् प्रविभक्तनामरूपविशेषमजायतोत्पन्नम् ।

These Śrutis have been discussed also in the Sūtras (2-1-2-7 and 2-1-6-17) and the *Bhāsya* thereon—

असदिति चेन्न प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात् ।

[If it be said that the effect that is the universe was then non-existent before origination, the reply is—no, for it is merely a negation without any basis.]

असद्व्यपदेशान्नेति चेन्न धर्मान्तरेण वाक्यशेषात् ।

[If it be said that on account of the effect being described as non-existent before origination, the conclusion of the previous Sūtra is not true, the reply is—not so, it being described by another characteristic as is seen from the subsequent part of the text]

नामरूपव्याकृतं हि वस्तु सच्छब्दार्हं लोके प्रसिद्धम् । अतः प्राङ्नामरूपव्याकरणादसदिवासीदित्युपचर्यते ।

Here it is shown that '*asat*' as referring to the cause from which 'this' universe has originated, does not mean absolute non-existence, but 'Existence' Itself, the names and forms being as yet undifferentiated.

In this respect point out the Śruti (Tai. U. 2-6-1) and the *Bhāsya* thereon—

असन्नेव स भवति । असद्ब्रह्मेति वेद चेत् । अस्ति ब्रह्मेति चेद्वेद । सन्तमेनं ततो विदुरिति ।

असन्नेव असत्सम एव, यथा असन्नपुरुषार्थसम्बन्ध्येवं स भवति अपुरुषार्थसम्बन्धी । कोऽसौ[2] यो असदविद्यमानं ब्रह्मेति वेद विजानाति चेद्यदि । तद्विपर्ययेण यत्सर्वविकल्पास्पदं सर्वप्रवृत्तिबीजं सर्वविशेषप्रत्यस्तमितमपि, अस्ति तद्ब्रह्मेति वेद चेत् । कुतः पुनराशङ्का तन्नास्तित्वे[2] व्यवहारातीतत्व ब्रह्मण इति ब्रूमः । व्यवहारविषये हि वाचारम्भणमात्रेऽस्ति-

त्वभावितबुद्धिस्तद्विपरीते व्यवहारातीते नास्तित्वमपि प्रतिपद्यते। यथा 'घटादिर्व्यवहारविषयतयोपपन्नः सन् तद्विपरीतोऽसन्' इति प्रसिद्धम्। एवं तत्सामान्यादिहापि स्याद्ब्रह्मणो नास्तित्वं प्रत्याशङ्का। तस्मादुच्यते—अस्ति ब्रह्मेति चेद्वेदेति। किं पुनः स्यात्तदस्तीति विजानतः? तदाह—सन्तं विद्यमानं ब्रह्मरूपेण परमार्थसदात्मापन्न एनं एवंविदं विदुर्ब्रह्मविदः। ततस्तस्मादस्तित्ववेदनात् सोऽन्येषां ब्रह्मविद्विज्ञेयो भवतीत्यर्थः।

[Verily does one become non-being if he knows Brahman as non-being. They regard him as being, who knows that Brahman is.

He who knows Brahman to be non-being becomes equal to a non-being, himself That is to say, he attains no human aspirations any more than one who is non-existent

If, on the contrary, a man knows that there exists Brahman which is the basis of all differentiation, which is the seed of all evolution and which in Itself is characterised by no distinguishing features (we know of . .) now, it may be asked whence at all arises the supposition that Brahman does not exist ? The reply is—it arises from the fact that Brahman is beyond the sense-experience The *buddhi*, trained as it has indeed been to regard that as existing which falls within the range of sense-experience and which is but a result of speech, has also come to believe that which is contrary thereto i.e , what is beyond sense-experience as non-existent. People understand, for instance, that a pot exists when it is brought within the range of experience, and that it does not exist when it does not come within the range of experience Similarly, here too one may suppose that Brahman does not exist; hence the supposition 'if one knows that Brahman is'. What then of him who knows that Brahman exists ? The Śruti says : Because of his knowledge that Brahman exists, those who know Brahman regard him as 'Being'; they regard that, being one with Brahman, he is the Supreme Being and Reality. That is to say, others regard that he is Brahman Itself.]

*

The same is pointed to by the *Mānasollāsa* (VI-31) and the *ṭikā* thereon—

असन्नेव भवेद्विद्वानसद्ब्रह्मेति वेद चेत् ।
अस्ति ब्रह्मेति चेद्वेद सन्तमेनं ततो विदुः ॥

9.5.1 Brahman Beyond Words etc.

Referring to the *Gitāśloka* (XIII-12)—

ज्ञेयं यत्तत्प्रवक्ष्यामि यज्ज्ञात्वाऽमृतमश्नुते ।
अनादिमत्परं ब्रह्म न सत्तन्नासदुच्यते ॥

[That which has to be known, I shall describe, knowing which, one attains the Immortal. Beginningless is the Supreme Brahman It is not said to be *sat* or *asat*]

says the *Bhāsya* thereon—

ननु महता परिकरबन्धेन कण्ठरवेणोद्घुष्य ज्ञेयं प्रवक्ष्यामीत्यननुरूप-मुक्तं न सत्तन्नासदुच्यत इति । न, अनुरूपमेवोक्तम् । कथम् ? सर्वासु ह्युपनिषत्सु ज्ञेयं ब्रह्म 'नेति नेति', 'अस्थूलमनणु' इत्यादिविशेषप्रतिषेधे-नैव निर्दिश्यते, नेदं तदिति वाचोऽगोचरत्वात् ।

[If it is said that after proclaiming very loudly that He is going to speak of the Knowable, it does not become the Lord to describe It as neither *sat* nor *asat*, the reply is—it is quite the right thing that has been said. How? Thus—being inaccessible to speech, Brahman, the Knowable, is defined in all Upanisads only by a denial of all qualities as 'Not this, not this', 'Not gross, not subtle' and not in the manner 'It is this'.]

ननु तदस्ति यद्वस्तु अस्तिशब्देनोच्यते । अथास्तिशब्देन नोच्यते, नास्ति तज्ज्ञेयम् । विप्रतिषिद्धं च ज्ञेय तदस्तिशब्देन नोच्यत इति च । न तावन्नास्ति । नास्तिबुद्ध्यविषयत्वात् ।

ननु सर्वा बुद्धयोऽस्तिनास्तिबुद्ध्यनुगता एव । तत्रैवं सति ज्ञेयमप्यस्ति-बुद्ध्यनुगतप्रत्ययविषयं वा स्यान्नास्तिबुद्ध्यनुगतप्रत्ययविषयं वा स्यात् । न, अतीन्द्रियत्वेनोभयबुद्ध्यनुगतप्रत्ययाविषयत्वात् । यद्धीन्द्रियगम्यं वस्तु घटा-

दिकं तदस्तिबुद्ध्यनुगतप्रत्ययविषयं वा स्यान्नास्तिबुद्ध्यनुगतप्रत्ययविषयं वा स्यात् । इदं तु ज्ञेयमतीन्द्रियत्वेन शब्दैकप्रमाणगम्यत्वान्न घटादिवदुभयबुद्ध्यनुगतप्रत्ययविषयमित्यतो न सत्तन्नासदित्युच्यते । (Gī. Bhā. XIII-12)

[Here is raised another objection — that thing alone exists which can be spoken of as 'It exists'. If the Knowable cannot be spoken of as 'It exists', then It cannot exist And it is a contradiction in terms to say that It is Knowable and, at the same time, that It cannot be spoken of as existing.

The reply is that It is not non-existent either, since It is not an object of the consciousness of non-existence.

Again it is objected—every state of consciousness involves either the consciousness of existence or that of non-existence Such being the case, the Knowable should be comprehended either by a state of consciousness accompanied with the consciousness of existence or by a state of consciousness accompanied with the consciousness of non-existence

The answer is — no; for, being beyond the reach of the senses, It is not an object of consciousness accompanied with the idea of either existence or non-existence That thing, indeed, which can be perceived by the senses, such as a pot, can be an object of consciousness accompanied with the idea of existence, or an object of consciousness accompanied with the idea of non-existence. Since, on the other hand, the Knowable is beyond the reach of the senses and as such can be known solely through that instrument of knowledge which is called *śābda* (verbal testimony), It cannot be, like a pot etc , an object of consciousness accompanied with the idea of either existence or non-existence and is therefore not said to be *sat* or *asat*.]

यत्तूक्तं—विरुद्धमुच्यते ज्ञेयं तन्न सत्तन्नासदुच्यते इति । न विरुद्धम् । 'अन्यदेव तद्विदितादथो अविदितादधि' इति श्रुतेः । श्रुतिरपि विरुद्धार्थेति चेत् . . . । न, विदिताविदिताभ्यामन्यत्वश्रुतेरवश्यविज्ञेयार्थप्रतिपादनपरत्वात् ।

[Now as regards the allegation that it is a self-contradiction in terms to say that the Knowable is not said to be *sat* or *asat*,

the reply is that there is no contradiction, for Śruti says 'It i
other than the known and beyond the unknown'.

If it is said that even the Śruti quoted here is self-contradic
tory, it is not so. The above Śruti teaches by itself somethin
which should be accepted as true]

उपपत्तेश्च सदसदादिशब्दैर्ब्रह्म नोच्यत इति । सर्वो हि शब्दोऽर्थ
प्रकाशनाय प्रयुक्तः श्रूयमाणश्च श्रोतृभिर्जातिक्रियागुणसम्बन्धद्वारेण सङ्केत
ग्रहणसव्यपेक्षोऽर्थं प्रत्याययति, नान्यथा, अदृष्टत्वात् । तद्यथा गौरश्व इति व
जातितः, पाचकः पाठक इति वा क्रियातः, शुक्लः कृष्ण इति वा गुणतः, धनी
गोमानिति वा सम्बन्धतः, न तु ब्रह्म जातिमदतो न सदादिशब्दवाच्यं नापि
गुणवत्वेन गुणशब्देनोच्येत निर्गुणत्वान्नापि क्रियाशब्दवाच्यं निष्क्रियत्वात
'निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तम्' इति श्रुतेः । न च सम्बन्ध्येकत्वादद्वयत्वादविष
यत्वादात्मत्वाच्च न केनचिच्छब्देनोच्यत इति युक्तम्, 'यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते
इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यश्च ।

[Moreover, it stands to reason to say that Brahman canno
be expressed in words such as *sat* because every word employe
to denote a thing denotes that thing—when heard by another—
as associated with a certain genus, a certain act, a certai
quality or a certain mode of relation. Thus 'cow' and 'horse
imply genera, 'cook' and 'teacher' imply acts; 'white' and 'black
imply qualities; 'wealthy' and 'cattle-owner' imply relations
But Brahman belongs to no genus wherefore It cannot b
denoted by such words as *sat*. Being devoid of attributes, I
possesses no qualities. If It were possessed of qualities, then I
could be denoted by a word implying a quality. Being action
less, It cannot be indicated by a word implying an act. Th
Śruti says 'It is without parts, actionless and tranquil'. It is no
related to anything else, for It is One; It is without a second; I
is no object of any sense organ; It is the very Ātman. Therefor
it is but right to say that It can be denoted by no word at all; an
the Śrutis like the following, point to the same thing—'whenc
all words recede'.]

The *Taittirīyabhāṣya*, prior to commenting on this Śruti (Tai. U. 2-9-1) says—

तस्मात् सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्मेति यथोक्तलक्षणात्मप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमेव बहुभवनसर्गप्रवेशरसलाभाभयसंक्रमणादि परिकल्प्यते ब्रह्मणि संव्यवहारविषये ; न तु परमार्थतो निर्विकल्पे ब्रह्मणि कश्चिदपि विकल्प उपपद्यते ।

[It is only with a view to impart the knowledge of the oneness of Ātman with Brahman defined in the Śruti in the words 'Existence, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman' etc., that Brahman which is sought to be made known is represented as multiplying Itself, as creating the Universe, as entering it, as the Flavour attained by the wise, as the Fearless, as the Goal attained and so on, whereas, in actuality, no such conditions can exist in the unconditioned Brahman.]

Say the Śruti (Tai. U. 2-9-1) and the *Bhāṣya* thereon—

यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते। अप्राप्य मनसा सह।

[Whence all words recede along with the mind, without reaching]

यतः यस्मान्निर्विकल्पाद्यथोक्तलक्षणादद्वयादानन्दादात्मनो, वाचोऽभिधानानि द्रव्यादिसविकल्पवस्तुविषयाणि वस्तुसामान्यान्निर्विकल्पेऽद्वयेऽपि ब्रह्मणि प्रयोक्तृभिः प्रकाशनाय प्रयुज्यमानानि अप्राप्याप्रकाश्यैव निवर्तन्ते स्वसामर्थ्याद्धीयन्ते । मन इति प्रत्ययो विज्ञानम् । तच्च, यत्राभिधानं प्रवृत्तमतीन्द्रियेऽप्यर्थे तदर्थे च प्रवर्तते प्रकाशनाय । यत्र च विज्ञानम् , तत्र वाचः प्रवृत्तिः । तस्मात् सहैव वाङ्मनसयोरभिधानप्रत्यययोः प्रवृत्तिः सर्वत्र । तस्माद्ब्रह्मप्रकाशनाय सर्वथा प्रयोक्तृभिः प्रयुज्यमाना अपि वाचो यस्मादप्रत्ययविषयादनभिधेयाददृश्यादिविशेषणात् सहैव मनसा विज्ञानेन सर्वप्रकाशनसमर्थेन निवर्तन्ते ।

[From the Unconditioned Non-dual Bliss that is Ātman defined above, all words—all designations which can denote only conditioned things such as substances but which are employed by authors to denote the Unconditioned Non-dual Brahman alike because of the fact that It is also an existing entity—recede without reaching It i.e., failing to denote

Brahman, they show themselves powerless Mind means thought i.e, cognition, and this proceeds to comprehend whatever is denoted by employing speech, be it even beyond the senses And wherever cognition acts, there speech also acts. Thus everywhere speech and thought, words and cognitions, act together. In whatever manner words be employed to denote Brahman which is not object of any knowledge, which is beyond speech and which cannot be seen with the eyes etc, they recede powerless, along with mind that is cognition which is capable of comprehending all else.]

9.5.2 Nevertheless Brahman Comprehended as 'Is'

Say the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* (2-3-12) and the *Bhāṣya* thereon—

नैव वाचा न मनसा प्राप्तुं शक्यो न चक्षुषा ।
अस्तीति ब्रुवतोऽन्यत्र कथं तदुपलभ्यते ॥

सत्यम् । नैव वाचा न मनसा न चक्षुषा नान्यैरपीन्द्रियैः प्राप्तुं शक्यत इत्यर्थः । तथापि सर्वविशेषरहितोऽपि जगतो मूलमित्यवगतत्वादस्त्येव, कार्यप्रविलापनस्यास्तित्वनिष्ठत्वात् । तथा हीदं कार्यं सौक्ष्म्यतारतम्यपारम्पर्येणानुगम्यमानं सद्बुद्धिनिष्ठामेवावगमयति । यदाऽपि विषयप्रविलापनेन प्रविलाप्यमाना बुद्धिः तदापि सा सत्प्रत्ययगर्भैव विलीयते । बुद्धिर्हि नः प्रमाणं सदसतोर्याथात्म्यावगमे । मूलं चेज्जगतो न स्यादसदन्वितमेवेदं कार्यमसदसदित्येव गृह्येत, न त्वेतदस्ति ; सत्सदित्येव तु गृह्यते ; यथा मृदादिकार्यं घटादि मृदाद्यन्वितम् । तस्माज्जगतो मूलमात्मास्तीत्येवोपलब्धव्यः । कस्मात् ? अस्तीति ब्रुवतोऽस्तित्ववादिन आगमार्थानुसारिणः श्रद्दधानादन्यत्र नास्तिकवादिनि नास्ति जगतो मूलमात्मा निरन्वयमेवेदं कार्यमभावान्तं प्रविलीयत इति मन्यमाने विपरीतदर्शिनि, कथं तद्ब्रह्म तत्त्वत उपलभ्यते ; न कथञ्चनोपलभ्यत इत्यर्थः ।

[Not by speech, not by mind, not by the eye, can It be attained. How can It be comprehended except by him who says 'It is'!

True, not by speech, not by mind, not by the eye, not by other senses, could It be known. Still though devoid of any attributes, being known as the origin of the universe, It certainly exists, for that into which effects are absorbed must certainly exist, for here also in the process of tracing this effect viz , the universe, back to its source, through subtler and subtler entities, each of these is seen to be comprehended as *sat* (existent) which is the culmination as well Even when being sublated on the sublation of the objects of cognition, the intellect is still pregnant with the knowledge of existence of something remaining unsublated, for knowledge is our *pramāna* in the comprehending of the existence and non-existence of things If the origin of the universe were non-existent, the effect that is this universe, being inseperably connected with non-existence, would be apprehended as non-existing , but it is not so. It is apprehended as existing only, just as a pot etc , made of mud is comprehended as inseparably connected with mud Therefore Ātman, the origin of the universe, is to be known as existing. Why? Brahman can be truly known only by him who believes and argues that Ātman exists and who follows Śruti and has faith in its teaching How can Brahman be truly known by others who seeing perversely argue that there is no Ātman, the origin of this universe which is not connected with any cause and which is absorbed into non-existence! The meaning is that It cannot at all be 'known'.]

Again the *Kaṭhopanisad* (2-3-13) and the *Bhāsya* thereon say—

अस्तीत्येवोपलब्धव्यस्तत्त्वभावेन चोभयोः ।
अस्तीत्येवोपलब्धस्य तत्त्वभावः प्रसीदति ॥

[He should be apprehended only as Existence, and that, as He really is. Of these two, to him who knows Him to exist, His real nature becomes revealed]

तस्मादपोह्यासद्वादिपक्षमासुरम् अस्तीत्येवात्मोपलब्धव्यः सत्कार्यबुद्ध्याद्युपाधिभिः । यदा तु तद्रहितोऽविक्रिय आत्मा कार्यं च कारणव्यतिरेकेण

नास्ति 'वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्' इति श्रुतेः, तदा तस्य निरुपाधिकस्यालिङ्गस्य सदसदादिप्रत्ययविषयत्ववर्जितस्यात्मनस्तत्त्वभावो भवति । तेन च रूपेणात्मोपलब्धव्य इत्यनुवर्तते ।

[Therefore having abandoned the theory of the non-existence of Ātman, which would bind one only to the worldly life, Ātman, the Cause, is to be known as existing because of the delimiting adjuncts viz , the effects such as intellect etc., which are experienced as 'the effect is'. But when Ātman is devoid of the adjuncts and the concomitant modifications as well, an effect having no existence independent of its cause, as pointed out by the Śruti 'What is designated as a modification is a matter of mere speech; that it is mud is alone true', then is known the true nature of Ātman unconditioned, devoid of indicative marks and incapable of being thought of as existent, non-existent etc. In this manner Ātman is to be known verily in His true nature.]

तत्राप्युभयोः सोपाधिकनिरुपाधिकयोरस्तित्वतत्त्वभावयोः—निर्धारणार्था षष्ठी—पूर्वमस्तीत्येवोपलब्धस्यात्मनः सत्कार्योपाधिकृतास्तित्वप्रत्ययेनोपलब्धस्येत्यर्थः । पश्चात्प्रत्यस्तमितसर्वोपाधिरूप आत्मनस्तत्त्वभावो विदिताविदिताभ्यामन्योऽद्वयस्वभावो 'नेति नेति', 'अस्थूलमनण्वह्रस्वम्' 'अदृश्येऽनात्म्येऽनिरुक्तेऽनिलयने' इत्यादिश्रुतिनिर्दिष्टः प्रसीदत्यभिमुखीभवति आत्मप्रकाशनाय पूर्वमस्तीत्युपलब्धवत इत्येतत् ।

[Ātman in association with the adjuncts and known previously as existent alone, is the one cognised as existent because of the adjunct viz , the effect which is an existent. Subsequently the real nature of Ātman, devoid of all adjuncts, different from both the known and the unknown, of non-dual nature and indicated by the Śrutis 'Not this, not this', 'Not gross, not subtle, not short', 'In the invisible, bodiless, indescribable, abodeless' etc., presents Itself for revelation to one who had previously realised Him as existent.]

9.5.3 Import of Sruti—Brahman-Atman Identity; not Sunyavada

Thus is clear that the Śrutis quoted here have their

import in indicating, and thereby enabling the revelation of Ātman as Brahman, and not in *Śūnyavāda*, as had been misunderstood. The *Upadeśasāhasrī* (III–1 to 4) points out that these Śrutis are meaningful only if they are taken as pertaining to Ātman and not to anything else—

ईश्वरश्चेदनात्मा स्यान्नासावस्मीति धारयेत् ।
आत्मा चेदीश्वरोऽस्मीति विद्या सान्यनिवर्तिका ॥
आत्मनोऽन्यस्य चेद्धर्मा अस्थूलत्वादयो मताः ।
अज्ञेयत्वेऽस्य किं तैः स्यादात्मत्वे ह्यन्यधीह्नुतिः ॥
मिथ्याध्यासनिषेधार्थं ततोऽस्थूलादि गृह्यताम् ।
परत्र चेन्निषेधार्थं शून्यतावर्णनं हि तत् ॥
बुभुत्सोर्यदि चान्यत्र प्रत्यगात्मन इष्यते ।
अप्राणो ह्यमनाः शुभ्र इति चानर्थकं वचः ॥

[If Brahman were different from Ātman, the aspirant cannot realise that he is Brahman. If he realises that Ātman is Brahman, this is right knowledge, the destroyer of Avidyā. What would be the use of description by Śruti, of qualities like 'not gross' etc., if they were to pertain to Īśvara as different from Ātman, as in that case, the description would in no way help in making Him known

If it pertains to Ātman, however, it would then be of use in negating the opposite qualities falsely superposed on Ātman given expression to as 'I am stout' etc. Otherwise it would amount to a description of void

Moreover, the Śruti 'devoid of the vital force, devoid of mind; and pure' would be meaningless if these qualities were meant to be negated from an aspirant other than Ātman.]

9.5.4 Sruti, Akhandakaravritti—Dispelling of Avidya Veiling Brahman

Thus, though it has been established by Śruti itself that

words fail to convey directly Brahman-Ātman and that mind is unable to comprehend It as an object, still it may be recalled that It is to be known only by *Śrutipramāna* and the teaching by the *Ācārya*—

'औपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि' (Bṛ. U. 5-9-26)

'अनन्यप्रोक्ते गतिरत्र नास्ति' (Ka. U. 1-2-8)

by having recourse to the method of *laksaṇā*; and also that the appropriate mental mode viz., *vṛttivyāpti*, is necessary— मनसैवेदमाप्तव्यम् (Ka. U 2-1-11) though not the accompanying shine, *phalavyāpti* Even when It is spoken of as being revealed by Śruti and *Akhaṇḍākāravṛtti*, it is only by way of dispelling Avidyā veiling Brahman-Ātman which shines of Its own accord.

The *Daśaślokī* (10) 'Neither is It one nor many; nor has It oneness nor multiplicity; neither is It void nor non-void, being Itself non-dual. How can I speak of That which is established by all the Upanisads?' puts all these succinctly as pointed out by the *Siddhāntabindu* on it. The idea is that being the very 'Shine' Itself, It is bereft of all distinctions based on duality such as the quality and the qualified, the knower and the known, the revealer and the revealed, the contemplator and the contemplated, word and its meaning etc., It being the Substratum of all illusion as well as the ultimate limit of all sublation. The knowledge of what is sublated need not necessarily be valid knowledge; it may be illusory also, as made known by empirical *pramāṇas* like perception—

न चैकं तदन्यद्द्वितीयं कुतः स्यान्न वा केवलत्वं न चाकेवलत्वम् ।
न शून्य न चाशून्यमद्वैतकत्वात् कथ सर्ववेदान्तसिद्धं ब्रवीमि ॥

एकत्वसङ्ख्यायोग्येकम् । तदपेक्षाबुद्धिजन्यद्वित्वसङ्ख्यायोगि द्वितीयम् ।

तत एकाभावे द्वितीयं कुतः स्यात्? द्वितीयं च तृतीयादीनामप्युपलक्षणम्। ननु 'एकमेवाद्वितीयम्' इति श्रुत्या एकत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते । नेत्याह—न वा केवलत्वमिति। केवलत्वमेकत्वम्। तस्याविद्यकत्वात्। यद्यात्मन एकत्वं श्रुत्या न प्रतिपाद्यते तर्हि प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणवशादनेकत्वमेव स्यादिति चेन्नेत्याह—न चाकेवलत्वमिति। अकेवलत्वमनेकत्वम्। 'नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन', 'एकमेवाद्वितीयम् ब्रह्म', 'अथात आदेशो नेति नेति' इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः। तर्हि सर्वप्रतिषेधाच्छून्यमेव स्यादिति नेत्याह—न शून्यमिति। 'असन्नेव स भवति। असद्ब्रह्मेति वेद चेत्। अस्ति ब्रह्मेति चेद्वेद। सन्तमेन ततो विदुरिति।', 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म', 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' इत्युपक्रम्य 'ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं तत् सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि' इत्यादिश्रुतिभिः सत्यत्वप्रतिपादनात्, सर्वभ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वात् सर्वबाधावधित्वाच्च। तर्हि सत्यत्वज्ञानत्वादिधर्मवदपि स्यात्, नेत्याह—न चाशून्यमिति। एकमद्वितीयमिति पदद्वयेन सर्वभेदप्रतिषेधेऽप्येवकारेण धर्मधर्मिभावादिभेदप्रतिषेधात्। सर्वत्र हेतुमाह—अद्वैतकत्वादिति। द्विधा इतं द्वीतम्। तस्य भावो द्वैतम्। तदुक्तं वार्तिके—द्विधेतं द्वीतमित्याहुस्तद्भावो द्वैतमुच्यते। इति। न विद्यते द्वैतं द्विधाभावो यत्र तदद्वैतमित्यक्षरार्थः। 'सलिलमेको द्रष्टाद्वैतः' इति श्रुतेः। प्रतियोगिज्ञानस्यैव लाघवेनाभावबुद्धौ कारणत्वात् द्वैतस्यानिर्वचनीयत्वाङ्गीकारेण प्रत्यक्षादिवेद्यत्वान्निषेधोपपत्तिरित्यर्थः। तर्ह्येतादृश आत्माङ्गुलिनिर्देशेन प्रतिपाद्यतामिति नेत्याह—कथं ब्रवीमीति। किमाक्षेपे। अद्वैतकत्वेन वागविषयत्वात्। 'अवचनेनैव प्रोवाच', 'यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते। अप्राप्य मनसा सह', 'न विज्ञातेर्विज्ञातारं विजानीयाः' इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः। वागविषयत्वे वेदान्तानां कथं तत्र प्रामाण्यमिति चेन्न। अविषयेऽप्यात्मनि तदाकारवृत्तिमात्रेण तदविद्यानिवर्तकत्वादित्याह—सर्ववेदान्तसिद्धमिति। तथा च श्रुतिः 'यस्यामतं तस्य मतं मतं यस्य न वेद सः', ' [illegible] विजानतां विज्ञातमविजानताम्', 'यन्मनसा न मनुते येनाहुर्मनो [illegible] व ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते।' इ[illegible] । तदेवं वेदान्तवाक्यज-

खण्डाकारवृत्त्या अविद्यानिवृत्तौ तत्कल्पितसकलानर्थनिवृत्तौ परमानन्दरूपः सन् कृतकृत्यो भवतीति सिद्धम् ।

This is pointed out by the *Mānasollāsa* (VI-28, 29) and the *ṭīkā* thereon—

वाचो यत्र निवर्तन्ते मनो यत्र विलीयते ।
एकीभवन्ति यत्रैव भूतानि भुवनानि च ॥ (28)
समस्तानि च तत्त्वानि समुद्रे सिन्धवो यथा ।
कश्शोकः तत्र को मोह एकत्वमनुपश्यतः ॥ (29)

The *ṭīkā* thereon quotes the Śrutis—

'आत्मेत्येवोपासीतात्र ह्येते सर्व एक भवन्ति' (Bṛ.U. 3-4-7), 'परेऽव्यये सर्व एकीभवन्ति' (Mu. U. 3-2-7), 'यथास्यैव प्रज्ञायै सर्वाणि भूतानि एकं भवन्ति तद्व्याख्यास्यामः' (Kau. U. 3-4), 'अथास्मिन्प्राण एवैकधा भवति ।' (Kau. U. 3-3)

यथा नद्यस्स्यन्दमानास्समुद्रेऽस्त गच्छन्ति नामरूपे विहाय ।
तथा विद्वान्नामरूपाद्विमुक्तः परात्परं पुरुषमुपैति दिव्यम् ॥
(Mu. U. 3-2-8)

यस्मिन्सर्वाणि भूतान्यात्मैवाभूद्विजानतः ।
तत्र को मोहः कश्शोक एकत्वमनुपश्यतः ॥ (Ī. U. 7)

[Ātman is to be meditated upon, for in Him all these become one.

All become one in the Supreme Immutable Being. Now we will explain how all beings become one with this Intelligence.

He becomes one in this *Prāna* (which is the same as *Prajñā*, the Intelligence).

Just as the flowing rivers disappear in the ocean casting off name and form, even so the knower, freed from name and form, attains to the Effulgent Person, higher than the high

When to the knower, all beings have verily become one with Ātman, then what delusion and what sorrow can be to him who has thus seen the Oneness !]

9.6.1 Existence of Atman — Evidenced from Deep Sleep Experience — Bliss

Having thus refuted, on the basis of Śruti and reasoning, the various aspects of the Bauddha doctrine, showing up in their full bloom in the *Śūnyavāda* as claimed by them, attention may now be focussed upon the indubitable evidence in respect of the existence of Ātman, provided by the experience, as voiced by this sixth stanza of the hymn, referring to the recollection 'I slept hitherto'.

The *Siddhāntabindu* (quoted already in connection with the fifth stanza of the hymn) on the line सुषुप्त्येकसिद्धः of the *Daśaślokī*, points out that the Self-effulgent Ātman being the Witness of the state of deep sleep is not non-existent in that state, for otherwise the *pratyabhijñā* i.e., the recollection 'I was ignorant' cannot be accounted for.

This question may now be considered in fair detail The importance of the consideration of the deep sleep state in the triad of states—the waking, the dream and the deep sleep—is seen from the fact that practically everyone longs for it and contrives to get into it as the way out of the troubles and the turmoils experienced in the other two states. This fact itself makes it clear that peace and happiness are believed to be attained in that state. Says the *Pañcadaśī* (XI-42 to 45)—

निद्रायां तु सुखं यत्तज्जन्यते केन हेतुना ।
सुखाभिमुखधीरादौ पश्चान्मज्जेत्परे सुखे ॥
जाग्रद्व्यावृत्तिभिः श्रान्तो विश्रम्याथ विरोधिनि ।
अपनीते स्वस्थचित्तोऽनुभवेद्विषये सुखम् ॥
आत्माभिमुखधीवृत्तौ स्वानन्दः प्रतिबिम्बति ।
अनुभूयैनमत्रापि त्रिपुटया श्रान्तिमाप्नुयात् ॥

तच्छ्रमस्यापनुत्त्यर्थं जीवो धावेत्परात्मनि ।
तेनैक्यं प्राप्य तत्रत्यो ब्रह्मानन्दः स्वयं भवेत् ॥

If it is asked as to how happiness is attained in deep sleep, the answer is that the mind first becomes turned towards happiness by soft beds etc., and then merges in the great happiness of Self.

9.6.2 Longing for Sleep—The Five Examples

Tired of its avocations in the waking state, the jīva seeks happiness in such objects of enjoyment as bed etc. This happiness is no doubt external and extrinsic, विषयानन्द, not completely free from misery as there is still the differentiation of the experiencer, the experience and the experienced i.e., the *triputī*; and it is only a semblance of Bliss which is a reflection of the Bliss of Self, in the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*. For getting rid of the tiresomeness, the jīva plunges into the Supreme Self and secures identity with the Brahman-Bliss thereof.

By means of five examples, Śruti indicates what the Brahman-Bliss experienced in deep sleep is like—

तद्यथाऽस्मिन्नाकाशे श्येनो वा सुपर्णो वा विपरिपत्य श्रान्तः संहत्य पक्षौ सँल्लयायैव ध्रियत एवमेवायं पुरुष एतस्मा अन्ताय धावति यत्र सुप्तो न कञ्चन कामं कामयते न कञ्चन स्वप्नं पश्यति । (Br U. 6-3-19)

स यथा शकुनिः सूत्रेण प्रबद्धो दिशं दिशं पतित्वाऽन्यत्रायतनमलब्ध्वा बन्धनमेवोपश्रयत एवमेव खलु सोम्य तन्मनो दिशं दिशं पतित्वाऽन्यत्रायतनमलब्ध्वा प्राणमेवोपश्रयते प्राणबन्धनं हि सोम्य मन इति । (Ch U.6-8-2)

स मनाख्योपाधिर्जीवोऽविद्याकामकर्मोपदिष्टा दिश दिश सुखदुःखादिलक्षणा जाग्रत्स्वप्नयोः पतित्वा गत्वानुभूयेत्यर्थः । अन्यत्र सदाख्यात् स्वात्मन आयतन विश्रमणस्थानमलब्ध्वा प्राणमेव प्राणेन सर्वकार्यकरणाश्रयेणोपलक्षिता

प्राण इत्युच्यते सदाख्या परा देवता, 'प्राणस्य प्राणम्', 'प्राणशरीरो भारूपः' इत्यादिश्रुतेः। (Ch Bhā 6-8-2)

[As a hawk or a falcon flying in the sky becomes tired and spreading its wings is bound for its nest, so does this being run for this state where falling asleep he craves no desires and sees no dreams

Just as a bird tied to a string, after flying in various directions and finding no resting place elsewhere, takes refuge at the very place whereto it is tied, even so, dear boy! jīva i e, the *Sat* with the internal organ as *upādhi*, impelled by ignorance, cravings and the activities resulting therefrom, by excursions into the external world through the senses and the mind, on experiencing pleasure and pain derived from contact with innumerable objects in the waking and the dream states, finding no shelter other than his very Ātman termed herein as *Sat*, takes refuge in *Prāna* i e, the Divine Supreme, the *Sat*, indicated in the Śrutis by the word *Prāna* which is the support of the entire body, senses etc., 'The *Prāna* of the *prāna*', 'He who has *prāna* for His body, whose nature is Consciousness' etc.]

9 6 3 Vijnanamaya One with Brahman in Deep Sleep; No Void

The question — 'When this being, the *vijñānamaya*, was thus asleep, where was he; and whence did he thus come?'— is raised and answered by Śruti in the conversation between Ajātaśatru and Bālāki—

स होवाचाजातशत्रुर्यत्रैष एतत्सुप्तोऽभूद्य एष विज्ञानमयः पुरुषः क्वैष तदाभूत्कुत एतदागादिति। (Br. U. 4-1-16)

अथ यदा सुषुप्तो भवति यदा न कस्यचन वेद . . . . स यथा कुमारो वा महाराजो वा महाब्राह्मणो वातिघ्नीमानन्दस्य गत्वा शयीतैवमेवैष एतच्छेते। (Br. U. 4-1-19)

The *Bhāsya* thereon says—

यदा यस्मिन्काले सुषुप्तः सुष्ठु सुप्तः सम्प्रसाद स्वाभाव्य गतो भवति . सुप्ते तु विशेषविज्ञानाभावस्य विवक्षितत्वात्। . नायमात्मा अन्योऽन्यत्रा-

भूदन्यो वा अन्यस्मादागतः, साधनान्तरं वा आत्मन्यस्ति। किं तर्हि? स्वात्मन्येवाभूत्। 'स्वमात्मानमपीतो भवति', 'सता सोम्य तदा सम्पन्नो भवति', 'प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिष्वक्तः', 'पर आत्मनि सम्प्रतिष्ठते' इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः। अत एव नान्योऽन्यस्मादागच्छति। तत् श्रुत्यैव प्रदर्श्यते— 'अस्मादात्मनः' इति। आत्मव्यतिरेकेण वस्त्वन्तराभावात्।

[When he becomes fast asleep i.e, attains his natural state of perfect purity .... when he does not know anything i e., there is no consciousness in particular of anything whatsoever, in the state of profound sleep.. . as a boy or an emperor or a noble *brāhmana* lives, having attained the acme of Bliss, so does he remain

This self was not in any place different from itself, nor did it come from any place different from itself nor is there in the self any means different from itself. What then is the import? The import is that the self was in its own Self This is borne out by Śrutis .. . 'It merges in its own Self', 'With Existence, my dear! it is then united', 'Fully embraced by the Supreme Self', 'Rests on the Supreme Self' etc For the same reason, it does not come from any place different from itself, for there is naught besides Self as pointed out by the Śruti]

That this self is none other than Brahman-Ātman is shown by the subsequent Śruti (Br U. 4-1-20) which speaks of creation as proceeding from It at the time of waking—

स यथोर्णनाभिस्तन्तुनोच्चरेद्यथाग्नेः क्षुद्रा विस्फुलिङ्गा व्युच्चरन्त्येवमेवास्मादात्मनः सर्वे प्राणाः सर्वे लोकाः सर्वे देवाः सर्वाणि भूतानि व्युच्चरन्ति तस्योपनिषत्सत्यस्य सत्यमिति प्राणा वै सत्यं तेषामेष सत्यम्।

[As a spider produces the thread from out of itself, and as from fire tiny sparks fly in all directions, so from this Self emanate all organs, all worlds, all gods and all beings Its secret name is 'the Truth of truth'. The vital force is truth, and It is the Truth of that.]

These impressive illustrations of a bird etc., are cited in the *Pañcadaśī* (XI-46 to 52) as well—

दृष्टान्ताः शकुनिः श्येनः कुमारश्च महान्नृपः ।
महाब्राह्मण इत्येते सुप्त्यानन्दे श्रुतीरिताः ॥
शकुनिः सूत्रबद्धः सन्दिक्षु व्यापृत्य विश्रमम् ।
अलब्ध्वा बन्धनस्थानं हस्तस्तम्भाद्युपाश्रयेत् ॥
जीवोपाधिमनस्तद्वद्धर्माधर्मफलाप्तये ।
स्वप्ने जाग्रति च भ्रान्त्वा क्षीणे कर्मणि लीयते ॥
श्येनो वेगेन नीडैकलम्पटः शयितुं व्रजेत् ।
जीवः सुप्त्यै तथा धावेद्ब्रह्मानन्दैकलम्पटः ॥
अतिबालः स्तनं पीत्वा मृदुशय्यागतो हसन् ।
रागद्वेषाद्यनुत्पत्तेरानन्दैकस्वभावभाक् ॥
महाराजः सार्वभौमः संतृप्तः सर्वभोगतः ।
मानुषानन्दसीमानं प्राप्यानन्दैकमूर्तिभाक् ॥
महाविप्रो ब्रह्मवेदी कृतकृत्यत्वलक्षणाम् ।
विद्यानन्दस्य परमां काष्ठां प्राप्यावतिष्ठते ॥

The *Praśnopaniṣad* (IV-7, 8, 9) says that in deep sleep—the elements, gross and subtle, the ten sense organs along with their objects, the internal organ with its four aspects along with their objects i.e., the entire totality of effects and instruments having name and form, and combined for the benefit of some other entity (i.e., Self)—

(सर्वं हि कार्यकरणजातं पारार्थ्येन संहतं नामरूपात्मकम् ।
—*Bhāṣya* thereon)

—all this becomes absorbed into the Supreme Imperishable Ātman, even as birds resort to a tree, their abode Also, verily this *puruṣa*, *vijñānātmā*, intelligent entity, who sees, touches, hears, smells, tastes, thinks, knows and does,

*

gets merged in the Supreme Imperishable Ātman, the Supporter of the universe, just as the image of the Sun enters the Sun on the drying up of the water that reflects it etc.—

स च जलसूर्यकादिप्रतिबिम्बस्य सूर्यादिप्रवेशवज्जलाद्याधारशोषे परेऽक्षर आत्मनि सम्प्रतिष्ठते। (Pr. U. Bh. IV-9) as the *Bhāsya* says.

स यथा सोम्य वयांसि वासोवृक्षं सम्प्रतिष्ठन्ते । एवं ह वै तत्सर्वं पर आत्मनि सम्प्रतिष्ठते ॥

पृथिवी च पृथिवीमात्रा . . . प्राणश्च विधारयितव्यं च। एष हि द्रष्टा स्प्रष्टा श्रोता घ्राता रसयिता मन्ता बोद्धा कर्ता विज्ञानात्मा . . . पुरुषः स परे अक्षर आत्मनि सम्प्रतिष्ठते ॥ (Pr.U. IV-7, 8, 9).

Profound sleep experienced daily by the jīva is thus a return to this Source for recuperation and refreshment This itself shows that the state of deep sleep cannot be a state of nothingness where one would like to proceed to extinguish himself.

In passing, it may be pointed out that the absorption of the entire universe, gross and subtle, inclusive of the experienced as also the adjuncts of the experiencer spoken of in this *Praśnopanisad*, as also the emanation of the entire universe at the time of waking voiced by the *Bṛhadāranyakopanisad* are indicative of their purport in *Ekajīvavāda*—the doctrine of only one jīva.

9.6.4 Condition in Deep Sleep; Awakening—Reminiscence and Sruti

Then what exactly is this deep sleep state as distinguished from the other two from which the individual tries to escape? What is his condition then? What are his experiences then and what are the means? What is the relation of this state to the other two and what is the outcome of this investiga-

tion ? These are the questions that arise These are to be solved on the basis of the reminiscences pertaining to the deep sleep state as voiced in the waking state and the *Śruti-pramāna*. The very fact that one is reminiscent of his state of deep sleep, *gives the lie to the theory that he was non-existent* then What the Śruti says in this respect is made clear in the Sūtras (3-2-2-7, 8) and (3-2-3-9) and the *Bhāsya* thereon—तदभावो नाडीषु तच्छ्रुतेरात्मनि च। (The deep sleep i.e , the absence of that (dreams) takes place in the *nādis*, and in Ātman, according to Śrutis), अतः प्रबोधोऽस्मात्। (Hence the waking up is from the Supreme Self), स एव तु कर्मानुस्मृतिशब्दविधिभ्यः। (But the very same jīva returns from sleep as justified by the reasons of karma, remembrance, Śruti and injunction).

एवमेतासु श्रुतिषु त्रीण्येव सुषुप्तिस्थानानि सङ्कीर्तितानि नाड्यः पुरीतद्ब्रह्म चेति। तत्रापि द्वारमात्रं नाड्यः पुरीतच्च, ब्रह्मैव त्वेकमनपायि सुषुप्तिस्थानम्। अपि च नाड्यः पुरीतद्वा जीवस्योपाध्याधार एव भवति, तत्रास्य करणानि वर्तन्त इति। न ह्युपाधिसम्बन्धमन्तरेण स्वत एव जीवस्याधारः कश्चित्सम्भवति, ब्रह्माव्यतिरेकेण स्वमहिमप्रतिष्ठितत्वात्। ब्रह्माधारत्वमप्यस्य सुषुप्ते नैवाधाराधेयभेदाभिप्रायेणोच्यते। कथ तर्हि ? तादात्म्याभिप्रायेण। यत आह—'सता सोम्य तदा सम्पन्नो भवति स्वमपीतो भवति' इति। स्वशब्देनात्माभिलप्यते, स्वरूपमापन्नः सुप्तो भवतीत्यर्थः। अपि च न कदाचिज्जीवस्य ब्रह्मणा सम्पत्तिर्नास्ति, स्वरूपस्यानपायित्वात्। स्वप्नजागरितयोस्तूपाधिसंपर्कवशात्पररूपापत्तिमिवापेक्ष्य तदुपशमात्सुषुप्तेः स्वरूपापत्तिर्विवक्ष्यते, 'स्वमपीतो भवति' इति। अतश्च सुप्तावस्थायां कदाचित्सता संपद्यते कदाचिन्न संपद्यत इत्ययुक्तम्। अपि च स्थानविकल्पाभ्युपगमेऽपि विशेषविज्ञानोपशमलक्षणं तावत्सुषुप्तं न क्वचिद्विशिष्यते। तत्र सति संपन्नस्तावत्तदेकत्वान्न विजानातीति युक्तम्। 'तत्केन कं विजानीयात्' इति श्रुतेः। नाडीषु पुरीतति च शयानस्य न किञ्चिदविज्ञाने कारणं शक्यं विज्ञातुम्, भेदविषयत्वात्। 'यत्र

वा अन्यदिव स्यात्तत्रान्योऽन्यत्पश्येत्' इति श्रुतेः। ननु भेदविषयस्याप्यतिदूरादिकारणमविज्ञाने स्यात्। बाढम्। एवं स्याद्यदि जीवः स्वतः परिच्छिन्नोऽभ्युपगम्येत, यथा विष्णुमित्रः प्रवासी स्वगृहं न पश्यति। नतु जीवस्योपाधिव्यतिरेकेण परिच्छेदो विद्यते। उपाधिगतमेवातिदूरादिकारणमविज्ञान इति यद्युच्येत तथाप्युपाधेरुपशान्तत्वात्सत्येव संपन्नो न विजानातीति युक्तम्।

(Sū Bhā. 3-2-2-7)

[Thus in these Śrutis, only three places are mentioned as the places of sleep—the *nādis*, the pericardium and Brahman. Among these again, the *nādis* as also the pericardium are mere entrances, the Imperishable Brahman alone without a second being the lasting place of deep sleep. Moreover the *nādis* as well as the pericardium become merely the abode of the *upādhis* of the jīva for in them abide the organs. Without the association of the *upādhis* it is impossible for the jīva itself to abide anywhere since it is ever established in its own glory owing to its non-difference from Brahman As for its having Brahman as its abode in deep sleep, that too is stated not by way of making a distinction as between a container and the contained In what way then? By way of showing their identity since it is said 'O amiable one! he then becomes unified with Existence; he attains his own Self' where the Supreme Self is referred to by the phrase 'own Self', the idea implied being that one asleep remains established in his true *Svarūpa* Moreover there is no time when the jīva is not in union with Brahman since one's own nature is ever unchangeable But the statement 'He attains his own Self' is made because in the dream and the waking, jiva seems to assume another's garb under the influence of the *upādhis* with which it remains associated, whereas in sleep that garb falls off so that in comparison with the other two, sleep is sought to be spoken of as the state of assumption of the real nature Thus it is clear that it is improper to say that sometimes (in deep sleep) the jīva becomes unified with Existence and sometimes not Besides even if it be admitted that there are different loci for the jīva in deep sleep, still deep sleep as consisting in the cessation of particularised knowledge, is

always the same. And under such circumstances it is but logical that jīva, merged in Existence, should not know anything because of its non-duality as shown by the Śruti—'Then what should one know and through what?'. Further, if the sleeping jīva did rest in the *nāḍis* and the pericardium, it would be impossible to assign any reason for its not cognising the objects since particularised cognition is concerned with duality which is present there as shown by the Śruti—'when there is something else, as it were, then one sees the other'. It may be objected that even the objects in the world of duality may remain unknown owing to great distance etc The answer is that it could be so if the jīva were supposed to be limited by itself, even as Visnumitra cannot see his house when on a sojourn. But the jīva has no limitation apart from that caused by the *upādhis*. Well, then, great distance etc., inherent in the *upādhi* may be the reason for non-cognition. Yes, but that leads to the conclusion already arrived at viz , that the jīva does not cognise when, the *upādhi* being merged, it has become one with Existence during sleep]

9.6.5 Persistence of Upadhi — Not Aware of Oneness with Brahman

Says the *Sūtrabhāsya* (3-2-3-9)—

यत्पुनरुक्तं यथा जलराशौ प्रक्षिप्तो जलबिन्दुर्नोद्धर्तुं शक्यते, एवं सति संपन्नो जीवो नोत्पतितुमर्हतीति, तत्परिह्रियते । युक्तं तत्र विवेककारणाभावाज्जलविन्दोरनुद्धरणम् । इह तु विद्यते विवेककारणं कर्म चाविद्या चेति वैषम्यम् । दृश्यते च दुर्विवेचयोरप्यस्माज्जातीयैः क्षीरोदकयोः संसृष्टयोर्हंसेन विवेचनम् । अपि च न जीवो नाम कश्चित्परस्मादन्यो विद्यते यो जलविन्दुरिव जलराशेः सतो विविच्येत । सदेव तूपाधिसंपर्काज्जीव इत्युपचर्यत इत्यसकृत्प्रपञ्चितम् । एवं सति यावदेकोपाधिगता बन्धानुवृत्तिस्तावदेकजीवव्यवहारः । उपाध्यन्तरगतायां तु बन्धानुवृत्तौ जीवान्तरव्यवहारः । स एवायमुपाधिः स्वापप्रबोधयोर्बीजाङ्कुरन्यायेनेत्यतः स एव जीवः प्रतिबुध्यत इति युक्तम् ।

[Now is refuted the analogical reasoning that the jīva, if once united with *Sat*, can no more emerge from It than a drop of water can again be taken out from the ocean into which it had been thrown. In the analogy it is quite in order to say that the self-same drop of water cannot be taken out since there is no means of distinguishing it from the other drops. But here there are karma and ignorance (of each jīva) as distinguishing factors, thus the two cases are not analogous Moreover it is a matter of experience that though milk and water when mixed together cannot be separated by any one of us, still they can be separated by swans. Moreover, jīva is not such an entity which is really different from the Supreme Ātman to be distinguished from Existence like a drop of water from a mass of water. It has been shown again and again that Existence Itself comes to be called metaphorically a jīva on account of the connection with *upādhi* This being the case, so long as bondage pertains to one set of *upādhis*, there is the parlance of one jīva, if it pertains to another set of *upādhis* then there is the parlance of another jīva The very same set of *upādhis* persists in deep sleep and the waking, on the maxim of the seed and the seedling, so that it is quite reasonable to say that the self-same jīva wakes up from sleep]

This has been put succinctly by the *Bhāṣya* on the Sūtra (1-1-5-9) —स्वाप्ययात्। (Because of the merger of jīva in his own Self in deep sleep), while discussing the Śruti (Ch. U VI-8-1)—

यत्रैतत्पुरुषः स्वपिति नाम सता सोम्य तदा सम्पन्नो भवति। स्वमपीतो भवति तस्मादेनꣳ स्वपितीत्याचक्षते स्वꣳ ह्यपीतो भवति।

(When the jīva sleeps here, then, my dear! he becomes united with *Sat*, he merges in his Self)

स्वशब्देनेहात्मोच्यते। यः प्रकृतः सच्छब्दवाच्यस्तमपीतो भवत्यपिगतो भवतीत्यर्थः। अपिपूर्वस्यैतेर्लयार्थत्वं प्रसिद्धम्, प्रभवाप्ययावित्युत्पत्तिप्रलययोः प्रयोगदर्शनात्। मनःप्रचारोपाधिविशेषसम्बन्धादिन्द्रियार्थान्गृह्णंस्तद्विशेषापन्नो जीवो जागर्ति। तद्वासनाविशिष्टः स्वप्नान्पश्यन्मनःशब्दवाच्यो भवति।

स उपाधिद्वयोरुपरमे सुषुप्तावस्थायामुपाधिकृतविशेषाभावात्स्वात्मनि प्रलीन इवेति ‘स्व ह्यपीतो भवति’ इत्युच्यते।

[The term ‘his own’ denotes Ātman denoted by the word *Sat*, in the present context; to this Ātman goes the jīva The jīva is said to be awake as long as, being connected with the various external objects by means of the modifications of the mind — which thus constitute limiting adjuncts of the jīva — he apprehends those external objects He assumes the name ‘mind’ while seeing dreams under the influence of the impression of the experiences of the waking state And when these two *upādhis* become inactive in the deep sleep state, he appears to be merged, as it were, in Ātman because of the absence of particularisation created by the *upādhis* And hence he is said ‘to have become merged in his own Self’]

Says the *Brahmavidyābharana* on this *Bhāṣya*—

अयमाशयः। लयो हि अभेदाभिव्यक्तिरेव। घटो हि नाम अवस्थाविशेषापन्न मृद्द्रव्यमेव। तत्र घटावस्थारूपोपाधिविशेषात् कारणस्य मृद्द्रव्यस्य घटद्रव्याद् भेदव्यवहारो यथाकथञ्चित् प्रातिभासिक भेदमादाय। तदुपाधिनाशे स्वाभाविकोऽभेदः परिशिष्यते। ... सुषुप्तिदशायां च जीवस्य स्वाप्नजागरोपाधिलये तत्तदुपाध्यवच्छिन्नस्यांशस्याधिष्ठानात्मकशुद्धचैतन्येन सहाभेदाभिव्यक्तिः सम्भवत्येव। सुषुप्तिदशानुस्यूततमोरूपोपाधेर्विद्यमानतया तावन्मात्रावच्छिन्नस्यांशस्य तस्या दशायामभेदाभिव्यक्तिर्नास्तीति मुक्तिदशातो वैलक्षण्य ‘प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिष्वक्तः’, ‘सति संपद्य न विदुः’ इति भेदव्यवहारश्च सङ्गच्छते। ...मनःप्रचारोपाधिविशेषसम्बन्धादित्यनेन इन्द्रियप्रणालिकया मनसो घटादिषु प्रचारो वृत्तिरूपो भवति। तादृशोपाधिविशेषसम्बद्धो जीवो जाग्रदवस्थापन्न इत्युच्यते। तादृशवृत्तिवासनोपाधिको जीवो मनोमात्रप्रधानत्वान्मनश्शब्दोदितः स्वप्नावस्थ इत्युच्यत इति प्रतिपादितम्। सुषुप्तौ पूर्वावस्थाद्वयोपाधिविलयेन तत्तदवच्छिन्नस्याभेदाभिव्यक्तौ स्थितायामपि तमे [illegible] तय [illegible] वाभेदाभिव्यक्तिरितीवशब्देन द्योत्यते।

[This is what is intended—Merging is indeed the manifestation of identity A pot is merely the substance mud itself in a particular state. Here the parlance that the material cause viz., the mud-substance is different from the pot-substance is based on the acceptance of the apparent difference because of the particular *upādhi*, the pot-state. On the destruction of this *upādhi*, the natural non-difference remains over ..And in the state of deep sleep when the *upādhis* of the jīva, pertaining to the waking and the dream states, are merged then is possible the manifestation of the non-difference of that 'aspect' of Consciousness delimited by the respective *upādhis*, with the Pure Consciousness that is the Substratum Because of the continued presence even in deep sleep of the veiling *upādhi*, there is no manifestation of the non-difference of that aspect of Consciousness which is delimited by this *upādhi* And thus it is that the deep sleep state is distinguished from the state of liberation in the manner voiced by the Śrutis 'Embraced by the *prājña*', and 'Identified with Existence, yet not aware of it' Though there is thus the manifestation of non-difference in deep sleep, yet, because of the persistence of the *upādhi* viz , the veiling Ajñāna, the absolute non-difference is not manifested, as shown by the particle *iva* in the *Bhāsya*.]

9.6.6 Absence of Awareness of Objects due to Absence of Objects; Not Absence of Consciousness

As the *Bhāsya* points out, the word *sva* in the Śruti स्वमपीतो stands for the Self, and not for something connected with or belonging to the Self The Śruti (Br. U. 6-3-21)—

प्राज्ञेनात्मना सपरिष्वक्तो न बाह्य किञ्चन वेद नान्तरम्

which says that 'fully embraced by the Supreme Self, not knowing anything at all, either internal or external' is also to be understood as referring to the *prājñasvarūpa* which is bereft of the other *upādhis* of the waking and the dream states because of dissolution and not because of the embrace of Īśvara different from it. It is for this very reason that the Śruti

which speaks of the experience of nothing else in deep sleep 'यद्वै तन्न पश्यति' proceeds to say—

न तु तद्द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यत्पश्येत् । (Br. U. 6-3-23)

i e., there is no other thing which could be experienced as different from Itself. So it is that the Śruti (Br.U. 6-3-31)—

यत्र वा अन्यदिव स्यात्तत्रान्योऽन्यत्पश्येत्

says that where there is something as though different from itself, there one experiences the other as different from itself, illusory duality being the cause of particular experiences Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda commenting on these Śrutis, in the *Bhāṣya* on the Sūtra (2-3-12-18) ज्ञोऽत एव । (Ātman the eternal cogniser, for this very reason) says — 'what is sought to be conveyed is this : the 'absence' of awareness is because of the absence of the objects of knowledge, and not because of the absence of Consciousness, it is like the non-manifestation of light spread over space because of the absence of things which could be illuminated and not because of its own absence'—

एतदुक्तं भवति । विषयाभावादियमचेतयमानता, न चैतन्याभावादिति । यथा वियदाश्रयस्य प्रकाशस्य प्रकाश्याभावादनभिव्यक्तिः, न स्वरूपाभावात्, तद्वत् ।

This *Bhāṣya* is seen also to refute the opinion of the *Vaiśeṣikas* etc., who assert that Ātman is naturally insentient, Its consciousness being adventitious, basing their opinions on what is expressed by those who wake up from sleep and those who are brought to normalcy from the states of swoon or possession by supernatural beings—'We were not conscious of anything'—न किञ्चिद्वयमचेतयामहि. This is also given expression to as गाढमूढोऽहमासम्.

9 6 7 Triad of Avidyavrittis in Deep Sleep—of the form of Sakshi, Sukha and Avasthajnana

In respect of the state of deep sleep, the *Siddhānta-bindu* (8) observes—

एवं जाग्रत्स्वप्नभोगद्वयेन श्रान्तस्य जीवस्य तदुभयकारणकर्मक्षये ज्ञान-शक्त्यवच्छिन्नस्य सवासनान्तःकरणस्य कारणात्मनावस्थाने सति विश्राम-स्थानं सुषुप्त्यवस्था। न किञ्चिदवेदिषमिति कारणमात्रोपलम्भः सुषुप्तिः। तत्र जाग्रत्स्वप्नभोग्यपदार्थज्ञानाभावेऽपि साक्ष्याकारं सुखाकारमवस्थाऽज्ञानाकारं चाविद्याया वृत्तित्रयमभ्युपेयते। अहङ्काराभावाच्च नैका विशिष्टवृत्तिः, सुषुप्त्य-भावप्रसङ्गाच्च। अत एव वृत्तिरूपस्योपलम्भस्याभावान्न प्रलयेऽतिव्याप्तिः। तत्र तत्कल्पनाबीजाभावात्। इह च सुखमहमस्वाप्सं न किञ्चिदवेदिषमिति सुप्तोत्थितस्य परामर्शात्। अननुभवे च परामर्शानुपपत्तेः।

On the exhaustion of the karma i e., the *adrsta*, responsible for the waking and the dream states, the jiva who is tired by the experiences in these two states, finds himself in his resting place when, with all its impressions, the inner organ delimited by the power of knowing is identified with the causal body (its power of action, *prāna*, however, not being merged) i.e., ignorance in which is latent the said inner organ with its impressions etc This is deep sleep state Deep sleep is the cognition of only this causal ignorance as qualified by the non-cognition of the gross and the subtle body, given expression to by one and all in the form 'I did not know anything', as is well known. Here the mention of the phrase 'the cognition of this causal ignorance' is intended to ward off the states of swoon and dissolution since there is no such recollection, *parāmarśa*, in evidence which would warrant the acceptance of such a cognition therein This ignorance pertaining to the deep sleep state involves the impressions of the ingredients of the waking and the dream states as also those

relating to the differences between jīva and Īśvara etc which are beginningless. In dissolution Avidyā is in primal state without any *vṛtti* whatever. Coeval with creatic is this *Avidyāvṛtti*, the first modification of Avidyā term *ajñānākāravṛtti* of the form 'I know not the basic *Svarūp* which is an expression of the universal experience of t persistence—in all the three states viz , the waking, the drea and the deep sleep—of the ignorance pertaining to the bas Reality. As being present in the waking state as well, t *ajñānākāravṛtti* is not opposed to the various items of know edge pertaining to the parlance of the waking or the drea which are seen to be there along with it. Thus the de sleep state cannot be accounted for merely on the basis this *ajñānākāravṛtti*. Hence for this purpose is to be accepte in addition to this *vṛtti* persisting in all the three state another modification of Avidyā termed *avasthā(i)jñānākāravr* which specifically prevents the experiences of the waking a dream parlance Again to account for the experience of t deep sleep state as voiced by the *parāmarśa* 'Blissfully did sleep, I did not know anything', two other modifications Avidyā, one of the form of the Witness-self and the other the form of Bliss, must also be accepted in addition. Th besides the *Mūlāvidyā* modification i.e., the *ajñānākāravr* common to all the three states, in deep sleep, is to be accept the triad of *vṛttis*—of the form of Witness-self, Bliss a *avasthā(a)jñāna*.

Says the *Vivekacūdāmaṇi*—122, 123, 210 and its *ṭīkā*-

अव्यक्तमेनत्त्रिगुणैर्निरुक्त तत्कारणं नाम शरीरमात्मनः ।
सुषुप्तिरेतस्य विभक्त्यवस्था प्रलीनसर्वेन्द्रियबुद्धिवृत्तिः ॥
सर्वप्रकारप्रमितिप्रशान्तिर्बीजात्मनावस्थितिरेव बुद्धेः ।
सुपुप्तिरत्रास्य किल प्रतीतिः किञ्चिन्न वेद्मीति जगत्प्रसिद्धेः ॥

आनन्दमयकोशस्य सुपुप्तौ स्फूर्तिरुत्कटा ।
स्वप्नजागरयोरीपदिष्टसंदर्शनादिना ॥

तामसी सुखाकारवृत्तिरानन्दमयकोश इतिकृत्वा सुपुप्तौ तस्योत्कटत्वं दर्शयति । तदानीं पुण्यजन्यस्य स्वरूपसुखस्यैवाविद्यावृत्तिविषयत्वात् प्रत्यहमारब्धपुण्यक्षय एव दैनन्दिनप्रलयरूपसुपुप्तिसम्भवात्, उक्तं हि सूत्रभाष्ये 'अदृष्टमपि भोगप्रसिद्ध्यर्थं न प्रलयप्रसिद्ध्यर्थम्' इति । उत्कटा अधिका स्फूर्तिः स्फुरणं सुपुप्तावानन्दमयकोशस्य, तदा सुखस्य दुःखासम्भिन्नत्वादिति भावः । तथाप्यज्ञानेनावृतत्वान्न मुख्यानन्दरूपत्वम् । स्वप्नजागरयोरीपत् स्वल्पा स्फूर्तिरिष्टसन्दर्शनादिना, आदिपदेन लाभभोगपरिग्रहः । तदा भिन्नविषयकवृत्तिभिरस्या वृत्तेर्नाश्यमानत्वात् सुपुप्तौ वृत्त्यन्तराभावादुत्कटत्वमिति भावः ।

9.6.8 Deep Sleep Experience Nirvikalpaka

In the recollection itself of the sleep experience, 'Blissfully did I sleep, I did not know anything', there is reference to four ingredients—Bliss, ego, sleep and the ajñāna special to the state. Here the 'Witness-Self' is referred to as 'sleep' which is the cognition of the causal ignorance by the 'Witness-Self', there being no other means like organs or the *antaḥkarana* then Of these four ingredients, ego is a modification of the *antaḥkarana* of the waking state which along with its modifications is merged in the deep sleep state, for otherwise it would not be the deep sleep state at all Hence the ego is not an object of recollection, but it is the support wherein arises the *parāmarśa* in the waking state. Therefore it cannot be that the other three ingredients are the attributes of the ego, resulting in a single *vṛtti* in the deep sleep state. Also it cannot be said that the three together form a single *vṛtti*, two of them being the attributes of the other, since they are mutually unrelated. The Witness-self which is taintless is in no way related to the other two.

The other two also stand unrelated to each other, like the colour and taste of a fruit. If it is said that these two be regarded as the attributes of the ego as suggested by the form of the *parāmarśa*, like the colour and the taste which are the attributes of the fruit, that cannot be, for the situation refers to the deep sleep state wherein the ego is not patent.

Also if attributes are brought in, it would be speaking in terms of *savikalpakajñāna*, whereas the deep sleep experience is *nirvikalpaka*. Thus the three *vṛttis* cannot be reduced to one. In the *Advaitasiddhi* (1-39), Śrī Śrī Madhusūdana-sarasvatipāda refers to the other view which argues in favour of a single composite *vṛtti* only, समूहालम्बनैकवृत्ति, with three phases and pertaining to the triad mentioned and observes that in the present context it is not of much consequence as to which view is held—

एवं च साक्ष्यज्ञानसुखाकारास्तिस्रोऽविद्यावृत्तयः सुषुप्ताख्यैकैव वा वृत्तिरित्यन्यदेतत् ।

The *Siddhāntabindu* (8) continues to say—

अन्तःकरणोपरागकालीनानुभवजन्यत्वाभावाच्च न तत्तोल्लेखाभावेऽपि स्मरणत्वानुपपत्तिः । स्मरणे तत्तोल्लेखनियमाभावाच्च जाग्रद्दशायामस्वाप्समित्यनुभवानुपपत्तेश्च लिङ्गाभावेनाश्रयासिद्ध्या चानुमानस्यासम्भवात् । अहङ्कारस्तत्थान समय एवानुभूयते । सुषुप्तौ लीनत्वेन तस्याननुभूतत्वात् स्मरणानुपपत्तेः ।

If it is asserted—that the knowledge 'Blissfully did I sleep' etc., is not a recollection, on the ground that such details as time, place etc., i e., the 'thatness' pertaining to the experience, is not referred to therein—it cannot be, for first of all, this is not an experience in which the *antaḥkaraṇa* plays a part as it was not patent then. Even in an experience that is of the form of an *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*, all the factors pertaining to the experience are not seen to be recollected, as a rule, every

time. Also the impression of a *nirvikalpaka*-experience leads always to a *nirvikalpaka*-recollection. Again, reference to 'thatness' in a *nirvikalpaka*-reflection being nowhere in evidence even in the waking state, what to say of deep sleep state !

9.6.9 Deep Sleep Experience Established by Sakshi, not by Pramana; No ego in Deep Sleep

Again, obviously it cannot be established by any *pramāna* that the knowledge 'Blissfully did I sleep' etc., is a matter of experience in the waking state, for it is not an object of perception, *pratyaksa*, since it cannot be that one would be asleep in the waking state. Since deep sleep is not known to be similar to anything else, it cannot be made known by comparison, *upamāna*. Nor can it be that one's deep sleep is made known by verbal testimony, *śābdapramāna*. Since there is nothing which warrants the postulation of deep sleep, *arthāpatti* is of no avail here. Also nothing can be thought of, the knowledge of whose absence, *anupalabdhi*, would produce this knowledge of one's sleep. Again since no sign pertaining to deep sleep, a thing of the past, is available, much less the knowledge of pervasion etc, inference, *anumāna*, is not a *pramāna* in this respect, also because the inference, if at all, would have to be of the form 'I am asleep' and this cannot be, since the subject 'I', the *aham*, could not be there in deep sleep, for otherwise it would not be the deep sleep state at all Neither *manolaya* i.e., the dissolution of the mind, nor the *avasthā(a)jñāna*, the transitory phase of ignorance in deep sleep, as pertaining to the other states already mentioned, can be a sign, *linga*, leading to inference, as they are not there in the waking state. Thus all attempts at establishing by inference, mere absence of

knowledge in deep sleep—ज्ञानसामान्याभाव i.e., no knowledge at all or ज्ञानविशेषाभाव i.e., the absence of knowledge of any particular thing or ज्ञानसामग्र्यभाव i.e., the absence of the means of knowledge—would be futile. Hence the *parāmarśa* 'Blissfully did I sleep ' is to be regarded only as a recollection of the past experience

9.6.10 Memory of Avastha(a)jnana, not of Persistent Mulajnana

Here an objection is raised—the 'recollection' spoken of cannot be, for the experience of the ajñāna is confined not merely to the deep sleep state which lapses giving rise to its impression on waking up, but is persistent throughout in all the states; how then can this 'recollection' be a case of memory of the past experience in the deep sleep state? The *Advaitasiddhi* (1) raises this question and answers it—

नन्वज्ञानवृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्यरूपस्याज्ञानानुभवस्य जाग्रत्यपि विद्यमानत्वात् कथमज्ञानस्मरणम्? न हि धारावाहिकेष्वनुभवेषु तुल्यसामग्रीकेषु स्मरण-व्यवहारः; तथा च धारावाहिकोऽज्ञानानुभव इति वक्तव्यम्, न तु परामर्श इति, सत्यम्, सुषुप्त्याख्यायास्तामस्या अज्ञानवृत्तेर्नाशे जाग्रति तद्विशिष्टाज्ञानस्य साक्षिणाऽनुभूयमानत्वाभावेन संस्कारजन्याविद्यावृत्त्यैव सुषुप्तिविशिष्टाज्ञानभानात् परामर्शत्वोपपत्तेः, केवलाज्ञानांशे तु तुल्यसामग्रीकत्वाद्धारावाहिकत्वमेव, अत एव कार्योपाधिविनाशसंस्कृतमज्ञानमात्रमेव प्रलयोपमं सुषुप्तिरित्यभिप्रेत्य वार्तिककारपादैः सौषुप्ताज्ञानस्मरणमपाकृतम्। तथा चोक्तम्—

> 'न सुषुप्तिगविज्ञानं नाज्ञासिषमिति स्मृतिः।
> कालाद्यव्यवधानत्वान्न ह्यात्मस्थमतीतभाक्॥
> न भूतकालस्पृक् प्रत्यङ् चागामिस्पृगीक्षते।
> स्वार्थदेशः परार्थोऽर्थो विकल्पस्तेन स स्मृतः॥'

इत्याद्यव्याकृतप्रक्रियायाम्। विवरणकारैस्तु—'अभावप्रत्ययालम्बना वृत्तिर्निद्रा' इति योगसूत्रानुसारेण तमोगुणात्मकावरणमात्रालम्बना काचिद्वृत्तिः

सुषुप्तिरित्यभिप्रेत्य तदुपरक्तचैतन्यस्य तन्नाशेनैव नाशात् तत्कालीनाज्ञानानुभव-जनितसंस्कारवशेन 'न किञ्चिदवेदिषम्' इति 'स्मरणमभ्युपेतम्' इति वार्तिकविवरणयोरप्यविरोधः। अत एवोक्तं वार्तिककारैरुपस्तिब्राह्मणे—

'न चेदनुभवव्याप्तिः सुषुप्तस्याभ्युपेयते।
नावेदिषं सुषुप्तेऽहमिति धीः किंबलाद्भवेत्॥' इत्यादि।

The objection is—since the experience of ajñāna which is of the nature of *ābhāsa* or a reflection of Consciousness in the *ajñānākāravṛtti* continues to be there even in the waking state, how can this 'recollection' be a case of memory, for a cognition-stream continuously generated by exactly similar circumstances, is not termed as memory; in the same way, the experience of ajñāna is also to be regarded as a case of cognition-stream, and not as a case of memory. To this the answer is—yes, it is true that as pertaining to ajñāna as such (i.e., the *Mūlājñāna* veiling the *Svarūpa*), it is a case of cognition-stream as the circumstances responsible for it are the same throughout But ajñāna, as qualified by the *tāmasī ajñānavṛtti* called deep sleep, ceases to be experienced by the Witness-self in the waking state as it is dissolved on the dawn of the waking state and the *parāmarśa* can be accounted for only by regarding it as an *avidyāvṛtti* generated by the impression of ajñāna as qualified by deep sleep and as such, it is appropriately termed as a matter of memory But the experience of mere ajñāna as such without the said attribute is one of cognition-stream because of exactly similar circumstances It is therefore that—by regarding deep sleep as ajñāna itself qualified by the dissolution of the *upādhis* such as mind etc , which are the products of ajñāna, thus resembling the state of dissolution—Śrī Śrī Vārtikakāra-pāda, in the text pertaining to the *avyākṛta* set-up, refutes the memory of ajñāna pertaining to the deep sleep in the

following words—" Ajñāna as experienced in deep sleep and given expression to as 'I did not know' is not a case of memory since the ajñāna pertains to Ātman wherein it abides, and since there is no lapse of time in respect of its experience, as what abides in Ātman is not a matter of the past, the Innermost Ātman with the *upādhi* of ajñāna is not a thing of either only the past or only the future. Thus it is a case of *vikalpa* i.e., not *smṛtirūpanirvikalpaka* (not a memory of indeterminate experience)."

Without taking into account for the moment the experience of sleep and bliss, Śrī Śrī Vivaranakārapāda opines, in conformity with the *Pātañjalasūtra*, that the *sāttvikavṛtti* when the *tamoguṇa* of ajñāna is in spate and thus is the cause of the absence of other *vṛttis* experienced in the waking and the dream states—वृत्त्यन्तराभावकारणतमोगुणालम्बना वृत्ति' (The *Bhāmatī*-1-1-5-5)—is the experience of ajñāna in deep sleep. That is, it is the veiling *vṛtti* of the nature of *tamoguṇa* by the destruction of which the consciousness associated with it is destroyed on waking, leaving behind its impression i.e., of the ajñāna experienced previously with the said attributes. This is what leads to the memory 'I did not know anything'. This latter spoken of by the *Vivaraṇa* pertains not to the mere unqualified *Mūlājñāna* veiling Ātman, that is always there as far as the unenlightened is concerned, and not at all for the enlightened for whom even this would be a '*vikalpa*', but it pertains to the *avasthā(a)jñāna* i.e., ajñāna as qualified by the attributes mentioned. As such this view of the *Vivaraṇa* is not opposed to that of the *Vārtika*. The *Gauḍabrahmānandī* on the *Advaitasiddhi* (1-39) and the *Nyāyaratnāvalī* on the *Siddhāntabindu* (1) make this clear. It is thus that the *Vārtika* says in the *Usastibrāhmaṇa* (Br. U. 5-4-103)—If the

experience does not pervade deep sleep i.e., if there is no experience with deep sleep as its content, on the strength of what can the *vrtti* 'I did not know anything' arise as pertaining to sleep ? It is seen that the *vrtti* in the waking 'I did not know anything in sleep' may even be regarded as a *savikalpakavṛtti* persisting in all the three states, interpreted in the manner of the *Pātañjalasūtra*—शब्दज्ञानानुपाती वस्तुशून्यो विकल्पः—as put by some commentators Or as put by others in the manner of the *Vācārambhanaśruti*—वाचारम्भण विकारो नामधेयं—it is merely a name i e , तुच्छा, totally non-existent, as far as the enlightened is concerned when it is taken as referring to the *Mūlājñāna*. As for the unenlightened, however, it is possible also to regard it as the experience (illusory or actual—अनिर्वचनीय or वास्तव) of the ajñāna-ingredient, as distinguished from the experience of the sleep-ingredient and the Bliss-ingredient and as such pertaining to the *avasthā(a)jñāna*. All the ingredients are, however, included in the *parāmarśa* 'I slept happily, I did not know anything'.

9.6.11 'Happiness', the very Svarupa of Sakshi : not Duhkhabhava : Likewise not Jnanabhava; 'I' in Recollection is Pramatru

On this topic says the *Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha* (1-1)—

अस्ति स्वप्रकाशसाक्षिचैतन्यस्वरूपभूत आनन्दः सर्वदा भासमानोऽपि जाग्रत्स्वप्नयोस्तीव्रवायुविक्षिप्तप्रदीपप्रभावत् 'अहं मनुष्यः' इत्यादिमिथ्याज्ञानविक्षिप्ततया न स्पष्टमवभासते। सुषुप्तौ तु तदभावाद्विस्पष्टमेवावभासते। आवरणाविद्या तु ब्रह्मतत्त्वाकारमाच्छादयन्त्यपि स्वभासकं साक्षिचैतन्याकारं नावृणोति। नो चेदविद्यैव निःसाक्षिका सती न सिध्येत् ततश्च सुषुप्तावनुभूत आनन्द आत्मा भावरूपाज्ञानं चेति त्रयमप्युत्थितेन परामृश्यते 'सुखमहमस्वाप्सं न किञ्चिदवेदिषम्' इति।

नन्वेतत्त्रयं सुषुप्तौ नान्तःकरणवृत्तिभिरनुभूयते तासां तत्राभावात्।

चैतन्येनानुभवे तस्याविनाशिनः संस्कारानुत्पादकत्वान्न परामर्शः सिध्येदिति चेत् मैवम्, अविद्यैवोक्तत्रयग्राहकवृत्तित्रयाकारेण सुप्तौ विवर्तते। ताभिर्वृत्तिभिरवच्छिन्नाश्चिदाभासा उक्तत्रयमनुभूयोत्थानकाले विनङ्क्ष्यन्ति। तत्संस्कारजन्या स्मृतिः किं न स्यात्। अविद्याविशिष्टस्यात्मनोऽनुभवितृत्वमन्तःकरणविशिष्टस्यैव स्मर्तृत्वमिति वैयधिकरण्यमिति चेत्, न, उत्थानेऽप्यविद्याविशिष्टस्यैव स्मर्तृत्वाङ्गीकारात्। अन्तःकरण तु स्मृतस्यार्थस्य शब्दानुविद्धव्यवहारमापादयति। न च सुखमित्यनेन नावेदिपमित्यनेन च दुःखाभावज्ञानाभावयोरेव परामर्श इति वाच्यम्, तयोः सुषुप्तौ सतोरप्यननुभवात्। तत्प्रतियोगिनोर्दुःखज्ञानयोस्तदानीमस्मरणात्।

कथं तर्हि सौषुप्तयोरननुभूतयोर्दुःखाभावज्ञानाभावयोरवगमः? अर्थापत्त्येति ब्रूमः। उक्तरीत्या सौषुप्तमविक्षिप्तं सुखमनुस्मृत्य एतदन्यथानुपपत्त्या तद्विरोधिनो दुःखस्याभावः प्रमीयते। तथा परामृष्टभावरूपाज्ञानानुपपत्त्या तद्विरोधिज्ञानस्याभावोऽवगम्यते।

ननु भावरूपाज्ञानं ज्ञानेन न विरुध्यते, जागरणे तयोः सहावस्थानादिति चेत्, न; अज्ञानमात्रस्य प्रपञ्चज्ञानैरविरोधेऽपि विशेषाकारपरिणताज्ञानस्य तद्विरोधित्वात्। घटज्ञानाकारेण हि परिणतमज्ञानं पटादिज्ञानैर्विरुध्यते; अन्यथा घटज्ञानकाल एव पटादिकं सर्वं जगदवभासेत।

एव सति सुषुप्तावस्थाकारेण परिणतस्याप्यज्ञानस्याशेपविशेपज्ञानैर्विरोधो भविष्यति। ततो युक्तैवार्थापत्तिः। ... तदेव सुषुप्तौ दुःखाभावज्ञानाभावौ अर्थापत्तिवेद्यौ, भावरूपाज्ञानानन्दात्मानस्तु स्मर्यन्त इति सिद्धान्तस्थितिः। नन्वेतावताऽहङ्कारे किमायातम्?

इदमायातम्—न सुषुप्तावहङ्कारोऽनुभूयते, नाप्युत्थितेन परामृश्यत इति।

का तर्हि सुखमहमिति परामर्शगतस्याहमुल्लेखस्य गतिः? एषा गतिः—सुषुप्तौ विलीनोऽहङ्कारः प्रबोधे पुनरुत्पद्यते, स चोत्पन्नः परामृश्यमानमात्मान सविकल्पकत्वेन स्पष्टव्यवहारायोपलक्षयति, एतदेकप्रयोजनत्वादहङ्कारवृत्तेः।

अत एवात्मा कदाचिदपि नान्याभिरन्तःकरणवृत्तिभिर्व्यवह्रियते । तदुक्तं नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धौ—

प्रत्यक्त्वादतिसूक्ष्मत्वादात्मदृष्ट्यनुशीलनात् ।
अतो वृत्तीर्विहायान्या ह्यहंवृत्त्योपलक्ष्यते ॥
आत्मभावाविनाभावमथ वा विलयं व्रजेत् ।
न तु पक्षान्तरं यायादतश्चाहंधियोच्यते ॥ इति ।

ततो जाग्रत्स्वप्नयोरात्मत्वेन प्रतिभासमानोऽप्यय जडोऽहङ्कारः सुषुप्तावभावान्न स्वयप्रकाशस्यात्मनः स्वरूपमिति श्रुतिस्मृतिकुशलैरभ्युपेयमिति । . . .

तर्ह्यहङ्कारः किमुपादानः ? किन्निमित्तः ? किंस्वरूपः ? किंप्रमाणकः ? किंकार्यः ? किमिति सुषुप्तौ नास्तीति चेत्, उच्यते—अहङ्कारस्यानाद्यनिर्वचनीयाऽविद्या उपादानम्, अविद्यायाः परमेश्वराधिष्ठितत्व निमित्तम्, ज्ञानशक्तिक्रियाशक्तिद्वयं स्वरूपम्, कूटस्थचैतन्य प्रमाणम्, कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वादिक च कार्यम् । सुषुप्तेरन्तःकरणप्रलयरूपत्वान्न तत्र सद्भावः । यद्यपि क्रियाशक्तिरूपः प्राणः सुषुप्तौ वर्तते, तथापि प्राणस्याहङ्कारादन्यत्वे तल्लयो न विरुध्यते । अनन्यत्वे च प्राणांशं विहायावशिष्टस्य लयः कल्प्यताम् । दृष्टिसृष्टिसमाश्रयणे तु सुप्तपुरुषं प्रति सर्वलयो मुख्य एव सेत्स्यति ।

There does exist Bliss which is the very nature of the Self-effulgent Consciousness that is the Witness. Though constantly manifested, It is yet not clearly manifest in the waking and the dream, being disturbed by illusory cognitions like 'I am a man', in the same way as the light of a lamp disturbed by a strong wind In sleep, however, because of the non-existence of this disturbance, It is manifest quite clearly As for the Avidyā which obscures, though it veils the true nature of Brahman, it does not obscure the form of the Witness-Consciousness which manifests that Avidyā itself. If not, Avidyā, itself being devoid of a witness, would not be established. And thus, all the three experienced in deep

sleep viz., Bliss, Ātman and Avidyā which is of the nature of an existent, are reflected upon by him who has woken up, in the recollection 'I slept happily, I knew nothing'.

If it is said—now in sleep these three are not experienced through *antaḥkaraṇavṛttis*, since these *vṛttis* are not existent there; if experienced through Consciousness since this Consciousness which is imperishable does not originate residual impressions, reflective cognitions would not result—it is not so. Avidyā itself is transformed in deep sleep in the form of the three *vṛttis* that apprehend the said three. The semblances of Consciousness defined by these *vṛttis* experience the said three and perish at the time of waking. Why should there not be remembrance generated by the residual impressions of these semblances of Consciousness? If it be said that there is the defect of absence of common ground since the experiencer is Ātman qualified by Avidyā while the rememberer is Ātman qualified by *antaḥkaraṇa*, it is not so, for it is admitted that even on waking, it is Ātman qualified by Avidyā itself that is the rememberer. *Antaḥkarana*, however, brings about, for the object remembered, the usage accompanied by words. Nor may it be said that by 'happiness' and 'I knew not' is implied that there is reflective cognition only of the non-existence of misery and of the non-existence of cognition, for there is no experience of these two non-existences in sleep; and even if present, their counter-correlates—misery and cognition—are not remembered at that time.

How then is there the knowledge of the non-existence of misery and the non-existence of cognition, which belong to the period of sleep if they are not experienced? We say it is by presumption. Having in the said manner remembered the undisturbed happiness of the period of sleep, because of the

non-intelligibility otherwise of this, there is valid knowledge (by means of the *pramāna* viz., presumption) of the non-existence of its opposite viz., misery Similarly, because of the non-intelligibility otherwise of what is reflected upon i.e., Avidyā having the nature of an existent, the non-existence of its opposite viz., cognition, is understood.

Now if it is said that Avidyā, having the nature of an existent, does not conflict with cognition because of their co-existence in the waking, it cannot be, since though for Avidyā in general there is no conflict with cognitions of the world, there is conflict with these for Avidyā which has been transformed into particular forms Avidyā which has been transformed in the form of a pot-cognition does indeed conflict with cognitions of cloth etc. Otherwise even at the time of the pot-cognition, the whole world including cloth etc., would be presented

This being the case even for Avidyā transformed into the form of the state of deep sleep, there will be conflict with all particular cognitions without exception. Therefore the presumption of the non-existence of cognition does certainly stand to reason

Thus, therefore, the non-existence of misery and the non-existence of cognition in sleep are known through presumption Avidyā having the nature of an existent, Bliss as also Self are, however, remembered. This is the position in the final view.

Now with this what results for the ego? The result is that the ego is not experienced in deep sleep, nor is it reflected upon by him who has woken up

What then is the explanation of the designation 'I' present in the reflective cognition 'I slept happily'? This is

the explanation: Ego which was merged in sleep is again originated on waking; and this which is originated qualifies per accidens as determinate, the Self that is reflected upon for the sake of clear empirical usage, for that is the sole purpose of the *ahankāravṛtti*. For this very reason Self is not referred to in experiences at any time through other *vṛttis* of the internal organ. This has been said in the *Naiskarmyasiddhi*. "Because of being internal (as compared with all other things which are non-Ātman), exceedingly subtle (being devoid of touch etc.,) and because of conforming to the vision that is Ātman, this ego is qualified per accidens by the *vṛtti* 'I' to the exclusion of all other *vṛttis* of the internal organ This ego is inseparably related to the existence of Ātman, or else it would attain destruction. There is no other possibility of its existence; therefore, it is denoted by the word which causes the 'I'—cognition.".

Therefore this inert ego, though appearing as Ātman in the waking and in the dream, yet because of its absence in sleep, is not the nature of the Self-Effulgent Ātman, this has to be admitted by those versed in Śruti and *Smṛti*

Then for the ego, what is the material cause? What is its efficient cause? What is its nature? What is the *pramāna* for it? What is its effect? Why is it absent in sleep? The answer is—for the ego, the beginningless indeterminable Avidyā is the material cause; the control of the Supreme Lord over Avidyā is the efficient cause; the cognitive and conative powers constitute its nature; the Immutable Consciousness is the *pramāṇa*; agency, enjoyership etc., are its effects. Since sleep is of the nature of the merger of the internal organ, there is the non-existence of the ego then Though the vital air which is of the nature of conative power exists in

sleep, yet if the vital air be taken as other than the ego, the merger of the ego is not contradicted. And if *prāna* be taken as not different from the ego, there may be assumed the merger of the rest of the ego to the exclusion of the vital air aspect. On the adoption, however, of the view that perception is creation, there is established the merger of all, even in the principal sense, in respect of the sleeping person. Taking up the question as to how this recollection could be in this form involving the 'I' which is not there in deep sleep, the *Siddhāntabindu* (8) continues to say—

मुखप्रतिबिम्बाश्रये दर्पणे जपाकुसुमलौहित्याध्यासेन रक्तं मुखमिति प्रतीतिवदहङ्काराश्रयसाक्षिचैतन्यस्य स्मरणाश्रयत्वादहमस्वाप्समिति सामानाधिकरण्यप्रतीतिः ; न पुनरहं सुखीतिवदाश्रयतया . . . । अहङ्कारस्य च प्रमाणजन्यज्ञानाश्रयत्वनियमात् ।

[When the redness of a hibiscus is superimposed on a mirror reflecting the face, one gets the illusion that the face is red. Similarly the Witness-consciousness is the locus of both the ego and the memory and these two which have a common locus give rise to the *parāmarśa* 'I slept', not because the ego is the locus of the qualified experience, 'I slept a happy person'. The rule is that the ego is the locus of only knowledge arising from *pramānas*.]

9.7.1 Pratyabhijna in respect of Atman: Experience by Sakshi, Recollection by Pramatru—Drishtisrishtivada

All this is indicated by this sixth stanza of the hymn in the lines—

सन्मात्रः करणोपसंहरणतो योऽभूत् सुषुप्तः पुमान् ।
प्रागस्वाप्समिति प्रबोधसमये यः प्रत्यभिज्ञायते

as shown concisely in the *Tattvasudhā* thereon—

यः पुमान्—प्रत्यग्रूपः परमेश्वरः करणोपसंहरणतः—विशेषविज्ञानहेतुचक्षुरादिकरणानामुपसंहारात्, सन्मात्रः—पूर्णानन्दादिरूपेण स्फुटमप्रकाशमानतया

केवलं सन्मात्रेणावस्थितः सन् सुषुप्तोऽभूत्—सुप्तिप्राप्तोऽभूत्। करणाभावेऽपि पूर्णानन्दभानवतो मुक्तात्मनस्सकाशात् सुषुप्तात्मनो वैषम्यमाह—मायासमाच्छादनादिति। माययात्माऽविद्यया समाच्छादनादावरणात्, सन्मात्र इति सम्बन्धः। ...सुषुप्तौ आत्मनोऽप्यविशेषतो भानं साधयति—प्रागस्वाप्समित्यादिना। यः सुषुप्तिकालीनात्मा प्रबोधसमये—सुषुप्तेरुत्थानसमये, प्रत्यभिज्ञायते। कथम्? प्राग्योऽहमस्वाप्सं स इदानीं जागर्मीति। न च तदाननुभूतस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञानं सम्भवति, अन्यत्र देवदत्तादननुभूते प्रत्यभिज्ञानादर्शनात्। न च तदा करणेनात्मानुभवः। इन्द्रियादिकरणानां सुषुप्तावभावात्। अतः स्वप्रकाशस्यात्मनः सत्त्वान्न तदा शून्यत्वम्। नापि तस्य क्षणिकत्वम्; नापि जडत्वम्, उक्तयुक्तेरेव।

'सुषुप्तिकाले सकले विलीने तमोभिभूतस्सुखरूपमेति।
पुनश्च जन्मान्तरकर्मयोगात् स एव जीवः स्वपिति प्रबुद्धः॥'

'सता सोम्य तदा सम्पन्नो भवति' इत्यादिश्रुतिश्चात्मनः सच्चिदानन्दरूपत्वेन सुषुप्तावस्थानं दर्शयति। आत्मनः सुखरूपत्व चोत्थितेन तेनानुसन्धीयते 'सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्' इति।

It may be pointed out that the keynote of the stanza is that the Lord, the Supreme Being, who made the universe come out of the unmanifested state in the course of His manifesting the undifferentiated name and form after projecting the worlds containing bipeds, quadrupeds etc., entered the body as a 'bird' i.e., as the subtle body, as the Śruti (Br. U. 4-5-18) says—

पुरश्चक्रे द्विपदः, पुरश्चक्रे चतुष्पदः। पुरः स पक्षी भूत्वा पुरः पुरुष आविशत्...

and now withdraws everything in the deep sleep state into which merges also this bird-like subtle body. This is in tune with the bird illustration quoted from the Śrutis already. The above Śruti continues to say —On account of His

dwelling in all bodies He is called the *Purusa* There is nothing that is not covered by Him, nothing that is not pervaded by Him—

स वा अयं पुरुषः सर्वासु पूर्षु पुरिशयो नैनेन किञ्चनानावृतं नैनेन किञ्चनासंवृतम्

i.e., everything is enveloped by Him as its inside and outside. In other words, this *mantra* briefly enunciates the unity of Self, as the *Bhāsya* thereon points out—

'पुरश्चक्रे' इत्यादिमन्त्रः सङ्क्षेपत आत्मैकत्वमाचष्ट इत्यर्थः ।

The quotations in the *Tattvasudhā*—सुषुप्तिकाले सकले विलीने from the *Kaivalyopanisad*, which speaks of dissolution of everything in the deep sleep state, and सता सोम्य तदा सपन्नो भवति from the *Chāndogyopanisad* which shows that the merging is in the *Sat* which is एकमेवाद्वितीयम् (one only without a second) in the state prior to manifestation indicate that the purport is in the *Drstisrstivāda*.

In this respect says the *Mānasollāsa* (VI-21 to 24)—

सुषुप्तिसमयेऽप्यात्मा सत्यज्ञानसुखात्मकः ।
सुखमस्वाप्समित्येव प्रत्यभिज्ञायते यतः ॥
प्रत्यभिज्ञायत इति प्रयोगः कर्मकर्तरि ।
आत्मा स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वाज्जानात्यात्मानमात्मना ॥
सुषुप्तौ मायया मूढो जडोऽन्ध इव लक्ष्यते ।
अप्रकाशतया भाति स्वप्रकाशतयाऽपि च ॥
जडात्मनि च देहादौ साक्षादीशो विविच्यते ।

The idea is—Even during deep sleep Ātman is endued with Existence, Consciousness and Bliss, because self-identity is recognised in the consciousness 'I slept happy'. This self-identity cannot be a mere illusion based on similarity as the Buddhists say, as there is no persisting entity to perceive the

similarity between two things occurring in two different moments. The expression 'Ātman is recognised' is in the reflexive passive voice and it is equivalent to 'Ātman recognises Himself' in the active voice. Thus the expression does not mean that Ātman is perceived by another as an object like external objects. The use of the given expression does not therefore detract from the self-effulgence of Ātman. Deluded as He is by Māyā in deep sleep, Ātman appears as though inert and insentient, there being no special form of cognition. But as His inherent Consciousness never fails, He appears as Self-Effulgent as well The physical body and the *upādhis* are insentient in themselves, whereas Ātman who is conscious of His own Self-identity illumines all thus—I who then saw, now hear, taste, speak, go and so on Thus Ātman is clearly distinguishable from other things as the Lord of them all, as one to whom all else is subservient, subserving His interests and glory as it were.

9.7.2 Prajna, Taijasa and Visva ; Prana

As has been seen, the self-luminous Bliss experienced in deep sleep is the Bliss that is the *Svarūpa* of Brahman-Ātman. So declares the Śruti (Br. U. 5-9-28) विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म।

In sleep the intellect and the mind which are the products of Avidyā get dissolved in their cause ; and since the *upādhi* viz , the intellect is non-existent then, there cannot be the jīva as conditioned by the intellect. What experiences happiness and Avidyā by means of *avidyāvṛttis* in deep sleep, is the *ānandamaya*-self which has for its *upādhi* Avidyā which is associated with the residual impression generated by the inward turned *vṛtti* of the intellect. The remembrance of that in the waking by the *vijñānamaya*-self is intelligible because the Witness-self is the same in both the states of

experience although the *upādhis* vary. This is expressed by saying that what is experienced by the *prājña* in the state of deep sleep is recollected and given expression to by the *viśva* who has in addition the intellect as *upādhi*. Says the *Siddhānta-bindu* (8)—

तदेवं सुषुप्त्यवस्थायामस्त्यानन्दभोगस्तद्भोक्ता च सुषुप्त्यभिमानी प्राज्ञ इत्युच्यते प्रकर्षेणाज्ञत्वात्तदानीं विशेषावच्छेदाभावेन प्रकृष्टज्ञत्वाद्वा। तदा चान्तःकरणस्य लयेऽपि तत्संस्कारेणावच्छेदान्न जीवाभावप्रसङ्गः। न वा सार्वज्ञ्यत्वापत्तिः। ईशाभेदप्रतिपादनं च शरीरेन्द्रियाद्यभिमानरहितत्वेनोपचारात्। संस्कारस्य च निमित्तकारणत्वेन साक्ष्याश्रितकार्योपादानकोटावप्रवेशान्न तद्भेदेऽपि साक्षिभेदः। जागरणे त्वन्तःकरणस्य प्रमात्राश्रितकार्योपादानकोटौ प्रवेशात्तद्भेदेन प्रमातृभेद एव। साक्षिण एव चाधिकोपाधिविशिष्टस्य प्रमातृत्वान्न प्रतिसन्धानानुपपत्तिरिति।

[In this manner there is the experience of Bliss in the deep sleep state. The locus of this experience is the *prājña*; and by the term 'enjoyment' is meant the *vṛtti* of the form of Bliss. He is spoken of as *prājña* because of his being swayed overwhelmingly by Ajñāna (as in deep sleep, there is the *avasthā(a)jñāna* in addition to the *mūlājñāna* which is always there), or because His shine is much more intense than usual because of the absence of particular delimiting adjuncts like *antaḥkarana*, senses etc, which give rise to numerous special *vṛttis* pertaining to particular objects etc In that state even though the *antaḥkarana* is in a state of dissolution, its impressions being present there in the delimiting adjunct, there is neither the question of the absence of the jīva then nor the contingency of his omniscience. It is because he is devoid of identification of the body and the senses etc, then, as it is even in the case of Īśvara, that he is spoken of by courtesy as Īśvara. The impressions of the *antaḥkarana* etc, though present then, being of the nature of only efficient cause in respect of memory etc, which are the products of merely Avidyā because of which is the witnesshood, there is no multiplicity in respect of the Witness In the waking state, however, in respect of the

products that arise viz , the particular cognitions like that of the pot etc , due to the further delimiting adjuncts which form the extra cloak that the *pramātā* dons (over and above the *upādhi* of the Witness) viz., the *antahkarana* with its *vrttis* etc , the distinctions among the various *pramātās* as also the remembrance on the part of the *pramātā* of what is experienced by the Witness, are explicable]

Speaking of the deep sleep state, the *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad* (1-5, 6) says in respect of the *prājña*—

यत्र सुप्तो न कञ्चन कामं कामयते न कञ्चन स्वप्नं पश्यति तत्सुषुप्तम् । सुषुप्तस्थान एकीभूतः प्रज्ञानघन एवानन्दमयो ह्यानन्दभुक् चेतोमुखः प्राज्ञ-स्तृतीयः पादः । एष सर्वेश्वर एष सर्वज्ञ एषोऽन्तर्याम्येष योनिः सर्वस्य प्रभवाप्ययौ हि भूतानाम् ।

The *Gauḍapādakārikā* (1) says—

बहिष्प्रज्ञो विभुर्विश्वो ह्यन्तःप्रज्ञस्तु तैजसः ।
घनप्रज्ञस्तथा प्राज्ञ एक एव त्रिधा स्मृतः ॥ (1)
दक्षिणाक्षिमुखे विश्वो मनस्यन्तस्तु तैजसः ।
आकाशे च हृदि प्राज्ञस्त्रिधा देहे व्यवस्थितः ॥ (2)

[That is the state of deep sleep wherein the sleeper does not desire any objects nor does he see any dream The third quarter, *pāda*, is the *prājña* whose sphere is deep sleep, in whom all experiences become unified or undifferentiated, who is verily a mass of Consciousness entire, who is full of Bliss, who experiences Bliss and who is the doorway leading to the knowledge of the other two states.

This is the Lord of all , This is the Knower of all ; This is the Controller within , This is the Source of all ; and This is That from which all things originate and in which they finally disappear.

Viśva, the first *pāda*, is he who is all-pervading and who experiences the external objects. *Taijasa*, the second *pāda*, is he who cognises the internal, the subtle objects *Prājña* is he who

is a mass of Consciousness, it is One alone who is thus known in the three states

Viśva is he who cognises in the right eye; *taijasa* is he who cognises in the mind within; and *prājña* is he who constitutes the *ākāśa* in the heart. Thus the one Ātman is perceived as threefold in the body]

The *Bhāsya* on these *kārikās* points out how in the absence of the forms of thought viz , both perception and memory, the seer remains indistinguishably in the form of *prāna* in the heart alone, in support of which is quoted the Śruti—प्राणो ह्येवैतान् सर्वान् सङ्क्ते । (Chā-U.4-3-3)—(*Prāṇa* alone withdraws all these within). Subsequently is raised the objection—the *prāna*, the vital breath of one in deep sleep, is manifest as witnessed by the onlookers, the sense organs at that time are merged in the *prāna*; how then can the *prāna* be said to be unmanifest? It is answered thus—This is no mistake for the unmanifested is characterised by the absence of knowledge of time and space. Though *prāṇa*, in the case of one who identifies himself with particular *prāna*, appears to be manifested during the waking and the dream, yet even in the case of these the *prāna* during deep sleep loses such particular identification, which is due to its limitation by the body and is verily same as the unmanifested as in death or dissolution This *prāna* of deep sleep further contains the seed of future creation as is the case with the *avyākṛta*. The cogniser of the two states (the deep sleep and the *avyākrta*) is also one viz., the Pure Consciousness. The one in deep sleep is identical with the apparently different cognisers identifying themselves with the conditioned (in the waking and the dream). Therefore such attributes as 'unified', 'mass of all Consciousness' etc , as described above, are reasonably applicable to him. The other reason already stated viz., the

merging of both the *adhyātma* and the *adhidaiva*, then, into one, supports it. So says the *Bhāṣya* on the *Kārikās* quoted above—

ननु व्याकृतः प्राणः। सुषुप्ते तदात्मकानि करणानि भवन्ति। कथमव्याकृतता? नैष दोषः। अव्याकृतस्य देशकालविशेषाभावात्। यद्यपि प्राणाभिमाने सति व्याकृततैव प्राणस्य, तथापि पिण्डपरिच्छिन्नविशेषाभिमाननिरोधः प्राणे भवतीत्यव्याकृत एव प्राणः सुषुप्ते परिच्छिन्नाभिमानवताम्। यथा प्राणलये परिच्छिन्नाभिमानिनां प्राणोऽव्याकृतः तथा प्राणाभिमानिनोऽप्यविशेषापत्तावव्याकृतता समाना। प्रसवबीजात्मकत्वं च। तदध्यक्षश्चैकोऽव्याकृतावस्थः। परिच्छिन्नाभिमानिनामध्यक्षाणां च तेनैकत्वमिति पूर्वोक्तं विशेषणमेकीभूतः प्रज्ञानघन इत्याद्युपपन्नं तस्मिन्नुक्तहेतुत्वाच्च।

The *Bhāṣya* now raises the question as to how the term *prāṇa* can be made to signify the unmanifest If it be said that it is as per the Śruti 'Oh, amiable one ! the mind is tied to the *prāna*', the question is asked as to whether it is not a mistake to employ the term *prāna* to denote the unmanifest, while in the Śruti it obviously indicates *Sat* i e, the Existence, Brahman. The answer is that it is no mistake for, in that Śruti passage, the *Sat* is admitted to be that which contains within It the seed i e., the cause of creation. Though *Sat* i e., Brahman is indicated in that passage by the word *prāna*, yet Brahman that is indicated by the word *Sat* and *prāṇa* in that connection is not the one who is free from its attribute of being the seed that creates all beings, for if in that Śruti passage, Brahman, the Absolute devoid of causal relation, were sought to be described, then the Śruti would have used such expressions as 'Not this, not this', 'whence speech turns back' and 'That is something other than both the known and the unknown'. The Smṛti also declares 'It is neither *Sat* nor *asat*'. If by the text were meant the

Absolute devoid of causal relation, then the return to the plane of consciousness, of those who were in deep sleep and unified with *Sat* at the time of cosmic dissolution, could not happen. Further in that case there is the contingency of the liberated being born again, for the absence of the seed, the cause of the world of names and forms, would be the common feature of both. Further in the absence of the seed which can be destroyed by *Jñāna* alone, *Jñāna* itself becomes futile. Therefore, the word *Sat* (in the Śruti) in that aspect in which causality is attributed to It is indicated by *prāna*, and accordingly has been described in all the Śrutis as the cause, as the *Bhāsya* (Gau Kā. 1-2) says—

कथं प्राणशब्दत्वमव्याकृतस्य ? 'प्राणबन्धनं हि सोम्य मनः' इति श्रुतेः। ननु तत्र 'सदेव सोम्य' इति प्रकृत सद्ब्रह्म प्राणशब्दवाच्यम्। नैप दोषः। बीजात्मकत्वाभ्युपगमात् सतः। यद्यपि सद्ब्रह्म प्राणशब्दवाच्यम् तत्र तथापि जीवप्रसवबीजात्मकत्वमपरित्यज्यैव प्राणशब्दत्वं सतः सच्छब्दवाच्यता च। यदि हि निर्बीजरूपं विवक्षित ब्रह्माभविष्यत् 'नेति नेति', 'यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते', 'अन्यदेव तद्विदितादथो अविदितादधि' इत्यवक्ष्यत्। 'न सत्तन्नासदुच्यते' इति स्मृतेः। निर्बीजतयैव चेत् सति प्रलीनानां सपन्नानां सुषुप्तप्रलययोः पुनरुत्थानानुपपत्तिः स्यात्। मुक्तानां च पुनरुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गः। बीजाभावाविशेषात्। ज्ञानदाह्यबीजाभावे च ज्ञानानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गः। तस्मात् सबीजत्वाभ्युपगमेनैव सतः प्राणत्वव्यपदेशः सर्वश्रुतिषु च कारणत्वव्यपदेशः।

9.8.1 Rahugrastha—'Avidya' in Deep Sleep Likened unto Rahu

In respect of the One Ātman experienced as threefold in the body, the *Bhāsya* (Gau. Kā. 1-2) says—the causal condition is also verily experienced in the body as is evident from such recollection of the one awakened from deep sleep as 'I did not know anything at the time of deep sleep'—

बीजावस्थापि न किञ्चिदवेदिषमित्युत्थितस्य प्रत्ययदर्शनाद्देहेऽनुभूयत एवेति त्रिधा देहे व्यवस्थित इत्युच्यते ।

As pointed out, during deep-sleep the 'jīva' bereft of his *upādhis* pertaining to the waking and the dream states is one with Ātman, the *Sat*, though not aware of it. He is being veiled by Avidyā with the latent impressions in it Though he comes out of *Sat* at the time of waking, he is not aware that he has come out of It. So says the Śruti (Ch. U. 6-9-2 and 6-10-2)—

सति सपद्य न विदुः सति सपद्यामह इति ।
सत आगम्य न विदुः सत आगच्छामह इति ॥

Also just as people who do not know the treasure of gold hidden underground, walk over the field again and again but do not find the treasure, even so all these creatures here, though they go daily (during sleep) into Brahman, yet do not realise It for they are carried away by the false Avidyā, as the *Chāndogyopanisad* (8-3-2) says—

तद्यथापि हिरण्यनिधि निहितमक्षेत्रज्ञा उपर्युपरि सञ्चरन्तो न विन्देयुरेवमेवेमाः सर्वाः प्रजा अहरहर्गच्छन्त्य एतं ब्रह्मलोक न विन्दन्त्यनृतेन हि प्रत्यूढाः ।

This is because of the veil that is Avidyā which is likened unto the Rāhu that eclipses the Sun or the Moon. So it is that the hymn says—

राहुग्रस्तदिवाकरेन्दुसदृशो मायासमाच्छादनात्
सन्मात्रः करणोपसंहरणतो योऽभूत् सुषुप्तः पुमान् ।

Says the *Tattvasudhā* thereon—

स्फुटमप्रकाशमानस्य स्वरूपतः सत्त्वे दृष्टान्तमाह—राहुग्रस्तेति । . . . यथा राहुणा ग्रस्तो दिवाकरश्चन्द्रो वा स्फुटं न प्रकाशत इत्येतावता दिवाकरस्य चन्द्रमसो वा नासत्त्वम् ; तद्वत् करणानामुपसंहारान्माययावृतत्वाच्च सुषुप्तौ स्फुटमात्मा न भासत इत्येतावता आत्मनो नासत्त्वमित्यर्थः ।

*

ननु राहुग्रस्तस्य सूर्यस्य चन्द्रमसो वा स्फुटप्रकाशाभावेऽपि चक्षुषा अविशेषतः सर्वैर्ग्रहणादस्ति सत्त्वम्। न तद्वदात्मनः केनचित् सत्त्वमनुभूयत इत्याशङ्क्य सुषुप्तौ आत्मनोऽप्यविशेषतो भानं साधयति—प्रागस्वाप्समित्यादिना।

[To drive home that Ātman does exist in deep sleep though not manifest in Its full effulgence, the illustration of the Rāhu is given—Just as it cannot be said that the Sun or the Moon does not exist merely because they do not shine fully when eclipsed by the Rāhu, similarly it cannot be said that Ātman is non-existent just because It does not shine in Its full glory in deep sleep because of the withdrawal of the senses, as also the veil of Māyā. If it is said that the illustration is not appropriate since the Sun or the Moon, though not fully bright, is seen by the eye during eclipse by every one, while none experiences likewise the existence of Ātman, during deep sleep, the answer is that the shine of Ātman is there during deep sleep though not in a particularised manner, as seen by the *parāmarśa* 'I was fast asleep then ....']

Referring to these lines in the stanza of the hymn, the *Mānasollāsa* brings out the meaning of the expression '*Rāhu-grasta*', as the *ṭīkā* points out—Deluded as the individual is by Māyā in deep sleep, he then appears as inert and ignorant. He appears as non-luminous, as not manifest in particular forms of cognition. He also appears as self-luminous as his inherent Consciousness never fails—

सुषुप्तौ मायया मूढो जडोऽन्ध इव लक्ष्यते।
अप्रकाशतया भाति स्वप्रकाशतयापि च॥

अतो विशेषविज्ञानाभावादप्रकाशतया भाति, स्वरूपविज्ञानस्य विलोपाभावात् स्वप्रकाशतयापि च आभातीत्यर्थः।

(*Mānasollāsa* VI-23 and the *ṭīkā* thereon)

As revealed by the very Consciousness which it veils, Māyā i e., Avidyā, is compared to the Rāhu—

भास्या स्वावृतचिद्भास्नाऽविद्या राहुवदिष्यते ।

(*Advaitasiddhisiddhāntasāra* 1-76-258)

Raising the question as to how the Witness-self, who is veiled by Avidyā which covers Consciousness as such, can reveal Avidyā etc., Śrī Śrī Sadāśivabrahmendrapāda in his *Siddhānta-kalpavalli* (88-89) which summarises the *Siddhāntaleśasangraha*, answers it by saying that it does it in the manner in which the Moon that is covered by the shadow, the Rāhu, reveals that Rāhu—

नु चिन्मात्रावरकतमसा स्वयमावृतः साक्षी ।
स कथमविद्यादीनामवभासयिता भवेदिति चेत् ॥
राहुच्छन्नश्चन्द्रो राहुं यद्वत्प्रकाशयति ।
तमसाऽऽवृतोपि साक्षी तमः प्रकाशयति तद्वदित्याहुः ॥

9.8.2 Turiya, Enlightenment as Distinguished from Deep Sleep

As contrasted with this state of deep sleep—in which, though one with Brahman-Atman, jīva is not aware of it, either in that state or after coming out of it into any of the other two states because of the veil of Avidyā—is the 'state' of enlightenment in which he is free from Avidyā. Says the *Praśnopaniṣad* (4-10)—

परमेवाक्षरं प्रतिपद्यते स यो ह वै तदच्छायमशरीरमलोहित शुभ्रमक्षरं वेदयते यस्तु सोम्य। स सर्वतः सर्वो भवति ।

[He who realises the Supreme Undecaying One, attains surely the Supreme, the Undecaying, the Shadowless i.e., free from *tamas*, the Bodiless i e., without the *upādhis* to which pertain name, form etc., devoid of all *gunas* such as *rajas*, and therefore Pure, ignorance being removed by *Akhandākāravrtti*, he now knows All; becomes All.]

That is, as Śrī Ānandagiri points out, he knows That by knowing which everything is known; and attains to that

'state' transcending the gross, the subtle and the causal bodies and thereby the triad of states, the waking, the dream and the deep sleep.

This 'state', counted as the 'fourth', the *Turīya*, from the standpoint of the other three, transcends them; nevertheless it underlies the other three Says the *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad* (7)—

नान्तःप्रज्ञं न वहिष्प्रज्ञ नोभयतःप्रज्ञ न प्रज्ञानघनं न प्रज्ञ नाप्रज्ञम् । अदृश्यमव्यवहार्यमग्राह्यमलक्षणमचिन्त्यमव्यपदेश्यमेकात्मप्रत्ययसारं प्रपञ्चोपशमं शान्तं शिवमद्वैतं चतुर्थं मन्यन्ते स आत्मा स विज्ञेयः ।

[The fourth 'state' of enlightenment—the *Turīya,* as distinguished from the other three, is not the *taijasa* i e , that which is conscious of the internal subjective world, nor the *viśva* i e., that which is conscious of the external objective world, nor the one in between, conscious of both these, nor the *prājña* i e , that which is a mass of sentiency, nor that which knows everything all at once, nor that which is insentient It is unseen by any sense organ, beyond all negotiation, incomprehensible by the mind, without any distinguishing feature, unthinkable, indescribable, Consciousness in its essence, the One Ātman that is Self-effulgent, negation of all phenomena, the Serene, the Bliss and the Non-dual; known as the fourth, the *Turīya*. He is Ātman, He has to be realised.]

The common and specific characteristics of the *viśva* etc., are described by the *Kārikās* (1—11 to 16) with a view to determining the real nature of the *Turya*—

कार्यकारणवद्धौ ताविष्येते विश्वतैजसौ ।
प्राज्ञः कारणवद्धस्तु द्वौ तौ तुर्ये न सिध्यतः ॥

नात्मान न परांश्चैव न सत्य नापि चानृतम् ।
प्राज्ञः किञ्चन म्वेत्ति तुर्यं तत्सर्वदृक्सदा ॥

द्वैतस्याग्रहणं तुल्यमुभयोः प्राज्ञतुर्ययोः ।
बीजनिद्रायुतः प्राज्ञः सा च तुर्ये न विद्यते ॥
स्वप्ननिद्रायुतावाद्यौ प्राज्ञस्त्वस्वप्ननिद्रया ।
न निद्रां नैव च स्वप्नं तुर्ये पश्यन्ति निश्चिताः ॥
अन्यथागृह्णतः स्वप्नो निद्रा तत्त्वमजानतः ।
विपर्यासे तयोः क्षीणे तुरीयं पदमश्नुते ॥
अनादिमायया सुप्तो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते ।
अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नमद्वैतं बुध्यते तदा ॥

[The *viśva* and the *taijasa* are conditioned by both cause and effect i.e., the seed and the fruit, by which is meant तत्त्वाग्रहण and अन्यथाग्रहण i e , non-apprehension and misapprehension of Reality. But *prājña* is conditioned by cause alone i.e , non-apprehension. These two, cause and effect, do not exist in the *Turya*.

The *prājña* knows not anything of his own Self or the non-Self, i.e., the external duality born of the seed that is Avidyā, अविद्याबीजप्रसूत बाह्य द्वैतम्, truth or untruth, and as such he is bound only by Avidyā, the cause. But the *Turya* is ever the All, *Sarvam*, the sole Seer, the *Drk*, in all the states He is not bound by either the causal Avidyā or its effects

The non-cognition of duality is common to both the *prājña* and the *Turya*. But the *prājña* is associated with sleep in the form of cause; and this sleep does not exist in the *Turya*.

The first two viz., the *viśva* and the *taijasa* are associated with the dream and the sleep states; the *prājña* is associated with the dreamless sleep The knowers of the truth see neither sleep nor dream in the *Turya* who is not bound either by the cause or the effect

Dream is the wrong cognition of Reality. Sleep is the state in which one does not know what Reality is When the erroneous knowledge in these two disappears, the *Turiya* state is realised.

When the jiva 'sleeping' under the influence of the beginningless Māyā is 'awakened' he then realises in himself

the Non-duality, the Beginningless, the Sleepless and the Dreamless]

9.8.3 Mulajnana, the Seed very much Present in Deep Sleep

Says the *Upadeśasāhasrī* (17-26, 27)—

सुषुप्त्याख्य तमोऽज्ञानं बीज स्वप्नप्रबोधयोः ।
स्वात्मबोधप्रदग्ध स्याद्बीजं दग्धं यथाभवम् ॥

तदेवैक त्रिधा ज्ञेयं मायाबीजं पुनः क्रमात् ।
मायाव्यात्माऽविकारोऽपि बहुधैको जलार्कवत् ॥

[What is called deep sleep, darkness or ignorance, is the seed of the waking and the dream states. It gets perfectly burnt by the fire of Self-knowledge and it no more produces effects, like a fried seed that does not germinate

That one seed called Māyā is evolved into the three states which come one after another again and again. Self, the Substratum of Māyā, though One only and Immutable, appears to be many like the reflections of the Sun in waters]

9.8.4 Atman the Abiding Substratum Unattached to Varying States

In respect of the deep sleep state and the *Turīya*, say the *Pratyaktattvacintāmani* (1-46) and the *ṭīkā* thereon—

सुप्तौ सर्वं व्रजति विलय मातृमानादि विश्वं
द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेर्न भवति लयो नाशशून्यत्वहेतोः ।
तत्राज्ञानं सकलविलय स्फोरयन् बोधरूपो
निश्चेतव्यः सुखवपुरयं प्रत्यगात्मा तुरीयः ॥

जाग्रत्स्वप्नावस्थयोः सर्वबुद्धिवृत्त्यवभासकतया साक्षिण प्रसाध्य सुप्तौ तल्लयप्रकाशकत्वेन तं साधयति—सुप्ताविति । सुप्त्यवस्थायां सर्वं मातृमानादि विश्व स्वकारणभूताज्ञाने विलयं व्रजति । तत्र सर्वबुद्धिवृत्तिविलयावभासकत्वेन द्रष्टुः स्वरूपभूताया दृष्टेर्न विलयो भवति । तन्नाशस्य ससाक्षिकत्वे साक्ष्यन्तर-

कल्पने तस्यापि नादवस्थ्यादनवस्थानादाद्यस्यैवावस्थानात् । निःसाक्षिकत्वे तु साधकाभावादेव साक्षिविनाशासिद्धेः । प्रत्युत 'न हि द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यतेऽविनाशित्वात्', 'अविनाशी वा अरे अयमात्मा' इत्याद्याः शत श्रुतयोऽपि तस्य नित्यतां गमयन्तीत्यर्थः । यद्यात्मनोऽपि नाशः स्यात्तर्हि सुषुप्तेस्तत्सुखस्य चानुभवितुरभावादुत्थितस्य 'सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्' इति स्वापसुखयोः स्मरणं न स्यादिति तत्परामर्शान्यथानुपपत्त्या तत्राज्ञानानुभवितृत्वेन साक्षिणं दर्शयति—तत्रेति । सकलस्य स्थूलसूक्ष्मकार्यजातस्य विलयो यस्मिस्तदज्ञानं कर्मीभूत भासयन्ननुभवन् नित्यज्ञानघनो जागरे तत्परामर्शान्यथानुपपत्त्या निश्चेतव्यः—सर्वविलयभासकत्वेन स्वयं निरतिशयानन्दरूपः प्रत्यगात्मा तुरीयरूपोऽवस्थात्रयानुगतभानरूपतया त्वंपदार्थोऽसङ्गचिद्रूपत्वेनाध्यवसेय इत्यर्थः । नन्ववस्थात्रयसम्बन्धस्य सर्वानुभवसिद्धत्वात् कथमस्यासङ्गत्वमिति शङ्का परिजिहीर्षुः 'शिवमद्वैत चतुर्थ मन्यन्ते' इति श्रुतिसिद्धमर्थमवस्थात्रयानुगतत्वेनाप्यसङ्गत्वरूप दर्शयति—तुरीय इति ।

[In deep sleep the entire universe consisting of the knower, the means of knowledge etc , gets merged whereas the Consciousness that is the *Svarūpa* of the seer is never lost as there is nothing to destroy It. This is borne out by hundreds of Śrutis of the type cited here Since the *parāmarśa* of the experience of ajñāna etc , in deep sleep cannot be accounted for otherwise, the Witness-self who reveals the ajñāna in which all else is dissolved is to be accepted as the embodiment of Bliss, the Inner Self, the *Turīya*, by Itself unassociated with any of the three states, spoken of in the *Māndūkyopanisad*]

The *ṭikā* continues to say—

अयं भावः—यद्यात्मन्यवस्थात्रयं यौगपद्येनानुवर्तेत दहनपचनप्रकाशनशक्तय इव वह्नौ, यदि वा एकावस्थानुभूताः कतिपये वा धर्मा अवस्थान्तरेऽनुभूयेरन्, यथा बाल्याद्यवस्थानुभूता रूपगोत्रजातिप्रभृतयः शरीरयौवनेऽप्यनुभूयन्ते, तदा भवेदात्मा तत्सङ्गी । न त्वेवम्, स्वप्नदृश्यमात्रस्य जागरे बाधात्, जाग्रद्दृश्यमात्रस्य च स्वप्ने तिरोधानात्, तदुभयदृश्यस्य सुषुप्तौ

विलयात्, सुषुप्तेश्च तयोरप्रतिभासाद्द्रष्टैव केवलोऽवस्थात्रयेऽनुवर्तमानः प्रत्यभिज्ञयैकोऽनुभूयते। तदियमनुवर्तमानैकवस्तुनि पर्यायेण प्रतिभासमानस्यानेकस्यैककाले अपरस्याननुवृत्तिर्मन्दान्धकारे नदीव प्रावलम्बिजरल्लतायां क्रमारोपितवक्रकाष्ठतरुमूलभूप्रदरभुजङ्गादीनामिव, अवस्थात्रयस्य मिथ्यात्वमवगमयतीति हेतोरध्यस्तैः पदार्थैरधिष्ठानस्यासंस्पर्शादसङ्गत्वसिद्धिरिति । 'स यत्तत्र किञ्चित्पश्यत्यनन्वागतस्तेन भवति', 'असङ्गो ह्यय पुरुषः' इति श्रुतिरप्यसङ्गत्वादननुवृत्तिं दर्शयन्ती अमुमेवार्थं द्रढयति, 'असङ्गो न हि सज्जते' इति च श्रुत्यन्तरम्। तथा चावस्थात्रयाधिष्ठानत्वाद्बाधकान्तरापरिशेषाच्चात्मनः सत्यत्वं सिद्धमिति ।

[This is what is sought to be conveyed Had the triad of states been simultaneously present in Ātman, like the powers in fire, of burning, cooking and illuminating or had there been the experience in the other states of some at least of what was experienced in one state, like the form, the *gotra* and the community, experienced in the boyhood continuing to be experienced in the adulthood of the body as well, then Ātman could be associated with them. Far from it! What is seen in the dream is as a whole sublated in the waking What is seen in the waking vanishes completely in the dream. The 'seen' in either of these two states is dissolved in deep sleep state, and deep sleep is not experienced in the other two states The Seer alone as abiding in all these three states is experienced as is made known by reflective cognition In this One abiding Entity these states appear one after another, no two of them being simultaneous, like a curved stick, a root of a tree, a fissure in the earth or a snake etc., superposed in a dried creeper lying in the slope on the bank of a river in dim light. Thus it is made known that the triad of states is illusory and the Substratum on which they are superimposed is untainted by them, and as such Ātman, the Substratum, is in no sense tainted by them. The Śruti 'He is untouched by whatever He sees in that state, for this *Purusa* is unattached' emphasizes this untainted nature by showing the non-continuance of one state in the others; so also the Śruti,

'Unattached, for He is never attached'. This Ātman being the Substratum of the three states which appear and disappear, and there being nothing else to sublate It, Its abiding Reality is established]

9.8.5 Enquiry into Deep Sleep culminates in Knowledge of Turiya the Brahman-Atman

The *Svārājyasiddhi* gives this discussion in exactly the same terms at the end of the *ṭīkā* on the verse (1-42)—

इच्छादेरुदयविनाशसन्ततीनामक्षाणामसुमनसां धियश्च तस्मात् ।
द्रष्टान्योऽस्त्यविपरिलुप्तदृक्सतत्त्वो निस्सङ्गो विहरति यः पुरत्रयेऽपि ॥

[The Seer of the stream of the rise and the disappearance of desires etc., and the Witness as also the Seer of the senses, *prāna*, mind and intellect, must be different from the seen He is Ātman, the Eternal Seer, who is detached even as He moves through all the three states.]

Says the *Naiskarmyasiddhi* (4-45 to 48)—

तत्रान्यथाग्रहणवदन्यथाग्रहणबीजमग्रहणमनात्मधर्म एवेत्याह—

इदं ज्ञानमहं ज्ञाता ज्ञेयमेतदिति त्रयम् ।
योऽविकारो विजानाति परागेवास्य तत्तमः ॥

यत एतदेवमतस्तस्यैव बीजात्मनस्तमसश्चित्तधर्मविशिष्टस्य स्वकार्यद्वितीयाभिसम्बन्धो न त्वविकारिण आत्मन इत्याह दृष्टान्तेन—

रूपप्रकाशयोर्यद्वत्सङ्गतिर्विक्रियावतः ।
सुखदुःखादिसम्बन्धश्चित्तस्यैवं विकारिणः ॥

तदेतदन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां दर्शयिष्यन्नाह—

सम्प्रसादेऽविकारित्वादस्तं याते विकारिणि ।
पश्यतो नात्मनः किञ्चिद्द्वितीयं स्पृशतेऽण्वपि ॥

सोऽयं कूटस्थज्ञानमूर्तिरात्मा—

यथा प्राज्ञे तथैवायं स्वप्नजागरितान्तयोः ।
पश्यन्नप्यविकारित्वाद्द्वितीय नैव पश्यति ॥

[Like misapprehension, non-apprehension which brings about misapprehension is also not an attribute of Ātman. The darkness of ignorance is external to this unchanging Ātman who cognises this knowledge, the knower and the objects known.

This being the case it is only this causal ignorance, qualified by the traits of the mind, that is associated with the non-Self set up by ignorance itself The unchanging Ātman is not so associated This is brought out with an analogy Just as colour and light, both subject to change, enter into mutual relation, pleasures and pains are associated with the mind subject to change. This is demonstrated through the method of co-presence and co-absence In the state of deep sleep the changing mind subsides and Ātman, being changeless, continues to be the Seer, in that state nothing external to Ātman affects It in the least

This Ātman is constituted of unchanging knowledge. As in deep sleep, in the dream and the waking states also, the seeing Ātman, being changeless, sees none other in reality]

The *Kaivalyopanisad* says—

पुरत्रये क्रीडति यस्तु जीवस्ततस्तु जातं सकलं विचित्रम् ।
आधारमानन्दमखण्डबोधं यस्मिंल्लयं याति पुरत्रयं च ॥

[From Him who, as jiva, sports in the three 'cities' (viz , the states of waking, dream and deep sleep), has sprung up all diversity. He is the Substratum, the Bliss, Impartite Consciousness, in whom the three 'cities' dissolve themselves]

The gist of all this discussion is that by enquiry one is landed in the Brahman-Atman *Svarūpa* the *Turīya*—शान्तं शिवमद्वैतम्—which as the *Praśnopanisad* says, is the Omniscient, the All, which underlies all the three states as their Substratum providing the Shine as well.

Says the *Sankṣepaśārīraka* (3-136, 81, 137) by way of instruction to the disciple by the preceptor—

तिस्रोऽपि चिद्घनतनोस्तव दृश्यभूता दूरे चकासति मतेर्बहिरेव तावत् ।
आविस्तिरोभवनधर्मतया ह्यवस्थाः कः सङ्करो विमलचिद्वपुषस्तवाभिः ॥
कर्त्रादिसन्निधिबलेन तवापि कर्तृभोक्तृप्रमातृवपुरापतति भ्रमेण ।
तद्बुद्धिसंश्रयमनात्मगत प्रतीचि शुद्धेऽपि पश्यसि तमःपटलावृताक्षः ॥
त्वय्येव कल्पितमहङ्करणं बिभर्ति तिस्रोऽपि ताः सहितमेव तु तच्च ताभिः ।
त्वच्चित्प्रकाशविषयत्वमुपेत्य भाति स्वाज्ञानवत्तव न रूपमतश्चतुष्कम् ॥

[These three states of the intellect are known by your true Nature, the Pure Consciousness, and hence they are manifested as external to you Moreover, as these states possess the attributes of appearance and disappearance, how could there be any real relation of these three states to your Nature, the Pure Consciousness?

On the strength of the presence of the agent etc , there arises erroneously the forms of the agent, the enjoyer and the knower in your true Nature But they are present in the intellect that is an insentient object And as your true Nature is veiled by Avidyā, you perceive them in your Pure Inner Self.

The intellect superimposed on You sustains the three states And the intellect associated with them is manifested, by being the object of the Light that is your Consciousness. Hence these four factors viz , the three states and the intellect, like Avidyā, do not constitute your Nature]

The co-presence of the ego and the *samsāra* in the waking and the dream states and their co-absence in the deep sleep state, which is a matter of experience, is to be recognised, while Ātman abides in all the three states as the unchanging Witness.

The experience of this Witness-self which is a pointer to this *Turya* as distinguished from the jīva subject to the three states, is given expression to in the *Advaitamakaranda* (10, 11, 12)—

सुप्तेऽहमि न दृश्यन्ते दुःखदोषप्रवृत्तयः ।
अतस्तस्यैव संसारो न मे संसर्तृसाक्षिणः ॥
सुप्तः सुप्तिं न जानाति नासुप्ते स्वप्नजागरौ ।
जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तीनां साक्ष्यतोऽहमतद्दशः ॥
विज्ञानविरतिः सुप्तिस्तज्जन्म स्वप्नजागरौ ।
तत्साक्षिणः कथं मे स्युर्नित्यज्ञानस्य ते त्रयः ॥

[When the ego is dissolved in deep sleep, misery, attachment etc., and the resulting motivation for action etc., are not in evidence. Hence *samsāra* pertains only to the ego and not to Me, the Witness of the ego which is subject to *samsāra*. During sleep one is not aware that one is asleep. The waking and the dream are not for the one to whom the deep sleep state does not pertain Hence, as the Witness of all the three states, I am bereft of them.

The absence of particularised knowledge is the state of deep sleep; arising of it is either the dream or the waking state How can they pertain to Me, the Witness, who am of the very nature of Eternal Consciousness?]

9.9.1 Deep Sleep an Illustration of Kaivalya

The consideration of the deep sleep state among the triad, is particularly useful as providing many a similarity with the *Turīya*, the state of liberation. Says the *Śataślokī*—

आश्लिष्यात्मानमात्मा न किमपि सहसैवान्तरं वेद बाह्यं
यद्वत्कामी विदेशात्सदनमुपगतो गाढमाश्लिष्य कान्ताम् ।
यात्यस्तं तत्र लोकव्यवहृतिरखिला पुण्यपापानुबन्धः
शोको मोहो भयं वा समविषममिदं न स्मरेत्येव किञ्चित् ॥ (69)

[The moment the jīva comes into union with Brahman during deep sleep, he ceases to be conscious of anything, internal or external, like unto a lover fervently embracing his beloved

one on his return home from a foreign land In that state all worldly activity that is the result of merit and demerit disappears, and nothing is remembered of all these ups and downs—sorrow, confusion or fear.]

9.9.2 Diversity—Laya, Submerging in Deep Sleep, Sublation in Kaivalya

The *Daśaślokī* (3) and the *Siddhāntabindu* thereon say—

न माता पिता वा न देवा न लोका न वेदा न यज्ञा न तीर्थं ब्रुवन्ति ।
सुषुप्तौ निरस्तातिशून्यात्मकत्वात्तदेकोऽवशिष्टः शिवः केवलोऽहम् ॥

तथा च सुषुप्तिं प्रकृत्य श्रुतिः—'अत्र पिताऽपिता भवति माताऽमाता लोका अलोका देवा अदेवा वेदा अवेदाः । अत्र स्तेनोऽस्तेनो भवति भ्रूणहाऽभ्रूणहा चाण्डालोऽचाण्डाल पौल्कसोऽपौल्कसः श्रमणोऽश्रमणस्तापसोऽतापसोऽनन्वागतं पुण्येनानन्वागतं पापेन तीर्णो हि तदा सर्वाञ्छोकान् हृदयस्य भवति' इत्याद्या अभिमानाभावे सर्वानर्थनिवृत्तिमनुवदन्ति ।

ननु सर्वव्यवहाराभावे शून्यतैव स्यात् । नेत्याह—निरस्तातिशून्यात्मकत्वादिति । निरस्तमतिशून्यात्मकत्वं यस्मात्तत्तथा । भावप्रधानो निर्देशः । तस्य सुषुप्तिसाधकत्वात् पुनरुत्थानानुपपत्तेश्च । विकारसामान्यनाशाभाववानिति बृहदारण्यकभाष्ये व्याख्या दृश्यते । 'अविनाशी वा अरे अयमात्मा । अनुच्छित्तिधर्मा', 'मात्रासंसर्गस्त्वस्य भवति', 'यद्वै तन्न पश्यति पश्यन्वै तन्न पश्यति', 'न हि द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते अविनाशित्वान्न तु तद्द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यत्पश्येत्' इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यश्चात्मचैतन्यस्य न सुषुप्तौ शून्यतेत्यर्थः । निराकृतमप्येतत्पुनरपि स्थूणानिखननन्यायेन निराक्रियते ।

यद्वा निरस्तमशनायाद्यतीतमद्वितीयमतिशून्यं यद्ब्रह्म तदात्मकत्वात् । तथा च श्रुतिः—'यदा वै पुरुषः स्वपिति नाम सता सोम्य तदा सम्पन्नो भवति', 'तद्यथा प्रियया स्त्रिया सम्परिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किञ्चन वेद नान्तरमेवमेवायं पुरुषः प्राज्ञेनात्मना सम्परिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किञ्चन वेद नान्तरम्'

इति । तेन जगत्कारणीभूतसर्वज्ञसर्वशक्तिपरिपूर्णानन्दबोधस्वरूपेण ब्रह्मणा सहैकत्वादसंसार्येव जीव इति सिद्धम् ।

[The Śrutis say that in deep sleep there is neither mother nor father nor the gods nor the worlds nor the Vedas nor sacrifices nor places of pilgrimage; the total void is also denied. Therefore, I am the One, the Residue, Śiva, the Absolute.

Thus the Śrutis pertaining to deep sleep state say—'There a father becomes not a father, a mother, not a mother; the worlds, not the worlds, the gods, not the gods; the Vedas, not the Vedas, a thief, not a thief; there the destroyer of a foetus becomes not a destroyer of a foetus, a *cāndāla* (the son of a *śūdra* father and a *brāhmana* mother) is not a *cāndāla*; a *paulkasa* (the son of a *śūdra* father and a *ksatriya* mother) is not a *paulkasa*, a monk is not a monk, an ascetic is not an ascetic Then one is not accompanied by merits, not accompanied by demerits for then he has transcended all the sorrows of the heart'. These Śrutis and others corroborate the cessation of all miseries because of the absence of identification with the body.

Then, it is objected, in the absence of all parlance, it would verily be total void Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda refutes it by the statement that then the total void is also denied. This is indicative of the positive nature of existence because that serves to establish the deep sleep state and also because a return to the waking state cannot otherwise be accounted for. Also that Ātman, the Consciousness, is not reduced to void in deep sleep, is shown by Śrutis like—'Verily, my dear! this Ātman is imperishable, is of an indestructible nature', 'For there takes place the severance of Its connection with the material elements', 'Verily when He does not see, He is verily seeing, though He does not see', 'There is no cessation of the seeing power of the Seer because of His imperishability There is no other thing second to It, which It can see as separate from Itself'. Though the voidness of Ātman has been refuted, it is refuted again according to the maxim of the process of implanting a post firmly.

An alternative interpretation is—Ātman is of the nature of that Brahman which is beyond hunger etc., without a second and transcending the void. And so say the Śrutis 'When, O amiable one! a man sleeps, then he becomes united with Existence', 'Just as a man, when embraced by his beloved does not know anything either inside or outside himself, even so this jīva when embraced by *Prājñātmā* does not know anything either inside or outside himself'. Therefore it is established that the jīva is necessarily untransmigratory as he is identical with Brahman which is the cause of the universe, Omniscient, Omnipotent, Perfect, of the nature of Bliss and Consciousness.]

9.9.3 Jiva attains His very Svarupa in Deep Sleep

It may be mentioned that in addition to the Śrutis referred to in the *Siddhāntabindu* etc., quoted above, there are many other Śrutis driving home the idea that the *Purusa* is not attached to any of the triad of states which are but passing ones, with particular reference to the deep sleep state. For example, in the *Daharādhikarana*, in discussing the Sūtra (1-3-5-19)—उत्तराच्चेदाविर्भूतस्वरूपस्तु—says the *Bhāsya*—

एवं मिथ्याज्ञानकृत एव जीवपरमेश्वरयोर्भेदो न वस्तुकृतः, व्योमवदसङ्गत्वाविशेषात्। कुतश्चैतदेवं प्रतिपत्तव्यम्। यतो 'य एषोऽक्षिणिपुरुषो दृश्यते' इत्युपदिश्य 'एतदमृतमभयमेतद्ब्रह्म' इत्युपदिशति। योऽक्षिणि प्रसिद्धो द्रष्टा द्रष्टृत्वेन विभाव्यते सोऽमृताभयलक्षणाद्ब्रह्मणोऽन्यश्चेत्स्यात्ततोऽमृताभयब्रह्मसामानाधिकरण्यं न स्यात्। नापि प्रतिच्छायात्मायमक्षिलक्षितो निर्दिश्यते, प्रजापतेर्मृषावादित्वप्रसङ्गात्। तथा द्वितीयेऽपि पर्याये 'य एषः स्वप्ने महीयमानश्चरति' इति न प्रथमपर्यायनिर्दिष्टादक्षिपुरुषाद्द्रष्टुरन्यो निर्दिष्टः, 'एतं त्वेव ते भूयोऽनुव्याख्यास्यामि' इत्युपक्रमात्। किञ्च 'अहमद्य स्वप्ने हस्तिनमद्राक्षं नेदानीं तं पश्यामि' इति दृष्टमेव प्रतिबुद्धः प्रत्याचष्टे। द्रष्टारं तु तमेव प्रत्यभिजानाति 'य एवाहं स्वप्नमद्राक्षं स एवाहं जागरितं पश्यामि' इति। तथा तृतीयेऽपि पर्याये 'नाह खल्वयमेवं संप्रत्यात्मानं जानात्यय-

महमस्मीति नो एवेमानि भूतानि ' इति सुषुप्तावस्थायां विशेषविज्ञानाभावमेव दर्शयति न विज्ञातारं प्रतिषेधति । यत्तु तत्र ' विनाशमेवापीतो भवति ' इति तदपि विशेषविज्ञानविनाशाभिप्रायमेव न विज्ञातृविनाशाभिप्रायम् । ' न हि विज्ञातुर्विज्ञातेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यतेऽविनाशित्वात् ' इति श्रुत्यन्तरात् । तथा चतुर्थेऽपि पर्याये ' एतं त्वेव ते भूयोऽनुव्याख्यास्यामि नो एवान्यत्रैतस्मात् ' इत्युपक्रम्य ' मघवन्मर्त्यं वा इदं शरीरम् ' इत्यादिना प्रपञ्चेन शरीराद्युपाधिसम्बन्धप्रत्याख्यानेन सम्प्रसादशब्दोदित जीव ' स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते ' इति ब्रह्मस्वरूपापन्नं दर्शयन् न परस्माद्ब्रह्मणोऽमृताभयस्वरूपादन्यं जीवं दर्शयति ।

[Thus the difference between the jīva and the Supreme Lord is due only to ajñāna that is false; and it is not a factual situation since, like *ākāśa*, both are free from any attachment whatsoever. How again is this to be known? From the instruction of Prajāpati who first teaches 'The *Purusa* that is seen in the eye', and then says 'This is the Immortal, the Fearless; this is Brahman'. If the well-known seer in the eye were different from Brahman characterised as Immortal and Fearless, then that seer would not have been put in apposition with the Fearless and Immortal Brahman. Nor is the reflection in the eye indicated here by the word 'eye' for that would lead to the undesirable possibility of Prajāpati being regarded as deceitful. So also at the second stage, the instruction 'He who moves about happy in dreams' etc , does not refer to a being different from the seeing person within the eye spoken of in the first stage, as is clear from the introductory clause 'I shall explain this very One to you over again'. Moreover, a man after waking up speaks thus 'I saw an elephant in a dream today, I do not see it now'. What he repudiates here is what he saw, whereas he cognises the identity of that very Witness thus 'I myself who saw the dream, now see the things of the waking state'. Similarly at the third stage Indra says 'This one does not certainly know himself now in deep sleep as "I am so and so", nor does he know these things', whereby he shows only the

absence of particularised cognition in deep sleep, and does not deny the Witness-self. As for the statement of Indra—'There it undergoes annihilation, as it were', that too is made in respect of annihilation of particularised cognition but not in the sense of annihilation of the Knower, for another *Upanisad* declares—'The knowing power of the Knower never ceases, becauses It is indestructible'. Similarly at the fourth stage, Prajāpati starts with 'I shall explain this very One to you over again, and not anything different from It' and then he adds 'O Maghavan! this body is surely mortal' etc., which elaboration denies any relationship with such *upādhis* as the body. And then by saying 'It attains its own nature', Prajāpati reveals the jīva called *samprasāda* (one wholly serene in deep sleep) in its identity with Brahman and shows not the jīva to be something other than the Supreme Brahman, Immortal and Fearless by nature.]

9.9.4 Outcome of Enquiry into Dream and Deep Sleep—Tvampadarthasodhana

The *Anubhūtiprakāśa* (18-24, 25) puts in a nutshell the outcome of the enquiry into the dream and the deep sleep states—

देहादिव्यतिरिक्तत्वं स्वप्रभत्वमसङ्गता ।
स्वप्नप्रसङ्गतस्त्वेतत्त्रयमत्र प्रपञ्च्यते ॥

अद्वैतत्वं दृष्ट्यलोप आनन्दैकस्वभावता ।
इदं त्रयं सुषुप्तस्य प्रसङ्गेनोपपाद्यते ॥

[By the analysis of the dream state are established the distinction of Ātman from the body etc., Its Self-effulgence and Untaintedness; and by that of the deep sleep state, the non-duality, ever unfailing sentiency and the nature of unmixed Bliss of Ātman.]

9.9.5 Deep Sleep, Samadhi and Liberation—Common Features and Distinctions

Making mention of the similarity between the deep sleep

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state and absolute union with Brahman, found in the Śrutis, observes the *Bhāṣya* on the Sūtra (4-4-6-16)—

स्वाप्ययसंपत्त्योरन्यतरापेक्षमाविष्कृत हि ।

तयोरन्यतरामवस्थामपेक्ष्यैतद्विशेषसञ्ज्ञाभाववचनम् । क्वचित्सुषुप्तावस्थामपेक्ष्योच्यते, क्वचित्कैवल्यावस्थाम् । कथमवगम्यते ? यतस्तत्रैवैतदधिकारवशादाविष्कृतम् 'एतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तान्येवानु विनश्यति न प्रेत्य सञ्ज्ञाऽस्तीति', 'यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्', 'यत्र सुप्तो न कञ्चन कामं कामयते न कञ्चन स्वप्नं पश्यति' इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः ।

[Having in view either of these two states viz., the deep sleep and liberation, it is asserted, that there is an absence of particularised knowledge. This is said sometimes in relation to the state of deep sleep and sometimes to absolute liberation. How is this known? Because this is made clear by the *Upanisad* in the context dealing with this very subject as 'Ātman comes out as a separate entity from these elements and the separateness is destroyed with them i e., after attaining this oneness it has no more particular consciousness', 'But when to the knower of Brahman everything has become Ātman', 'Where falling asleep, he craves no desire and sees no dream']

The analysis of the deep sleep state thus shows that the individual then is free from desires, action, merit and demerit, particularised knowledge, duality, misery, fear, the *upādhis* like the ego, the intellect, the mind, the senses, the body etc., attachment, the notion of I, mine or this, and all diversities experienced in the waking and the dream states, and thus from all the diversifying powers of Avidyā. And as being one with Brahman, there is the experience of non-duality, Self-effulgence, uncontaminated Bliss, persistence of Shine etc. The deep sleep state has this situation in common with liberation as also *Samādhi* Those desirous of getting into the deep sleep state or *Samādhi* are themselves bereft of the desire for external objects, as they seek only Ātman. This

Ātman, however, is ever attained. Says the *Bṛhadvārtikasāra* (4-3)—

> बुद्ध्यादिषु विलीनेषु लीने चित्प्रतिबिम्बके ।
> जाग्रत्स्वप्नभिदा सर्वा लीयते तत्सुषुप्तकम् ॥ (245)
> आत्मस्वभावो निःशेषः पुञ्जीकृत्येह लक्ष्यते ।
> सुप्तौ मुक्ताविवाद्वैतस्वप्रभानन्दलक्षणः ॥ (246)
> अविद्या तु स्थिताप्यत्र द्वैतदुःखाद्यनुद्भवात् ।
> स्वभावं न तिरोधत्ते स्वप्रभानन्दमद्वयम् ॥ (247)
> समाधिसुप्त्योरद्वैतं स्वयमेवानुभूयते ॥ (264)
> छन्दः कामः कर्म पापं भयं स्यात्कर्मणः फलम् ।
> अनर्थरूपं त्रितयमद्वैते वीक्ष्यते न हि ॥ (265)
> त्रितयानर्थनिर्मुक्तं नानर्थान्तरयोगि च ।
> इति द्वैतं श्रुतावस्यां वैशब्देन निवार्यते ॥ (266)
> एवं सुप्तौ समाधौ वाऽऽलिङ्गितः परमात्मना ।
> न बहिर्जागरं नान्तः स्वप्नं च द्वैतमीक्षते ॥ (273)
> आनुकूल्यप्रातिकूल्ये द्वैतादर्शनतो न हि ।
> ततः कामभयाभावादात्मानन्दे निमज्जति ॥ (274)
> आत्मरूपं यदद्वैतमाप्तकामं तदीक्ष्यताम् । (275)
> सुषुप्सुश्च समाधित्सुर्बाह्यं कामयते न हि ।
> अपि त्वात्मानमेवात्मा प्राप्त एवाखिलैः सदा ॥ (276)

Thus the jīva in the deep sleep state is placed closer to the *Svarūpa*. Says the *Abhayaṅkaraṭīkā* on the *Siddhāntabindu* (8)—

तथा च सुप्तावस्थः प्रत्यगात्मा आत्मस्वरूपज्ञाने जाग्रज्जीवापेक्षया संनिकृष्ट इति भावः ।

It is thus clear that the deep sleep state provides the best illustration for liberation as much as the dream state affords the illustration for the other worlds beyond.

In fact it is to drive home the idea of the Self-effulgence of Ātman that the illusory nature of the dream is pointed out by Śruti. Similarly the discussion as to the locus of jīva in deep sleep is brought in, to point out his real *Svarūpa*, the Brahmanhood. Says the *Vārtikasāra* (4-3-240)—

अथवा परलोकस्य दृष्टान्तः स्वप्न ईरितः ।
सुषुप्तिर्मोक्षदृष्टान्तस्तदर्थो ग्रन्थ उत्तरः ॥

The *Śāstradarpaṇa* (3-2-2) says—

जीवस्य स्वप्रभत्वाय स्वप्नमिथ्यात्वमीरितम् ।
अथास्य ब्रह्मभावाय सुप्तिः केति विचिन्त्यते ॥

Points out the *Śataślokī* (70)—

अल्पानल्पप्रपञ्चप्रलय उपरतिश्चेन्द्रियाणां सुखाप्ति-
र्जीवन्मुक्तौ सुषुप्तौ त्रितयमपि समं किन्तु तत्रास्ति भेदः ।
प्राक्संस्कारात्प्रसुप्तः पुनरपि च परावृत्तिमेति प्रबुद्धो
नश्यत्संस्कारजातो न स किल पुनरावर्तते यश्च मुक्तः ॥

[The disappearance of all gross and subtle existence, the cessation of the senses and the attainment of bliss—these three are common to liberation-while-alive and the state of deep sleep.

There is, however, this difference that, whereas one who is asleep comes back to the life of mundane existence, births and deaths, again and again by virtue of the effects of past actions, he that has attained enlightenment and liberation never comes back to worldly life because the effects of all his past actions have been destroyed.]

The *Mānasollāsa* (VI-23) also points to the difference in these terms—

सुषुप्तौ मायया मूढो जडोऽन्ध इव लक्ष्यते ।
अप्रकाशतया भाति स्वप्रकाशतयापि च ॥

Delusion and non-luminosity which are experienced along

with Self-effulgence in deep sleep state, are conspicuous by their absence in liberation.

9.9.6 Inference Based on Avasthatrayaviveka, Inadequate; for Aparokshanubhava, Mahavakya Vital

In this connection the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* (3-57) (and the *ṭikā* thereon) raises an objection and answers it—

ननु द्रष्टृदर्शनदृश्यानां जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तेष्वागमापायदर्शनाद्यत्साक्षिकौ तेषा-मागमापायौ स आगमापायविभागरहित आत्मा यथा यन्निबन्धनौ जगतः प्रकाशाप्रकाशौ स प्रकाशाप्रकाशविभागरहितः सूर्य इति। यदा चैवं तदा वाक्यावगम्यस्यार्थस्यानुदितानस्तमितविज्ञानमात्रस्वभावस्यानुमानेनैव प्रतिपन्न-त्वात्पुनरपि वाक्यस्य निर्विषयत्वप्रसङ्गः। नैष दोषः। लिङ्गव्यवधानेन तत्प्रतिपत्तेः। ननु साक्षादपरोक्षादात्मस्वभावेनानात्मनो हानोपादानयोः सम्बन्धग्रहणात् किमतिशय वाक्यं कुर्यात्? मैवं वोचः। लिङ्गाधीनत्वात्त-त्प्रतिपत्तेः। न हि लिङ्गव्यवधानेनात्मप्रतिपत्तिः साक्षात्प्रतिपत्तिर्भवति 'यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यः' इति श्रुतेः। अत आह—

लिङ्गमस्तित्वनिष्ठत्वान्न स्याद्वाक्यार्थबोधकम्।
सदसद्व्युत्थितात्मायमतो वाक्यात्प्रतीयते॥

[The Sun illumines the world and the setting of the Sun plunges the world in darkness. Still in the Sun itself there is no transformation by way of losing luminosity and gaining it. In the same way, the objects of experience seen by the seer appear and disappear in the course of the three states of waking, dream and sleep and he who witnesses their coming into being and cessation, does not undergo changes by way of coming into being and cessation When this is comprehended, we realise that the import of the *Mahāvākya* viz., the Self of the nature of Pure Consciousness, subject to no beginning and no termination, is understood by reas[illegible] itself and there is no matter for the *Mahāvākya* to co[illegible]

To this [illegible]at this position is untenab[illegible]

understanding of Self in the manner described is through the mediation of inferential ground.

If it be asked—the connection between Self of the nature of immediacy and the non-Self which is accepted and rejected, being directly and immediately grasped, what more can be accomplished by the *Mahāvākya*?—the answer is—do not say so; the apprehension of Self by way of reasoning is dependent on the inferential ground. Surely apprehension through the mediation of the inferential ground cannot be direct apprehension and the Śruti says 'This Self reveals Its Supreme Nature to him alone who seeks for It, to him alone whom It chooses'. So it is said—As the inferential ground culminates in making known only the existence (of the entity concerned), it cannot convey the meaning of the *Mahāvākya*. The Self transcends both existence and non-existence. It is therefore grasped through the *Mahāvākya* alone.]

Here again the necessity for the *Mahāvākya* is questioned, on grounds that Reality bereft of all determinations presents Itself in the state of deep sleep, to everyone, be he a fool or a sage. This is answered by the *Naiskarmyasiddhi* (3-58) and its *ṭikā*—

ननु यदि व्यावृत्तसदसद्विकल्पजालं वस्त्वभीष्टं वाक्याद्भवतः, तथापि तत्सार्यते वाक्यविषया तृष्णा—यस्मादन्तरेणापि वाक्यश्रवणं निरस्ताशेषविकल्पमागोपालाविपालपण्डितं सुषुप्ते वस्तु सिद्धमतो नार्थो वाक्यश्रवणेन। नैतदेवम्। किं कारणम्? सर्वानर्थबीजस्यात्मानवबोधस्य सुषुप्ते सम्भवात्। यदि हि सुषुप्तेऽज्ञानं नाभविष्यदन्तरेणापि वेदान्तवाक्यश्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनान्यहं ब्रह्मास्मीत्यध्यवसायात् सर्वप्राणभृतामपि स्वरसत एव सुषुप्तप्रतिपत्तेः सकलसंसारोच्छित्तिप्रसङ्गः। न च कैवल्यात्पुनरुत्थानं न्याय्यमनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गात्। न चान्य एव सुषुप्तोऽन्य एवोत्थित इति शक्यं वक्तुं नाद्राक्षमहं सुषुप्तेऽन्यत्किञ्चिदपीत्युत्थितस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञादर्शनात्। तस्मादवश्यं सुषुप्तेऽज्ञानमभ्युपगन्तव्यम्। ननु यदि तत्राज्ञानमभविष्यद्रागद्वेषघटाज्ञानादिवत्प्रत्यक्षम-

भविष्यद्यथेह लोके घटं न जानामीत्यज्ञानमव्यवहितं प्रत्यक्षम् । अत्रोच्यते । न । अभिव्यञ्जकाभावात् । कथमभिव्यञ्जकाभाव इति चेच्छृणु—

वाह्यां वृत्तिमनुत्पाद्य व्यक्तिः स्यान्नाहमो यथा ।
नर्तेन्तःकरण तद्वद्ध्वान्तस्य व्यक्तिराञ्जसी ॥

[This objection cannot stand to reason. In sleep there obtains the non-apprehension of Ātman which is the root cause of all evil. If there were no ajñāna in deep sleep, then it would follow that the experience 'I am Brahman' must occur independent of the hearing of the *Vedāntamahāvākya*, reflection and meditation on it, and the bondage of all creatures would stand destroyed, for all creatures enjoy sleep as a matter of natural law. When once perfection is attained, there should be no waking up from sleep, for that would mean that there is no final deliverance. It is not possible to say that one person goes to sleep and another person wakes up, for the one who wakes up recognises his identity with the subject of sleep in the experience 'I saw nothing else while asleep'. Therefore the existence of ajñāna in sleep must be necessarily admitted.

But, it may be argued—if there were ajñāna in sleep, it should have been a matter of direct perception like the ignorance of desire, hatred and that of things like a pot in the waking state. In ordinary parlance, ajñāna of the form 'I do not know the pot' is a case of direct perception.

To this we reply that there is no perception of ajñāna in sleep itself because the conditions needed for manifesting perceptual experience are absent in sleep. If it is asked—'how?', this is the explanation—

The ego does not manifest itself without generating the awareness of external objects. In the same way, in the absence of the internal organ, ajñāna does not enjoy the status of a perceptual object]

The necessity for the instruction through the *Mahāvākya* is seen in the *Prajāpatividyā* wherein this instruction comes in

the fourth *paryāya*, stage, after the instruction pertaining to the three states, on Indra's expression of dissatisfaction regarding the knowledge of self in the deep sleep state, in the terms—

नाह खल्वयं भगव एव संप्रत्यात्मानं जानात्ययमहमस्मीति नो एवेमानि भूतानि विनाशमेवापीतो भवति नाहमत्र भोग्यं पश्यामीति ।

(Ch. U. 8-11-2)

[In truth this one does not know himself now as 'I am He', nor indeed these beings. It seems as if he has gone into annihilation I see no good in this]

In the fourth *paryāya* the instruction is—

एवमेवैष संप्रसादोऽस्माच्छरीरात्समुत्थाय परं ज्योतिरुपसंपद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते स उत्तमपुरुषः । (Ch. U. 8-12-3)

[Even so this serene one rises out of this body and reaches the highest Light and appears in His own form. He is the highest *Purusa.*]

9.9.7 Jiva Divested of the Triad of States is Uttamapurusha Sought After

He is the Highest as also the *Purusa*, the *Uttamapurusa.* He alone is the *Uttamapurusa.* The one in the eye and the one in the dream are the manifested ones i.e., the experiencer in the waking and the dream states. The experiencer of deep sleep, the serene one, when the organs are withdrawn, is the unmanifest one. *Uttamapurusa*, the *Turya*, transcends the manifest and the unmanifest ones i.e., the perishable and the imperishable, as the *Bhāsya* says—

उत्तमश्चासौ पुरुषश्चेत्युत्तमपुरुषः स एवोत्तमपुरुषः । अक्षिस्वप्नपुरुषौ व्यक्ताव्यक्तश्च सुषुप्तः समस्तः सम्प्रसन्नोऽशरीरश्च स्वेन रूपेणेति । एषामेष स्वेन रूपेणावस्थितः क्षराक्षरौ व्याकृताव्याकृतावपेक्ष्योत्तमपुरुषः । कृतनिर्वचनो ह्यय गीतासु ।

The *Gītāślokas* (XV-16, 17, 18) referred to are—

द्वाविमौ पुरुषौ लोके क्षरश्चाक्षर एव च ।
क्षरः सर्वाणि भूतानि कूटस्थोऽक्षर उच्यते ॥
उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः परमात्मेत्युदाहृतः ।
यस्मात्क्षरमतीतोऽहमक्षरादपि चोत्तमः ।

[There are these two beings in the world, the perishable and the imperishable. The perishable comprises of all creatures; the imperishable spoken of also as the *Kūtastha*, is the seed of *samsāra*. The *Uttamapurusa*, however, distinct from these two, is the Supreme Self, transcending the perishable, and even higher than the imperishable.]

The earlier portion of the *Sūtrabhāsya* (1-3-5-19) delineates this method of instruction culminating in the *Mahāvākyārtha*—

तुशब्दः पूर्वपक्षव्यावृत्त्यर्थः । नोत्तरस्मादपि वाक्यादिह जीवस्याशङ्का सम्भवतीत्यर्थः । कस्मात्? यतस्तत्राप्याविर्भूतस्वरूपो जीवो विवक्ष्यते । आविर्भूत स्वरूपमस्येत्याविर्भूतस्वरूपः । भूतपूर्वगत्या जीववचनम् । एतदुक्तं भवति— 'य एषोऽक्षिणि' इत्यक्षिलक्षित द्रष्टारं निर्दिश्योदशरावब्राह्मणेनैनं शरीरात्मतया व्युत्थाप्य 'एतं त्वेव ते' इति पुनः पुनस्तमेव व्याख्येयत्वेनाकृष्य स्वप्नसुषुप्तोपन्यासक्रमेण 'परं ज्योतिरुपसंपद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते' इति यदस्य पारमार्थिक स्वरूपं परं ब्रह्म तद्रूपतयैनं जीवं व्याचष्टे न जैवेन रूपेण । यत्परं ज्योतिरुपसंपत्तव्यं श्रुतं तत्परं ब्रह्म । तच्चापहतपाप्मत्वादिधर्मकम्, तदेव च जीवस्य पारमार्थिक स्वरूप 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्यादिशास्त्रेभ्यः, नेतरदुपाधिकल्पितम् । यावदेव हि स्थाणाविव पुरुषबुद्धिं द्वैतलक्षणामविद्यां निवर्तयन्कूटस्थनित्यदृक्स्वरूपमात्मानमहं ब्रह्मास्मीति न प्रतिपद्यते तावज्जीवस्य जीवत्वम् । यदा तु देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिसङ्घाताद्व्युत्थाप्य श्रुत्या प्रतिबोध्यते, नासि त्वं देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिसङ्घातः, नासि संसारी, किं तर्हि तद्यत्सत्यं स आत्मा चैतन्यमात्रस्वरूपस्तत्त्वमसीति, तदा कूटस्थनित्यदृक्स्वरूपमात्मान

प्रतिवुध्यास्माच्छरीराद्यभिमानात्समुत्तिष्ठन्स एव कूटस्थनित्यदृक्स्वरूप आत्मा भवति । 'स यो ह वै तत्परमं ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति' इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः । तदेव चास्य पारमार्थिकं स्वरूपं येन शरीरात्समुत्थाय स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते ।

[The word 'rather' is used for repudiating the opponent, the idea implied being that even on the strength of the subsequent text, the assumption of the individual soul is not possible Why? Because even there the jiva is intended to be presented in its real nature that has become manifest The Sūtra uses the expression 'He whose nature has become manifest', in respect of jīva whose true nature has become manifest, the term jīva being retained even after enlightenment in continuation of the earlier conventional uses in the text. The sense conveyed is this · The Witness indicated by the word 'eye' is first pointed out by the Śruti, 'He that is in the eye' Then in the *Brāhmana* portion presenting the reflection in the water in a plate, this very One is freed from the conception of the identity with the body. And this very One is repeatedly alluded to for the purpose of explanation with the utterance—'I shall explain this very One to you'. Then after presenting the states of dream and deep sleep it is said 'realising the Supreme Light, attains its own real nature', where this jīva in its true nature, which is the Supreme Brahman, is explained, and not in its nature as an individual. The Supreme Light that is mentioned in the *Upanisad* as the thing to be realised is the Supreme Brahman That Brahman has such characteristics as freedom from sin and so on; and that is the real nature of jīva as shown in Śrutis like 'That thou art', but not so is the other nature conjured up by the *upādhis*. As long as he does not eradicate Avidyā expressing itself as the world of duality, like the elimination of the illusion of a man superimposed on a stump of a tree, and he does not know his Immutable Eternal Witness-self as 'I am Brahman', so long does persist the jīvahood of the jīva But when he is roused from the assemblage of body, senses, mind and intellect, by the *Upanisad* which makes him understand 'You are not the assemblage of body, senses, mind

and intellect, nor are you a transmigratory being. What are you then? That which is Truth—Ātman of the nature of Pure Consciousness—That thou art', then he realises Ātman—the Immutable Eternal Witness-self. And then that very jīva rises above his identity with the body and the rest, to become Ātman Itself, the Immutable Eternal Witness-self. This is declared in the *Upanisad* as 'Any one who knows That Supreme Brahman becomes verily Brahman Itself'. And that is the Supremely real nature of the jīva by virtue of which he attains his essential nature after rising above the body.]

The necessity for instruction through the *Mahāvākya*, even after the enquiry into the experience of the three states—*avasthātrayaviveka*—is thus brought home by the *Bhāsya*. The Śruti (the *Prajāpativākya*)—

एष संप्रसादोऽस्माच्छरीरात्समुत्थाय परं ज्योतिरुपसंपद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते स उत्तमपुरुषः। (Ch. U. 8-12-3)

itself declares thus—having acquired the discriminatory knowledge, *vivekavijñāna*, leading to the direct experience of the meaning indicated by the term 'thou', *tvampada-laksyārtha*, made known by the clause—अस्माच्छरीरात्समुत्थाय i.e., having detached oneself from the three bodies—the gross, the subtle and the causal—and thereafter securing the knowledge of the identity with Brahman, the meaning indicated by the word 'That', तत्पदलक्ष्यार्थभेदज्ञान, made known by the clause स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते, one attains Brahmanhood as made known by परं ज्योतिरुपसपद्य, the last two clauses in the Śruti being taken in the reverse order in the manner of the usage मुखं व्यादाय स्वपिति meaning 'He sleeps with his mouth open'. This is pointed out also by the *Bhāmatī* (1-3-5-19)—

तदनेन श्रवणमननध्यानाभ्यासाद्विवेकविज्ञानमुक्त्वा तस्य विवेकविज्ञानस्य फलं केवलात्मरूपसाक्षात्कारः, स्वरूपेणाभिनिष्पत्तिः, स च साक्षात्कारो वृत्तिरूपः प्रपञ्चमात्रं प्रविलापयन् स्वयमपि प्रपञ्चरूपत्वात्कतकफलवत्प्रवि-

लीयते । तथा च निर्मृष्टनिखिलप्रपञ्चजालमनुपसर्गमपराधीनप्रकाशमात्मज्योतिः सिद्ध भवति । तदिदमुक्त परं ज्योतिरुपसम्पद्येति । अत्र चोपसम्पत्तावुत्तर-कालायामपि क्त्वाप्रयोगो मुखं व्यादाय स्वपितीतिवन्मन्तव्यः ।

A similar development is seen in the *Brhadāranyakopanisad—Janaka-Yājñavalkyasamvāda* (6-3-4) which is incidentally outlined in the *Bhāsya* on the Sūtra (1-3-13-42)—सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्योर्भेदेन, wherein the Supreme Lord is shown to be different from the jīva who is subject to sleep and death. The Śrutis discussed therein are—(1) कतम आत्मेति, योऽय विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु हृद्यन्तर्ज्योतिः पुरुषः (Br.U.6-3-7) found in the beginning—*upakrama*. (Of all the entities cognised through the idea of 'I', which is the self? This *Purusa* that is the *Vijñānamaya* in the midst of the organs, the Self-effulgent Light within the heart.), (2) स वा एष महानज आत्मा योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु। (Br U. 6-4-22) (That *Vijñānamaya* in the midst of the organs is this Great Unborn Self), found in the conclusion–*upasamhāra*. There are also references to Śrutis in the middle, that pertain to the triad of states, particularly the one referring to deep sleep—अयं पुरुषः प्राज्ञेनात्मना सपरिष्वक्तो न बाह्य किञ्चन वेद नान्तरम्। (Br. U. 6-3-21) (So this *Purusa* who being fully embraced by the *Prājnātmā* does not know anything at all either external or internal).

Says the *Sūtrabhāsya* (1-3-13-42)—

न संसारिस्वरूपं विवक्षितं किं तर्ह्यनूद्य संसारिस्वरूपं परेण ब्रह्मणास्यैकतां विवक्षति । यतो 'ध्यायतीव लेलायतीव' इत्येवमाद्युत्तरग्रन्थप्रवृत्तिः संसारिधर्मनिराकरणपरा लक्ष्यते । तथोपसंहारेऽपि यथोपक्रममेवोपसंहरति—'स वा एष महानज आत्मा योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु' इति । योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु संसारी लक्ष्यते स वा एष महानज आत्मा परमेश्वर एवास्माभिः प्रतिपादित इत्यर्थः । यस्तु मध्ये बुद्धान्ताद्यवस्थोपन्यासात्संसारि-

स्वरूपविवक्षां मन्यते, स प्राचीमपि दिशं प्रस्थापितः प्रतीचीमपि दिशं प्रतिष्ठेत। यतो न बुद्धान्ताद्यवस्थोपन्यासेनावस्थावत्त्वं संसारित्वं वा विवक्षति, किं तर्ह्यवस्थारहितत्वमसंसारित्वं च। कथमेतदवगम्यते। यत् 'अत ऊर्ध्वं विमोक्षायैव ब्रूहि' इति पदे पदे पृच्छति। यच्च 'अनन्वागतस्तेन भवत्यसङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः' इति पदे पदे प्रतिवक्ति। 'अनन्वागतं पुण्येनानन्वागतं पापेन तीर्णो हि तदा सर्वाञ्छोकान्हृदयस्य भवति' इति च। तस्मादसंसारिस्वरूपप्रतिपादनपरमेवैतद्वाक्यमित्यवगन्तव्यम्।

[The nature of the transmigratory jīva is not sought to be presented. What is meant then? The intention is to show the identity of the jīva with Supreme Brahman after a restatement of the former's characteristics, for the succeeding text, 'It meditates, as it were, it moves, as it were' etc., is seen to be devoted to the refutation of the transmigratory nature of the jīva

But one who would think that the nature of the transmigrating jīva is sought to be taught because of the presentation of the waking state etc., may as well pop up in the Western direction when sent towards the East, for the presentation of the states of waking etc, is meant to imply neither the possession of any state nor the transmigratory nature. What is meant then? It is freedom from the states and transmigration How is this known? This is known because at every turn Janaka requests Yājñavalkya 'Please instruct me further about liberation' and because the answer given at every step is 'He is untouched by whatever he sees in that state for this *Purusa* is unattached'. Further it is stated 'This form of his is untouched by merit, untouched by demerit, for he is then beyond all the woes of his heart'. Accordingly it is to be understood that this text is meant for establishing the nature of the Super-mundane Self]

The *Bhāsya* shows the rendering as योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु लक्ष्यते स वा एष महानज आत्मा परमेश्वर एव। (The entity indicated by 'He who is the *vijñānamaya* among the organs', is verily this great Unborn Self, the Supreme Lord). This is in the manner of *Mahāvākya*.

Thus the recognition of the experience of the deep sleep state in which there is no experience of duality, made known by the Śruti, is not enough for though there is the intimation that in that state there is none other than oneself, still it also is the seed of the dream and the waking states. The seed, the causal *ajñāna*, is sublated only by the *Mahāvākyas* such as 'That thou art'. Says the *Naiskarmyasiddhi* (4-40)—

तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्थविज्ञानेनैव बाध्यते । यस्मात्—

अस्माद्यदपरं रूपं नास्तीत्येव निरूप्यते ।
अन्यथाग्रहणाभावाद्बीजं तत्स्वप्नबोधयोः ॥

The *Kaivalyopanisad*—

त्रिषु धामसु यद्भोग्यं भोक्ता भोगश्च यद्भवेत् ।
तेभ्यो विलक्षणः साक्षी चिन्मात्रोऽहं सदाशिवः ॥

is seen to point to the attainment of Brahman, the *Sadāśiva-svarūpa*, after recognising that one is the *Sākṣī* and thereafter that one is only of the nature of Pure Consciousness divested of even that which is witnessed.

The *Ratnaprabhā* on the *Sūtrabhāsya* (1-3-5-19) styles the *Prajāpativākya* as—

विश्वतैजसप्राज्ञतुरीयपर्यायचतुष्टयात्मकप्रजापतिवाक्य

which is seen to be in tune with the methods adopted in the *Praśnopanisad* and the *Māṇḍūkyopanisad.* The *Anubhūtiprakāśa* (5-57 to 63) in respect of the *Prajāpatividyā* (Ch. U. 8-12) says—

जागरे स्थूलसूक्ष्माभ्यां तादात्म्याद्बाधयोऽखिलाः ।
आधयश्चास्य सन्तीदं महत्कालुष्यमिष्यते ॥
ईषत्कलुषता स्वप्ने सूक्ष्ममात्राभिमानतः ।
सुप्तौ तेनापि हीनत्वादयमात्मा प्रसीदति ॥

कालुष्यबीजमज्ञानमस्त्यत्राथ विवेचितः ।
बीजेनापि विहीनत्वात् सम्यगेव प्रसीदति ॥
स्वतः साक्षी संप्रसादस्तत्स्वरूपानुभूतये ।
समुत्थान भवेदस्य देहादिभ्यो विवेचने ॥
समुत्थितस्य जीवत्वनिवृत्त्यै ब्रह्मरूपताम् ।
महावाक्यानि सर्वाणि बोधयन्त्यतियत्नतः ॥
परं ज्योतिर्ब्रह्मरूपं प्राप्य वाक्यार्थबोधतः ।
उत्तमः पुरुषः स स्याद्यः पुराक्षिणि वर्णितः ॥
देहादज्ञानतः कार्यात् कारणाच्चायमुत्तमः ।
जीवत्वहानाद्ब्रह्मत्वभावाच्चोत्तमतोचिता ॥

9.9.8 Deep Sleep a Pointer to Maya

A detailed discussion of the triad of states shows that each state must again be considered as threefold as has already been mentioned This is indicated by the term कञ्चन in the Śruti—न कञ्चन स्वप्नं पश्यति (Bṛ. U. 6-3-19).

Says the *Bṛhadvārtikasāra* (4-3-243, 244)—

कामं कामयते नेति जाग्रद्भोगो निषिध्यते ।
तदवान्तरभेदानां बहुत्वात् कञ्चनेति गीः ॥
त्रय आवसथास्तस्य त्रयः स्वप्ना इति श्रुतेः ।
एकैकस्यामवस्थायामवस्थात्रयमिष्यताम् ॥

Thus as long as one is swayed by Māyā as mentioned in the hymn by the word मायासमाच्छादनात्, one is subject to the triad of states, each one of them threefold. All this means, in effect, that the deep sleep state is a pointer to the veil, Māyā i.e , Avidyā, from which one is to be liberated.

9.9.9 "Awakening"; Destruction of Maya by the Gracious Guru

The State of one who is liberated is spoken of by the *Gītā* (II-69)—

या निशा सर्वभूतानां तस्यां जागर्ति संयमी ।
यस्यां जाग्रति भूतानि सा निशा पश्यतो मुनेः ॥

[What is night to all beings, therein the self-controlled one who has shaken off the sleep of Avidyā, is awake. Where all beings are said to be awake, but are really asleep in the night of Avidyā, that is the 'night' of the Sage who knows the Supreme Reality.]

Declares the *Māndūkyakārikā* (1-16)—

अनादिमायया सुप्तो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते ।
अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नमद्वैतं बुध्यते तदा ॥

[When the jiva 'sleeping' under the influence of the beginningless Māyā is 'awakened', he then realises in himself the Non-duality, the Beginningless, the Sleepless and the Dreamless.]

Māyā which is of the nature of sleep, containing the seeds of dream (and the waking), becomes powerless on 'awakening', *prabodha*, as mentioned in the first stanza which also says that the *viśvam*, the universe, that is seen in Ātman as though outside because of Māyā, is illusory, like the city seen in a mirror. This is on the removal of the delusion due to Māyā—मायाशक्तिविलासकल्पितमहाव्यामोहसंहारिणे—that is brought about by the Guru who is Śrīdakṣiṇāmūrti, of the nature of Self-effulgence. All these viz, (1) the creation, *srsti*, that is mentioned in the second stanza, (2) the presentation, *sthiti*, mentioned in the third, (3) the dissolution, *laya*, mentioned in the sixth, (4) the parlance of the jīva, in the fourth, (5) indicative references to the triad of states, particularly the deep sleep state in the sixth, (6) the use of the terms मायावीव, योगीव, असत्कल्पार्थगम् etc., and (7) the emphasis on the illusory nature of the aforesaid parlance by the use of the word 'Māyā' again and again, are brought in by way of

alluding to the concoction that is natural to the seeker, with the sole object of removing it by the method of *adhyāropa* and *apavāda*. The repetition of the refrain at every step emphasises that the sole endeavour of the hymn is in making the seeker transcend all these and in establishing him in his natural *Brahmanhood*. The rendering of every stanza would be along the lines shown in the *Sūtrabhāṣya* (1-3-13-42). For example, in this sixth stanza the rendering would be—

यः प्रागस्वाप्समिति प्रबोधसमये प्रत्यभिज्ञायते करणोपसंहरणतो सुषुप्तः सन्मात्रोऽभूत् (इति च) यः पुमान् लक्ष्यते तस्मै श्रीगुरुमूर्तये श्रीदक्षिणामूर्तये।

Says the *Mānasollāsa* (VI-24, 25)—

जडात्मनि च देहादौ साक्षादीशो विविच्यते।
एषैव मोहिनी नाम मायाशक्तिर्महेशितुः॥
मोहापोहः प्रमातॄणां मोक्ष इत्यभिधीयते।
अवस्थात्रयनिर्मुक्तो दोषादिभिरनाविलः॥

[From the physical body and other *upādhis* which are all inert in themselves, He is clearly distinguished as their Lord. This is verily the stupefying power of the Mighty Lord's Māyā! Removal of this illusion from the jivas is spoken of as liberation Ātman is free from the three states, tainted by no evil passion or thought]

9.9.10 Sunyavada set at Rest Once and for all ; Sriguru, Sanmatra, the Atman—Obeisance

Whatever has been said so far in detail, centres round what has been expressed in the stanza six itself. The deep sleep state is the state of dissolution in which jīva is verily Existence alone, सन्मात्रः, but covered by Māyā made known by the shine of Ātman Itself in the manner of an eclipse. This state in which the organs are all withdrawn, करणोपसहरणतः, is also clearly the state in which the objects of these organs viz , the objective world of the waking and the

*

dream, are also withdrawn. This state of non-apprehension, अग्रहण, of Ātman as It is, by the jīva, is also the state prior to the manifestation i.e., *sṛṣṭi* of the objective world, of the waking or the dream, along with the functioning of the senses. This situation as also the word सन्मात्रः recall to the mind what is declared by the *Chāndogyopanisad* (VI) सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्. The *pratyabhijñā* in the waking state as made known by the *paramārśa* प्रागस्वाप्समिति shows on analysis the condition of the jīva, the role of Avidyā, the Witness-self etc., in that state, as also the deep sleep state as providing an illustration of the 'state' of liberation. Further, analysis of the other two states along with this, shows that Ātman is the Substratum on which the three illusory states are superimposed one after another. The Witness-self which reveals the delusions such as the Māyā-produced elephant, horse, chariot etc., and their sublations, in which case may be suspected a substratumless delusion and a limitless sublation, is itself the Substratum and the Limit. Nor is That too sublated for there is nothing to reveal that sublation, everything else being non-sentient. Nor is void the substratum for there is no persistence of it among the superimposed; or, if there were, it would be cognised at the time of delusion as 'the void is this state' just as in the example of shell-silver as 'this is silver'. If it be said that what is cognised as 'this' is itself void, then the dispute is as to the name alone. Nor can the void be the limit since that is not cognised in any sublation; or if it be cognised, (Self-effulgent) Consciousness alone would be called by the name void, as shown by the *Vivaranaprameyasangraha* (1-1)—

यत्रापि मायाविनिर्मितहस्त्यश्वरथादावन्यत्र वा निरधिष्ठानभ्रमं निरवधिक-बाधं च त्व शङ्कसे तत्रापि भ्रमबाधयोः साधक साक्षिचैतन्यमेवाधिष्ठान-

मत्वधिश्च स्यात् । न च तदपि बाध्यम्, तद्बाधस्य साधकाभावात् । अन्यस्य च सर्वस्य जडत्वात् । न च शून्यस्याधिष्ठानत्वम्, अध्यस्यमानेष्वनुगत्यभावात् । भावे वा भ्रान्तिकाले शून्यं रजतमिति प्रतीयात्, न त्विदं रजतमिति । इदमिति प्रतीयमानमेव शून्यमिति चेत्, तर्हि नाममात्रे विवादः । नापि शून्यस्यावधित्वम्, सर्वबाधे तदप्रतीतेः । प्रतीतौ वा चैतन्यमेव शून्यनाम्नाऽभिधीयते ।

The *Mānasollāsaṭīkā* on the stanza says—

य एतावन्तं काल सन्मात्रोऽभूवम्, न कमपि विशेषमज्ञासिषम्, सोऽहमिदानीं प्रबुद्धो विप्रसृतकरणग्रामतया जागर्मीत्यात्मनः प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वान्नायं शून्यः क्षणिको वेत्यभिप्रायः ।

[As shown by the recollection of oneself in the manner 'I who was all this while verily existence alone and was not cognisant of anything at all in particular, am now wide awake with my senses fully functioning' it is evident that Oneself, Ātman, is neither void nor momentary.]

Thus is set at rest once and for all the *Śūnyavāda* according to which the state of deep sleep is regarded merely as void proving thereby that Ātman is non-existent.

The rendering यः पुमान् करणोपसहरणतः सुषुप्तः सन्मात्रोऽभूत् (That *Puruṣa* who, on the withdrawal of the organs, getting into the state of deep sleep, became verily Existence alone) recalls to the mind the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* (VI) तत् सत्यं स आत्मा wherein the word *Tat* refers to the *Satpadārtha* mentioned in the beginning in the expression '*Sadeva*'. Again in the manner of the *Mahāvākya* तत्त्वमसि (That thou art) coming thereafter, यः पुमान् करणोपसहरणतः सुषुप्तः सन्मात्रोऽभूत्, तस्मै श्रीगुरुमूर्तये श्रीदक्षिणामूर्तये imparts the same instruction in the manner of the *Mahāvākya* अयमात्मा ब्रह्म (This Ātman is Brahman).

The veiling due to Avidyā is as seen from the standpoint of the ignorant who is swayed by Avidyā Even while affirming this the Shine, the *Svarūpa*, by Itself is untouched by this veil, as otherwise, there could not have been the experience that there has been a veiling as given expression to in the *parāmarśa*, as the *Advaitamakaranda* (16) puts it—

न प्रकाशेऽहमित्युक्तिर्यत्प्रकाशनिबन्धना ।
स्वप्रकाशं तमात्मानमप्रकाशः कथ स्पृशेत् ॥

Thus the veiling is also a superimposition—a concoction.

The metaphor employed shows that just as the eclipse is not from the standpoint of the luminous entity, the veiling is not there from the standpoint of the Shine Itself, but from that of the complex entity, the Shine plus Avidyā, in whom the Avidyā is apparently inextricably interwoven as it were, regarded, however, even by himself as a single entity, jīva. Though the Shine is one's own *Svarūpa* one is unable to experience It in Its full glory, due to the predelictions in one's disposition to see entities outside as different from oneself, and when they are not so seen, to declare that there is nothing at all—in other words to meander only in the framework of the concocted categories set up in connection with the outside entities not involving Ātman as He is i e., the Shine as transcending the categories. The situation is best described in Śrī Śrī Ācārayapāda's words—पश्यन्नपि च न पश्यति मूढः—this is the fate of all the *vādins* inclusive of the *Śūnyavādin* On securing the direct knowledge of the *tvampadārtha* bereft of the *upādhis*, and thereafter the direct realisation—*aparoksajñāna* of the identity of the *tvampadārtha* with the *Tatpadārtha* as declared by the *Mahāvākya* by the Grace of the Guru—then is removed this *aparoksabhrama*, the illusion of the nature of direct experience. Then one shines

by himself as the Supreme in His full glory. All this is affirmed by the stanza in the hymn—

राहुग्रस्तदिवाकरेन्दुसदृशो मायासमाच्छादनात्
सन्मात्रः करणोपसंहरणतो योऽभूत् सुषुप्तः पुमान् ।
प्रागस्वाप्समिति प्रबोधसमये यः प्रत्यभिज्ञायते
तस्मै श्रीगुरुमूर्तये नम इदं श्रीदक्षिणामूर्तये ॥

the word नमः in the refrain affirming the said identity of oneself with Śrīdakṣiṇāmūrti, as has been shown previously, in the manner of 'I am Brahman'—अहं ब्रह्मास्मि.



10 SEVENTH STANZA

ŚRĪGURU AS DIRECT, IMMEDIATE, ETERNAL SELF-EFFULGENCE

10.1.1 Atman Constant in the Mutually Exclusive Varying States

In the search for Ātman, enquiry so far has shown that none of the entities such as the external objects of the world, the body, the *prāṇa*, the sense organs, the mind, the intellect and the ego, nor the void can ever be Ātman. Ātman transcends all these which are set up by Avidyā. It follows that the various states associated with each one of these, can never pertain to Ātman, though in parlance they are all mistakenly regarded as the states of oneself because of superimposition on Ātman. Recognition of this situation culminates in realising that Ātman is distinct from anything whatsoever that can be characterised as *idam*. Though indicated by the word *aham*, Ātman, the Consciousness, is distinct from the ego i.e., it is indicated by *aham* totally divested of the *idam*-aspect. That this is none other than the very Brahman as made known by the instruction by the *Mahāvākya*, has already been shown. Obstacles which are in the way of abiding in this realisation which is immediate and direct, are the various types of *adhyāsa* of the *idam*-aspects in *aham*. That these are removed by persistent enquiry i.e., *manana* and *nididhyāsana*, adhering all the while only to what is continuously experienced as constant in all the varying states, has already been pointed out. Recalling this, the stanza seven of the hymn proceeds to show that thereupon the disciple realises his *Brahmanhood* graciously conferred on him by the venerable Ācārya, Īśvara Himself, manifesting His own *Svarūpa* which is Consciousness, Bliss, without a second, from within, at the same time pointing to this situation by the blessed symbol from without. So says the hymn—

बाल्यादिष्वपि जाग्रदादिषु तथा सर्वास्ववस्थास्वपि
व्यावृत्तास्वनुवर्तमानमहमित्यन्तः स्फुरन्त सदा ।
स्वात्मानं प्रकटीकरोति भजतां यो मुद्रया भद्रया
तस्मै श्रीगुरुमूर्तये नम इदं श्रीदक्षिणामूर्तये ॥

10.1.2 Explanation of the Stanza—Experience of Idam-free Aham, the Self-Effulgent

The *Mānasollāsaṭīkā* gives succinctly the meaning of the stanza—

एतदुक्तं भवति—अहमित्यनिदं चिदात्मनि तादात्म्येनाध्यस्तमविद्याकार्यमन्तःकरणमुच्यते । तच्चाहमित्येवमाकारया स्ववृत्त्या स्थूलदेहपर्यन्तं प्रसर्पति । तथाच स्वाध्यस्ताहङ्कारात्मना अवभासमानमेवात्मानमहङ्कारगतेदमंशापोहेन विविच्य स्वं—स्वाभाविकं ब्रह्मरूप पूर्णमात्मानं प्रकटीकरोति । तत्र विवेकप्रकारं दर्शयन्नात्मानं विशिनष्टि—बाल्यादिष्विति । बाल्यकौमारयौवनवार्धकेषु तथा जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिषु तथा अन्यास्वपि सर्वासु मूर्छातुरास्वास्थ्यसत्वनिस्स्वाद्यनेकावस्थासु । किं लक्षणासु ? व्यावृत्तासु—प्रतिप्रत्ययकालं भिन्नासु अनुवर्तमानमभिन्नमहमाकारानुरक्तदेहेन्द्रियादेरनेकविधपरिणामवतः सर्वावस्थस्य सदैकरूपोऽपरिणममानः सन्, अवभासकश्चिदानन्दाद्वयब्रह्मरूप आत्मा अहमस्मीति जानत इति शिष्यान् बोधयन्तमित्यर्थः ।

Pointing to the *idam*-free *aham* as indicating Ātman, says the *Sūtasamhitā* (Sū, Gī-5, 39 to 42)—

प्रतीत्या वह्निसंबन्धाद्यथाऽयो दाहकं तथा ।
चित्संबन्धादहङ्कारोऽहंशब्दार्थः प्रकीर्तितः ॥

चैतन्येद्धाहमः स्पर्शा देहादौ भ्रान्तचेतसाम् ।
अहंशब्दप्रयोगः स्यात्तथाऽहप्रत्ययोऽपि च ॥

इत्थं विवेकतः साक्ष्यं देहादिप्राणपूर्वकम् ।
अन्तःकरणमात्मानं विभज्य स्वात्मनः पृथक् ॥

सर्वसाक्षिणमात्मानं स्वयज्योतिःस्वलक्षणम् ।
सत्यमानन्दमद्वैतमहमर्थं विचिन्तयेत् ॥

More elaborately, says the *Tattvasudhā* on stanza seven of the hymn—

इदानीं मुञ्जादिषीकामिव देहादिभ्यो विविच्य सच्चिदानन्दरूपं प्रत्यगात्मानं प्रदर्श्य तस्य परमेश्वराभेदं श्रुतिगुर्वीश्वरप्रसादलभ्यं प्रदर्शयन्नाह—बाल्यादिष्विति । बाल्यादिषु—बाल्यं—शैशवम्, तदादिषु—शैशवकौमारयौवनमध्यवयस्स्थाविररूपासु, जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिमूर्छाजन्मजरामरणरूपासु, तथा अन्यास्वप्यवान्तरासु दर्शनश्रवणादिरूपासु कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वादिरूपासु च सर्वास्ववस्थासु दशासु व्यावृत्तासु—परस्परं व्यावर्तमानासु, अनुवर्तमानम्—अनुगततया सर्वास्ववस्थासु वर्तमानम् । अय भावः—यो हि असत्यजडानानन्दरूपासु सर्वास्ववस्थासु व्यावर्तमानासु 'योऽहं सुप्तौ स्वप्नमद्राक्षं सोऽहमिदानीं जागर्मि' इति अवस्थात्रये 'योऽहं बालो युवा चाभूवं सोऽहमिदानीं वृद्धोऽस्मि' इति बाल्यादिष्वपि च सत्त्वेनानुवर्तमानोऽनुभूयते, तथा द्रष्टृत्वेनाभिमतेषु चक्षुरादिषु व्यावर्तमानेषु स्वय तत्सकलसाक्षित्वेन यः चिद्रूपः सदा अनुवर्तमानोऽनुभूयते, तथा प्रियत्वेनाभिमतवित्तपुत्रपिण्डादिषु व्यावर्तमानेषु च यः स्वयं सदा प्रीतिविषयः सर्वशेषित्वेन निरतिशयप्रीतिविषयतया, आनन्दरूपत्वेनानुवर्तमानोऽनुभूयते, तद्वदेव अहंबुद्धिविषयतया आत्मत्वेनाभिमतेषु देहादिभोक्त्रन्तेषु व्यावर्तमानेषु यश्च स्वयमहबुद्धिमव्यभिचरन् सदा आत्मत्वेनानुवर्तमानोऽनुभूयते, ततः सद्रूपत्वं चिद्रूपत्वमानन्दरूपतया प्रियत्वमहंबुद्धिविषयतया प्रत्यक्त्वं च यः कदापि न व्यभिचरति स एव त्वंपदलक्ष्यार्थ आत्मेति । तथाच तापनीयश्रुतिः—'त वा एतमात्मान जाग्रत्यस्वप्नमसुषुप्तम्, स्वप्नेऽजाग्रतमसुषुप्तम्, सुषुप्तेऽजाग्रतमस्वप्नं, तुरीयेऽजाग्रतमस्वप्नमसुषुप्तमव्यभिचारिणं नित्यानन्दसदेकरसं ह्येवं चक्षुषो द्रष्टा श्रोत्रस्य द्रष्टा वाचो द्रष्टा' इति । एतदेवाह अहमित्यन्तःस्फुरन्त सदेति । अन्तः—शरीरादिषु मध्ये, अहमिति—अहंबुद्धिविषयत्वेन, सदा—सर्वेष्वपि कालेषु, स्फुरन्तं—भासमानम्, उपलक्षणमेतत् सत्त्वेन प्रियत्वेन च सदा स्फुरन्तमित्यपि

द्रष्टव्यम् । एवंभूतं प्रत्यगात्मानं यः परमेश्वरः स्वात्मानमेव—स्वं—'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म', 'विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म' इत्यादिषु श्रुतिषु सच्चिदानन्दात्मकत्वेन त्रिविधपरिच्छेदशून्यतया च प्रसिद्धः परमेश्वर एव आत्मा—स्वरूपं यस्य प्रत्यगात्मनः, न तु कर्त्रादिरूपेण प्रतीयमान आत्मा सः स्वात्मा प्रत्यगात्मा, तं स्वात्मानं ब्रह्माभिन्नमिति यावत् । भद्रया—शोभनया, मुद्रया—करकलितज्ञानमुद्रया, भजतां स्वभक्तानां प्रकटीकरोति तेषां प्रत्यगात्मानं ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वेनाप्रकटं प्रकटं करोति, स्फोरयति, तस्मै नमः ।

What the *Tattvasudhā* says is—In the stanza, by distinguishing the inner Ātman from the body etc., in the manner of separating a stalk of grass from its enveloping sheaths, Ātman is shown to be of the nature of Existence, Consciousness and Bliss, as also the identity of Ātman with the Supreme Lord Parameśvara. This is realised only by the grace of Śruti, Guru and Īśvara. It is shown that Ātman is constant in all the varying states which are mutually exclusive viz., childhood, boyhood, youth, middle age, old age, the waking, the dream, the deep sleep, the swoon, birth, decreptitude, death, also others within them like seeing, hearing etc., as also doership, enjoyership etc. All the varying states are of the nature of non-existence and insentience, and devoid of Bliss. But Ātman is experienced as persisting in the form of Existence in the triad of the waking, the dream and the deep sleep states in the manner 'I who saw the dream while sleeping, am now awake', as also in the states of childhood etc., in the manner 'I who was a boy and then a youth am now of old age'. Similarly Ātman is experienced as persisting in the form of Consciousness, Himself as the Witness of the eye etc., which are regarded as the seer etc., but which disappear. Likewise Ātman is experienced as persisting in the form of Bliss, being

Himself always the object of incomparable love, all other things being dear because they subserve Him, while wealth, progeny, body etc , which are regarded as dear, all disappear In the same manner, Ātman is experienced as the persisting Self, ever by the awareness 'I' and never otherwise, while the entities right from the gross body to the enjoyer, which are regarded as made known by the term 'I', all disappear. Thus in this manner, That alone which never departs from the nature of Existence, Consciousness, and from the nature of being dear—because of Its nature of Bliss—and from the nature of being Innermost, being as It is the object of the I-sense, is verily Ātman, indicated by the word "thou". So says the *Tāpanīyaśruti*—'This Ātman that persists in all the three states of the waking, the dream and the deep sleep as also in the *Turīya*, experiencing each of these to the exclusion of the others, which is of the nature of eternal Bliss, always of the nature of Pure Existence, the Seer of the eye, the ear, the speech etc.'. This is what is voiced by the stanza of the hymn by the phrase—अहमित्यन्तः-स्फुरन्तं सदा—'shining always as 'I' in the midst of the body' etc This shine is to be seen as indicative of the Shine as Existence and Endearing as well. This inner Self is verily the same as the very Self of Parameśvara the Supreme Lord, well known as of the nature of Existence, Consciousness and Bliss, and free from the threefold limitation—in the Śrutis—'Brahman is Existence, Consciousness and Infinite', 'Brahman is Consciousness and Bliss' etc ; It is not what is known as the doer etc. i.e , the Inner Self is not different from Brahman. Obeisance to Him who exhibits to His devotees by means of the auspicious symbol, the *Cinmudrā*, that the Inner Self is Brahman—which was not realised so far.

10.1.3 Pratyagatma Sadatma

The *Svārājyasıddhi* (2) shows how Ātman that persists in all the varying states is characterısed as Existence, Conscıousness, Blıss; and as such It is Brahman Itself—

स्वाप्नार्थैर्बाध्यमानैरयमिति सह यद्बाध्यमानो न दृष्टो
बाधद्रष्टा स्वयं सन् कथमिव कलयेदात्मबाधं दृगात्मा ।
दृग्भेदे यत्र मानं यदपि न च समा दृग्दृशोर्गोचरो वा
यच्चासौ निर्विकारस्तदयमनवधिः प्रत्यगात्मा सदात्मा ॥

(Svā. Si. 2-33)

[Though the dream-objects are sublated, the jīva ıs not seen to be sublated along wıth them How can He, the observer of sublatıon, the seeıng Ātman, observe hıs own sublatıon? There ıs no *pramāna* to show that there ıs some other seeing agency; even if ıt ıs there, they both beıng sımilar ın respect of theır seeıng nature, one cannot be an object for the other, He undergoes no change Hence thıs ınner Ātman that ıs Boundless ıs of the nature of Exıstence]

10 1.4 Pratyagatma Chidatma

यद्बाल्यादिष्ववस्थास्वहमहमिति भात्येकरूपो विभिन्ना-
स्वध्यक्ष जाग्रदर्थानिव निजमहसा यच्च सुप्तोऽपि वेत्ति ।
यच्चाहङ्कारमोषेऽप्यपरिमुषितचित्सुप्तिसौख्यादिसाक्षी
द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेरलोपे श्रुतिरपि तदसौ प्रत्यगात्मा दृगात्मा ॥

(Svā. Sı. 2-34)

[The inner Ātman unıformly shınes as 'I am, I am' in all the dıfferent stages such as chıldhood Just as He sees thıngs in the wakıng state through the senses, so does He cognıse, by Hıs own power, the objects ın a dream. Even in deep sleep when the ego ıs merged, the Conscıousness persısts and remaıns as the Wıtness of the happıness etc, therein. Moreover the Śruti poınts out that the Seer's ability to see is not lost Hence this *Pratyagātmā* ıs of the nature of Consciousness.]

10.1.5 Pratyagatma Sukhatma

यच्चात्मान्यद्ब्रुवाणं प्रियमिति नव तद्रोत्स्यतीति ब्रवीति
प्राज्ञेनैक्यं सुषुप्तौ निगदति च यदानन्दसंविन्मयेन ।
इच्छा यत्स्वानुकूले त्रिजगति विदिता स्वप्रतीपे जिहासा
यच्च स्या सर्वदेति स्पृहयति तदसौ प्रत्यगात्मा सुखात्मा ॥

(Svā. Si. 2-35)

["If a person considers anything other than Ātman as dear to him, that other thing will make him weep"—So says the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* Moreover it is said that in deep sleep, jīva is merged into the *Prājña* (Ātman) which is full of the experience of Bliss. It is well known in the three worlds that one desires what is pleasant and abhors what is otherwise. Moreover one always desires that one should continue to 'be' forever. Hence is jīva of the nature of Bliss.]

10.1.6 Pratyagatma, the same Characteristics as Brahman

सच्चित्सौख्यैकरस्यं निगदितमिह यद्ब्रह्मणो लक्षणं त-
त्प्रत्यक्तत्त्वेऽपि जैवे सममखिलदृशस्तस्य बाधाद्ययोगात् ।
मुख्यप्रेमास्पदत्वादुपधिविभिदया वस्तुभेदाद्यसिद्धे-
र्ब्रह्मांशत्वप्रवादात्तनुकरणदृशः स्वप्रकाशत्वतश्च ॥

(Svā. Si. 2-32)

[The characterisation of Brahman as Unitary. Existence, Consciousness and Bliss is applicable also in the case of the Inmost principle of jīva This is because—jīva is the Seer of everything and is not subject to sublation etc., it is the one primary subject of affection, affection for any other thing subserving only this; differences in the limiting adjuncts cannot bring about differences in Ātman, it is said to be a part of Brahman, it is the witness of the body and the senses, also it is Self-effulgent]

10.1.7 Direct Realisation—Mahavakyavichara

When in this manner, one ponders with one-pointed

attention over the true nature of jīva and Īśvara whose characteristics are identical, and understands decisively through the instruction of Śruti and the preceptor, by reasoning and experience, that they are identical, then the *Mahāvākyas* like 'That thou art' whose essence is determined by looking to their setting etc., will at once be able to make one realise Brahman-Ātman directly, without any obstruction—

इत्थं मीमांस्यमाने श्रुतिगुरुवचनैर्युक्तिमिश्राऽनुभूत्या
शश्वज्जीवेशतत्त्वे निपुणमधिगते वस्तुनो लक्षणैक्ये ।
निष्प्रत्यूहं निजार्थं समधिगमयितुं तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्या-
न्याद्यन्ताऽवेक्षणाद्यैरधिगतहृदयान्यञ्जसैव क्षमन्ते ॥

(Svā. Si. 2-36)

10.2.1 Formalism of Enquiry—Sravana, Manana, Nididhyasana—Reductio ad Absurdum

It is clear by now that the method adopted to establish the nature of *Pratyagātmā* by enquiry, is the one suggested in the hymn by the words व्यावृत्तास्वनुवर्तमानं, persisting in all the states which are by themselves mutually exclusive. The formalism underlying this process of enquiry is given succinctly in the *Siddhāntabindu* (8) wherein it is pointed out that this is the intention of the Śruti ordaining *śravana*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*, reasonings of the type of reductio ad absurdum, व्याप्यारोपेण व्यापकारोपः, as an aid to the direct realisation of Ātman—

'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः'—अत एव मनननिदिध्यासनसहिते श्रवणाख्ये वेदान्तवाक्यविचारे 'श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः' इत्यादिविधिरप्युपपद्यते । तस्य चतुर्विधान्वयव्यतिरेकादितर्करूपत्वात्, दृग्दृश्यान्वयव्यतिरेकः। साक्षिसाक्ष्यान्वयव्यतिरेकः, आगमापायितदवध्यन्वयव्यतिरेकः दुःखिपरमप्रेमास्पदान्वयव्यतिरेक इति । अनुवृत्तव्यावृत्तान्वयव्यतिरेकः पञ्चमः ।

The *Nyāyaratnāvalī* on this says—

तत्र श्रवणं नाम 'तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यं यदि ब्रह्मात्मैक्यपरं न स्यात्, तदोपक्रमोपसंहारादिभिरपि अद्वैतब्रह्मबोधकं न स्यात्' इत्यादितर्करूपम्। तस्य च प्रमाणीभूतवाक्यतात्पर्यविषयकत्वेन प्राधान्यम्। ब्रह्मात्मैक्यसिद्ध्यनुकूलतर्कादयोऽपि श्रवणेऽन्तर्भवन्ति। मननं तु वाक्यजन्यज्ञानस्य परोक्षनिश्चयभावसंपादकस्तर्कः। निदिध्यासनमपरोक्षनिश्चयत्वसंपादकस्तर्कः। 'तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यजं ज्ञान यदि परोक्षं स्यात्, तर्हि अपरोक्षात्मविषयकं न स्यात्' इत्यादिरूपः। तयोस्तत्संपादनरूपफलोपकारकारित्वेन श्रवणाङ्गत्वम्। तदसंपादने हि श्रवणफलीभूतं वाक्यजज्ञानं नापरोक्षभ्रमहेत्वज्ञानस्य निवर्तकम्। ... दृग्दृश्यान्वयव्यतिरेक इत्यादि। दृशि दृश्यानां तादात्म्यमन्वयः। तस्य च निरूपणासंभवात् दृशि दृश्यानि कल्पितानीति दृशि दृश्यानामन्वयेनैव व्यतिरेकः सिध्यतीत्यर्थः। एवं साक्षिणो निर्विकारत्वात् साक्ष्याणां च विकारित्वात् साक्षिणि साक्ष्यस्यान्वयेन व्यतिरेकः सिध्यतीत्यर्थः। एवमागमापायितया उत्पत्तिविनाशवत्त्वरूपया सर्वदृश्यानां कादाचित्कत्वम्। आत्मा हि तेषामवधिः, आगमापायशून्यत्वात्... एव दुःखित्वेनोपलभ्यमानस्याहङ्कारादेः परमप्रेमास्पदात्मभिन्नत्वात् तयोस्तादात्म्यरूपान्वयेनानुपपद्यमानेनात्मन्यहङ्कारादिकल्पितम्। एवं सर्वेषु दृश्येषु मिथो व्यावृत्तेषु भिन्नेषु सद्रूपेणानुवृत्त आत्मा, तस्मात्तत्र तेषामन्वयेन तादात्म्यरूपेण व्यतिरेकः सिध्यति। यत् येषु व्यावृत्तेषु तादाम्येनान्वित तत्र तानि कल्पितानि। यथा रज्जौ मालासर्पादि यथा वा जातौ व्यक्तय इति भावः।

'स्वप्रकाशदृशस्तादात्म्येन सिद्धं जडं यदि सत्यं स्यात्, तदा जडत्वादिना स्वप्रकाशादत्यन्तविलक्षणं न स्यात्' इति तर्को बोध्यः, एवमग्रेऽपि 'निर्विकारसाक्षितादात्म्येन सिद्धं दृश्यं यदि सत्यं स्यात्, तदा विकारवत् न स्यात्'। 'एवमागमापायशून्यात्मतादात्म्येन सिद्धं दृश्य यदि सत्यं स्यात्, तदा आगमापायित्वरूपकादाचित्कत्ववन्तं स्यात्', 'परमप्रेमास्पदात्मतादात्म्येन प्रतीयमानं यदि सत्यं स्यात्, तदा दुःखसाधनं न स्यात्', 'अनुवृत्त-

सद्वस्तुतादात्म्येन प्रतीयमानं पटादिकं यदि सत्यं स्यात् तदा मिथो व्यावृत्तं न स्यात्' इति बोध्यम् ।

The idea is—by the word *śravaṇa* in the Śruti is to be understood reasonings of the type 'If a *Mahāvākya* such as "That thou art" is not declaring the identity of Brahman and Ātman, then the beginning and conclusion etc., should not be conveying the knowledge of the Non-dual Brahman'. As concerned with the purport of the *Mahāvākya*, primarily this is *śravaṇa*. This is inclusive of other reasonings which are conducive to the establishment of Brahman-Ātman identity. *Manana* stands for reasonings which enable the securing of certitude, though indirect, of the knowledge produced by the *Mahāvākya*. *Nididhyāsana* stands for reasonings which enable the securing of certitude in respect of the direct knowledge of the same, of the type 'If the knowledge produced by the *Mahāvākya* like "That thou art" be indirect then it should not pertain to Ātman that one is directly aware of'. These two, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*, subserve *śravana* as being helpful in securing the fruit, direct knowledge by *śravaṇa*; otherwise the knowledge generated by the *vākya*, which is the fruit of *śravana*, would be unable to sublate the ignorance that is the cause of the direct illusory experience.

The *Nyāyaratnāvalī* explains *anvaya* as *kalpitatādātmya*, *vyatireka* as *abhāva* and *anvayavyatireka* as अन्वयेनैव व्यतिरेकः i.e., the non-existence of an object based upon the very fact that the object exists in a substratum by the relation of false identity with the substratum (here Brahman-Ātman). The reasoning is fourfold—(1) The non-existence of a pot, a piece of cloth and other objects of perception based upon their relation of false identity with the perceiving Conscious-

ness (i.e., jīva) as no other basic relation is possible as has already been shown. (2) The non-existence of the shell-silver based upon its relation of false identity with the Witnessing Consciousness, the witnessed being liable to change and the Witness remaining unchanged. (3) The non-existence of those subject to creation and destruction based on their relation of false identity with that Consciousness not subject to creation or destruction, which Consciousness is their limit (4) The non-existence of the one affected with misery (i e., immersed in worldliness) like the ego etc., based upon its relation of false identity with that which is the Seat of highest Bliss.

In each case the non-existence follows from the fact of false identification. The 'presence' and 'absence' of relation between that which persists and that which is excluded is the fifth.

Thus Ātman as existence persisting in all those that are perceived which are mutually excluded, is other than these as having been falsely identified with each of them. Whenever there is identification with each of the mutually excluded entities, they are all related with the persisting entity like a garland, a snake etc , in a rope or individuals in a class.

The reasonings are to be understood as of the type 'If the inert which is known because of identification with the Self-effulgent Perceiver is real, there would be the contingency of its not being totally different from the Self-effulgent one because of inertness etc.'. Similarly in the later cases: 'What is made known as being identified with the unchanging Witness, if real, then it would not be changing'. Again, 'What is made known as being identified by that which is not subject to origination and destruction, if real,

would not be a transient entity subject to generation and destruction'. Again 'Whatever is seen as identified with that which is the seat of the highest love, if real, would not be the cause of misery'. Again, 'A cloth etc., which are seen in identification with *Sat*, Existence, which is persistent, if real, then they would not be different from one another'.

10.2.2 Experience of Pure 'Aham' the Substratum of all Idam

It is clear from this that all the *idam* aspect of the universe is superimposed on the Substratum viz., Ātman which is of the nature of Existence, Shine, Supreme Bliss, Eternal, Pure, Real, Consciousness, Ever Free, Subtle, All-pervasive, persistent in all variables, unchanging and non-dual.

The *Advaitamakaranda* gives all this in a summary form—

अभारूपस्य विश्वस्य भानं भासन्निधेर्विना ।
कदाचिन्नावकल्पेत भा चाहं तेन सर्वगः ॥ 6 ॥

न हि भानादृते सत्त्वं नर्ते भान चितोऽचितः ।
चित्संभेदोऽपि नाध्यासादृते तेनाहमद्वयः ॥ 7 ॥

साक्षी सर्वान्वितः प्रेयानहं नाहं कदाचन ।
परिणामपरिच्छेदपरितापैरुपप्लवात् ॥ 9 ॥

षड्विकारवता वेत्ता निर्विकारोऽहमन्यथा ।
तद्विकारानुसंधानं सर्वथा नावकल्पते ॥ 13 ॥

[The presentation of the dull insentient universe cannot at all be understood without the proximity of the Shine pervading it, and that Shine am I. As such I am everywhere, All-pervasive.

Without being cognised, an entity cannot be regarded as having existence. And the cognition of the insentient cannot be without the Shine of the Sentient The relation between them

*

cannot be anything other than superimposition. As such I am without a second

The Witness, present in all, and ever dear am I. I am never the 'I' which suffers change, which is finite and is partaking of distress.

The knower of the sixfold transformation, I am never the participant in any of these changes. Otherwise the recalling of the transformation can never be understood at all]

The *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* may be recalled in this connection—

प्रकृतिविकृतिभिन्नः शुद्धबोधस्वभावः
सदसदिदमशेषं भासयन्निर्विशेषः ।
विलसति परमात्मा जाग्रदादिष्ववस्था-
स्वहमहमिति साक्षात् साक्षिरूपेण बुद्धेः ॥ 137 ॥

ज्ञाता मनोहङ्कृतिविक्रियाणा देहेन्द्रियप्राणकृतक्रियाणाम् ।
अयोग्निवत्ताननुवर्तमानो न चेष्टते नो विकरोति किञ्चन ॥ 135 ॥

नित्याद्वयाखण्डचिदेकरूपो बुद्ध्यादिसाक्षी सदसद्विलक्षणः ।
अहंपदप्रत्ययलक्षितार्थः प्रत्यक्सदानन्दघनः परात्मा ॥ 352 ॥

[Different from the *prakṛti* and its modifications, of the nature of Pure Consciousness, Absolute, manifesting this entire gross and subtle universe, sports the Supreme Self in the waking and other states persistently as 'I', being the direct Witness of the intellect

Ātman is the knower of the modifications of the mind and the *ahankāra* and the activities of the body, the sense organs and the vital airs Accompanying them all, like fire in an iron ball, It neither acts nor undergoes any change in the least.

The Supreme Ātman is eternal, non-dual, unlimited Consciousness, ever the same, the Witness of the intellect etc , different from the subtle and the gross i e., from Avidyā and its effects ; It is the meaning indicated by the word 'I' the inmost Self, ever compacted of Bliss]

10.2.3 All Parlance due to Anyonyadhyasa of Aham and Idam; Avidya

It is thus seen that all parlance in the world is concomitant on mutual superimposition of Self and non-Self as the *Adhyāsabhāsya* points out—

तथाप्यन्योन्यस्मिन्नन्योन्यात्मकतामन्योन्यधर्मांश्चाध्यस्य, इतरेतराविवेकेनात्यन्तविविक्तयोर्धर्मधर्मिणोर्मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः, सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य 'अहमिदम्, ममेदम्' इति नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः।

All error is due to the superimposition of the unreal on the real, सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य, or it is seeing a thing in a substrate where it is not, अतस्मिंस्तद्बुद्धिः, परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः. This is what is named Avidyā by the discerning, अध्यास पण्डिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते. Whatever one's theory of error, one thing is common to all viz, *adhyāsa* consists in perceiving one thing in another, its substrate. It is lack of discrimination, इतरेतराविवेकः, and false knowledge.

10.3.1 What is Adhyasa?

This *adhyāsa* is patent in the illusions such as that of the silver in the shell, of the double Moon and of the not-Self as the Self. Śrī Śrī Bhagavatpāda offers the full definition of superimposition as follows—'the apparent presentation in the form of remembrance to consciousness, of something previously observed in some other things'—स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः.

This is sought to be made clear further by the *Bhāsya* which takes up the discussion as to what is intended to be conveyed by the term *adhyāsa*.

The *Anyathākhyātivādins* maintain that error is the superimposition of the attributes of one thing on another. The *Akhyātivādins* hold that error is founded on the non-

apprehension of the distinctness of the two things. Others, however, say that when there is superimposition of one on another, there is a fictitious assumption of an opposite attribute in the latter. All these definitions, however, agree in so far as they represent superimposition of the apparent presentation of the attributes of one thing in another. And thus is our experience in the world—'The shell appears as if it were silver', 'The Moon though one, appears as having a second' Says the *Adhyāsabhāṣya*—

आह—कोऽयमध्यासो नामेति। उच्यते। स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः। तं केचिदन्यत्रान्यधर्माध्यास इति वदन्ति। केचित्तु यत्र यदध्यासस्तद्विवेकाग्रहनिबन्धनो भ्रम इति। अन्ये तु यत्र यदध्यासस्तस्यैव विपरीतधर्मत्वकल्पनामाचक्षत इति। सर्वथापि त्वन्यस्यान्यधर्मावभासतां न व्यभिचरति। तथाच लोकेऽनुभवः—शुक्तिका हि रजतवदवभासते, एकश्चन्द्रः सद्वितीयवदिति।

10.3.2 Arthadhyasa, Jnanadhyasa

What is pointed out by the *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha* in this connection may be noted—

द्विविधो ह्यध्यासो ज्ञानविशिष्टोऽर्थोऽर्थविशिष्टं ज्ञान चेति। तत्रार्थस्य तावत् स्मर्यमाणसदृशोऽन्यात्मनाऽवभास्यमानोऽन्योऽर्थोऽध्यास इति लक्षणम्। ज्ञानस्य तु स्मृतिसमानोऽन्यस्यान्यात्मतावभासोऽध्यास इति।

[Superimposition is of two kinds, a thing qualified by a cognition and a cognition qualified by a thing Of these, the definition of the thing superimposed is 'Superimposition is that thing which is similar to what is remembered and appears as of the nature of a different thing'. Of the cognition, however, the definition is 'Superimposition is that cognition similar to memory which is the presentation of one thing as of the nature of another'.]

As for the superimposition of cognition, since that is inseparable from the superimposition of things, it has not to be established separately. So says the *Vivaraṇaprameya-saṅgraha*—ज्ञानाध्यासस्त्वर्थाध्यासाविनाभूतत्वान्न पृथक् साधनीयः ।

10.3.3 Adhyāsa—Various Theories

The various theories of error are referred to succinctly in the *Mānasollāsa* (VII-22 to 26) and the *ṭīkā* thereon—

शुक्तौ रजतमित्येवं यथा व्यामुह्यतेऽन्यथा ।
सदेव रूप्यं चेद्भाति विलयस्ते न सिध्यति ॥

[The illusion caused by the mutual superimposition of Ātman and non-Ātman is just like the mutual superimposition in the case of shell-silver—the shell is mistaken for silver that is quite a different thing and the 'thisness' of the shell is superimposed on silver. If the silver which presents itself as 'here' be really existent, then how, according to your theory, can it be reduced to nothing by the sublating knowledge?]

नात्यन्तासत्प्रकाशेत नरशृङ्गादिवत्क्वचित् ।
कान्ताकरादौ रजतमिति स्यात्स्मरणं भ्रमे ॥

[Again what is altogether non-existent can never present itself to consciousness any more than a man's horn etc. That is to say, the silver which here presents itself to consciousness cannot be altogether non-existent]

तेनेदं तुल्यमित्येवं स्यात्सादृश्यात्तु विभ्रमः ।
पीतः शङ्खो गुडस्तिक्त इत्यादौ नास्ति तुल्यता ॥

[If illusion be due to similarity between the things confounded together, then we should be conscious of similarity at that time in the form 'this shell is similar to that silver'. When the white conch appears as yellow to the jaundiced eye or when jaggery tastes bitter to the diseased tongue, there is indeed no similarity between the colours or the tastes confounded]

तादात्म्येन स्फुरति चेद्रजतत्वेन शुक्तिका ।
विभ्रमो निरधिष्ठानो बाधो निरवधिर्भवेत् ॥

[If it be said that the shell presents itself to consciousness at that time as silver itself—as in fact identical with it—then the illusory consciousness would have no real basis whatever; and when contradicted by experience, no residual truth would be left in the consciousness]

बुद्धिस्थित चेद्रजतं बाह्यत्वेन प्रतीयते ।
गुञ्जादौ ज्वलनारोपे देहदाहः प्रसज्यते ॥

[If silver, existent as an idea in the intellect, appears to be external, then when a *guñja* seed is mistaken for fire, there would be the burning of the body.]

10.3.4 Akhyativada of Prabhakaramimamsa

The various theories of error referred to may now be considered in fair detail The *Svārājyasiddhiṭīkā* (2-24) brings in the discussion of these *khyātivādas* while considering the example of the mirage-illusion, मृगतृष्णिकोदकवन्मरोः, given in the *śloka* (2-24) which is brought in to establish that all creation is but a concoction and the Substratum that is Secondless is alone real. The view of the *Akhyātivādins* viz., that of the *Prābhākara* school of *Mīmāṃsā* is first considered—

मृगतृष्णिकोदकवदिति दृष्टान्तासिद्धिः । भ्रान्त्यात्मकविशिष्टज्ञानानभ्युपगमात् । तत्र हीदमिति सलिलमिति च द्वौ प्रत्ययौ स्वतो विपयतश्चागृहीतभेदौ । इदमिति हि मरुदेशसंप्रक्ता मरीचयो दोपवशादगृहीतमरीचित्वादिविशेपा गृह्यन्ते । सलिलमिति च प्रागनुभूत सलिल मरीचिशौक्ल्यस्वाच्छ्यदर्शनोद्बुद्धसंस्कारकं दोषवशादेव प्रमुष्टतत्ताकं स्मर्यते । न च मरीचिबुद्धौ सलिल गोचरम् । अनुभवविरोधादसन्निकृष्टत्वाच्च । एव सलिलबुद्धावपि न मरीचयः । ज्ञानानां विषयव्यभिचारे सर्वत्रानाश्वासप्रसङ्गात् । न च खलु पुरः सत्तामात्रेण, जनकत्वेन वा अर्थाना ज्ञानगोचरता । चक्षूर-

सयोरपि चाक्षुषत्वापातात् । अपि तु ज्ञानभास्यत्वेन । न च सलिलप्रत्यये मरीचयो भासन्त इति सांप्रतम् । किञ्च, इन्द्रियाणां यथार्थप्रत्ययजनन-स्वाभाव्यं क्लृप्तं विपर्ययाभ्युपगमे हीयेत ।

[The example of the 'water' in the mirage is inappropriate as it is not illustrative of the situation, for an error in the sense of a single unit of knowledge is not admissible. There are, in fact, two *jñānas* of the form 'this' and 'water', which are not distinguished from each other either by themselves or in respect of their objective contents. The perception is of the 'this', the substrate of the illusion, through the senses and pertains to the Sun's rays in contact with the desert region, which, however, are not cognised specifically as 'rays' consequent on a defect. The *jñāna* of the form 'water' is a memory of the water that has been previously experienced, this memory being generated from the impression called up by the similarity such as the whiteness and the placidity of the rays, in which, however, the 'thatness' characteristic of remembrance is obscured by defects Also 'water' is not the content of the *jñāna* pertaining to the rays, as this is contrary to experience and 'water' is not there in front Likewise, neither are the rays the content of the *jñāna* pertaining to 'water'. If a thing is not the content of the *jñāna* pertaining to it, then there would be lack of certainty in respect of every *jñāna* Neither a thing merely because it is there in front, nor the sense that produces a *jñāna*, can be the content of that *jñāna* for in that case arises the contingency of both the taste and the eye being seen by the eye. On the other hand, the content of a *jñāna* is what is revealed by it Also it would not be proper to say that the rays are revealed in the *jñāna* pertaining to 'water'. Moreover if it is accepted to be otherwise, it would be violating what is decidedly known viz., that the sense organs, by their very nature, produce valid knowledge]

सदोषाणां तेषां मिथ्याप्रत्ययहेतुतेति चेन्न । दोषाणां कार्यप्रतिबन्धमात्र हेतुत्वेन कार्यान्तराप्रयोजकत्वात् । अन्यथा दुष्टात् कुटजबीजाद्वटाङ्कुरान्त-रोत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात् ।

[If it is said that, because of the defects in themselves, the sense organs produce erroneous knowledge, it cannot be so, for the defects are causes of only obstructions in the way of production of an effect and not the causes of arising of another effect. Otherwise there would be the possibility of a banyan sprout springing up from a defective *kutaja* seed.]

न च पुरः सलिलाप्रतिभासे तदर्थिनस्तत्र प्रवृत्तेः, उत्तरत्र नेदं सलिलमिति बाधस्य चानुपपत्तिः । तत्र प्रवृत्तेस्तद्विवेकाग्रहमात्रनिबंधनत्वाद्बाधस्य च तत्प्रसञ्जितव्यवहारमात्रगोचरत्वात् ।

[Again, it cannot be held that if the water is not cognised there in front, the effort to secure it, on the part of the one desirous of it, as also the subsequent sublation 'this is not water' cannot be accounted for, since the effort there is only because of the non-apprehension of the distinction between the two *jñānas*, the perceived and the remembered, and the sublation pertains only to the usage in parlance of the expression in that connection]

पीतः शङ्ख इत्यादिस्थले तु ग्रहणयोरेव स्वतो विषयतश्चासंसर्गाग्रहात्तथा व्यवहारः । इत्थं च सर्वेऽपि संदेहविभ्रमत्वेनाभिमतप्रत्यया यथार्था एव, प्रत्ययत्वात्, संमतवदिति मृगतृष्णिकोदकवदित्यदृष्टान्त इति ।

[In cases of expressions such as 'the conch is yellow', however, the parlance is due to the non-apprehension of the distinction between the two *jñānas*, both perceptual, as also that between the two objects concerned. In this manner all *jñānas* regarded as coming under the categories of doubt and error are verily valid because they are *jñānas* like the ones accepted as valid Hence the analogy of the mirage-water is inappropriate.]

10.3.5 Refutation of Akhyativada

This *Akhyātivāda* is now refuted—

तदसारम् । विवेकाग्रहमात्रेण सलिलार्थिप्रवृत्तेरिदं सलिलमिति सामानाधिकरण्यव्यवहारस्य च विशिष्टग्रहणहेतुकत्वेन निरूढस्यानिर्वाहात् ।

अग्रहणमात्रस्य सदैव सुलभत्वेन उदासीनपुरुषस्यापि तथाविधस्य पुरःप्रवृत्त्यापत्तेः ।

ननु न विवेकाग्रहमात्रात् प्रवृत्तिः, किन्त्वगृहीतविवेकत्वेन विशिष्ट-यथार्थज्ञानसदृशाज्ज्ञानद्वयादेवेति चेत् । अत्र भवान् प्रष्टव्यः, किं विशिष्टैक-ज्ञानसादृश्यं गृह्यमाणं तयोः प्रयोजकम् ? उत सत्तामात्रेणेति ? आद्येऽपि इमे ज्ञाने विशिष्टज्ञानसदृशे इति सामान्यतो वा, इमे स्वतो विषयतश्चागृहीत-भेदे इति विशेषतो वा सादृश्यग्रहणम् ? न चोभयथापि विशिष्टार्थिनस्तत्सदृशे प्रवृत्तिसिद्धिः । नहि सामान्यतो विशेषतो वा गोसदृशो गवय इति ज्ञानात्, गोप्रत्ययसदृशोऽयं गवयप्रत्यय इति बोधाद्वा गवयार्थी गवये प्रवर्तते । अगृहीतभेदे इमे ज्ञाने इति तु व्याहतम् । नहि भेदाग्रहे इमे इति, अगृहीत-भेदे इति वा भवति । अतः सत्तामात्रेणेति पक्ष एव परिशिष्यते ।

न च विमर्शे विवेकाग्रहरूपाद्विशिष्टज्ञानसादृश्याच्चेतनप्रवृत्तिः सिध्यति । कथं हि तत्र प्रवर्तेत यदि न तदिच्छेत् । अन्यदिच्छत्यन्यत्करोतीति च व्याहतम् । न चेत् पुरोवर्तिनं जलमिति जानीयात्, कथं तदिच्छेत् ? यद्यजलत्वेनाज्ञानात् प्रवर्तेत इति ब्रूयाः, अथ जलत्वेनाज्ञानात् कुतो नोपेक्षेत, तत्रोपादानोपेक्षाभ्यामुभयतः कृष्यमाणो विशिष्टजलारोपे सत्येव प्रवृत्तौ व्यव-तिष्ठते इत्यारोपद्वारैव भेदाग्रहः प्रवृत्तिहेतुः । आरोपिते हि जले तज्जातीयस्य तृषोपशमहेतुतामनुचिन्त्य तज्जातीयतया पुरोवर्तिन्यपि तदनुमाय तदर्थी तत्र प्रवर्तेत इति क्रमः सिध्यति । तथा च प्रयोगः—विवादास्पदं जलादिज्ञानं पुरोवर्तिविषयकम्, जलाद्यर्थिनः पुरोवर्तिनि नियमेन प्रवर्तकत्वात् । यत् यदर्थिनं तथा प्रवर्तयति तज्ज्ञानं तद्गोचरम् । यथोभयसंमतं नद्यां जलज्ञानमिति । तथा हि—अनुभविता क्व जलमिति पृष्टः पुरःप्रदेशमङ्गुल्या निर्दिशति ।

दृष्टं हि दावाग्निदाहदुष्टवेत्रबीजानां कदलीकाण्डरूपकार्यान्तरजनकत्वम् । भस्मकरोगदुष्टजाठराग्नेश्च बह्वन्नपानजरणहेतुत्वमिति सदोषैरिन्द्रियैर्मिथ्याप्रत्यय-जननाविरोधः । प्रत्यक्षबाधितविषयं ह्याभासाना याथार्थ्यानुमानं वह्निशैत्यानु-मानवत् । बोधकत्वेन हि ज्ञानानां स्वतःप्रामाण्य नाव्यभिचारेणेति विपर्ययस्य

विपयव्यभिचारेऽपि न सर्वत्रानाश्वासः । नेदं जलमिति वाधानुसारेण वाधार्हस्यानिर्वचनीयजलस्यैवाभ्युपगमात् नात्यन्तासद्विपयकत्वमपीति न दृष्टान्तासिद्धिः ।

This standpoint is untenable, since the effort of the one desirous of water cannot be explained as due only to the non-apprehension of the distinction between the two (the water and the Sun's rays). Nor can one explain away the parlance 'This is water' which pertains to the same locus and which is well accepted as due to the perception of the concerned locus along with the attributes. This is because, the mere non-apprehension of the distinction being ever of easy avail, there arises the contingency of the effort on the part of even a disinterested person to secure water 'that is there in front'.

It may be argued that the effort is due not merely to the non-apprehension of the distinction alone but due to the two *jñānas* which, consequent on the non-apprehension of the distinction between them, bear similarity to particularised valid *jñāna*. Then it must be asked—is it the knowledge of the similarity or its mere existence that is responsible for the effort and the usage 'this is water'? In the first case, what is it that is meant by the knowledge of similarity? Is it merely the knowledge of the type 'these two *jñānas* are similar to particularised knowledge', in a general way? Or, is it of the special type like 'the distinction between these two *jñānas* in respect of themselves as also their contents, is not apprehended'? In neither case would activity ensue for him who is desirous of a particular thing. It is nowhere seen that one desirous of *gavaya* will proceed to secure them by knowing either in a general way or in a particularised manner, that *gavaya* is similar to the cow or that the *jñānas* with these as contents are similar. To say that the difference between

these two is not known would be self-stultifying for if the difference is not apprehended then, neither can they be referred to as 'these two' nor can it be spoken in such terms as 'the difference between them is not apprehended'. Thus remains over only the possibility that the activity to secure it ensues merely because of the existence of the two *jñānas*.

Also a careful examination shows that activity on the part of the sentient cannot arise from the non-apprehension of the difference, deemed similar to a particularised knowledge. How can he proceed to act if he is not desirous of the very thing? It would be stultifying to say that the desire is for one thing and the activity is for something else. If what is present in front is not known to be water, how can the desire for it arise in him? If it is said that the activity arises because he does not know that it is not water, why should he not be indifferent as he does not know that it is water? When in this situation of not knowing whether to act or not, he would definitely proceed to act only when there is the superimposition of water Thus it is only through superimposition that the non-apprehension of the difference would be the cause of activity. Once water is superimposed, recalling that what quenches thirst is only such an entity, and inferring the same in respect of what is in front, one desirous of water proceeds to secure it. Such would be the order. Hence the inference—What is under discussion viz., the *jñāna* of water etc , pertains to what is in front, as those desirous of water etc., are seen to proceed invariably to secure what is in front. That knowledge which invariably prompts one to activity to secure what he desires, has for its content that object of desire, just as the knowledge of water in a river which is acceptable to both the contending parties. Thus

when questioned 'where is water?' one who has the experience of it points to the region in front.

It is also seen that where causes are obstructed by a defect in the production of their normal effects, they acquire the capacity to produce other effects. For example, the seeds of the cane parched by the forest fire produce plantain shoots, the digestive fire of him whose stomach is affected by the disease called *bhasmaka* can digest a large quantity of food Thus there is no contradiction in the defective sense organs giving rise to erroneous knowledge. The inference of the truth of delusions which are deprived of their contents by sublating perceptions is fallacious like the inference that fire is cold.

As for what was said about the loss of confidence in all means of valid knowledge, though illusory cognitions are inconstant in their contents, it is to be pointed out that for cognition, there is self-validity through the very fact of conveying knowledge and not through its constancy to its contents. In accordance with the sublation 'this is not water', what is accepted is indefinable water which is susceptible to sublation and not what is absolutely non-existent; as such the illustration is not inappropriate.

Detailed discussions in respect of the points raised here as also others, pertaining to the metaphysical as also the psychological aspects, are to be found in treatises like the *Brahmasiddhi*, the *Iṣṭasiddhi* etc. It is pointed out, for example, that the causehood of the wrong usage cannot be ascribed to perception and remembrance either directly or indirectly. Not directly because, cognitions, in themselves valid, can never cause an illusory usage directly as it would then lead to the absurd situation of all valid cognitions leading to illusions If indirectly, this possibility of a valid cognition, indirectly

leading to illusory activity through the revival of *samskāras* in spite of being valid, will include all valid cognitions and make them illusory with the result that there will be no certainty anywhere of a valid cognition—

कान्ताकरादिगतरजतख्यातीनामपि संस्कारपरम्परया अयथार्थव्यवहार-हेतुत्वसंभवाद्भ्रमत्वं स्यात्। (*Iṣṭasiddhivivarana* p. 417)

Further the theory of *Akhyāti* breaks down when it is applied to dream experience. In dream experience, however, the question of the non-apprehension of the difference between the perceived and the remembered cannot arise at all, since there is no second object which is perceived other than what is remembered. So it has to be said that there is no erroneous cognition in dream experience, a conclusion which is palpably untrue.

Again the difficulty with the theory of *Akhyāti* is how the sublating cognition can arise at all. Sublation is the negation of what has been previously affirmed. According to them there is but non-apprehension of difference at the time of mirage-water cognition. There is no content which is apprehended at all, for non-apprehension cannot claim anything for its content. And if there is no content apprehended at that time, there should be no sublating cognition later on.

Also, just as in the case of right cognition, in delusion also, the general and the particular are immediately presented as in reciprocal relation i e., even of the delusive cognition the content is a 'this-what'. And hence the characterisation of delusion as a succession of two cognitions mistaken for one, is not sound. If delusion consists of two cognitions, the activity which it prompts cannot be explained.

Nor can the various instances of delusion like the double Moon or the yellow conch be explained by the *Prābhākara* theory. There is no question of tracing the second Moon to memory since it is well established in memory that there is only one Moon. Again, the tracing of the appearance of the yellow conch to the cognition of the bilious substance in the eye cannot be accepted as there can be no visual perception of that which is in the eye, since objects which are only outside the eye can be seen. The 'role of the defects' involved in delusive cognitions is not satisfactorily delineated.

Again erroneous knowledge in this doctrine, as already pointed out, and as signified by its name *Akhyāti*, is 'lack of knowledge', but the *Prābhākaras* who do not accept *abhāva* in a negative sense but explain it always in positive terms, are not strictly entitled to speak of the 'absence' of knowledge. Even supposing that they may do so, lack of knowledge fails to account for error, whether we view it as incomplete knowledge or as an entire negation of it. In the former case, all human knowledge, being more or less fragmentary, will have to be erroneous which is the very reverse of what is sought to be maintained here; in the latter, error will have to be confined only to states like deep sleep!

10.3.6 Anyathakhyativada of Naiyayika; also Viparitakhyativada of Bhattamimamsa—Refutation

In such a situation the theory of *Anyathākhyāti* i.e., misapprehension, is then taken up for consideration—

नन्वस्तु तर्ह्यन्यथाख्यातिः। तथा च गङ्गादौ प्रसिद्धस्यैव जलस्य जलत्वस्य वा स्मृत्युपनीतस्य पुरोदेशे मरीचिषु वा ग्रहः, तयोश्च देशान्तरे स्वविशेष्यात् पृथक्सत्त्वाद्दृष्टान्तासिद्धिस्तदवस्थैवेति चेत्।

न। तयोरसन्निकृष्टत्वेनेदमर्थासंभिन्नत्वेन चापरोक्षेण इदमर्थोपरागेण च प्रतिभासानुपपत्तेः। तत्र चाक्षुषादिवृत्तिव्याप्तिमन्तरेण तदवच्छिन्नचैतन्ये आवरणभङ्गायोगेनानावृतचैतन्यतादात्म्यलक्षणविषयापरोक्ष्यासिद्धेः। वृत्तिषु च विषयापरोक्षप्रयुक्तमेवापरोक्ष्यम्, न वैजात्यरूपम्, नियामकाननुगमात्। पर्वतो वह्निमानित्याद्यपरोक्षपक्षकानुमितौ पर्वत पश्यामि वह्निमेवानुमिनोमीत्यनुभवेन आशिकत्वोपगमाच्च करणनियम्यत्वाभ्युपगन्तुरपि करणासंप्रयुक्तजलादौ तदसिद्धेश्च।

न च तत्र दोषनियम्य तत्। दोषाणामननुगतत्वात्। तेषा भ्रमत्वमात्रप्रयोजकत्वेनापरोक्ष्याप्रयोजकत्वात्। विशिष्टारोपस्थले विशेषणतावच्छेदकवैशिष्ट्यावगाहनांशे भ्रमस्यापि प्रमात्वापत्त्या तद्धेतोर्दोषस्य चक्षुरादिवत्प्रमाणान्तरत्वापत्तेश्च। मनो हि यदसाधारण कारणमासाद्य वहिर्गोचरां प्रमां जनयति, तदेव प्रमाणान्तरमिति परैरभ्युपगमात्। अन्यथाख्यातिभक्तेर्जलादेः पुरोवर्तिसंसर्गांशेऽनिर्वाहाच्च। न ह्यसौ जलादिप्रदेशसंसर्गः। तस्य तत्प्रदेशभानमन्तरेण भानायोगात्। संसर्गे संसर्ग्यनिरूपितसांसर्गिकविषयताया अप्रसिद्धेः। नापि पुरोवर्तिसंसर्गः। तस्य जलाद्यनिरूप्यत्वात्। तदनिरूप्योऽपि दोषात् तन्निरूप्यत्वेन भासत इति चेत्, तर्हि संसर्गे जलादिनिरूप्यत्वारोपाय संबन्धान्तरमन्वेषणीय तदवस्थमनवस्थितं च। विनैव संबन्धं तन्निरूपितत्वभानेऽभ्युपगते तु स एव पुनरुपस्थितोऽख्यातिवादः।

न च विशिष्टज्ञाने तन्निरूप्यत्वलक्षणः संबन्धसंबन्धो भासत इति त्वयाभ्युपगम्यत इति न प्रसिद्धसंसर्गख्यातिसिद्धिः। अत एवासत एव संसर्गस्य भानमिति न्यायटीकाकृतः। न च सोऽपि युक्तः। संसर्गांश इव प्रकारविशेष्यांशयोरपि असद्विषयत्वावर्जनेन विज्ञानवादापत्तेः। किञ्चानुभविता मृगतृष्णिकानदीमनुभूतचरविलक्षणसस्थानवीचीप्रकारसन्निहिततरुगुल्मादि-प्रतिबिम्बसङ्कुलामिति विततस्वच्छभास्वरजलामनुभवन्नपूर्वेयमित्येवाध्यवस्यति। पृच्छ्यमानोऽपि तथैवाचष्टे। उत्तरकालं च समीपोपसृप्तौ नेदं जलमिति बाधमनुभवति। न तु गङ्गादावेव इदं जलमिति। प्रतीतिमात्रशरणैर्यावद्बाध

प्रातिभासिकमनिर्वचनीयमेव सलिलाद्यभ्युपेयम् । एवं च सत्यमिथ्याशब्दयोर्लोके भिन्नार्थकता, असति बाधे शङ्काविषादिना मरणमूर्छादिदर्शनं, स्वप्ने देवतानुग्रहादेः फलावाप्तिरित्येवमादीन्यर्थनिमित्तानि कार्याण्युपपद्यन्ते नान्यथेति बहुधा पराक्रान्तमत्र महद्भिः । (Svā Si. tīkā 2-24)

According to the theory of *Anyathākhyāti*, the well-known water or waterness that is elsewhere in the Gaṅgā etc., recalled by memory, is what is seen here in the region in front or in the rays; but, as these (water and waterness) exist elsewhere i.e., in the Gangā etc , the mirage-water illustration in the *śloka* (Svā. Si 2-24) is again inappropriate.

This is now refuted—such a viewpoint would not be reasonable since there is no sense-contact with the water and the waterness and they do not have any connection with the 'this'; and as such they cannot be experienced directly and as connected with the 'this'. Without the pervasion of the mental mode generated by the eye etc , the destruction of the obscuration of the Consciousness delimited by the object of perception, does not ensue; and as such the direct awareness of the object, which is characterised by the identity of the object with the unobscured Consciousness, the Substratum of the object, does not also ensue. Knowledge that is immediate is only that the object of which is presented immediately, and not otherwise; no other criterion that holds in all such cases is found

In the cases of inferences such as 'the hill has fire' where the subject viz., the hill, is directly perceived, the experience of the form 'I see the hill, I infer only the fire' is accepted as direct in the first part and as indirect in the second. Hence even if sense-contact is taken as the criterion of immediacy, water etc., which are not in direct

contact with the senses, cannot be objects of immediate experience. Nor can the immediacy of water be regarded as conditioned by defects, as the defect is not a generic attribute but only an *upādhi*. Only the arising of illusions can be traced to defects and not the immediacy in respect of experience. Further, in the case of an illusion wherein the superimposed is itself a qualified entity such as शृंगिपुरुषवद्भूतलम् (the floor with the horned man on it), in so far as it makes known the delimiting factor of the attribute of the superimposed viz., one's experience of the horned man, though illusory, it would have to be accepted as *pramā*, valid experience, from the viewpoint of the *Anyathākhyāti*. And the defect responsible for it, if assumed as causing direct experience, would be yet another means of valid knowledge like the eye etc. This is because these theories maintain that the extraordinary cause (whatever it be) with which the mind associates itself in giving rise to valid knowledge of an outside entity, is the means, *pramāna*, of that valid knowledge. Again the votaries of *Anyathākhyāti* cannot manage successfully to account for the relation of water etc., with what is in front. This certainly is not that relation of water etc., with the locus etc., in which they abide, as it would not present itself in experience without the presentation of the concerned locus etc. This is because in respect of a relation, its being an object of knowledge as a relation without reference to the entities that are so related, is nowhere in evidence. Nor is it the relation with what is in front, for it is not made known by water etc. If it is maintained that even though not made known, it appears as though made [illegible] by virtue of the defect, then for this superimpositi[illegible] he relation being made to appear as made kno[illegible] [illegible]r etc., one would have to hunt for another r[illegible] with the recurrence of t[illegible]

same difficulty as above as also infinite regress If it is accepted that the relation that is not there appears as though made known by water, then it would be tantamount to entertaining the *Akhyātivāda*, since no other theory of error which takes into account the presentation of relation can be brought in, as the *Anyathākhyātivādin* does not accept the relation of the relation as made known by the related in the compound knowledge like 'This is water' Hence it is that the author of the *Nyāyaṭīkā* has stated that it is the non-existent relation itself that appears. Even this is not reasonable for just like the relation the attribute and the substantive also would have to be non-existents; and as such it would result in *Vijñānavāda*. Moreover here one who experiences a river with unusual arrangement of waves in which a host of nearby trees and bushes are reflected, experiences a wide river with sparkling clear water and is convinced that it was not experienced before; and when questioned, he replies in the same way And when he approaches it later, he experiences its sublation in the manner 'this is not water' and not as 'this water is only in the Gaṅgā etc'.

Hence those who go by what is revealed by knowledge, will have to accept water etc, which defy definition either as real or unreal and yet experienced until after sublation. Great ones have decided after deep consideration of various aspects, that in this manner alone and in no other, become explicable the difference in meaning between the two words *satya* and *mithyā* in parlance, happenings such as death, loss of consciousness etc., that are seen to ensue from suspected poisoning prior to its sublation, securing of the fruit as a result of the grace of god in a dream etc.

The view that error is not non-apprehension, *Akhyāti*, between two objects and the cognitions thereof, but misapprehension of one object as another, termed *Anyathā-khyāti*, is held by the *Naiyāyikas* There is substantial agreement between this and the view termed *Viparītakhyāti* held by the *Bhāṭṭamīmāmsakas* though there are differences in matters of detail. They hold the view that error is the perceptual cognition of an object as other than what it is, *anyathā*, or contrary to what it is, *viparīta*, and erroneous cognition points to an object outside it, also that the objects of erroneous cognition is immediate What is existent alone can be cognised and not what is non-existent. In error there is a wrong synthesis of two objects both of which are existent. Taking the example of shell-silver, both the 'subject' ('this') and the 'predicate' (silver) of the erroneous cognition 'This is silver' are existent, *sat*. What is false—*asat*—is the relation of identity, तादात्म्य, (or संसर्ग as it is sometimes called) between them ('this' and the silver). The sublating cognition through which the error is discovered only shows that there is no silver in front; it does not deny the existence of silver elsewhere.

Neither *Anyathākhyāti* nor *Viparītakhyāti* is tenable as an explanation of error. The theory of ज्ञानलक्षणप्रत्यासत्ति extranormal sense-relation, far from explaining satisfactorily as to how an object that is elsewhere is seen as immediate, leads to the conclusion that since an object that is far away can be seen through extranormal sense-relation, everyone would become omniscient—एव हि न कश्चिदसर्वज्ञो भवेत् (*Sucaritamiśrakārikā* on the *Ślokavārtika* 5-2-114).

Also the sublating cognition 'This is not silver' only falsifies the claim that the silver is in front and is not in the

least concerned with elsewhere and elsewhen (as already shown). Also cognition by its very nature is object-oriented and object-dependent. If a cognition is said to be *anyathā* or *viparīta* on the ground that it reveals the object differently, it is tantamount to saying that the cognition misrepresents the object If this is accepted one can never be certain about the nature of the object cognised nor can anyone have confidence in one's cognition.

Again the sublating cognition 'This is not silver' only purports to deny the presence of silver in front. It is not concerned with the relation of identity between the subject and the predicate It does not say that there is no relation; nor does it say that it is false, *asat*.

The 'this' persists even during the sublating cognition which only confirms that the 'this' is in front as it was seen earlier The correction is not in respect of the 'this' but only with regard to silver which is now denied. In so far as silver does not continue to exist where it was seen at the time of erroneous cognition, it cannot be said to be real in the same sense in which the 'this' is said to be real. In other words the 'subject' and the 'predicate' of the erroneous cognition do not have the same ontological status as postulated by these *Vādins*.

10.3.7 Atmakhyativada of the Yogachara—Refutation

Since the *Anyathākhyātivāda* does not meet the situation, it is suggested that recourse may be had to the *Ātmakhyātivāda*—

ननु तर्ह्यस्तु स्वसंवेद्यत्वादपरोक्षस्वभावविज्ञानपरिणाम एव मृगतृष्णिकादिः । तथा हि—यथाप्रत्ययमेव सर्वत्रार्थसत्तावधारणमित्युत्सर्गो बाधकप्रत्ययबलात् क्वचिदपोद्यते । नेदं सलिलमिति बाधकप्रत्ययस्य चेदन्तामात्रबाधे-

नोपपत्तेर्न सलिलगोचरता। तस्य धर्मिणो बाधे हि धर्मितद्धर्मसलिलत्वं चेत्युभयं बाध्येत। तद्वरमिदन्तैवास्यैका बाध्यत इति कल्पनम्। तथा च तज्जल बहिर्बाधितमर्थादान्तरे विज्ञाने व्यवतिष्ठत इति ज्ञानाकारस्यैव बहिरध्यासः। तथा च न प्रागुक्तदोष इति।

तदप्यसारम्। प्रातिभासिकार्थानां विज्ञानाकारता तदनुभवादुच्येत? उत तद्बाधकप्रत्ययबलात्? न तावदाद्यः। अनुभवो हि इदंकारास्पदं बाह्य जलमित्यावेदयति, नान्तरविज्ञानम्। अहं जलमिति हि तदा स्यात्। भ्रान्तविज्ञानं स्वाकारमेव जलादि बाह्यत्वेनाध्यवस्यति, नाहंत्वेनेति चेत्। न। तर्हि तेन स्वाकारतासिद्धिः। नापि द्वितीयः। नेदं जलमिति प्रत्ययो हि पुरोवर्तिद्रव्यं जलाद्विवेचयति न तु जलस्य ज्ञानाकारतां गोचरयति। अहमेव जलमिति हि तदा स्यात्। पुरोवर्तित्वप्रतिषेधेऽर्थाज्ज्ञानाकारतेति चेत्। सन्निधानप्रतिषेधे ह्यसन्निधान स्यात्। अत्यन्तसन्निधानन्त्वस्य प्रतिपन्नात्मता लक्षणं दूरापास्तम्। न च मानान्तरं विज्ञानाकारताग्राहकमस्ति। किञ्च। यत्तद्विज्ञानाकारे रजते इदमर्थसंवलनं भासते तच्चेद्बाह्यम्? तर्ह्यन्यथाख्यातिः। अथान्तरमेव? तदेदमर्थस्याप्यान्तरत्वप्रसङ्गेन बाह्यार्थाभ्युपगमहानिरिति नात्मख्यातिसिद्धिः।

According to the *Ātmakhyātivāda*, the outside object such as the mirage-water is merely the transformation of the *vijñāna* which, by its very nature, is immediate and self-revealing. That is to say, the general principle is that the existence of an object is determined in accordance with the knowledge pertaining to it, there being an exception only when there is a sublating knowledge. The sublating knowledge 'This is not water' [illegible] understood reasonably as sublating only the 't' i [illegible] ence does not have water as its object, for if wat [illegible] ostantive, is regarded as sublated, it has to be [illegible] at both the substantive and the attribute viz, [illegible] would be sublated. T

is better therefore to postulate that only the 'thisness' is sublated. Thus the water that is sublated outside is perforce to be accepted as situated internally in the *vijñāna*; and as such the outside superimposition is a form of *jñāna* alone. In this manner the defects pointed out in the previous *vādas* do not arise here.

Even this is untenable. It is affirmed that an object regarded as seen outside is only a form of *vijñāna*. Now, is it based on the experience pertaining to it or to its sublation? Not on the first, for the experience points to water outside offering incidence to 'thisness', and does not point to the *vijñāna* inside, for then it would have to be of the form 'I am water'. If it is said that the illusory *vijñāna* presents its own form, the water, as if outside and not as 'I am water', it cannot be, for in that case by the experience 'this is water', it is not established that water is a form of *vijñāna*. Nor on the second viz, the experience pertaining to its sublation The experience 'this is not water' distinguishes the substance in front from water, and does not show that water is a form of *vijñāna*, in which case it should have been of the form 'I am water'. If it is said that from the denial of existence of water in front, follows that water is of the form of *vijñāna* that is inside, it is pointed out that verily the denial of nearness would amount to remoteness This rejection of nearness would naturally exclude the very limit of nearness viz, oneself, the *vijñāna* Nor is there any other *pramāna* which reveals that the water is of the form of *vijñāna* Again if it is said that the relation of the 'thisness' that appears in the silver that is of the form of *vijñāna* is outside, that would tantamount to *Anyathākhyāti*. If it is said that the relation is inside alone, then there arises the contingency

of what is denoted by 'this' also being inside and this amounts to the rejection of the accepted existence of outside entities Thus the *Ātmakhyātivāda* cannot be sustained. It may be added that the *Ātmakhyātivāda* stands automatically refuted by the refutation of the *Vijñānavādin's* view that objects are none other than the cognitions themselves.

10.3.8 Asatkhyativada of the Sunyavadin—Refutation

In this situation the *Śūnyavādin* among the Buddhists puts forward his point of view, the *Asatkhyātivāda*, as the way out—

अस्तु तर्ह्यसत्ख्यातिरेव । आन्तरस्य विज्ञानस्यासद्बाह्यार्थप्रकाशनशक्तिरेवादृष्टान्तसिद्धस्वप्रत्ययसामर्थ्यासादितस्वभावोऽविद्येत्यभ्युपगमादिति चेत् । न । येयमसत्प्रकाशनशक्तिः, किं पुनरस्याः शक्यम् ? असदिति चेत् । किमस्याः कार्यम् ? उत ज्ञाप्यम् ? नाद्यः । असत उत्पत्त्ययोगान्निरात्मकस्य आत्मलाभोक्तिव्याघातात् । नापि द्वितीयः । ज्ञानान्तरानुपलब्धेरनवस्थापाताच्च । नोभयमपि । सदसतोः संबन्धायोगात् । असदधीननिरूपणत्वं प्रत्यये तत्संबन्ध इति चेत् । न । तेनाऽनाहितातिशयस्य तदधीनत्वोक्त्ययोगात् । अतिशयाधायकत्वे चासत्त्वव्याघातात् । अर्थक्रियाकारित्वस्यैव त्वन्मते सत्त्वात् । असदन्तरेणाप्रथमानता प्रत्ययस्यैव स्वभावो, न त्वसता किञ्चित्क्रियत इति चेत् । त्वैनैव हेतु प्रत्ययस्यासत्पक्षपातोक्तेरुपहासास्पदत्वात् । न च प्रत्ययेनासति किञ्चिदाधीयते । तस्याधारत्वायोगादिति नात्यन्तासतः प्रतिभाससिद्धिः ।

According to the *Asatkhyātivādin*, though the external objects of experience are non-existent, the cognitions, through the capacity inherent in them as cognitions, by themselves give rise to the appearance of the non-existent. And this unique capacity of cognitions to make the non-existent appear as an existent is Avidyā. This is now refuted.

Here it is questioned as to what this capacity of cognition which makes the non-existent appear, relates itself to. If to the non-existent, is this non-existent produced or only made known by this capacity of cognition? It cannot be the produced since that is unintelligible in the case of the non-existent. Nor is it what is made known since no other cognition is known other than that which makes manifest. There is no second cognition in evidence to certify such a revelation on the part of the first cognition; if it is there, then what is thus revealed being non-existent, and requiring its relation to the new cognition to be explained, infinite regress would result. Nor can it be said that it is both viz, that it is the very essence of cognition to produce as well as manifest the non-existent, for there can be no relation between an existent and a non-existent It cannot be said that the relation of cognition which is existent, to that which is non-existent is that the former is determined as being under the control of what is non-existent, for, the non-existent cannot bring about any speciality in the cognition which, therefore, cannot be under the control of the non-existent. If it does bring about any speciality, then its non-existence is contradicted since according to the *Asatkhyātivādin*, practical efficiency is the criterion of existence. If it is said that it is the very nature of cognition not to appear apart from the non-existent and that nothing whatever is brought about by the non-existent, then it would be ridiculous since without any cause the cognition would have to be partial to what does not exist. Nor can it be said that cognition causes something to abide in the non-existent as its support, for what is non-existent cannot be the support of anything. Hence absolute non-existent cannot be an object of experience.

10.3.9 Sadasatkhyativada—Refutation—Anirvachaniyakhyativada of Vedanta

Thus the *Akhyātıvāda*, *Satkhyātıvādas* viz—*Anyathākhyātivāda* and *Ātmakhyātıvāda*, as also the *Asatkhyātıvāda*, all stand refuted, whereby it is clear that what appears in an erroneous cognition cannot be considered to be an existent, nor can it be a non-existent. In this situation the viewpoint is put forward, in the manner of the *Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsakas*, that its essence is twofold, existence-cum-non-existence—

ननु तर्ह्यस्तु सदसदात्मकमेव सर्वं वस्तु । सत्त्व तु स्वतः । असत्त्वं तु तस्य परतः । यथाहुः—

'स्वरूपपररूपाभ्यां नित्यं सदसदात्मके ।
वस्तुनि ज्ञायते किञ्चिद्रूप कैश्चित्कदाचन ॥' इति ।

न च विरोधः । भावस्यासत्त्वं भावान्तरस्वरूपमेवेत्यभ्युपगमात् । यथाहुः—

'भावान्तरमभावोऽन्यो न कश्चिदनिरूपणात् ॥' इति ।

तथा च मरीचिकोदकप्रत्ययस्य सदसदात्मकवस्तुगोचरत्वान्न मिथ्यार्थावगाहितेति दृष्टान्तासिद्धिरेवेति चेत् । तर्हि किं मरीचिषु तोयप्रत्ययस्तत्त्वगोचरः ? तथा सति न विपर्ययः स्यात्, नापि बाध्येत । स्यादेव यदि मरीचीनतोयात्मकांस्तथैव गृह्णीयात् । तोयात्मना तु गृह्णन् कथमविपर्ययः स्यात्, अबाध्यो वेति चेत् । हन्त तर्हि तोयाभावात्मनां मरीचीनां तोयात्मता न सती । अभावस्य प्रतियोग्यभेदायोगात् । नाप्यसती । वस्त्वन्तरात्मनैवासत्त्वस्य त्वया वाच्यत्वेन तादृशवस्त्वनिरूपणात् । द्वयोर्हि वस्तुनोरिह प्रसक्तिर्गङ्गादितोयस्य मरीचीनां च । न तावदाद्यात्मना । गङ्गाया तोयमिति प्रत्ययापत्तेः । गङ्गादिगतत्वानुपस्थितौ तोयमित्येव प्रतिभासापत्तेः । तदात्मना असत्त्वे तद्भिन्नत्वापत्तेश्च । नापि द्वितीयात्मना । मरीचय इत्येव प्रतिभासापत्तेः । तोयमित्यनापत्तेः । सन्मरीच्यात्मना असत्त्वव्याघाताच्च । मरीचीनामप्यन्यात्मना असत्त्वान्न व्याघात इति चेत् । तर्हि यदात्मना मरीचीनामसत्त्वं तोयात्मताया अपि तदात्मनैवासत्त्वं स्यान्न मरीच्यात्मना । वस्तुतस्तु मरीचीनामपि नासत्त्वसिद्धिः ।

व्याघातसाम्यादनवस्थानाच्च । नाप्यत्यन्ततुच्छा । अनुभवगोचरत्वायोगात् । इत्थ चेय न सती, नासती, नापि सदसती इत्यनिर्वचनीयैव मिथ्याऽपरपर्याया अधिष्ठानमात्रसत्त्वाधीनप्रतिभासा मरुमरीचिका नदी सिध्यतीति निरूढो दृष्टान्त इति भाव: ।

According to the *Bhāṭṭamīmāmsakas*, the essence of all entities is twofold, existence-cum-non-existence, existence in their own form and non-existence in respect of things other than themselves Thus is said—

'The essence of things is grasped by some at some time or other, either as existence in relation to those things themselves or as non-existence in relation to others. There is no contradiction here, since it is accepted that the so-called non-existence as pertaining to an existent, is nothing but the non-existence in it of the essence of an entity other than itself'. Hence it is said—

'Non-existence is existence in another form, and not anything else, since no such thing as non-existence other than this can be established'.

Thus here also the cognition of the mirage-water has as its object an entity whose essence is existence-cum-non-existence; and as such not an illusory entity; and thus the mirage-water illustration given in the *śloka* (Svā Si. 2-24) is untenable.

This objector is now asked—Does the cognition of water in the rays pertain to reality? If so, then being valid it would not be an illusion, nor would it be sublated If it is asked in return—it could have been so if the rays which are not of the essence of water were apprehended as they are, but when apprehended, however, as of the essence of water, how can it be non-delusive or unsublatable? Lo! then (it is

replied)—of the rays whose essence is non-waterness, the essence as waterness is not existence, since non-existence can never be identical with its counter-positive. Nor is it non-existence since the non-existence as pertaining to one thing is asserted by you only as the essence of another thing In this context of the illustration of the mirage-water, are relevant two things—the water of the Gangā etc., and the rays. It cannot be the first alternative of the mirage-water being of the essence of the water in the Gangā, since the cognition then would have to be of the form 'water in the Gangā'. Or if the water is not recollected as 'in the Gaṇgā', it should have been merely of the form 'water'. If its essence were non-existent as water, it should be different from water. Nor can it be the second alternative of the mirage-water being of the essence of the rays—for then the apprehension would have to be in the form 'rays'; and in this case of being of the essence of the rays that are existent (and not of the essence of water that is non-existent), it would be verily an existent alone, and its non-existence aspect would no longer be in evidence. Thus your assertion that it is of the essence of existence-cum-non-existence would be self-contradictory. But if it is asserted that there is no contradiction since the rays too are non-existent as the essence of another thing, then let the water too be non-existent as the essence of that other thing alone, and not as the essence of the rays But the fact of the situation is that the non-existence aspect of even the rays (as the essence of something else pertinent in this context) is not established. Thus there would be self-contradiction as before leading to infinite regress.

Nor is it an non-existence in which case it would not be expe all.

Thus also it becomes established that this mirage-river is neither existent nor non-existent and not even existent-cum-non-existent, and as such it is verily indeterminable; or otherwise termed 'illusory', merely an appearance superimposed on the substratum that is real. Hence it is that the illustration is quite valid.

10.3.10 Sri Sri Acharyapada's Definition of Adhyasa—Free from all the Defects of the other Thirty Schools

What has been outlined so far pertains to the five theories of error usually spoken of: *Ātmakhyāti*, *Akhyāti* and *Anyathākhyāti* are brought under *Satkhyāti* The *Asatkhyāti* of the *Mādhyamikas* forms a class by itself. As distinguished from these four theories there is the *Anirvacanīyokhyāti*—

आत्मख्यातिरसत्ख्यातिरख्यातिर्ख्यातिरन्यथा ।
तथाऽनिर्वचनख्यातिरित्येतत् ख्यातिपञ्चकम् ॥

As has been shown, the *Advaita* theory of *Anirvacanīya-khyāti* alone stands, all others being refuted. The theories of the *Bhāṭṭas*, the *Viśiṣṭādvaitins*, and the *Dvaitavedāntins* are not reckoned separately as they are only variations of the other theories.

The *Vārtika* by Śrī Nārāyaṇasarasvatī on the *Sūtra-bhāṣya*—स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः—shows that this definition of superimposition wards off the difficulties that arise in the other theories as also in the possible variations thereof—

पूर्वोक्तमेवाध्यासलक्षणं भङ्ग्यन्तरेण व्याचष्टे—'उच्यते, स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः' इति । . . . कथमिति चेत्, तत्राह—यतः स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः 'सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य' इत्यनेनाभिधीयत इति लक्षणवाक्ययोजना । संप्रति पदानि विभज्य तदर्थः कथ्यते । परत्र=शुक्तिकादौ । पूर्वदृष्टस्य=रजतादेः । अवभासः=आभास इति यावत् । . . .

तेन पूर्वदृष्टसजातीयं रजतादि पूर्वदृष्टावभासपदेनोच्यते। तस्य विशेपणम्—'स्मृतिरूपः' इति। स्मृतिरिति संस्कारजन्यत्वसादृश्यादनिर्वचनीयरजताद्याकाराविद्यावृत्तिरूपात्तेति ब्रूमः। ...तेन स्मृत्याऽविद्यावृत्त्या रूप्यते निरूप्यते विपयीक्रियत इति यावत्, य एवं स स्मृतिरूप इत्यर्थः। अवभास इत्येतावत्युक्ते शून्यमेव निरधिष्ठान रजतादिरूपेण भासत इति शून्यवादी मन्यते, तत्र मा भूदतिव्याप्तिरिति परत्रेत्युक्तम्, सत्य इत्यर्थः; मिथ्यावस्त्वपेक्षया सत्यस्य परत्वान्निरधिष्ठानभ्रमादर्शनात् सत्त्वेनापरोक्षतया च प्रथानुपपत्तेश्च सत्याधिष्ठानं वाच्यमित्यभिप्रायः। 'परत्रावभासः' इत्युक्तेऽन्तरेव ज्ञाने वहिष्ट्वारोप इति मन्यते, तत्र मा भूदतिव्याप्तिरिति पूर्वदृष्टेत्युक्तम्। वहिष्ट्वस्य तुच्छत्वाभ्युपगमाद्विज्ञानातिरिक्तवहिःपदार्थानभ्युपगमाच्च न पूर्वदृष्टजातीयत्वमस्तीत्यभिप्रायः। न च पूर्वपदवैयर्थ्यम्; तदन्तरेणातिव्याप्त्यपरिहारात्। विज्ञानवादिभिरपि स्वप्रकाशतया दृष्टस्य ज्ञानस्यावभासत्वेन वहिष्ट्वाङ्गीकारात्, पूर्वपदोपादाने च तज्ज्ञानव्यक्तेः पूर्वदृष्टत्वाभावान्नायं दोपः। यद्यपि तैरपि तत्सन्ताने रजतज्ञानोत्पादे पूर्वदृष्टरजतज्ञानान्तरं वासनात्वेनाङ्गीक्रियते, तथापि न तदाभासत्वेन वहिष्ट्वमङ्गीक्रियते, किन्तु विद्यमानज्ञानाभासत्वेनेति नातिव्याप्तिः; तन्मतस्यानुभवविरुद्धत्वेनापास्तत्वादित्याशयः। 'परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः' इत्युक्ते ज्ञानाध्यासेऽव्याप्तिः स्यात् तन्मा भूदिति—'स्मृतिरूप' इति। 'स्मृतिरूपः' इत्युक्ते पुनः शून्यवादिमतेऽतिव्याप्तिरित्यत उक्तम्—परत्रेति॥ 'परत्र स्मृतिरूपः' इत्युक्ते तद्भासकसाक्षिण्यतिव्याप्तिः; तस्यापि तथानिरूपणात् अत उक्तम्—'पूर्वदृष्टावभासः' इति। 'स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टः' इत्युक्तेऽन्यथाख्यातावख्यातौ चातिव्याप्तिः स्यात्, परत्र पूर्वदृष्टस्य देशान्तरीयस्य भ्रान्त्या निरूप्यमाणस्यान्यथाख्यातिवादिभिरङ्गीकारात्, अख्यातिवादिभिरपि भ्रान्तिरूपव्यवहारेण तन्निरूप्यमाणत्वस्याङ्गीकारात्, अत उक्तम्—'अवभासः' इति। तदुभयमतासंभवस्य पूर्वमेवोक्तत्वादित्याशयः। 'स्मृतिरूपः परत्रावभासः' इत्युक्ते सौत्रान्तिकमते स्वलक्षणे विकल्पशब्दितसामान्यादावतिव्याप्तिः, अत उक्तम्

—पूर्वदृष्टेति। तै· सामान्यादेः पूर्वदृष्टस्याभासत्वानङ्गीकरणात् तत्र नातिव्याप्तिः; सामान्यादेरनाभासत्वात् तद्विषयविकल्पप्रत्ययस्याबाधितत्वेनाभ्रान्तिरूपत्वात्, अग्रे तन्मतस्याविरोधलक्षणे निराकरिष्यमाणत्वादित्याशयः। किं बहुना?

त्रिंशत्कोटीर्व्युदस्यैकत्रिंशत्कोटीं स्वलक्षणाम्।
जग्राह भगवान् भाष्यकारो वेदस्य सम्मताम्॥

पञ्चभिः पदैर्व्यावर्त्य त्रिंशत्कोटीर्हित्वा तत्सङ्ग्राह्यामेकत्रिंशत्तमां कोटीं वेदतदनुयायिस्मृत्येकसम्मतां स्वकीयाध्यासलक्षणत्वेन भाष्यकारो गृहीतवान्। कथमिति चेत्, तदुच्यते—पञ्चभिः पदैः प्रत्येकं सङ्गृहीतानि पञ्च लक्षणानि—स्मृतिरूपः, परत्र, पूर्वः, दृष्टः, अवभासश्चेति पञ्च। द्वाभ्यां द्वाभ्यां च पदाभ्यां दश लक्षणानि।.. ....तथा द्वे द्वे पदे ध्रुवे कृत्वैकैकेन पदेन संयोजनीये .. . त्रिभिस्त्रिभिः पदैर्दश लक्षणानि। तथा त्रीणि त्रीणि पदानि ध्रुवाणि कृत्वा एकैकेन पदेन संयोजनीयानि चतुर्भिश्चतुर्भिः पञ्च लक्षणानि। तान्येतान्येक–द्वि–त्रि–चतुः पदैः सङ्गृहीतानि मिलित्वा त्रिंशल्लक्षणानि भवन्ति। एतेषां तु यथासंभवमव्याप्त्यतिव्याप्त्यसंभवैर्दुष्टत्वात् हित्वैतानि, पञ्चभि. पदैरुक्तदोषरहितमेकत्रिंशत्तमं स्वाभिमताध्यासलक्षण सङ्गृहीतं भवति।

The definition of *adhyāsa* given previously as सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य mixing up of the real and the unreal—is commented upon by the *Bhāsya* itself, rendering it more explicit in the words स्मृतिरूप परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः 'the apparent presentation in the form of remembrance to consciousness, of something previously observed in some other thing'. It is thus—परत्र= in some other thing e g , in the shell etc , पूर्वदृष्टस्य=of the previously observed thing e g., silver etc., अवभासः=आभासः i e., the apparent presentation which is nothing but false appearance. Thus the phrase 'the apparent presentation of something previously observed' is used to convey the idea

that what is now presented, silver etc., is of the same kind as that which had been observed previously. This 'apparent presentation' is qualified by 'in the form of remembrance'. The word 'remembrance' is employed here secondarily to convey a mode of Avidyā like the one having for its content the *anirvacanīya* silver etc., in view of its similarity in so far as it is generated by the residual impression. Thus *smṛtirūpaḥ* means that which is 'revealed' by this *avidyā-vṛtti*. If it were characterised only as *avabhāsaḥ* it might mean that mere void without any substratum appears in the form of silver etc., which would result in overpervasion into *Śūnyavāda*. To avoid this the word *paratra* is employed meaning 'in some other thing' which is an existent as differentiated from what is *mithyā*; and an illusion without a substratum is nowhere in evidence. And since the experience of the illusory 'object' as an existent and immediate cannot be accounted for otherwise, an existent must be accepted as the substratum. To avoid the possibility of interpreting *paratrāvabhāsaḥ* meaning 'appearance in some other thing' as superimposition of externality on the consciousness that is verily internal, the word *pūrvadṛṣṭa* is used. The *Vijñāna-vādin* asserts that there is no such thing like externality and denies the existence of external objects; and as such they do not fall under the category of *pūrvadṛṣṭa*. Also the word *pūrva* is not useless, for without it the overpervasion into the *Vijñānavāda* is not avoided. The *Vijñānavādin* accepts that *vijñāna*, the knowledge that is experienced as self-effulgent, falsely appears as external objects and this *vijñāna* was not previously experienced. Hence the use of the word *pūrva* is justified. When the *jñāna* of silver comes up in the series of *vijñāna* individuals, he too accepts in the form of residual impression, another *jñāna* with its content as the silver seen

previously; yet he accepts the appearance, as outside, of only the present *jñāna*, and not of the *jñāna* of silver seen previously; hence there is no overpervasion The import is that this system is rejected, as it is contrary to experience.

The phrase *paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ* which applies to the case of *arthādhyāsa* i.e., the object-superimposition, would not be pervasive enough to include the case of the corresponding *jñānādhyāsa* i e., knowledge-superimposition. To avoid this, the word *smṛtirūpaḥ* is brought in. Just the word *smṛtirūpaḥ* would again result in overpervasion into the *Śūnyavāda* to avoid which the word *paratra* is brought in. *Paratra smṛtirūpah* would result in overpervasion into what reveals this *avidyāvṛtti* viz., the *Sākṣī*, which though transcending the *vṛtti*, is nevertheless indicated by it.

It is therefore that the phrase *pūrvādṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ* is used Mention only of the phrase *smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrva-dṛṣṭah* would result in overpervasion into *Anyathākhyāti* and *Akhyāti* since the *Anyathākhyātivādins* accept that the content of illusory knowledge is what was previously seen elsewhere, and the *Akhyātivādins* who regard it as memory, also accept this in respect of parlance pertaining to the so-called illusory experience. To avoid this, the word *avabhāsah* is used. The untenability of both these *vādas* has since been mentioned.

Just the phrase *smṛtirūpaḥ paratrāvabhāsaḥ* would result in overpervasion into the *svalakṣaṇa* (i e., just that particular entity which is momentary) of the *Sautrāntikas* as also into *sāmānya*, the 'universal' etc., spoken of as *vikalpa*; hence *pūrvadṛṣṭaḥ* is added on which avoids this overpervasion. They do not accept that the *sāmānya* etc., known previously is illusory as the knowledge pertaining to them is not sublated. Subsequently, however, in the *Avirodhādhyāya* of the *Brahma-*

sūtra (2-2) and the *Bhāṣya* thereon, these theories are being refuted. Why talk more! The definition of *adhyāsa* contains the five words *smṛtirūpaḥ*, *paratra*, *pūrva*, *dṛṣṭa* and *avabhāsaḥ*. The definitions given by the various other schools are seen to be among the thirty definitions that can be formulated employing the above five words in different ways—each word by itself thus giving five definitions; pairing two words at a time giving ten; combining three words at a time giving ten and finally, combining four words at a time giving five. Each one of these is vitiated by one or the other of the defects of underpervasion, overpervasion and total inapplicability. As such rejecting all these, Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda gives His definition other than these thirty by using all the five words, which definition is free from all these defects and is in accordance with Śruti, and the *Smṛtis* based on it.

10.3.11 Examples of Adhyasa

The discussion so far in respect of illusions has been illustrated mainly with reference to what are usually spoken of as perceptual illusions such as the mirage-water and shell-silver. Besides these two, there is a host of other illusions, for example, the rope-snake, a pillar mistaken for a man, the blue of the sky, दिङ्मोहः i.e., mistaking of direction, गन्धर्वनगरः i.e., appearance like a city seen in the sky, तिक्तगुडः i.e., bitterness in the jaggery, केशोण्डुकः i.e., appearance like a cluster of hair seen in the sky, द्विचन्द्रः i.e., double Moon, प्रतिबिम्बः i.e., reflection in a mirror etc., and refraction such as a stick seen as bent in water, पीतः शङ्खः i.e., yellowness of a conch, स्फटिकरक्तिमा i.e., redness in a crystal, अलातचक्रः i.e., a circle of fire due to the whirling of a firebrand, backward motion of the trees etc., as seen from a moving boat, the illusion that the tenth person in a group of ten is missing as

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a result of not counting oneself, the small size of the Sun and the Moon, rainbow, colour-illusion and distant objects perceived as close by. Some other illusions are dreams, hallucinations, कामिनीसाक्षात्कार: i.e., the perception of the semblance of the beloved who is far away. In addition there are illusions in respect of ideas, opinions, beliefs, convictions, faiths etc., which are by far the most massive and stubborn 'facts' that constitute the mainspring of all action.

10.3.12 Delineation of Adhyasa—Classification; Defects and Other Factors Involved

These are, for purposes of discussion, classified variously as परोक्षभ्रम and अपरोक्षभ्रम i e , mediate and immediate illusions, सोपाधिकभ्रम and निरुपाधिकभ्रम i e., illusions conditioned by *upādhi* and those not conditioned by any *upādhi* etc. So also are the factors as also the defects believed to be causes of these illusions, put variously—सादृश्यज्ञान i.e., the knowledge of similarity, desire, grief, hunger, aversion, drowsiness, worry, imbalance of the bodily humours, fate, defect in the sensory organs, dim light etc. By incorporating these into their theories, the illusions are sought to be 'explained' by each school, accommodating them suitably into its metaphysical set-up. Here, as elsewhere, opposing formulations, as conditioned by their theories of the world, by the various schools, are seen. Every other school tries to accommodate the explanation of illusion and its sublation in its own way, which is far from satisfactory, as has been seen.

The *Vedānta*, however, points out that this is because of not taking cognisance of a significant factor in the situation. The sublating cognition means the cancellation of the illusion i.e , the seeming experience, and for this to happen, it should have arisen in the same locus as that of the sublating

cognition. Also if the prior experience were in the form 'this is shell', then the erroneous cognition of the form 'this is silver' would never have arisen. This shows that a concealment of the shell is necessary for the erroneous cognition as 'silver' to arise. In other words, this concealment of the shell and the consequent projection of 'silver', आवरण and विक्षेप, are to be traced to something; that is the ignorance pertaining to the shell —शुक्तिप्रकारिकाऽविद्या. Avidyā which is only another word for *ajñāna* implies, like *jñāna*, some person to whom it belongs, *āśraya*, and some object to which it refers, *viṣaya*. In the present case the person that mistakes the shell for silver is its *āśraya* and the shell, its object, *viṣaya*. It is this Avidyā that is described as the source of error. As the cause of both concealment and projection, this Avidyā should be deemed to be not mere absence of knowledge, but as something 'positive'—भावरूपा This Avidyā as also what it gives rise to viz., concealment and projection, is removed only by valid knowledge 'this is shell'—इयं शुक्तिः. An insight into the nature of this illusion is gained by taking one's stand on the concerned experiences First of all one has the 'experience'—'this is silver'. All activity seen then, stems from this knowledge which is believed to be valid till the sublating experience arises. The sublating experience has the form 'this is not silver' which is regarded indubitably as valid knowledge whereby the error involved in having regarded the earlier experience as valid, becomes recognised. Obviously, the earlier 'experience' pertains to the silver which has been superimposed, आरोपित, on the shell which is the substratum i.e., the *adhiṣṭhāna*. Also the relation, संसर्ग, between the superimposed and the substratrum, which is also a superimposition, must necessarily get sublated along with the silver; so does the knowledge

'this is silver' get sublated Thus, in an illusion, these factors viz., a substratum, its concealment, the superimposed, its relation with the substratum, the erroneous cognition and the sublating cognition are the ones which are universally accepted by all *vādins*, though in respect of what each of these is specifically, there are differences of opinion due to their adherence to their cherished theories. That is why the *Adhyāsabhāsya* already quoted, after mentioning the other schools says—सर्वथापि त्वन्यस्यान्यधर्मावभासता न व्यभिचरति. It is also pointed out that this accords with the common experience in the world, by citing examples शुक्तिका हि रजतवदवभासते and एकश्चन्द्रः सद्वितीयवत्. The examples cited show that, in an illusion, it is the substratum that is 'experienced' to be otherwise; it is the shell itself that is 'seen' as silver. Obviously, if there were no experience at all of the substratum (the shell) in any form, there would have been no illusion like 'this is silver', nor would there be this illusion if the valid knowledge in the form 'this is shell' were there. This latter would be produced by the sense contact with the shell. Evidently, therefore, for an illusion to arise, the substratum must be known in a general way as e.g., 'this', while its particular features e.g., the shellness etc, are concealed i.e., there must be the अधिष्ठानसामान्यज्ञान as e.g., *idam* 'this', not the विशेषज्ञान as e.g, शुक्ति, the shell. The *idam*-aspect, which is not concealed is termed the support, आधार (*ādhāra*), and the shell which is not revealed is called the substratum, अधिष्ठान (*adhiṣṭhāna*). The 'thisness' is experienced to persist during illusion as also after sublation, which experience must therefore be traced to the usual channels of valid knowledge like the sense organs, the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* and the *pramātṛ*. However, the Avidyā pertaining to the shell—शुक्तिप्रकारिकाऽविद्या—is not removed in its entirety, as the shellness etc., are

not revealed. Going by the shell-silver illustration, one may entertain the idea that in all cases of illusion, the substratum is revealed by sense perception, 'सर्वो हि पुरोऽवस्थित एव विषये विषयान्तरमध्यस्यति', as pointed out in the *Adhyāsabhāṣya*. That this need not always be the case is also emphasized in the same *Bhāṣya* by citing the example of the illusion of the blueness etc., of the sky, where the sky, the substratum, is not revealed by sense perception; all that is necessary is that the substratum must be well known—

न चायमस्ति नियमः पुरोऽवस्थित एव विषये विषयान्तरमध्यसितव्यमिति। अप्रत्यक्षेऽपि ह्याकाशे बालास्तलमलिनताद्यध्यस्यन्ति।

The Substratum which apparently is to be regarded as offering incidence to the superimposition is not in the least affected by the merits or the defects of the superimposed, as the *Adhyāsabhāṣya* says—

तत्रैवं सति यत्र यदध्यासस्तत्कृतेन दोषेण गुणेन वाऽणुमात्रेणापि स न संबध्यते। The superimposed, आरोपित, may now be considered. In the example under consideration, what is superimposed viz , silver, is made 'known' in the experience 'this is silver'. If this silver were non-existent, it would not be cognised, असच्चेन्न प्रतीयेत; thus it cannot be non-existent. This 'experience' is believed to be valid until after the sublating cognition, 'this is not silver'. If this silver were an existent, it would not be sublated, सच्चेन्न बाध्येत; thus it cannot be an existent. Thus it is neither an existent, सत्, nor a non-existent, असत्, nor can it be said to be existent-cum-non-existent, सदसत्. It is different from any of these categories of existence and non-existence, सदसद्विलक्षण; it is therefore styled *anirvacanīya* or *durnirūpa*. What is experienced in it is that the silver is 'seen'; and this fact of knowing an object as p [illegible] there is not explained, but is rather

explained away in other theories of illusion. It has been shown that the *Satkhyātivādins* like the *Bhāṭṭas*, the *Naiyāyikas*, the *Prābhākaras* and the *Yogācāras*, and the *Asatkhyātivādins* like the *Mādhyamika* Buddhists refute each other by their mutually contradictory arguments as pointed out by the *Istasiddhi* (p-47) — ख्यातेर्नासत्, बाधान्न सदित्यन्योन्यपक्षं निराकुर्वद्भिर्वादिभिरेव रूप्यस्यानिर्वचनीयत्वं स्थापितम् ।

And between themselves they establish the indefinability, *anirvacanīyatva*, of the illusory silver. If the silver, as it appears is real, then it would not be an illusion and there would be no sublation; if unreal, there is no question of its appearing even in illusion nor of its sublation Says the *Iṣṭasiddhi* (9)—सत्त्वे न भ्रान्तिबाधौ स्ता नासत्त्वे ख्यातिबाधकौ । Error thus points to a thing which is precisely like what it appears, but is yet not characterisable as either 'is' or 'is not'; and belongs to a category different from the categories of existence and non-existence So then, this appearance of existence and subsequent lapse into non-existence on sublation, must be accepted as a fourth mode—as different from existence, non-existence and existence-cum-non-existence—as otherwise there cannot be any acceptance of illusion and its sublation. Indefinability is not the incapacity for explanation. It emphasises the uniqueness of the illusory. While the other theorists try to fit in the phenomenon of illusion into their own categories and formal set-up, and analyse it on the basis of experience to explain away illusion and thus fail, the *anirvacanīyavāda* recognises the challenging element in the illusory situation not to be reduced to its experiential components viz., the existent silver or the non-existent silver. One is forced to conclude that the objects of error are of a type which is ontologically different from that of the common

objects. The distinction between illusion and ordinary knowledge is not accordingly due to the absence and presense respectively of an object outside corresponding to its content, but to the difference in the character of the object that is pointed to in either. The *pramāṇa* for such a conclusion is *arthāpatti*, presumption i.e., when one is face to face with a situation which contradicts a well-established view, one does not, all at once, revise that view, but endeavours to harmonise the new situation with it by means of a suitable hypothesis. The illusory situation cannot be otherwise intelligible if it is not assumed that it is indefinable, as the *Nyāyamakaranda* (p 116) says—

तदिहोभयान्यथानुपपत्त्या उभयविलक्षणता रजतादेराश्रियते ।

The objects of illusion, being experienced only by the person subject to it, are private or personal to him; nevertheless, they are not mental. Also, unlike the objects of ordinary experience, they come to exist as one apprehends them and cease to be when his apprehension of them ceases—यावत्प्रतिभासमवतिष्ठते. That is why they come to be called *prātibhāsika*, apparent, in contrast to the objects of parlance which are termed *vyāvahārika*, empirical. When a person is seeing silver where there is only shell, he is certainly convinced that the silver is there very much real, वास्तव i.e., as real as any other object of parlance. But when the 'silver' is sublated by the knowledge 'this is not silver', he discovers not only that he was in error, but also that the 'silver' neither was nor is nor will be there at any time, नासीन्नास्ति न भविष्यति i.e., the empirically real silver was never there, तुच्छा. Any attempt to understand the nature of the apparent silver by enquiry will end up only in its indefinability, अनिर्वचनीयता. Thus looked at from the three different

standpoints—of reality of parlance, of enquiry and of the one under the spell of illusion—it is seen that the statement in the *Pañcadaśī* (VI-130) तुच्छानिर्वचनीया च वास्तवी चेत्यसौ त्रिधा is exemplified in an illusion.

As has been seen, erroneous knowledge implies a ground, *ādhāra*, which is not contradicted afterwards. It is on this ground that an *anirvacanīya* object is superimposed The relation between the ground and the superimposed object, or the 'subject' and the 'predicate', in an erroneous judgement, also is *durnirūpa*, obtaining as it is between the relata whose ontological status are different.

On the principle that the nature of knowledge is like unto the nature of its object, it is impossible that the knowledge can be real when its object is not so, for the relation between the two is organic and there can be no such relation between things that are not real in the same sense. So, erroneous knowledge is as much an illusory appearance as its object In fact, it is not knowledge at all but only a semblance of it—*jñānābhāsa*.

10.3.13 Process of Appearance of the Illusory

The Vedāntin explains the process of the appearance of the illusory silver in this manner—First, there is sense-contact with what is in front viz , the shell But, since the sense organ, the eye, which cognises it is affected by disease such as *kāca*, the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* generated thereby has for its content 'thisness' and the form of glitter, but not the specific nature of the shell. Then there is the manifestation of Consciousness in the 'thisness' and in the *vṛtti* that cognises it. That being the case, as explained earlier, because of the outgoing of the *vṛtti*, the Consciousness defined by the 'this'-

aspect, the Consciousness defined by the *vṛtti* and the cogniser-defined Consciousness become non-different. The Avidyā present in that Consciousness is agitated because of the defect. Then owing to this defect-prompted agitation, the Avidyā present in the Consciousness defined by the 'this'-element is transformed in the form of silver as a result of association with the residual impression of silver which is called up by the sight of similarity in respect of glitter. Even as this Avidyā present in the Consciousness defined by the 'this'-element is transformed in the form of silver, the Avidyā present in the Consciousness defined by this *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* is transformed as an *avidyāvṛtti*, being associated with the residual impression of the previous cognition of silver. And that which manifests both of them viz., the transformation into silver and the transformation into the *avidyāvṛtti*, is their common substrate viz., the Witness-consciousness. Thus there is the presentation of silver. Says the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*—

न हि लोकसिद्धसामग्री प्रातिभासिकरजतोत्पादिका, किन्तु विलक्षणैव। तथा हि—काचादिदोषदूषितलोचनस्य पुरोवर्तिद्रव्यसंयोगात्, इदमाकारा चाकचिक्याकारा च काचिदन्तःकरणवृत्तिरुदेति। तस्यां च वृत्ताविदमंशावच्छिन्नं चैतन्यं प्रतिबिम्बते। तत्र पूर्वोक्तरीत्या वृत्तेर्बहिर्निर्गमनेनेदमंशावच्छिन्नचैतन्यं वृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्य प्रमातृचैतन्यं चाभिन्न भवति। ततश्च प्रमातृचैतन्याभिन्नविषयचैतन्यनिष्ठा शुक्तित्वप्रकारिकाऽविद्या चाकचिक्यादिसादृश्यसंदर्शनसमुद्बोधितरजतसंस्कारसध्रीचीना काचादिदोषसमवहिता रजतरूपार्थाकारेण रजतज्ञानाभासाकारेण च परिणमते।... प्रातिभासिकं रजतं चाऽविद्यापेक्षया परिणामः। चैतन्यापेक्षया विवर्त इत्युच्यते। अविद्यापरिणामरूपं च तद्रजतमविद्याधिष्ठान इदमवच्छिन्नचैतन्ये वर्तते। अस्मन्मते सर्वस्यापि कार्यस्य स्वोपादानाविद्याधिष्ठानाश्रितत्वनियमात्।... तस्य च विषयचैतन्यस्य

तदन्तःकरणोपहितचैतन्याभिन्नतया विषयचैतन्येऽध्यस्तमपि रजतं साक्षिण्य-ध्यस्त केवलसाक्षिवेद्य सुखादिवदनन्यवेद्यमिति चोच्यते ।

10.3.14 Avidya Constitutive of Adhyasa; Other Factors Incidental

Also the illusory silver is said to be a transformation in relation to Avidyā and a transfiguration in relation to Consciousness And this silver exists in the substrate viz., Avidyā, which is the 'this'-aspect-defined Consciousness, for in the Vedāntic system the rule being that every effect is located in the substrate, Avidyā, which is its material cause. This content-defined Consciousness being non-different from the Consciousness which has the particular *antaḥkaraṇa* as *upādhi*, silver though superimposed on the content-defined Consciousness is yet said to be superimposed on the Witness and cognised by the Pure Witness. And this superimposed silver, like pleasure etc., is not cognised by any other person and not knowable through any of the *pramānas* which invariably have reference to the world that is the same for all.

The common belief is that the efficient cause like defective eyes or faintness of light is adequate to explain illusion. But there is need to seek a material cause also for the emergence of objects having their own specific being. This cause is Avidyā, which in its concealing aspect, conceals the true nature of the object misapprehended and in its diversifying aspect, gives rise to the illusory object like 'silver'. Defects like imperfect eye-sight, dim light, biliousness etc , and other factors like similarity, the operation of the mental traces etc., are not common to all illusions In the case of illusions like the blue of the sky, no such factor can be brought in. The other factors are all incidental,

while Avidyā is constitutive of the error. The material cause of error, the *apramā*, which consists in the reciprocal superimposition of two things of unequal reality whether in respect of their existences (*svarūpa*), relations (*samsarga*) or cognitions (*jñāna*), is Avidyā which is of the nature of an existent, beginningless and indeterminable.

10.3.15 Adhyasa—Factors to be Contended with—Acceptance of Inexplicability Universal

Putting the situation succinctly, says the *Iṣṭasiddhi* (1-9)—

सत्त्वे न भ्रान्तिबाधौ स्तां नासत्त्वे ख्यातिबाधकौ ।
सदसद्भ्यामनिर्वाच्याऽविद्या वेद्यैस्सह भ्रमाः ॥

Thus from the Vedāntic standpoint it is seen that error is by its very nature inexplicable It is not explicable in terms of the real because it has no real relation with it It is perhaps explicable in terms of the illusory; even in the case of illusions occasioned by the presence of an external *upādhi* called *sopādhikabhrama* as, for example, a colourless crystal appearing red in the proximity of a red flower, the relation, of the red colour which is elsewhere, to the crystal, is *mithyā*. Here though the red colour contributed by the flower is real, its relation of *tādātmya* with the crystal is *mithyā*; also though the red colour may be elsewhere, the red coloured crystal seen by the person then and there is not anywhere else The *tādātmya* relation between the red colour and the crystal is also *anirvacanīya*; and as such it is wrong to say that the Vedānta resorts to *Anyathākhyāti* in the explanation of *sopādhikabhrama*.

But then this would not be going beyond the illusory or explaining the illusory as such. While others attempt the impossible in defining the content of error either as real or

unreal, the Vedānta exposes the futility of the task and speaks in terms of the *Anirvacanīyakhyāti* which means that error points to a thing which is precisely like what it appears, but is yet not characterisable as either 'is' or 'is not'. All the *vādins* who appear to be opposed to one another have, however, to contend with these factors—a substratum of the illusion, a knowledge of the substratum in a general way and the concealment of its particular aspects, the superimposition of the illusory appearing then and there, the unreality of the relation between the real *adhiṣṭhāna* and the object of illusion which is not real, the sublation of the illusion by right knowledge and also that the 'knowledge' of the illusory object is only a semblance of knowledge i.e., not valid knowledge. In describing the situation as *anirvacanīya*, the Vedāntin is seen to take stand only on these. This is reminiscent of Śrī Śrī Gauḍapādācārya's words—

परस्परं विरुध्यन्ते तैरयं न विरुध्यते । (Gau. Kā. 3–17)

Each of the other *vādins* attempts to fit in these factors into his set-up which is basically unsound, as has already been seen. Says the *Vārtika* on the *Adhyāsabhāṣya*—

तैरपि स्वकीयस्वकीयनिरुक्तिमार्गेण तस्य तथात्वाङ्गीकारात् तावतैवास्मदभिमताध्याससिद्धिरिति भावः ।

This is why the commentaries like the *Ratnaprabhā* and the *Bhāmatī* on the *Sūtrabhāṣya* show that the *Bhāṣya* intends to point out that it would follow that in all systems, this indeterminable appearance of the attributes of one thing in another has necessarily to find a place; hence this indeterminability is an accepted doctrine in all systems. For example, अनिर्वचनीयता सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्त इत्यर्थः। as the *Bhāmatī* puts it.

Illusion being an unaccountable experience, it cannot be defined as existent or non-existent. If it could be defined

as the one or the other, then it would no longer be an illusion, and no knowledge could remove it—a conclusion which is opposed to experience. Says the *Mānasollāsa* (VII-27)—

युक्तिहीनप्रकाशत्वाद्भ्रान्तेर्न ह्यस्ति लक्षणम् ।
यदि स्याल्लक्षणं किञ्चिद्भ्रान्तिरेव न सिध्यति ॥

It is thus obvious that illusion cannot be accounted for in terms of the ingredients which go to make up what is usually accepted as a valid experience, one has to contend with it. All this is implied in the statements of the *Adhyāsabhāsya*—अध्यासो मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तम्, तथापि . . . नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः । In this connection may be recalled the *Naiskarmyasiddhi* (3-66) and the *ṭīkā* thereon—

नान्वेष्य चात्र कारणमित्युक्तं तत्कस्मादिति चोदिते प्रत्याहान्वेषणासहिष्णुत्वात् । तत्कथमित्याह—

सेयं भ्रान्तिर्निरालम्बा सर्वन्यायविरोधिनी ।
सहते न विचारं सा तमो यद्वद्दिवाकरम् ॥

सेयं . . . भ्रान्तिर्लोकसिद्धपदार्थवत् क्लृप्तकारणशून्या, अत एव निरालम्बा—उचितालम्बनशून्या, सर्वन्यायविरोधिनी च लोकप्रसिद्धपदार्थान्तरवत् सत्तायां स्थितौ प्रतीतौ च ये न्यायास्तेषां विरोधिनी, अत एव विचारन्यायाघातं न सहते यथा तमः स्वनिवर्तकप्रकाशं न सहते तद्वदित्यर्थः ॥

[It has been asserted that the search for the cause of this is of no avail since the matter cannot bear investigation. How? Illusion is baseless and is opposed to all logic It cannot endure enquiry even as darkness cannot endure the Sun

Unlike the objects of empirical experience, this illusion has no definite cause, hence it is that it is bereft of an appropriate base It is opposed to all ... ons; that is, it is opposed to the well-accepted cano ... o existence, abidance and cognition in respect ... ings well known in the worl

That is why, being unable to withstand the onslaught of enquiry, it disappears just as darkness is unable to bear the light that dispels it]

10 3.16 Confusion between Two Orders of Reality—Explanation, Deduction etc., Futile—Prakriya only to Dispel Illusion —Application to World-Illusion

Seeking an 'explanation' of the illusion in terms of entities that are 'real', and trying to 'deduce' as an item characterised by empirical reality, if possible, as a result, would be a futile attempt In so far as it tries to do so, any *vāda* is bound to fail 'Explanation' involving causal relations or logical relations of the ground and the consequent, or in terms of laws of occurrence of things all of which involve the notion of a 'must', a compelling necessity, is of no avail in resolving the 'mystery' involved in respect of the how, the why and the wherefore of an illusion. The two terms involved—the real and the not real—are such that no question of necessity or mystery can be brought in, in respect of either of them What is, is; and what is not, is not; that is all The Vedāntic analysis of the illusion clearly recognises this, as is seen by its retaining Avidyā which is inexplicable, *anirvacanīya*, as the basic 'entity' involved in the entire situation. The sublating cognition, a valid experience, however, liberates one from the entire situation by showing that it is imaginary and that there has been no problem at all. This is the only way out. The apparent construct provided by Vedānta is a concoction to secure this end. It points to the entity, the *adhiṣṭhāna*, which, though apparently involved, is in reality not at all involved Also the relation between them is a superimposed one, being not at all real in the whole game It also points to the *Sākṣī*, the Witness-consciousness, which 'knows' both the illusion and the

sublation and thus remains unchanged. The concept of ignorance implies its necessary sublation by a subsequent right knowledge along with which the illusion collapses. Error, as has been seen, is thus 'illegitimate transference' or *adhyāsa* as the opening sentence of the *Sūtrabhāsya* puts it. Also wherever there is *adhyāsa*, there is a confusion between two orders of reality, which presupposes ignorance. The Vedānta analyses without any prepossessions in respect of the ultimate reality of the world—while granting parlance reality to it, thus keeping its doors open to take a leaf from the analysis of the illusion, thus helping one to undertake the search, अन्वेष्टव्यः, for the unchanging substratum of the world-illusion—i.e., for the *adhiṣṭhāna* which is ever free from its apparent thraldom.

In this connection may be recalled the *Sūtrabhāsya* (1-4-1-6)—

यावद्ध्यविद्या न निवर्तते तावद्धर्मादिगोचरत्व जीवस्य जीवत्वं च न निवर्तते। तन्निवृत्तौ तु प्राज्ञ एव 'तत् त्वमसि' इति श्रुत्या प्रत्याय्यते। न चाविद्यावत्त्वे तदपगमे च वस्तुनः कश्चिद्विशेषोऽस्ति। यथा कश्चित् संतमसे पतितां कांचिद्रज्जुमहिं मन्यमानो भीतो वेपमानः पलायते, त चापरो ब्रूयान्मा भैषीर्नायमही रज्जुरेवेति। स च तदुपश्रुत्याहिकृतं भयमुत्सृजेद्वेपथुं पलायनं च। न त्वहिबुद्धिकाले तदपगमकाले च वस्तुनः कश्चिद्विशेषः स्यात्। तथैवैतदपि द्रष्टव्यम्।

[As long as ignorance does not vanish, so long there can be no escape from the range of *dharma* etc., and no cessation of the jīvahood of the jīva When this ignorance is removed, the jīva is revealed to be none other than the Pure Consciousness by the text, 'That thou art'. The 'Thing' Itself is not affected in any way by the existence, continuance or elimination of ignorance For instance, when a piece of rope, not clearly visible because of dim light, is mistaken to be a snake, one may run away from it,

trembling with fear. And someone else may tell him 'Do not be afraid; this is not a snake, but merely a piece of rope'. Then on hearing this, the former gives up the fear of the snake as well as the trembling and running away. But neither during the continuance of the idea of the snake, nor after its sublation, is the thing itself affected in any way. So also is this to be understood.]

Again, the *Sūtrabhāsya* (2-1-6-14) says—

तस्माद्यथा घटकरकाद्याकाशानां महाकाशादनन्यत्वम्, यथा च मृगतृष्णिकोदकादीनामूषरादिभ्योऽनन्यत्वम्, दृष्टनष्टस्वरूपत्वात्, स्वरूपेणानुपाख्यत्वात्। एवमस्य भोग्यभोक्त्रादिप्रपञ्चजातस्य ब्रह्मव्यतिरेकेणाभाव इति द्रष्टव्यम्।

[Therefore just as the *ākāśas* within pots, jars etc, are non-different from the cosmic *ākāśa*, or as the mirage-water etc, is non-different from the sandy desert etc, since by their very nature they appear and subsequently disappear and as such their nature cannot be defined, even so it is to be understood that this diverse phenomenal world of the experiencer, the experienced and so on, has no existence apart from Brahman]

Also,

'ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं तत्सत्यम्' इति च परमकारणस्यैवैकस्य सत्यत्वावधारणात् 'स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो' इति च शारीरस्य ब्रह्मभावोपदेशात्। स्वयं प्रसिद्धं ह्येतच्छारीरस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्वमुपदिश्यते, न यत्नान्तरप्रसाध्यम्। अतश्चेदं शास्त्रीयं ब्रह्मात्मत्वमवगम्यमानं स्वाभाविकस्य शारीरात्मत्वस्य बाधकं संपद्यते, रज्ज्वादिबुद्धय इव सर्पादिबुद्धीनाम्।

(Sū Bhā. 2-1-6-14)

[The One ultimate cause alone is ascertained to be Real in, 'All this has That as its essence, That is Reality'. This also follows from the teaching that the embodied Self is in essence Brahman, in the passage 'That is Self, That thou art O Śvetaketu!'. This identity of the embodied Self, that is taught, is a self-established truth and it has not to be accom-

plished through some extraneous effort. From this it follows that like the knowledge of the rope etc, sublating the illusory knowledge of the superimposed snake etc., the realisation of the identity of the jīva with Brahman, as declared in this Śruti, results in the removal of the idea of the embodiedness of Self that is a concoction of the beginningless ignorance.]

10.3.17 Involvement of Atman Apparent—The 'Substratum' Untainted

Says the *Tattvaśuddhi*—

'इदं रजतं' इत्यत्र इदमंशः किं रजतपक्षपाती किं वा शुक्तिशकलपक्षपाती? इति। रजतपक्षपाती चेत्, बाध्यत्वात् 'इयं शुक्तिः' इति प्रतीतिर्न स्यात्; स च प्रतिभासविरुद्ध इति। शुक्तिकाशकलपक्षपातित्वेऽनवभासप्रसङ्गः। तदुभयं प्रमाणप्रतिभासविरुद्धम्। न च अध्यस्यमानाधिष्ठानविलक्षणस्य भ्रान्तौ प्रतीतिरस्ति। अथायमभिप्रायः—परमार्थतः शुक्तिपक्षत्वेऽपि 'इदं रजतम्' इति सामानाधिकरण्यादिदमंशस्य प्रतिभासतो रजतपक्षत्वम्, ततश्च न प्रमाणविरोधः, नापि प्रतिभासविरोध इति, इहापि तर्हि परमार्थतो ब्रह्मत्वेऽपि प्रतिभासतः साक्षिणः संसार्यन्तर्भाव एव, ततश्च न प्रमाणविरोधः, नापि प्रतिभासविरोधः, इति संतोष्टव्यम्। इयांस्तु विशेषः। शुक्तित्वमिदमंशादन्यदेव सत् भ्रान्तिसमयेऽनवभासमानं प्रमाणेन इदमंशात्मना व्यज्यते; तच्च तस्य रजतात्मत्वोपमर्देनावभासते, ब्रह्मभावः पुनः साक्षिमात्रभूत एव सन् अविद्यया संसारसमयेऽनभिव्यज्यमान इव भवति, 'तत्त्वमसि' इति प्रमाणज्ञानादज्ञानाभिभवे सति स एव साक्षी संसारोपमर्देनावभासमानो ब्रह्मभाव इत्युच्यते, साक्षिरूपस्य स्वयंप्रकाशत्वेन प्रत्यक्षत्वाच्च न प्रमाणवेद्यत्वप्रसङ्गः। तस्मात् प्रमाणप्रमातृप्रमेयप्रमितिभेदविभ्रमाधिष्ठानतया तत्साक्षिणः प्रतिभासतस्तदन्तर्भावेऽपि वस्तुतो ब्रह्मत्वमेव।

[In the experience 'This is silver', to what does the 'thisness' pertain—to the silver, or to the shell? If to the silver, since it is sublated (and along with it, the 'thisness' pertaining to silver), there would be no possibility of arising of the

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experience 'this is shell', but this is in contradiction to what is observed If the 'thisness' pertains to the shell, then there would be no experience of the 'thisness' (since there is no experience of the shell during illusion) Thus neither of these is acceptable since they are contradictory to the sublating experience generated by *pramāna* and the illusory experience respectively. Also nothing other than the substratum subject to superimposition is experienced during illusion Thus if it is maintained that—though, in reality, the 'thisness' pertains to the shell itself, in view of the apposition (similar case-ending) seen in 'this is silver'—there is the appearance of the 'thisness' as pertaining to silver then there would be no contradiction either with the sublating experience generated by *pramāna* or the illusory experience

So also, in the case of the world illusion though the Witness-self is in reality Brahman Itself, It appears to be a transmigratory jīva, and thus there is no contradiction either with *pramāna* or with the experience in parlance. But the special feature is this—the shellness, being distinct from the 'this'-aspect, does not manifest itself during illusion, but it is manifested as identical with 'thisness' by *pramāna* which sublates the silverness associated with the 'thisness' Brahmanhood, however, being the Witness-self Itself, becomes unmanifest, as it were, in empirical parlance because of Avidyā When this Avidyā is destroyed by the knowledge generated by the *Mahāvākya*, 'That thou art', on the dispelling of *samsāra,* the very same Witness-self is said to have attained Brahmanhood There is no question of the Witness-self being made known by a *pramāna* as It is always direct and immediate because of Its Self-effulgence. Thus though the Witness-self which is the Substratum of the illusory distinctions like the knower, the known, the knowledge and the means viz , the *pramāna* thereof, is apparently involved in them, It is, in reality, Brahman Itself]

10.3.18 The Way Out Shown by the Hymn

Thus from the *Vedāntic* standpoint, the whole universe is

looked upon merely as a superimposition, an illusory appearance of the One Ātman. The One Ātman appears to be many just as one Moon appears to be many in many waters. That Ātman which is never a cause of fear appears to cause fear like the rope appearing to be a snake. Ātman, the cause, appears to be the effect like gold appearing to be a bracelet. By illusion this universe which in reality is non-existent, is imagined to exist in the One Self-existent Ātman like the apparent silver in the shell In the All-pervading Changeless Sentient Ātman, the finite universe is concocted just like a city of *Yaksas* conjured up in the infinite *ākāśa*. In the luminous Ātman, the insentient universe is seen just as the mirage is seen in the rays of the Sun. Just as a pillar is mistaken for a thief, the Immutable Ātman is mistaken for the universe abounding in activity. So says the *Mānasollāsa* (VII-28, 29, 30)—

जलचन्द्रवदेकस्मिन् निर्भये रज्जुसर्पवत् ।
प्रतीयते यथा स्वर्णे कारणे कटकादिवत् ॥
उपात्ते रूप्यवच्छुक्तौ व्याप्ते यक्षपुरीव खे ।
रश्म्यम्बुवत् स्फुरद्रूपे स्थाणौ चोरवदक्रिये ॥
असत्कल्पमिद विश्वमात्मन्यारोप्यते भ्रमात् ।

Other examples to illustrate such superimpositions are also given—like doership in the Immutable Ātman due to *upādhis*, as redness of a crystal in the vicinity of a red flower, relatedness in the unrelated Ātman as the *ākāśa* in a pot, manifoldness in the secondless Ātman just as one experiences as becoming oneself many in a dream, creatorship in the Immutable Ātman like that of a conjurer.

Such examples not only illustrate the various aspects of the superimposition but also help in dispelling them.

Evidently such is the method adopted by the hymn as is seen by the examples cited therein—विश्वं दर्पणदृश्यमाननगरीतुल्यं, स्वप्न, मायावी, योगी, eclipse etc

10.4.1 Pratyabhijna—Recognition of Identity by Dispelling Illusion of Difference—Akhandartha

In the hymn, सर्वास्ववस्थास्वपि व्यावृत्तास्वनुवर्तमानमहमित्यन्तः स्फुरन्तं points to the means viz , प्रत्यभिज्ञा, recognition, for getting the knowledge of the true nature of Ātman, the Consciousness, *Adhiṣṭhāna* of the world illusion. The term *pratyabhijñā* is employed in the hymn itself in stanza six, wherein is established the abiding reality of Ātman, the Pure Existence—*Sanmātra* The *pratyabhijñā* relating to the two states of deep sleep and waking is of the form प्रागस्वाप्सम्, 'I was asleep till now'. This is seen to involve two aspects, the memory of the previous sleep and the experience of the present waking state. The usual example illustrating *pratyabhijñā* is the judgement of the form 'This is that Devadatta', सोऽयं देवदत्तः. Here, the perception of Devadatta, the past one as also the present one, is spoken of as *abhijñāpratyaksa*. Memory, *smṛti*, pertains to the knowledge of an object of past experience which is no longer present. The *pratyabhijñā* has in it both the ingredients, memory and perception ; the recognition is of a present object. The experience of the past recalled to memory may be of years ago or even of a former birth, as evidenced by the newborn animal which proceeds, of itself, to suck the mother's milk. Says the *Mānasollāsa* (VII-6)—

पूर्वजन्मानुभूतार्थस्मरणान्मृगशावकः ।
जननीस्तन्यपानाय स्वयमेव प्रवर्तते ॥

The significance of the recognitive judgement lies in the identity of the individual, the *vyakti*, in spite of the differences in time. As mentioned, the persistence of Ātman

in the various states is sought to be established in sta[nza]
seven of the hymn by means of *pratyabhijñā*. Here,
Mānasollāsa (VII-1 to 19) takes up a discussion as to wha[t is]
meant by *pratyabhijñā* and what is accomplished by it and si[nce]
pratyabhijñā is not enumerated among *pramāṇas* i.e., alo[ng]
with *pratyakṣa* etc., how can it be a *pramāna*. The *Mānasoll[āsa]*
proceeds to show that the hymn enlightens on these points

प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलादात्मा स्थायी निर्धार्यते यदि ।
का नाम प्रत्यभिज्ञेषा किं वा तस्याः प्रयोजनम् ॥ (VII–

प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणेषु प्रत्यभिज्ञा न पठ्यते ।
कथं तस्याः प्रमाणत्वमिति पृच्छन् प्रबोध्यते ॥ (VII–2)

एतदुक्तं भवति—

भातस्य कस्यचित् पूर्वं भासमानस्य सांप्रतम् ।
सोऽयमित्यनुसन्धानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानमुच्यते ॥ (VII–3)

तद्देशकालाकारादीनवधूयानुषङ्गिकान् ।
यथैकं वस्त्वनुस्यूतं सोऽयमित्यभिधीयते ॥ (VII–4)

तस्मान्निश्चीयते स्थायीत्यात्मा देहान्तरेष्वपि ।
स्मृतिं विना न घटते स्तन्यपानं शिशोर्यतः ॥ (VII–7)

What is sought to be conveyed here is this—*pratyabh[ijñā]*
consists in recognising a thing in the form 'this is the sa[me]
as that', सोऽयम्, which, having once before presented itsel[f to]
Consciousness, again becomes an object of Consciousness[s at]
present. This arises from a perception, associated with
impression of the past experience of the object.
significance of the judgement lies in the identity of
individual, *vyakti*, the substantive, which is continuo[usly]
present in spite of the differences in time, place, form e[tc.]
which are but *upādhis*, i.e., accidental circumstances.

Says the *Mānasollāsaṭīkā* (VII-3)—

पूर्वोत्तरदेशकालवैशिष्ट्यांशपरित्यागेन अनुगताविशिष्टवस्तुमात्रानुसंधानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानमित्यर्थः ।

What this *pratyabhijñā* really accomplishes is verily the dispelling of the illusion of difference which is due to the association of the two different *upādhis*. Says the *Tattvaśuddhi*

पूर्वानुभवसंस्कारसहितादिदानीन्तनप्रमाणकारणादुत्पद्यमानमेकस्य कालद्वयसम्बन्धविषयं प्रत्यक्षं प्रत्यभिज्ञा । . . . तत्फलं च उपाधिद्वयसम्बन्धनिमित्तभेदविभ्रमनिवृत्तिरेव । (31)

The differential denotations due to limiting adjuncts indicate one content only; that is the impartite sense, *akhandārtha*; impartite as the *mahākāśa* contained in the pot; so says the author of the *Kalpataru*.

10.4.2 The Determinant of Perceptibility—Pratyabhijna as Pratyakshapramana

The determinant of perceptibility is not sense-generatedness, but only the non-difference of *pramānacaitanya* from *visayacaitanya*, satisfying the conditions of perception viz., that the content should be present and competent to be perceived Thus the knowledge generated by the sentence 'This is that Devadatta' has for its object something connected with an organ, and as the mental mode that goes outside is assumed, the *Caitanya* limited by Devadatta is not different from That limited by the mental mode (in the form of the object), and hence the knowledge generated by the sentence 'This is that Devadatta', is a perception. If it is objected that in the verbal cognition 'This is that Devadatta', there is an element of memory, it can be replied that such an element of memory is present in all perceptions. Says the *Vedāntaparibhāsā* (1)—

न हीन्द्रियजन्यत्वं प्रत्यक्षत्वे तन्त्रम्, दूषितत्वात्, किन्तु योग्यवर्तमानविषयकत्वे सति प्रमाणचैतन्यस्य विषयचैतन्याभिन्नत्वमित्युक्तम् । तथा च 'सोऽयं देवदत्तः' इति वाक्यजन्यज्ञानस्य सन्निकृष्टविषयतया वहिर्निःसृतान्तःकरणवृत्त्यभ्युपगमेन देवदत्तावच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य वृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्याभिन्नतया 'सोऽयं देवदत्तः' इति वाक्यजन्यज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वम् ।

Pratyabhijñā is thus a *pramāṇa*; and it may be brought under *pratyakṣa*; only its process is somewhat different from other kinds of *pratyakṣa*. While in other kinds of *pratyaksa* the contact of the sense organ with the object is alone sufficient, in *pratyabhijñā*, memory operates as an additional factor. Illusion, for example, is indeed classed under *pratyaksa* though it is produced not merely by the contact with sense organs but also by defects and the latent impressions. Thus *pratyabhijñā* is verily *pratyaksapramāṇa*. Says the *Mānasollāsaṭīkā* (VII-7)—

एवं च सति प्रत्यभिज्ञा प्रमाणमेव, सा च प्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्भवति, सामग्रीभेदस्य प्रत्यक्षव्यक्तिभेदनियामकत्वेन जात्यन्तरगमकत्वाभावात् । न हि दोषसंस्कारसहितसंप्रयोगजन्यं भ्रान्तिज्ञानमप्रत्यक्ष भवति । तस्मात् प्रत्यभिज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणमिति स्थितम् ।

The *Tattvaśuddhi* (p 161) raises the same question and answers it—

ननु न प्रत्यभिज्ञा प्रमाणम्; प्रत्यक्षादावनन्तर्भावात् । तथा हि । न तावत् प्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्भावः, संस्कारजन्यत्वात्, परोक्षविषयत्वाच्च, स्मृत्यादिवत् । नाप्यनुमाने, व्याप्तिजन्यत्वाभावात् । अतो रजतादिज्ञानवदप्रमाण प्रत्यभिज्ञा । नेति ब्रूमः, प्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्भावसंभवात् । तथा हि । प्रत्यक्षं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्, संप्रयोगजन्यत्वात्, अपरोक्षविषयत्वाच्च । ननु संस्कारजन्यत्वात् परोक्षविषयत्वाच्च अप्रत्यक्षत्वमुक्तम् । बाढमुक्तम्; तथापि प्रत्यक्षपक्षपात एव प्रत्यभिज्ञाया युक्तः, विशेषणविशेष्ययोरुभयोरपि प्रत्यक्षत्वात्; परोक्षकालादिविशेषणमात्रस्यैव अप्रत्यक्षत्वात्, ब्राह्मणग्रामादिवत् ।

[Now the *pratyabhijñā* is not a *pramāna* as it cannot be accommodated within the fold of the *pramānas* like perception etc. It is thus—It cannot be included in *pratyaksa*, as unlike *pratyaksa* it arises from previous tendencies and is also concerned with indirect knowledge of an entity like memory etc. It is not included in *anumāna* as it does not arise from the knowledge of pervasion, *vyāpti* Hence like the knowledge of shell-silver etc., *pratyabhijñā* is not valid knowledge. The answer to this objection is—no. It is possible to include it in *pratyaksa* Thus *pratyabhijñā* is *pratyaksa*, direct knowledge, as arising from sense-contact and as revealing its object directly In reply to the objection stated already that it is not to be brought under direct knowledge, it must be said that the *pratyabhijñā* leans towards *pratyaksa* since the substantive and the adjective involved therein are both directly present, only the reference in the adjective pertaining to the past is not then present, as in the case of Brāhmanas' village etc]

The *pratyabhijñā* which is to be included under *pratyaksa* has been used as a *pramāna* in daily routine e.g , while meeting the same person again and again, while using the same article again and again, while repeating the same process again and again, as is well known. Many other examples wherein decisions have been arrived at on the basis of *pratyabhijñā* as a *pramāna*, such as identity of uttered sounds like *ga*, गोऽयं गकारः, the object of meditation, उपास्यस्वरूप, meditations themselves, *vidyās* etc., are to be found in the *Sūtrabhāṣya*.

10.4.3 In the Ultimate, Satpadartha Alone Revealed by Pratyabhijna Pertaining to an Object

The *pratyabhijñā* as pertaining to an external object may be exemplified by a moving body. Though associated with changing states (position and motion at an instant constituting a state), the body is recognised to be identically

the same. Here the recognition pertains only to the individual i.e., the body as such divested of the incidental association of time, position and motion, which are thus only superimposed on the body.

Similar considerations hold even in the case of a body regarded as a single entity for some empirical purposes though it has a structure, and subject to internal motions. Says the *Sūtrabhāṣya* (2-1-6-18)—

न च विशेपदर्शनमात्रेण वस्त्वन्यत्वं भवति । न हि देवदत्तः सङ्कुचितहस्तपादः प्रसारितहस्तपादश्च विशेषेण दृश्यमानोऽपि वस्त्वन्यत्व गच्छति । स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् ।

[A thing does not become different just because of the appearance of some peculiarity in it. Devadatta, even though seen in different postures when his hands and feet are folded or stretched does not differ in his personality since the recognition of identity persists as 'It is he himself'.]

This 'body' may very well be a part of the universe or the entire universe itself. It is also pointed out that, in the final analysis, in either case, what is revealed by *pratyabhijñā* is the primary basic entity, *Sat*, Brahman Itself. Continues the *Sūtrabhāṣya* (2-1-6-18)—

तथा मूलकारणमेव आ अन्त्यात् कार्यात् तेन तेन कार्याकारेण नटवत् सर्वव्यवहारास्पदत्वं प्रतिपद्यते ।

[Similarly, it is the Primary Cause (Brahman) Itself that, like an actor appearing in various costumes, appears in the form of this and that, up to the very last effect, thereby lending Itself to all empirical parlance]

So says the *Mānasollāsaṭīkā* on stanza two of the hymn—

अतः सर्वेऽपि सस्थानविशेषाः कार्यशब्दवाच्याः सर्वानुगतावयवात्मना स्थिता एव तत्र तत्र सहकारिविशेषेण आविर्भावतिरोभाववत्तया विभाव्यन्ते

...। तथा च सर्वेषु विशेषेषु कार्यकारणभावाद्यात्मना विभाव्यमानेषु 'इदं अयं तत्' इत्याद्युल्लेखयोग्यं यदव्यभिचारि सन्मात्रमनुगम्यमानमस्ति तदेव सर्वस्योपादानम, तच्च ब्रह्मैव नान्यदिति।

[Thus all those that are spoken of as products are various dispositions—appearing and disappearing because of the ancillary means of the parts of what abides in all of them Thus in all the various particularities persisting through all of them and fit to be referred to as this, that etc , the material cause of all of them is the *Sat* only i e., Brahman and none other.]

This *Satpadārtha* alone is real as the one that does not at all deviate from the 'form' in which it has once been ascertained; whatever deviates from the 'form' in which it has once been ascertained is unreal. So says the *Bhāṣya* commenting on the word *Satyam* in the Śruti—

सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म (*Tai U.* 2-1)

यद्रूपेण यन्निश्चित तद्रूप न व्यभिचरति, तत्सत्यम्। यद्रूपेण यन्निश्चितं तद्रूपं व्यभिचरति तत् 'अनृतम्' इत्युच्यते। अतो विकारोऽनृतम्।

All else other than *Sat*, the Brahman, is unreal. Commenting on the *Gītā* (II-16)—

नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः।
उभयोरपि दृष्टोऽन्तस्त्वनयोस्तत्त्वदर्शिभिः॥

[There is no 'being' of the unreal, there is no non-'being' of the Real. The truth of both these is seen by the seers of the abiding Reality, the Brahman-Ātman.]

the *Bhāṣya* says—

सर्वत्र बुद्धिद्वयोपलब्धेः सद्बुद्धिरसद्बुद्धिरिति। यद्विषया बुद्धिर्न व्यभिचरति तत् सत्, यद्विषया व्यभिचरति तदसदिति सदसद्विभागे बुद्धि-तन्त्रे स्थिते सर्वत्र द्वे बुद्धी सर्वैरुपलभ्येते समानाधिकरणे। न नीलोत्पलवत् 'सन् घटः', 'सन् पटः', 'सन् हस्ति' इत्येव सर्वत्र। तयोर्बुद्ध्यो-

घटादिबुद्धिर्व्यभिचरति, तथा च दर्शितम् । (सर्वो विकारः कारणव्यतिरेकेणानुपलब्धेरसज्जन्मप्रध्वंसाभ्यां प्रागूर्ध्वं चानुपलब्धेः ।) न तु सद्बुद्धिः । तस्माद्घटादिबुद्धिविषयोऽसन् व्यभिचारात् । न तु सद्बुद्धिविषयोऽव्यभिचारात् ।

[The knowledge pertaining to each and every entity is two-fold, of the real and of the unreal. That pertaining to the real never changes and that pertaining to the unreal changes. In such experiences as 'the pot is', 'the cloth is', 'the elephant is' etc., the 'is-ness' or the existence, *Sat* aspect, remains invariable, whereas that of the pot etc., varies This has been shown precisely. (Every effect such as a pot is unreal because it is not perceived as distinct from its cause and also because it is not perceived either before its production or after its destruction.) Not so the knowledge of existence. Thus the object of the knowledge pertaining to a pot etc., is unreal, being variable; but not so the object of the knowledge of *Sat*, being invariable.]

Further, as has been pointed out, like the pot etc., its cause such as clay is likewise unreal as it is not perceived apart from its causes—

घटादेर्मृदादिकारणस्य कार्यस्य च तत्कारणस्य च तत्कारणव्यतिरेकेणानुपलब्धेरसत्त्वम् ।

If it is argued—that if the Substratum such as the pot be unreal, the two-fold knowledge arising with reference to one and the same Substratum is inexplicable—the answer is—no. We find the two-fold knowledge arising with reference to one and the same Substratum even though one of the two objects corresponding to the two-fold knowledge is unreal, as for instance in the case of the mirage where the knowledge takes the form 'This is water'—

एकाधिकरणत्वं घटादिविशेष्याभावे न युक्तमिति चेत् । न । सदिदमुदकमिति मरीच्यादावन्यतराभावेऽपि सामानाधिकरण्यदर्शनात् ।

It is needless to point out that this *pratyabhijñā* that is spoken of in respect of the *Sat* which wards off all illusory and empirical entities is to be distinguished from illusory *pratyabhijñā* pertaining to such as सेयं दीपज्वाला (this is the same flame), as also *pratyabhijñā* pertaining to empirical matters such as *pariṇāminitya* like the earth, the *guṇas* of the *Sāṅkhyas* etc., (Sū. Bhā. 1-1-4-4). In the ultimate, invariably it is *Sat* alone that remains over. As the *Bhāṣya* on the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* (2-3-12) points out, the effect traced back in the ascending series of subtlety leads only to the conviction of something as existent. The intellect even in the ultimate analysis of all the objects of perception is still pregnant with the awareness of the existence of something; and the intellect is our *pramāna* in the comprehending of the real nature of existence and non-existence—

कार्यविलापनस्यास्तित्वनिष्ठत्वात्, तथा हीदं कार्यं सूक्ष्मतारतम्यपारंपर्येणानुगम्यमान सद्बुद्धिनिष्ठामेवावगमयति, यदापि विषयप्रविलापनेन प्रविलाप्यमाना बुद्धिः, तदापि सा सत्प्रत्ययगर्भैव विलीयते । बुद्धिर्हि नः प्रमाणं सदसतोर्याथात्म्यावगमे ।

Also if the universe had no ultimate existing cause, then the effect, being inseparably connected with the cause, would be apprehended as non-existing. But this is not so; it is perceived as existing only, just as a pot etc., made by earth etc., is perceived in association with earth etc. Therefore the cause of the world, Ātman, must be known as existing—

मूलं चेज्जगतो न स्यात्, असदन्वितमेवेद कार्यमसदसदित्येवं गृह्येत । न त्वेतदस्ति । सत् सदित्येव तु गृह्यते । यथा मृदादिकार्यं घटादि मृदाद्यन्वितम् । तस्माज्जगतो मूलमात्मास्तीत्येवोपलब्धव्यः । (Ka. U. 2-3-12)

Pratyabhijñā is employed in deciding that the Supreme Brahman, the *Ākāśa*, is to be regarded as that in which are

combined the denials of the conception in respect of It, that are found in various Upanisads.

The *Bhāṣya* on the Sūtra (3-3-20-33)—अक्षरधियां त्ववरोधः . . . says — समानो हि सर्वत्र विशेषनिराकरणरूपो ब्रह्मप्रतिपादनप्रकारः । तदेव च सर्वत्र प्रतिपाद्यं ब्रह्माभिन्नं प्रत्यभिज्ञायते ।

[All the Upanisads as exemplified, convey the idea of Brahman in the same way viz., by denying all attributes in respect of It, and it is recognised that It is the very same Brahman about which instruction is offered in all of them.]

10.5.1 All Changing States and Subsidiary States Pertain to Brahman the One Unchanging Satpadartha

Again in refuting the Buddhistic ideas of total annihilation without leaving any trace of each individual in a series, *pratyabhijñā* is made use of to point out that the individuals can have no such destruction as to leave no trace of recognition or to become non-existent for under all circumstances the common Substratum is seen, through a process of recognition, to persist uninterruptedly. Where such recognitions are not obvious, the persistence of a common Substratum can be inferred from the fact of its perception elsewhere. So says the *Bhāṣya* (2-2-4-22)—

न हि भावानां निरन्वयो निरुपाख्यो विनाशः संभवति, सर्वास्वप्यवस्थासु प्रत्यभिज्ञानबलेनान्वय्यविच्छेददर्शनात् । अस्पष्टप्रत्यभिज्ञानास्वप्यवस्थासु क्वचिद्दृष्टेनान्वय्यविच्छेदेनान्यत्रापि तदनुमानात् ।

This is evidently suggested by the phrase in the stanza—
सर्वास्ववस्थास्वपि व्यावृत्तास्वनुवर्तमानम्.

Taken by itself this phrase would refer to all the states of *Sat*, Brahman ; and taken [...]ted to each of the states and subsidiary states within [...] would refer to Brahm[...] that persists throughout [...]ing phenomena.

10.5.2 Revelation of Chit by Pratyabhijna

When it is said that a *pramāna* reveals an entity, it only operates to remove the ignorance veiling Brahman, the Substratum, on which the name and the form of the entity are superposed Any *pramāna* has only this purpose to serve. The 'object' of ignorance that is the unknown i e., the veiled, is only that for which veiling is meaningful; that is *Sphurana* (effulgence) that is Brahman. On the removal of the veil, what manifests is this Brahman on which name and form are superposed This is pointed out by the *Sambandha-vārtika* (1002)—

अतोऽनुभव एवैको विषयोऽज्ञातलक्षणः ।
अक्षादीनां स्वतःसिद्धो यत्र तेषां प्रमाणता ॥

The *Mānasollāsa* (VII-20) also says—

यावन्ति सन्ति मानानि व्यवहारप्रवृत्तये ।
तेषां मोहापसरणाद्व्यापारोऽन्यो न विद्यते ॥

While all the *pramāṇas* operate to remove the veiling pertaining to the existence-aspect of Brahman, the Substratum of an object, perception which is inclusive of *pratyabhijñā* operates to remove the veiling of the shine-aspect as well. The first and foremost characteristic of perception is its immediacy and directness This immediacy is verily the immediacy of Reality, the Consciousness, which is direct. Says the *Vedāntaparibhāsā* (1)—

प्रत्यक्षप्रमा चात्र चैतन्यमेव 'यत् साक्षादपरोक्षाद्ब्रह्म' इति श्रुतेः ।

The sole Reality which is Infinite Consciousness is conceived of as threefold, the *pramātrcaitanya*, the *pramānacaitanya* and the *visayacaitanya*. Only the *upādhis* which are accidental differ, but not the underlying Reality. This unobstrusive and pervasive identity escapes us. Space in which finite bodies

are located and move is quite unnoticed, the bodies engrossing all our interest and attention. Pure Existence in which entities appear is neglected as it serves no practical interest of ours—*avyavahārya*. This underlying universal Consciousness is the Great Normal, ever the same and not admitting of any novelty. It is the Infinite Normal Background on which all abnormalities appear for a time, only to disappear forever. It is no surprise, therefore, that It is unable to stimulate the curiosity of the ordinary man who is attracted only by the out-of-the-way and the abnormal. There is no knowledge, however insignificant, in which Reality or Unity is not incipient. The function of any *vṛtti* consists in manifesting the ever-present non-difference between the *pramātṛcaitanya* and the *viṣayacaitanya*. Every time an object is cognised, this non-difference, apparently sundered, is made manifest, vindicated as it were. Says the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (1)—

घटादेर्विषयस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वन्तु प्रमात्रभिन्नत्वम् ।

But the non-difference thus brought about by the *vṛtti* is by its nature limited. When an object is known, it is the Consciousness, as determined by the object, that is known. The experience of Consciousness as Infinite is not experiencing a large number of perceptions of empirical objects, nor a collection of them. The infinitude thus achieved is spurious, it is a sort of endlessness, a mere repetition, not a true whole. Only that knowledge in which the empirical *upādhis* do not appear constitutes the experience of the Infinite, *Akhaṇḍa*, which alone sublates the world-illusion. Thus every object is Brahman, the Consciousness, on which are superposed a name [illegible] orm which constitute, so to say, a 'state' of Brahm[illegible]

The immediacy of Brahman, the Consciousness Itself, is direct whereas the immediacy of *upādhis* pertaining to each of Its 'states' like a cloth etc , is because of its superposition on 'Brahman'—पटादीनामपरोक्षचैतन्याध्यासादपरोक्षता। चैतन्यस्य स्वत एव। (The *Prakāśikāṭīkā* on the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*-1). These 'states' are classified as those pertaining to external objects, to the mental modes revealing them and the knower i e , the *visayacaitanya*, the *pramānacaitanya*, and the *pramātṛcaitanya*.

10.5 3 Pratyabhijna as Pointer to the Subject—Always Valid

The *pratyabhijñā* as pertaining to an external object, which reveals the entity as such e g., the individual, Devadatta, or the pot, bereft of the changing attributes, has been seen to culminate in unveiling the Existence and the Shine of the persistent Substratum, Brahman. Likewise the *pratyabhijñā* is also a pointer to the knower i.e., the subject in whom this *pratyabhijñā* knowledge arises. In fact, the ultimate import of any *pratyabhijñā* whatever, lies, as the *Vedānta* points out, in the identity of the subject ; the predicates are free accidental attributes, *upalaksaṇa*. Here it may be noted that it is quite possible that one may be mistaken about the identity of Devadatta ; he may not be the same individual, appearances may be misleading. But the identity of the person who makes the judgement about Devadatta's identity is necessarily implied in his being in a position to make any such judgement, false or true. Says the *Bhāsya* on the Sūtra—अनुस्मृतेश्च। (2-2-4-25)—

भवेदपि कदाचिद्बाह्यवस्तुनि विप्रलम्भसम्भवात् 'तदेवेद स्यात् तत्सदृशं वा' इति संदेहः। उपलब्धरि तु संदेहोऽपि न कदाचिद्भवति 'स एवाहं स्याम्, तत्सदृशो वा' इति। 'य एवाहं पूर्वेद्युरद्राक्षम्, स एवाहमद्य स्मरामि' इति निश्चिततद्भावोपलम्भात्।

[It may be conceded, however, that in the case of an external entity, there may be the possibility of doubt of the form 'It may be either that very thing or one similar to that', since in the case of an external entity there is scope for delusion. But in the case of the cogniser himself there can never be such a doubt as 'I may be either that very person or one similar to him', for there occurs a definite recognition of identity, as in 'I who saw yesterday, am remembering today'.]

More generally, the analysis of every experience pertaining to an object, *idam*, is always seen to reveal some aspect of the experiencer, *aham*.

10.5.4 Memory—Pratyabhijna Relating to the Abiding Aham

Thus the *pratyabhijñā* pertaining even to an external object establishes the abiding nature of the experiencer. This being so, *pratyabhijñā* relating to *aham*, the experiencer himself, can very well be expected to throw more light about the nature of *aham*. The consciousness of something as having been experienced in the past, itself constitutes a *pratyabhijñā* relating to *aham*. Being present both at the time of the past experience and subsequently at the time of the experience of the remembrance, the individual recollects the thing which has persisted in himself in the form of a *samskāra*, as pointed out by the *Mānasollāsa* (VII-8) —

पूर्वत्रानुभवे काले स्मृतिकाले [illegible] ।
आत्मा संस्काररूपेण [illegible] ॥

In order to clarify the situation further, a possible question is raised and answered. If by *pratyabhijñā* relating to the individual is meant the remembrance of things, how can it be a *pramāna* as to the persistent existence of the individual, since remembrance [illegible] not [illegible] accepted as a *pramāṇa* by any school? To explain [illegible] memory, *smṛti*, the thing

remembered is not directly in evidence nor is there a decisive knowledge of the thing by means of any *pramāna*; nor can it be said that the previous experience of the object accompanies the object at the time of the memory pertaining to it like a pair of fingers presenting themselves together. Nor is the object remembered now in association with its present experience like the stick and the man holding it, since the object is not in actual experience at present. Otherwise the same thing would apply to all cases of memory e.g., what is called up to memory by a mere word. Says the *Mānasollāsa* (VII–9, 10, 11)—

प्रत्यभिज्ञेति भावानां स्मृतिश्चेदभिधीयते ।
आत्मस्थैर्ये प्रमाणत्वं स्मृतिश्च प्राप्नुयात्कथम् ॥
स्मृतौ प्रकाशो नार्थस्य न चाप्यर्थस्य निश्चयः ।
न चाप्यर्थानुभवयोरङ्गुल्योरिव सम्भवेत् ॥
नानुभूतिविशिष्टस्य पदार्थस्य च दण्डिवत् ।
सर्वत्राप्येवमित्येव प्रसङ्गादिति तच्छृणु ॥

This question is answered by pointing out that mere memory is not taken as a *pramāna*; but the persistence of the individual is established by presumption, *arthāpatti*, which is a *pramāna*, since otherwise memory of an object cannot be explained. Every remembrance implies a recollection, *pratyabhijñā*, pertaining to *aham*, in the form 'The same I who had the experience of the object formerly, am now remembering it'. As to how the memory of an object arises, it is pointed out that when a former experience has disappeared, its memory springs up from a cause abiding in the individual and called *samskāra*, the latent impression produced on the seat of that experience.

The individual, passing through an experience of the present moment and remembering a former event in virtue of the *samskāra* produced in him by the actual experience of that event, reflects thus—

'योऽहं पूर्वं हस्तिनरतुरगादिसङ्कुलं राज्यमन्वभूवं सोऽहमद्य हिमगिरिकुहरगुहापरिसरप्रपतन्मन्दाकिनीघोषमनुभवामि' इत्यात्मानं प्रत्यभिजानाति ।
(Mā. ṭikā VII-13)

['I who formerly ruled a kingdom now lead an ascetic life on the banks of the Gaṅgā, experiencing the roar of the river in the vicinity of caves etc., as it descends from the snow-clad mountains and falls into the valleys' He is thus conscious of his personal identity as persisting through two different periods of time.]

As pointed out previously, the memory may even pertain to an experience of a former birth. Thus as memory enters as a factor into the process by which recognition of identity is produced, *pratyabhijñā* has been spoken of as memory. So say the *Mānasollāsa* (VII–12, 13) and the *ṭikā* thereon—

प्राक्तनानुभवे नष्टे तदवष्टम्भसम्भवात् ।
संस्कारसंज्ञात् सामग्र्यात् पौरुपाज्जायते स्मृतिः ॥
आत्रेयानुभवे नष्टे तदीयं विषयं प्रति ।
अनुभावक्रमात्मानं बोधयत्यनपायिनम् ॥

Giving illustrations, the *Sūtrabhāsya* says in this respect—

अहमिदमद्राक्षमिति चावस्थान्तरयोगेऽप्युपलब्धृत्वेन प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्, स्मृत्याद्युपपत्तेश्च । (3-3-30-54)

अपि च दर्शनस्मरणयोः कर्तर्येकस्मिन् प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रत्ययः सर्वस्य लोकस्य प्रसिद्धः 'अहमदोऽद्राक्षम्, इदं पश्यामि' इति । (2-2-4-25)

किंच 'अहमद्य स्वप्ने हस्तिनमद्राक्षम्, नेदानीं त पश्यामि' इति

दृष्टमेव प्रतिबुद्धः प्रत्याचष्टे। द्रष्टारं तु तमेव प्रत्यभिजानाति 'य एवाहं स्वप्नमद्राक्षम्, स एवाहं जागरितं पश्यामि' इति। (1-3-5-19)

[For, although the individual comes to be associated with other states i.e , *upādhis*, still in such experiences as 'It is I that saw this', his identity as the perceiver is recognised; and this identity has to be admitted so that memory etc., may be reasonably accounted for

Moreover, it is well known to all that direct experience in the form of *pratyabhijñā* such as 'I who saw that, see this now' occurs only when the agent of seeing and remembering is the same

Moreover, a man after waking up speaks thus, 'I saw an elephant in a dream today, I do not see it now'. What he repudiates here is what he saw, whereas he recognises his own identity as the seer in the manner 'I myself who saw the dream, now see the things of the waking state'.]

When the object of experience has vanished as also the experience thereof, the effulgent, never-vanishing and ever-sentient experiencer calls to memory the object the experience of which has lain in himself in the form of *samskāra*, as the *Mānasollāsa* (VII–14) says—

विषये च प्रमुषिते नष्टे चानुभवे सति।
स्वविश्रान्तं स्मरत्यर्थं देवोऽप्रमुषितस्सदा॥

In respect of the criticism that in the case of the experience of Ātman that is Eternal and Self-effulgent, since there can be neither *samskāra* (nascent state of its experience) nor an instrument of valid knowledge, there cannot be *pratyabhijñā* pertaining to It. Says the *Tattvaśuddhi*—

यत् पुनरुक्तम् 'स्थायिनः स्वयंप्रकाशस्यात्मनः संस्कारासम्भवात् प्रमाणकारणाभावाच्च न प्रत्यभिज्ञा' इति, तत् प्रत्युच्यते।

स्वयंप्रकाशस्यात्मनो दर्पणादाविव सवितृकिरणस्यान्तःकरणोपाधौ अभिव्यज्यमानत्वात्, स्वरूपतो नित्यत्वेऽपि सोपाधिकावभासस्यास्थिरत्वात् तज्जनितसंस्कारोपपत्तेः, अन्तःकरणस्य च स्वयंप्रकाशाभिव्यक्तिहेतुत्वेन तत्प्रमाणकरणत्वव्यपदेशात्, उपपन्नमेव पूर्वानुभवसंस्कारसहितात्, इदानींतनप्रमाणकारणादात्मनि प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्।

[Ātman, the Self-effulgent, manifests in the *upādhi* viz , the *antahkarana* like the rays of the Sun in a mirror etc , and though *Ātmasvarūpa* is abiding by Its very nature, this manifested shine is transitory and as such it is reasonable to hold that this gives rise to a *samskāra.* Also as the cause of the manifestation of Ātman, the *antahkarana* may be looked upon as the cause of the *pramāna* which is its *vrtti* Thus it is reasonable to hold that there can be *pratyabhijñā* pertaining to Ātman arising from the *samskāra* of the previous experience along with the present experience of It by the *antaḥkarana* which is the cause of the *pramāna.*]

10.5.5 Maya and Vidya

The *Mānasollāsa* (VII-15) now proceeds to seed out the never-vanishing experiencer from out of the vanishing aspects involved—

प्रमोषणं प्रमातॄणां मायया तमसा कृतम्।
मायाविद्ये प्रभोश्शक्ती भानोश्छायाप्रभोपमे ॥

[It is the *pramātrs*, the percipients, that 'disappear' by becoming unmanifest because of *tamas* that is Māyā. Māyā and *Vidyā* are the two 'powers' associated with the Lord like unto the shadow and light associated with the Sun]

The 'disappearance' of the *pramātṛs* in such states as deep sleep and dissolution is spoken of as such because of the disappearance of the *upādhis* pertaining to the *pramātṛs.* This disappearance is due to the veiling Māyā and the manifestation is [illegible] to the unveiling by *Vidyā.* Pointing to this,

says the *Mānasollāsa* (VII-16) that it is indeed *pratyabhijñā*, the All-witnessing Consciousness, which underlies all *pramānas*—all means of knowledge, valid or otherwise—

सर्वानाच्छादयेन्माया विद्या व्याक्षिप्य दर्शयेत् ।
प्रत्यभिज्ञैव सर्वेषां प्रमाणानां च साधनम् ॥

10.5.6 Pratyabhijna as Antahkaranavritti

The *ṭikā* on this drives home the import of this verse in three different ways by way of answering these questions—

कथं सर्वावरणभूतां मायामपावृत्य जीवानां तत्त्व विद्या दर्शयेत्, तस्या जडत्वात्, जडा हि विद्या, अन्तःकरणवृत्तिरूपत्वात् तस्याः, इत्याशङ्क्याह —. . . सर्वेष्ववभासेष्वनुस्यूततयावगम्यत इति प्रत्यभिज्ञा, साक्षी, स एव सर्वविज्ञानसाधक इत्यक्षरार्थः । विद्यायाः स्वरूपतो जडत्वेऽपि अशेषविज्ञानाधिष्ठानसाक्षिचैतन्यव्याप्ततया तप्तायःपिण्डवदापन्नप्रकाशत्वात्, सा मायानिवारणसमर्थेति भावः ।

[*Vidyā*, though a *vṛtti* of the *antahkarana* which is in itself insentient, can dispel Māyā by the power of the All-witnessing Consciousness underlying it, just like an iron ball which becomes luminous on being heated]

10.5.7 Pratyabhijna as Sakshi

यद्वा कथमवगम्यते 'विद्या व्याक्षिप्य दर्शयेत्' इति ? . . . सर्वेषां प्रमाणानां प्रमाणवृत्तीनां या प्रत्यभिज्ञा इदमज्ञासिषमहमित्याकारा, सा साधनं विद्यारूपप्रमाणवृत्तिस्वभावसाधकम्, विद्याया विषयावरणतिरोधानसामर्थ्यप्रत्यायकमित्यर्थः ।

[Or, it may mean that the consciousness in the form 'I have known this' which accompanies every act of cognition, shows that *Vidyā* can remove the veil which conceals an object]

10.5.8 Pratyabhijna as Pratyagatman, the One Abiding Consciousness

अथवा केय विद्या या अविद्या व्याक्षिप्य सर्वेषां तत्त्वं प्रदर्शयेदित्या-

काङ्क्षायामाह—प्रत्यभिज्ञेति । प्रतिप्रत्ययं प्रतिविषयं च प्रकाशतया प्रत्यभिज्ञायते प्रकर्षेणाभितोऽनवच्छेदेन ज्ञायते यः प्रत्यगात्मा साक्षी सा प्रत्यभिज्ञा, यतः सर्वप्रमाणानां साधनं सर्वप्रमाणवृत्तान्ताभिज्ञानात्मकमित्यर्थः ।

[Or, it may even mean that *Vidyā* is *Pratyabhijñā* Itself which dispels ignorance and unfolds the true nature of all things, and which is none other than the very *Pratyagātman*, the All-witnessing Consciousness illuminating every *antahkaranavṛtti* as also the object revealed]

Say the *Kenopanisad* (2-4) and the *Bhāsya* thereon—

प्रतिबोधविदितं मतममृतत्वं हि विन्दते ।
आत्मना विन्दते वीर्यं विद्यया विन्दतेऽमृतम् ॥

प्रतिबोधविदित बोधं बोधं प्रति विदितम् । बोधशब्देन बौद्धाः प्रत्यया उच्यन्ते । सर्वे प्रत्यया विषयीभवन्ति यस्य स आत्मा सर्वबोधान् प्रतिबुध्यते सर्वप्रत्ययदर्शी चिच्छक्तिस्वरूपमात्रः प्रत्ययैरेव प्रत्ययेष्वविशिष्टतया लक्ष्यते, नान्यद्द्वारमन्तरात्मनो विज्ञानाय । अतः प्रत्ययप्रत्यगात्मतया विदितं ब्रह्म यदा तदा तन्मतं तत् सम्यग्दर्शनमित्यर्थः । सर्वप्रत्ययदर्शित्वे चोपजननापायवर्जितदृक्स्वरूपता, नित्यत्वम्, विशुद्धस्वरूपत्वम्, आत्मत्वम्, निर्विशेषता, एकत्वं च सर्वभूतेषु सिद्ध भवेत् । लक्षणभेदाभावाद्व्योम्न इव घटगिरिगुहादिषु ।

[The term *bodha* here stands for cognition i e , the mental mode that reveals an object He for whom each and every one of these cognitions is an object of direct perception, who is of the nature of Pure Consciousness alone and who is indicated by these very cognitions as being present in identically the same manner in all of them, without being conditioned by them, is Ātman ; there is no other way for knowing the Inner Ātman. Thus 'knowledge' of Brahman in this manner as the very essence of every cognition is *Samyagdarśana* i e., the true knowledge of Brahman. It becomes established thereby that Brahman, the Witness of all cognitions, is of the nature of Consciousness, subject to neither birth nor death, Eternal, of absolutely pure nature, the very Ātman, without any attributes, and the One in

all beings, as the *ākāśa* in a pot, a hill and a cave, there being no differentiating feature.]

The *Pañcadaśī* (I-6, 7, 8) referring to the One Consciousness as the Witness of the triad of states viz , the waking, the dream and the deep sleep, as also of the various experiences in these states says that It is neither originated nor destroyed, being identically the same in all the states every day, from day to day, month to month, year to year, *yuga* to *yuga* and *kalpa* to *kalpa*—that have gone by and that are yet to come. This is the Self-effulgent Ātman—

एवं स्थानत्रयेऽप्येका संवित्तद्वद्दिनान्तरे ॥
मासाब्दयुगकल्पेषु गतागम्येष्वनेकधा ।
नोदेति नास्तमेत्येका संविदेषा स्वयंप्रभा ॥
इयमात्मा . . . . ।

10.5.9 Pratyabhijna as Mahavakyartha, the Self-effulgent

The *Mānasollāsa* VII points to the essential nature of *pratyabhijñā* pertaining to Ātman—

ईश्वरोऽन्योऽहमप्यन्य इति विच्छेदकारिणीम् ।
व्याक्षिप्य विद्यया मायामीश्वरोऽहमिति स्मृतिः ॥ (17)

ईषत्प्रकाशोऽभूदीशो मायायवनिकावृतः ।
सम्यगावरणापाये सहस्रांशुरिव स्फुरेत् ॥ (18)

मायानुषङ्गसञ्जातकिञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वाद्यपोहनात् ।
सर्वज्ञत्वादिविज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानमात्मनः ॥ (5)

न कारणानां व्यापारात् प्रमाणाना न वा पुनः ।
प्रत्यभिज्ञापनं नाम मोहापसरणं परम् ॥ (19)

[*Pratyabhijñā* is the Consciousness 'I am Īśvara' manifesting itself, स्वयमेव स्वरूपाविर्भाव —on the removal, by *Vidyā*, of the veil of

Māyā which causes the illusion of separation as 'Īśvara is one and I am another'.

Concealed by the veil of Māyā, Īśvara's shine had not been in full glory like the Sun. He shines in His full glory, on the veil being fully removed.

टीका—पूर्वसिद्धस्फुरणेनैव यथावत्स्वरूपाभिव्यक्तिमात्रं प्रत्यभिज्ञा ।

The idea is that the manifestation of Ātman in Its ever-present full glory is *Pratyabhijñā*.

Thus *Pratyabhijñā*, the recognition of Ātman's self-identity, consists in the direct realisation of the meaning of the *Mahāvākya* that His essential nature is Infinite Consciousness and Infinite Bliss, after eliminating all limitations of Māyā and its effects like limited Consciousness etc , ascribed to Him by the ignorant.

टीका—अपरिच्छिन्नज्ञानानन्तानन्दरूपसाक्षात्कारो आत्मनः प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् ।

As already pointed out, a *pramāna* only removes the veil of ignorance, and *pratyabhijñā* as a *pramāna* does the same thing and thereby Ātman that has been obtaining manifests Itself Nothing new is originated by the operation of causal machinery nor is Ātman made known by the operation of *pramānas*—

टीका—मोहापसरण परं—अभिव्यक्तिकारणमित्यर्थः ।]

The illusion removed, the Self-effulgent Reality that is Existence, never subject to illusion or sublation, is recognised as It is. The body and the other *upādhis* shaken off, Ātman shines verily as Maheśvara, the Great Lord, as the *Mānasollāsa* (VII-30, 31) says—

स्वयंप्रकाशं सद्रूप भ्रान्तिबाधविवर्जितम् ॥

प्रत्यभिज्ञायते वस्तु प्राग्वन्मोहे व्यपोहिते ।

देहाद्युपाधौ निर्धूते स्यादात्मैव महेश्वरः ॥

10.5.10 Pramanas in Respect of Pratyabhijna

Pratyabhijñā arrived at by reasoning is established by *pramāṇas*. This is shown in the *Mānasollāsa* (VII-32)—

स्मृतिः प्रत्यक्षमैतिह्यमित्यादीन्यपराण्यपि ।
प्रमाणान्याप्तवागाह प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रसिद्धये ॥

The *ṭikā* points out that by the word *āptavāk* the Śruti (Tai. Ā. 1-2)—

स्मृतिः प्रत्यक्षमैतिह्यम् । अनुमानश्चतुष्टयम् ।
एतैरादित्यमण्डलम् । सर्वैरेव विधास्यते ॥

is to be taken; and the word *ādityamandalam* is to be understood as the 'Sun' which is indicated by the *upalaksanas*—the *ādhidaivika* and the *ādhyātmika* i.e., the solar orb and the eye i.e., the cosmic aspect and the individual aspect. In other words it is the *Pratyagbrahmatattva*, the inner Ātman that is the Brahman-Reality. The Śruti points out *smṛti*, *pratyaksa*, *aitihya* and *anumāna* as *pramāṇas* in this respect. The *ṭikā* here gives examples :

(1) *Smṛti*, the *Bhagavadgītā*—

क्षेत्रज्ञं चापि मां विद्धि सर्वक्षेत्रेषु भारत । (XIII–2)

[And do thou also know Me as *Ksetrajña* in all the *ksetras*, O Bhārata !]

and न च मत्स्थानि भूतानि पश्य मे योगमैश्वरम् । (IX–5)

[Nor do those beings dwell in Me; behold My divine yoga !]

(2) *Pratyaksa*—the experience of the enlightened as 'Brahman am I'.

(3) *Aitihya*—the Guru's instruction—'That thou art'.

(4) *Anumāna*—inference pointed to by the word *ādi* in the *Mānasollāsa*, such as jīva and Īśvara are not different in reality, for they are of the same nature as made known by Śrutis सत्यं ज्ञानम् (Existence, Consciousness) and प्रज्ञानघन एव (Verily the Pure Consciousness of one consistency) and between them no difference can be traced but for the association with *upādhis* as in the case of *ākāśa*.

Such are the *pramāṇas* in proof of the *pratyabhijñā*, recognition of identity of Brahman and Ātman, 'अहं ब्रह्म, ब्रह्मैवाहम्'.

The exposition adopted in the *Mānasollāsa* as also some of the terms used recalls the to mind the *pratyabhijñādarśana* as given, for example, in the *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha* (8) which says that one has to recognise one's identity with Śiva of Supreme Effulgence, Omniscient and the Doer of everything —सर्वज्ञः, सर्वकर्तृ Śrutis such as—

तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति ॥ (*Mu. U.* 2-2-11), *purāṇas, āgama, itihāsa* etc., and the instruction from the Masters serve only to remove the notions that are obstacles in the way of realisation of this identity which has always been obtaining. Formally similar is the situation in respect of the realisation of Ātman as Brahman, which has always been obtaining. This Brahman-Ātman shines internally and though one is aware of It as 'I', still It is not realised ordinarily as Brahman. The use of *pramānas*, *vicāra* and the instruction by the Guru serve to remove the concoctions that are obstacles. In view of such parallelisms or similarities and in the true spirit of the *Vedānta* which has been shown to be accommodative to the extent of finding a place for every system in its scheme and taking whatever is not opposed to it from any other system, such an exposition has been employed here also. In these matters what is said by the other systems may be adopted judiciously.

10.6.1 The Universal 'One Consciousness'; States, the Upadhis

This fairly lengthy discussion on the lines in the hymn—

वाल्यादिष्वपि जाग्रदादिषु तथा सर्वास्ववस्थास्वपि व्यावृत्तास्वनुवर्तमानम् ।

is intended to expose its importance. The word व्यावृत्तासु

relates to the various mutually exclusive apparent dispositions or states, दृष्टनष्ट, मिथ्या, transient phases, कादाचित्कावस्था, associated with the abiding underlying Reality made known by the *pratyabhijñāpramāna* as *Sat*, Existence To speak of It in terms of parlance, It is the One Primal Cause that takes up various stances right till the end, the ultimate effect, as the *Sūtrabhāsya* (2-1-6-18) already quoted says.

Because of the association with these 'states' which are superposed on It, the Reality, Brahman, is spoken of variously depending on—(1) the aspects pertaining to the states such as sentient and insentient, cosmic and individual, microcosmic and macrocosmic, subject and object, (2) states in which one of the three *gunas* is prominent, (3) the traid of states—the waking, the dream and the deep sleep (This is seen from the Śruti, the *Rudrādhyāya*, the *Purusasūkta*, the *Gītā* (X and XIV), other *Smrtis*, *Purānas*, *Sahasranāmas* etc.,) and (4) others mentioned in the hymn itself viz., space, time, *jīvanmukti*, *pramātrtva*, different subjective states by the identification with the body, the *prānas*, the senses and the *Sāksī*, subsidiary states in the waking itself like childhood etc., the cause, the effect, servant, master, the disciple, the preceptor, the father, the son etc , the eight-fold forms (*Mūrtyastaka*) such as the earth, the water, the fire, the air, the *ākāśa*, the Sun, the Moon, the jīva and Īśvara, as also *Sarvātmatva* which term is to be understood in the same way as the terms *Turīyāvasthā* (*Māndūkyopanisad*), *Paramārthāvasthā* (Su Bhā 2-1-6-14) etc

The *Aitareyopanisad* (3-1-3), for example, says—

एष ब्रह्मैष इन्द्र एष प्रजापतिरेते सर्वे देवा इमानि च पञ्च महाभूतानि पृथिवी वायुराकाश आपो ज्योतींषीत्येतानीमानि च क्षुद्रमिश्राणीव । बीजा-

नीतराणि चेतराणि चाण्डजानि च जारुजानि च स्वेदजानि चोद्भिज्जानि चाश्वा गावः पुरुषा हस्तिनो यत्किञ्चेदं प्राणि जङ्गमं च पतत्रि च यच्च स्थावरं सर्वं तत् प्रज्ञानेत्रं प्रज्ञाने प्रतिष्ठितं प्रज्ञानेत्रो लोकः प्रज्ञा प्रतिष्ठा प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म ।

[He is Brahmā; He is Indra; He is Prajāpati, He is all these gods; and these five great elements viz, the earth, the air, the *ākāsa*, the water and the fire, these things and living creatures down to the smallest; seeds of various types—the egg-born, the womb-born, the sweat-born and the sprout-born; horses, cows, men, elephants and all other living beings— those that walk, those that fly and those that are stationary. All this is guided by Consciousness and is established in Consciousness. The world is guided by Consciousness. Consciousness is the support Consciousness is Brahman]

Says the *Bhāṣya* thereon—

तदेतत् प्रत्यस्तमितसर्वोपाधिविशेष सन्निरञ्जनं निर्मलं निष्क्रियं शान्तमेकमद्वयम्; 'नेति नेति' इति सर्वविशेपापोहसंवेद्यं सर्वशब्दप्रत्ययागोचरं तदत्यन्तविशुद्धप्रज्ञोपाधिसम्बन्धेन सर्वज्ञमीश्वरसंज्ञं भवति । सर्वसाधारणाव्याकृतजगद्बीजप्रवर्तक नियन्तृत्वादन्तर्यामिसंज्ञं भवति । तदेव व्याकृतजगद्बीजभूतबुद्ध्यात्माभिमानलक्षण हिरण्यगर्भसंज्ञ भवति । तदेवान्तरण्डोद्भूतप्रथमशरीरोपाधिमद्विराट् प्रजापतिसंज्ञं भवति । तदुद्भूताग्न्याद्युपाधिमद्देवतासंज्ञं भवति । तथा विशेषशरीरोपाधिष्वपि ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तेषु तत्तन्नामरूपलाभो ब्रह्मणः । तदेवैक सर्वोपाधिभेदभिन्नं सर्वैः प्राणिभिस्तार्किकैश्च सर्वप्रकारेण ज्ञायते विकल्प्यते चानेकधा । 'एतमेके वदन्त्यग्निं मनुमन्ये प्रजापतिम्। इन्द्रमेकेऽपरे प्राणमपरे ब्रह्म शाश्वतम्॥' इत्याद्या स्मृतिः ॥

[This Brahman is free from all ascriptions and is untainted, Pure, Actionless, Peace, One only, Secondless, characterised by such epithets as 'Not this, not this' by negating all qualifications, and incapable of being comprehended by notions conveyed by words. That same Brahman when in association with the

upādhi that is the Purest *Prajñā*, *Māyāvrtti*, is spoken of as the All-knowing Īśvara. As causing the universal undifferentiated world-seed to germinate, as the controller of all It is called the Indwelling Ruler, *Antaryāmin*. The same Brahman in identification with the intellect, the root-cause of the rest of the universe after the quintuplication, *pañcīkarana*, gets the name of *Hiranyagarbha*. And as coming out of the primordial egg, *Brahmānda*, as the first embodied being, He is called *Virāt*, *Prajāpati*. That Brahman, again as delimited by *Agni* and the rest proceeding from the primordial egg acquires, as it were, the designation of *devatā*. Similarly from *Hiranyagarbha* to the smallest worm as associated with the several bodies as the various *upādhis*, Brahman acquires, as it were, the various names and forms as well. Hence it is that this Brahman is spoken of and imagined in all sorts of ways not only by the generality of common people but even by the learned men well versed in reasoning. Says the *Manusmrti* (12-123)—Some call It *Āgni*, others Manu, *Prajāpati*, some, Indra, some, *Prāna*, and yet others, the Eternal Brahman]

It is clear from this that the Consciousness to which are ascribed the various states is one and the same Entity, Brahman Also any so-called individual is in essence this Consciousness alone; the knowership, *jñātṛtva* is also because of superimposition of *antaḥkarana* and is only a state of the Consciousness. In passing, it may be remarked that in striving for knowledge it should be remembered that all effort must be geared to realise this Consciousness as one's very Self, and merely acquiring information about *idam*, the object of knowledge, however expansive it may be, is not 'acquiring' knowledge as such at all. The wealth of details pertains only to the various aspects of *idam* or its entirety which are merely the various states superposed. This must always be remembered. By Itself, Consciousness has no states; there is no state without an object being present, without an identification with some object. Some *upādhi* or

other is always to be had in these states. Difference in the states is traceable to difference in the *upādhis*. In the waking phases, the *antaḥkarana* is the *upādhi*, in dreams the same, in a subtler and attenuated form, while in sleep only ignorance—undifferentiated and homogeneous—is present. In virtue of a relation (*samsarga*, *tādātmya* etc.,) with these, the Pure Consciousness becomes successively the *Sākṣī*, the dreamer, the ego (*pramātṛ*) ; all these objective accretions are alien to Consciousness.

Where there is no object, there is no state. The *Turīya*, the highest ecstatic state, therefore, is not a state of Self; it is Self Itself, for no assignable object is present A state is defined as the phase that is trascended, passed over; Self cannot pass out of Its own nature.

10.6.2 Sakshi the Kutastha—Vrittis, the Intervals Between Them, Their Absence

There can be any number of egos, as any number of *antahkaranas* to condition them are available; but the *Sākṣī*, however, is one.

The experience of the whole, the continuum, as furnished by the *Sākṣī*, is indispensable for a knowledge of the parts and their relations. For the functioning of the ego, the *Sākṣī* is necessary; the converse, however, is not true. The *Sākṣī*, however, continues invariably whatever vicissitudes may overtake the ego. The ego identifies itself with a portion of the field known in its entirety by the *Sākṣī*. He takes a position in the landscape and makes that the centre, whence he surveys the field. Consequently he enjoys the advantages and drawbacks of that particular post Such an identification with a particular perspective, with a peculiar station in life, is wholly irrational and foreign to the impar-

tial and infinite nature of Consciousness. To Consciousness, all points of the field without preference are equally central and equally peripheral.

Before the ego can be brought into being, there must be change and commotion in the primordial homogeneous matter—ignorance—presented to the *Sākṣī*. A *vṛtti*—mental modification—arises dispelling the gloom in however small a degree; a small portion of the field is lighted according to the *vṛtti* and set against the rest of the dark background. Consciousness as identified with this tiny lighted portion is the ego. Such a limited Consciousness will view everything from that particular standpoint of the mental modification. The experience of the *Sākṣī* is viewed as 'unknown' in contrast to its own which is 'known', in contrast to the lighted portion of the field with which the ego is identified, thanks to the *vṛtti*, the rest of the field is dark, 'unknown'.

The role of the *Sākṣī* in relation to the objects, the senses and the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* concerned is described in the *Pañcadaśī* (X-9 to 15, 23, 24, 25)—

कर्तारं च क्रियां तद्वद्व्यावृत्तविषयानपि ।
स्फोरयेदेकयत्नेन योऽसौ साक्ष्यत्र चिद्वपुः ॥
ईक्षे शृणोमि जिघ्रामि स्वादयामि स्पृशाम्यहम् ।
इति भासयते सर्वं नृत्यशालास्थदीपवत् ॥
नृत्यशालास्थितो दीपः प्रभुं सभ्यांश्च नर्तकीम् ।
दीपयेदविशेषेण तदभावेऽपि दीप्यते ॥
अहङ्कारं धियं साक्षी विषयानपि भासयेत् ।
अहङ्काराद्यभावेऽपि स्वयं भात्येव पूर्ववत् ॥
निरन्तरं भासमाने कूटस्थे ज्ञप्तिरूपतः ।
तद्भासा भास्यमानेयं बुद्धिर्नृत्यत्यनेकधा ॥

अहङ्कारः प्रभुः सभ्या विषया नर्तकी मतिः ।
तालादिधारीण्यक्षाणि दीपः साक्ष्यवभासकः ॥
स्वस्थानसंस्थितो दीपः सर्वतो भासयेद्यथा ।
स्थिरस्थायी तथा साक्षी बहिरन्तः प्रकाशयेत् ॥
यद्यद्रूपादि कल्प्येत बुद्ध्या तत्तत्प्रकाशयन् ।
तस्य तस्य भवेत् साक्षी स्वतो वाग्बुद्ध्यगोचरः ॥
कथं तादृङमया ग्राह्य इति चेन्मैव गृह्यताम् ।
सर्वग्रहोपसंशान्तौ स्वयमेवावशिष्यते ॥
न तत्र मानापेक्षास्ति स्वप्रकाशस्वरूपतः ।
तादृग्व्युत्पत्त्यपेक्षा चेच्छ्रुति पठ गुरोर्मुखात् ॥

[That which illuminates by a single effort the doer, the activity and similarly the several objects also is the Witness here whose nature is Consciousness 'I see', 'I hear', 'I smell', 'I taste', 'I touch'—thus does It illuminate everything like a lamp which is in a dancing hall The lamp placed in a dancing hall illuminates the master, the spectators and the dancer without any difference, it will shine on even if nobody is there

Similarly the Witness illuminates the I-sense (the master), the mind (the dancer) and also the objects (the spectators), even in the absence of the I-sense etc., It will shine on by Itself as before

When the *Kūtastha*, the Witness, by reason of Its being of the nature of Consciousness is shining without any break, this mind, shining by Its light dances variously

The I-sense is the master; the objects, the spectators, the mind, the dancer, the senses, the bearers of the cymbals etc ; the Witness, the illuminating lamp. Just as the lamp staying in its own place illuminates all round, so does the Witness permanently stationed illuminate outside and inside Whatever form etc., is created by the mind, stands illuminated by the Witness who in Himself is beyond words and the mind

*

If it is asked as to how such an entity is to be grasped, the answer is—let It not be grasped at all. When all the graspings subside It will Itself remain as the residue.

For Its realisation there is no need of any *pramāna*, as It is self-luminous To grasp It, one has to study the Śruti under a Guru]

When sunlight is reflected into a house by a mirror the illumination of the objects inside depends upon the direction of reflection, though the sunlight itself is quite unconcerned with the direction of reflection and the objects reached by it. The Sun in the sky is not reachable by the light reflected in the mirror; much less can the latter illuminate the Sun. Similar is the case with the *Sākṣī*. When all mental activities cease the self-luminous Ātman will shine of Its own accord independently. The *Sākṣī* is to be realised by noting That which is changeless Self-luminous Entity which illuminates the various mental modes permeated by reflected Consciousness arising one after another, the intervals between these modes as also the absence of these in deep sleep, during faint and trance So says the *Pañcadaśī* (VIII-3, 20, 21)—

चिदाभासविशिष्टाना तथानेकधियामसौ ।
सन्धिं धियामभावं च भासयन् प्रविविच्यताम् ॥
क्रमाद्विच्छिद्य विच्छिद्य जायन्ते वृत्तयोऽखिलाः ।
सर्वा अपि विलीयन्ते सुप्तिमूर्छासमाधिषु ॥
सन्धयोऽखिलवृत्तीनामभावाश्चावभासिताः ।
निर्विकारेण येनासौ कूटस्थ इति चोच्यते ॥

10.6.3 Experience of Atman as It is—A Foretaste—'Fleeting Samadhis'

It is necessary therefore to point out how a taste can be secured of such an experience of Ātman as It is, without any

taint, the realisation of which Ātman will enable one to get over ignorance in its manifold aspect, as is done by Śrī Vasiṣṭha in reply to Śrīrāma's request (*Yogavāsiṣṭha* 3-7-18, 19, 20)—

श्रीराम उवाच—

रूपं कथय मे ब्रह्मन् यथावत्परमात्मनः ।
यस्मिन् दृष्टे मनो मोहान् समग्रान् संतरिष्यति ॥

श्री वसिष्ठ उवाच—

देशाद्देशान्तरं दूरं प्राप्तायाः संविदो वपुः ।
निमिषेणैव यन्मध्ये तद्रूपं परमात्मनः ॥
अत्यन्ताभाव एवास्ति संसारस्य यथास्थितेः ।
यस्मिन् बोधमहंबोधौ तद्रूपं परमात्मनः ॥

The *ṭīkā* on (19) is—

तत्र लोके निर्विषयज्ञानाप्रसिद्धेर्निर्विषयानावृतापरोक्षचिद्रूपं तदित्युक्तेऽप्यनुभवपथानारोहाद्यथा तत् तमारोहति तथाह—देशादिति । शाखाग्रचन्द्रदर्शने चक्षुर्द्वारा निःसृतान्तःकरणाभिव्यक्तापरोक्षसंविदः शाखादेशाद्दूरं चन्द्रदेशं निमिषान्तरमात्रेण प्राप्तायाः शाखाचन्द्रयोर्युगपद्ग्रहणान्यथानुपपत्त्या शाखाप्रदेशमारभ्य चन्द्रपर्यन्तमनुस्यूतता अवश्य वाच्या । अन्तराले विच्छेदे कारणानुभवयोरभावात् । तत्र तस्याः शाखाचन्द्रप्रदेशयोः सविषयत्वेऽपि मध्ये यद्वपुः स्वरूपं तदेव निर्विषयापरोक्षचिद्रूपं प्रसिद्धमिति परमात्मनोऽपि तद्रूपं ज्ञेयमित्यर्थः ।

[Evidently the difficulty is this. Knowledge by itself without any reference whatever to an object is not well known in the parlance of the world. So much so when it is declared that *Paramātman* is of the nature of Consciousness, immediate and direct, uncovered, with no objective reference whatsoever, It is not experienced as such. The attempt is to secure for the disciple such an experience For this purpose it is pointed out that though the two items of knowledge experienced one after another

such as the branch of a tree and thereafter the Moon that is further up, have objective references, in the split second (the interval between them) there is such an experience that is sought after. In the first case the direct experience of the branch is obtained consequent on the manifestation of the Consciousness in the mode of the mind going out through the eye to the branch. Similarly, in the second case is the direct experience of the Moon secured In the experience of the Moon as situated above the tip of a branch of a tree in the first instance, the direct knowledge of the branch of the tree is obtained, consequent on the manifestation of the Consciousness in the mode of the mind going out through the eye to the branch and taking its form After an interval, however small, a split second it may be, it reaches the Moon and takes on that form and in this interval it extends from the branch to the Moon. There is no reason to believe otherwise viz , that there is discontinuity in the middle since there is no cause to bring about this discontinuity nor is there any experience of it Thus though there is relationship of the Consciousness with an object when it pertains to the branch as also the Moon, what is in between is direct immediate Consciousness without any objective reference whatever. This is well known and the 'form' of *Paramātman* is to be understood as such In Consciousness i e , *Paramātman*, the *Adhisthāna*, there is absolute non-existence of the worldly parlance]

This is emphasised again in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* (3-17-12, 13, 14) by way of instruction by Goddess Sarasvatī to Līlā—

देशाद्देशान्तरप्राप्तौ संविदो मध्यमेव यत् ।
निमेषेण चिदाकाशं तद्विद्धि वरवर्णिनि ॥
तस्मिन्निरस्तनिःशेषसङ्कल्पस्थितिमेषि चेत् ।
सर्वात्मक पद तत्त्वं त्वं तदाप्नोष्यसंशयम् ॥
अत्यन्ताभावसंपत्त्या जगतश्चैतदाप्यते ।
नान्यथा मद्वरेणाशु त्वं तु प्राप्स्यसि सुन्दरि ॥

The *tīkā* on this in the *Laghuyogavāsiṣṭha* (3-2-39, 40, 41) is—

सविदश्चित्तस्य देशाद्देशान्तरप्राप्तौ विषयाद्विषयान्तरप्राप्तौ सत्यां निमेषेणात्यल्पकालेन प्रतीयमानं यन्मध्यमस्ति तदेव चिदाकाश विद्धि जानीहि । एतदुक्तं भवति—चित्तस्य पूर्ववृत्तौ नष्टायामुत्तरवृत्तौ भवित्र्यां मध्ये यन्निर्विषय सन्धिसाक्षिभूतं चैतन्य स्वयं प्रकाशते, वृत्त्योर्मध्ये प्रतीयमानत्वान्मध्यमित्युच्यमानं तच्चिदाकाशं विद्धीति । तथा च सप्तभूमिकानिरूपणावसरे (यो. वा. 3-117-8) वक्ष्यति—'अर्थादर्थान्तरं चित्ते याति मध्ये तु या स्थितिः । निरस्तमननाकारा स्वरूपस्थितिरुच्यते ॥' इति । उक्तं च महद्भिः—

'सन्धयोऽखिलवृत्तीनामभावाश्चावभासिताः ।
निर्विकारेण येनासौ कूटस्थ इति गीयते ॥' इति ।

सङ्कल्पो=अनात्मप्रत्ययलक्षणो. . .। . . . जगतोऽत्यन्ताभावसंपत्त्या=अत्यन्तासत्त्वनिश्चयेनेति यावत् ।

The import of this is—on the vanishing of the *vṛtti* of the mind, of the form of knowledge pertaining to an entity and the arising of a similar *vṛtti* as pertaining to another entity, in the interval between them, however small, it is the *Cidākāśa*, Immutable Witness of the interval, which shines of Its own accord without any objective reference. So will it be said while delineating the seven stages and so has it been said previously, in the *Pañcadaśīśloka* in *Kūṭasthadīpa* (VIII-21). This 'state' is secured by the conviction of the non-existence of the universe, जगतोऽत्यन्ताभावसपत्त्या, and not otherwise

Other instances of such 'fleeting *samādhis*', as they are termed, are given in the *Tripurārahasya—Jñānakaṇḍa*, (chapter 17), as pointed out by Janaka to Aśṭāvakra such as —when a man remains unaware of 'in and out' for a short interval and is not overpowered by the ignorance of sleep, the infinitesimal time when one is beside oneself—

तदा न वेद बाह्यं वाऽभ्यान्तरं वा क्षणं नरः ।
तिष्ठेन्न निद्रयाक्रान्तः स समाधिरुदीरितः ॥ (5-7-9-11)

When embraced by one's beloved in all purity, when a thing is gained which was intensely longed for but given up in despair, when a lonely traveller moving with the utmost confidence is suddenly confronted with the utmost danger, when one hears of the sudden death of one's only son who was in the best of health in the prime of life and at the apex of his glory—are instances of momentary *samādhis* when the mind abides in Ātman without any thought at the moment prior to falling into raptures of happiness, pleasure and in spasms of fear or sorrow

There are also instances of other fleeting *samādhis* viz., the intervals between the waking, the dream and the sleep states, at the time of sighting a distant object, the mind holding the body at one end, projecting itself into space until it holds the object at the other end just as a worm prolongs itself at the time of leaving one hold to catch another hold, in between having no other hold, the mind rests in Ātman

The *Tripurārahasyaślokas* referred to are—

शृणु ब्रह्मन् प्रवक्ष्यामि व्यवहारे समाधयः ।
प्रियया संपरिष्वक्तो नऽन्यया प्रथमं यदा ॥ (4)

यच्चिराद्वाञ्छितं किञ्चिदलभ्यत्वेन निश्चितम् ।
अकस्मात्तस्य संप्राप्तिर्यदा भवति वै मुने ॥ (6)

अतर्कितं व्रजन् क्वापि निर्भयो हृष्टमानसः ।
अकस्माद्यदि संपश्येद्व्याघ्रादि मृत्युसम्मितम् ॥ (8)

अतिप्रिय स्वपुत्रादिं विभुं च गृहकर्मणि ।
अरोगिणं यदाऽकस्मात् सश्रृणोति मृतं किल ॥ (10)

अथान्यथापि वक्ष्यामि समाधेस्सम्भवं शृणु ।
जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तीना मध्ये सन्ति समाधयः ॥ (12)
दूरे किञ्चित्पश्यतस्तु बुद्ध्या चैकाग्रया मुने ।
मनो दीर्घान्मतां याति जलूकेव तृणालिषु ॥ (13)
देहे देहाभासमय भावे भावात्मक तथा ।
मध्ये तन्निर्विकल्पाख्य मनो लक्षय सर्वदा ॥ (14)

10.6.4 Direct Experience of the One Consciousness—Following the Track of 'Aham'

It is clear that the one abiding entity in all the varying states—व्यावृत्तास्वनुवर्तमानम्—is this One Consciousness which reveals them Says the *Upadeśasāhasrī* (I-1) in this respect—

चैतन्यं सर्वग सर्वं सर्वभूतगुहाशयम् ।
यत्सर्वविषयातीतं तस्मै सर्वविदे नमः ॥

From the study of the objects, the states etc , that are revealed, an idea of the Consciousness Itself may be obtained. The *pramānas* including the *pratyabhijñā* and the *anvaya-vyatirekatarkas* help us in realising that the states are all transient while the Consciousness that is the substratum in which they are supposed to inhere is alone real, the *Sat*. Also in so far as any state is being revealed by It, the Consciousness, It is the *Citsvarūpa* as well. The persistence of the Consciousness in revealing the varying states shows that It is *Nityasvarūpa* also Again as revealing all the states inclusive of space and time, this Consciousness is bereft of the three-fold limitation—त्रिविधपरिच्छेदरहितम. Consideration of the dream state points to the fact that the Consciousness is distinct from the body and other adjuncts, that It is Self-effulgent and that It is untainted—

देहादिव्यतिरिक्तत्वं स्वप्रभत्वमसङ्गता । (*Anubhūtiprakāśa* 18-24)

Consideration of the deep sleep state points to the non-dual nature, unfailing effulgence and unalloyed Blissful nature of this Consciousness—

अद्वैतत्वं दृष्टयलोप आनन्दैकस्वभावता । (*Anubhūtiprakāśa* 18-25)

Enquiry, as pointed out, along with *pratyabhijñā*, reveals all this about the Consciousness. The importance of *pratyabhijñā* in revealing the *Sat* aspect underlying the universe and as pertaining to *aham*, the *Cit* aspect, as the knower, the Witness-self and the pure Ātman bereft of *upādhis* has already been seen. Incidentally it may be recalled that there is no *idam* which is not included in the *aham* pertaining to some sentient entity. It is *pratyabhijñā* that enables one to realise the import of the *Mahāvākya* culminating in establishing one in Pure Brahman-Ātman. This method of following the track of *aham* through the knower, the Witness, and Pure Brahman-Ātman indicated by *aham*, should necessarily culminate in the direct experience, *aparokṣānubhava*, of Brahman-Ātman as pointed to by the *Mahāvākya*. This is the import of the line व्यावृत्तास्वनुवर्तमानं in the hymn, that is, Brahman is the abiding Ātman, अहमित्यन्तः स्फुरन्तं सदा. This Brahman-Ātman is eternally present, as the One who knew the immediate and the remote past, who knows the present and who will know the immediate as also the distant future, as the *Sūtrabhāṣya* (2-3-1-7) says—

तथाहमेवेदानीं जानामि वर्तमानं वस्तु ; अहमेवातीतमतीततरं चाज्ञासिषम् ; अहमेवानागतमनागततरं च ज्ञास्यामीत्यतीतानागतवर्तमानभावेनान्यथाभवत्यपि ज्ञातव्ये न ज्ञातुरन्यथाभावोऽस्ति, सर्वदा वर्तमानस्वभावत्वात् ।

10.6.5 Consciousness, the Innermost Brahman-Atman alone, Direct, Immediate—Ushasti and Kahola Brahmanas

Though enquiry thus leads to the firm conviction with the underlying direct realisation of Brahman-Ātman and

duality is sublated, yet the continued appearance of duality makes it appear as though it is indirect knowledge. Śruti (Br. U. 6-4-20) declares that the unknowable and Eternal Ātman, beyond the subtle ether, Birthless, Infinite and Constant should be realised without even the vestige of the taint of duality, in one form only—

एकधैवानुद्रष्टव्यमेतदप्रमयं ध्रुवम् ।
विरजः पर आकाशादज आत्मा महान् ध्रुवः ॥

This Consciousness which alone is direct, immediate, the Innermost Ātman that is Brahman referred to in the lines व्यावृत्तास्वनुवर्तमानमहमित्यन्तः स्फुरन्तं सदा स्वात्मानं, is the topic of the *Usasti* and the *Kahola Brāhmanas* (4 and 5) of the *Bṛhadāranyakopanisad* (5)—

यदेव साक्षादपरोक्षाद्ब्रह्म य आत्मा सर्वान्तरस्तं मे व्याचक्ष्वेत्येष त आत्मा सर्वान्तरः ।

The *Vārtikasāra* (3-4-4 to 32) on it says—

यत्साक्षादपरोक्षं स्याद्ब्रह्म तद्रूपतामयम् ।
अर्हत् सर्वान्तरस्ताद्दृग्य आत्मा ब्रूहि त मुने ॥
साक्षादिति पदेनात्र व्यवधानं निवार्यते ।
स्वर्गलोकादिवद्ब्रह्म नातो देशान्तरादिगम् ॥
अगौणताऽपरोक्षार्था ब्रह्मत्वस्य विवक्षिता ।
नामादेरिव नो गौण ब्रह्मत्वं प्रत्यगात्मनः ॥
आविर्भावोऽपरोक्षत्वं तच्चास्त्यव्यवधानतः ।
स्वप्रकाशस्वभावत्वादिति वाऽर्थः पदद्वये ॥
अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं वस्तु ब्रह्मगिरोच्यते ।
अकारणमकार्यं तदित्यनेनोदितं भवेत् ॥
अपुमर्थमिदं प्राप्तं न चेदात्मैव तद्भवेत् ।
यतोऽत आत्मरूपार्थं य आत्मेति विशेष्यते ॥

सजातीयविजातीयद्वितीयार्थनिवृत्तये ।
सर्वान्तर इति प्राह सार्वात्म्यं तेन सिध्यति ॥

सार्वात्म्य ब्रह्मणो योग्य तच्च जीवात्मनीरितम् ।
मुख्यापरोक्ष्य जीवस्य योग्यं ब्रह्मणि वर्णितम् ॥

अभेदो वास्तवो जीवब्रह्मणोर्व्यत्ययादतः ।
विवक्षितस्तत्प्रसङ्गाद्वादिव्यामोह आर्थिकः ॥

आत्मनो ब्रह्मता मुख्या ब्रह्मणोऽप्यात्मता तथा ।
प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्या पराग्दृष्ट्या मिथो ब्रह्मात्मनोर्भिदा ॥

ब्रह्मत्वमात्मनो रूपं तमसा तत्तिरोहितम् ।
आत्मत्वं ब्रह्मणोऽप्येव ततो जीवेशभेदधीः ॥

तमसो बोधविध्वसे अब्रह्मानात्मताहृतेः ।
प्रत्यङ्मात्रावशेषत्वात् स्यामपूर्वादिमानहम् ॥

अमूढो याज्ञवल्क्योऽत्र प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्या परामृशन् ।
प्रत्याहैष त आत्मेति तं सर्वान्तरमद्वयम् ॥

मुख्यापरोक्षोऽयं प्रत्यक् स्वप्रकाशोऽवभासते ।
एतच्छब्देन त प्राह विस्पष्टत्वविवक्षया ॥

अन्तर्मुखस्य विस्पष्टो नायं सन्देहगोचरः ।
इत्यभिप्रेत्य तत्प्रश्ने बहुमान तु नाकरोत् ॥

षष्ठ्यन्तस्य त इत्यस्य युष्मद्बुद्ध्युपलक्षितम् ।
देहादिसर्वमाव्योम्नो दृश्यमर्थो विवक्षितः ॥

आत्मेति च प्रमात्रादेः स्वरूपमभिधीयते ।
प्रमात्राद्यागमापायसाक्षित्वात्तत्स्वरूपता ॥

यद्यस्मिन् व्यभिचार्येत तत्स्वरूपं न कुत्रचित् ।
कुण्डलित्व यथा पुसः साक्षी त्वव्यभिचारवान् ॥

व्यभिचारो मिथो यद्वत् प्रमात्रादेः ससाक्षिकः ।
साक्षिणोऽव्यभिचारस्तु तथा किंसाक्षिको भवेत् ॥
आत्मात्मवत्त्वसंबन्धः षष्ठ्योक्तो जगदात्मनोः ।
स्वतो निरात्मकं दृश्यमात्मना सात्मतां व्रजेत् ॥
आत्मा सर्वस्वरूपत्वात् सर्वान्तरगिरेरितः ।
सर्पधारादिकल्पेषु रज्जोरान्तरता यथा ॥
आत्मनोऽनवशेषेण तदन्यार्थाभिसङ्गतेः ।
प्रत्यङ्मात्रतयैवावबोधादात्मनि लीयते ॥
अतः सर्वान्तरत्वेन सर्वात्मत्वं विवक्षितम् ।
न सर्वेष्वन्वयो यस्मादन्वयादि न चात्मनि ॥
व्यतिरेकान्वयाभावाः कार्यकारणवस्तुनि ।
अकारणमकार्यं तद्व्यतिरेकादिभाक्कथम् ॥
अन्वेति सर्वकार्येषु कारणं तन्तवो यथा ।
व्यतिरेकस्तु कार्यस्य स्पष्टः कार्यान्तरात्मनः ॥
प्रध्वंसप्रागभावौ च कार्याणां सर्वसम्मतौ ।
आत्मनः सत्स्वभावत्वादभावः शङ्क्यतेऽपि न ॥
प्रत्यक्तया समाप्तत्वात् प्रतीचोऽन्यस्य वस्तुनः ।
व्यतिरेकैकरूपस्य व्यतिरेको न लभ्यते ॥
सर्वस्वरूपभूतस्य कुत्रान्वय इतीर्यताम् ।
तस्मात् सार्वात्म्यमेवेह वक्ति सर्वान्तरोक्तितः ॥
इत्थं स्वानुभवाद्याज्ञवल्क्यः सर्वान्तरं जगौ ।

The Sage Uṣasta Cākrāyaṇa asked Yājñavalkya to state specifically what that Self is which is innermost and within all, that is fit to be identical with Brahman which is immediate, direct. Yājñavalkya's reply is—The two words, *sākṣāt* and *aparokṣāt*, are meant to ward off respectively (a) separation by

distance and (b) the usage of the term by courtesy as, f
example, in the name etc., which are prescribed to be med
tated as Brahman. Alternatively, the two words may be tak
to mean that Brahman is *aparoksa* i e , shines by Itself since
is *sākṣāt* i e., Self-effulgent and not in need of anything els
an intervening *antaḥkaranavṛtti* etc., as in the case of a po
What is denoted by the word Brahman is not an effect as
is ever non-vanishing ; and It is not, in reality, the cause
anything as nothing whatever inheres in It. It would not
the Supreme goal sought after, if It were not the very Se
Ātman, of the individual. The term *sarvāntaraḥ* meani
'the innermost of all', wards off the existence of any oth
entity which is like unto It, or otherwise, establishing that
is the Universal Self, the Substratum of everything. Th
Universal-Selfhood is predicated of jīva. *Āparoksya* in
true sense befitting jīva is predicated of Brahman. Th
interchange of attributes is to emphasise the factual identi
of Brahman and Ātman. Nevertheless, the concoction
difference is due to the two different ways of looking at It—
inward and outward. The Brahmanhood of Ātman and th
Ātmanhood of Brahman are veiled by ignorance on th
removal of which by true knowledge, the non-Brahmanhoo
and the non-Ātmanhood vanish leaving the one entity, th
Innermost Self, realised as 'I' which is neither the cause no
the effect. It is to This Innermost Self that the wise sag
Yājñavalkya refers when he says 'This is Your Self that
within all'—एष त आत्मा सर्वान्तरः. This Self-effulgence of th
Innermost Self is itself direct experience which is paten
without the least doubt, to the one with inward attention
The possessive case of the word ते, 'your', in the Śruti show
that it stands for all the 'seen', the non-Self, right from th
body upto the *ākāśa*. The word *Ātmā* thereafter in the Śrut

stands for the Witness-self and thus the *Svarūpa* of the *pramātṛ* etc., (the non-Self) which appear and disappear. This Self-effulgent Witness-self is Its own testimony and needs no other proof The relation between Self and the superposed non-Self in the phrase ते आत्मा is illusory like that between the rope and the superposed snake, waterline etc. The superposed non-Self has no *svarūpa* of its own apart from Self, the Substratum, which is thus सर्वान्तर, the innermost of all. Self cannot be said to inhere in everything nor is It distinct from anything, there being nothing other than Self. Distinctness, inherence and non-existence (prior etc ,) are spoken of only in respect of things having the relationship of cause and effect and not in respect of Self which is Existence Itself and never a cause nor an effect. In fact there is nothing other than Self which is the *Svarūpa* of everything. Thus spoke the sage Yājñāvalkya of his own experience

10.6.6 The Sruti and the Stanza

The situation as envisaged in the lines—

व्यावृत्तास्वनुवर्तमानमहमित्यन्तः स्फुरन्तं सदा स्वात्मानं प्रकटीकरोति ।

is similar in many ways to the one outlined so far in connection with the Śruti यदेव साक्षात्. The concern here is with the direct immediate realisation of Brahman-Ātman It is the realised one, the Guru, that is offering the clear cut instruction Ātman by His very nature is ever Self-effulgent अन्तः स्फुरन्तं सदा and is not made known by a *pramāna*. He is ever immediate being the very Self as indicated by the words अहम्, स्वात्मानम्. All else inclusive of the *pramāṇas* belong to the category of the seen—दृश्य, साक्ष्य, those that are finite and which disappear, व्यावृत्तासु (cause, effect etc ,). These latter are superposed on Brahman-Ātman, the Substratum, to the intrinsic shine of which they owe their apparent shine—

अनुवर्तमानमन्तः स्फुरन्तम्. As the Substratum of the changing universe that is superposed, It is referred to as अनुवर्तमानं in सर्वास्ववस्थास्वपि, as these words, as also अन्तः स्फुरन्तम् सदा indicate that It is Shine without the limitations of space, time and object—त्रिविधपरिच्छेदशून्य i e, the सच्चिदानन्दब्रह्म and as the very Self of the individual seeking It, It is referred to by the words अहम्, स्वात्मानम् The use of them in apposition as in the celebrated *Mahāvākya*, अहं ब्रह्मास्मि, is to point out the factual Identity of what is indicated by them—the Cosmic Self and the individual Self. Says the *Vārtikasāra* (4-4-66, 70) in connection with the *Mahāvākya*, अयमात्मा ब्रह्म—

स्वप्रकाशोऽपरोक्षोऽर्थः कथ्यतेऽत्रायमित्यतः ।
देहादयः स्वस्वरूपा येनासावात्मशब्दभाक् ॥
प्रत्यक्त्वं ब्रह्मणस्तत्त्वं ब्रह्मत्वं चात्मनस्तथा ।
पारोक्ष्यद्वैतहानेन ह्यात्मा ब्रह्मेति बोध्यते ॥

Says the *Sūtrabhāsya* (1-3-5-19)—

न चायं व्यवहाराभावोऽवस्थाविशेषनिबद्धोऽभिधीयत इति युक्तं वक्तुम् । 'तत्त्वमसि' इति ब्रह्मात्मभावस्य अनवस्थाविशेषनिबन्धनत्वात् ।

The word *aham* also indicates that It is ever patent; one is already in possession of that which is sought to be realised. Says the *Vārtika* (1-4-1401)—

आत्मनैवात्मविज्ञानं ज्ञेयज्ञात्रादिवर्जितम् ।
स्वयमेव फलात्मत्वात् फलं चास्मान्न भिद्यते ॥

The phrase 'जाग्रदादिष्वनुवर्तमान' shows that It is the *Sākṣī* which shines directly and illuminates without mediation—साक्षात्. The lines बाल्यादिष्वपि . . . अहमित्यन्तः indicate that all the *idam* in the universe provides the various states of the jīva, included in the usual *aham* of the jīva. This *aham* is to be freed of them, thereby one realising oneself as the *Sākṣī* and thereafter

merely as the basic shine Itself without in the least being tainted even by the shadow of the *idam*-aspect, no other shine being necessary for the purpose. This is much in the same way as one is made to realise the luminous orb as the Sun by instructing in the first instance as सविता प्रकाशयति (the Sun illuminates) and then as सविता प्रकाशते (the Sun shines). Says the *Upadeśasāhasrī* (15-41)—

नान्येव ज्योतिषा कार्यं रवेरात्मप्रकाशने ।
स्वबोधान्नान्यबोधेच्छा बोधस्यात्मप्रकाशने ॥

as also the *Vārtikasāra* (3-4-88)—

यः सर्वं विषयीकुर्वन् विषयीक्रियते न हि ।
किन्तु भाति स्वय सोऽयं सर्वान्तर इतीरितः ॥

The idea is driven home by the *Usastabrāhmaṇa* (Br. U. 5-4-2)—

न दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारं पश्येः . . . न विज्ञातेर्विज्ञातारं विजानीयाः ।

and is conveyed by the line व्यावृत्तास्वनुवर्तमानमहमित्यन्तः स्फुरन्तम् which also indicates that all the *idam*-aspects appear only to disappear i.e , it is all *mithyā* i.e., none of these exists in fact. This is conveyed by the above Śruti which continues to say—एष त आत्मा सर्वान्तरोऽतोऽन्यदार्तम् ।

Says the *Vārtikasāra* (3-4-89, 90, 91) on it—

सर्वान्तरत्वं सार्वात्म्यमन्यस्मिन् सति तत्कुतः ।
न चेदन्यत्तदा सर्वशब्दार्थो नेति शङ्किते ॥
अतोऽन्यदार्तमित्याह दोषद्वयनिवृत्तये ।
आरोपितप्रपञ्चस्य तत्त्वज्ञानेन पीडनात् ॥
सर्पादीनां कल्पितानां रज्जुरात्मा यथा तथा ।
मायामयस्य सर्वस्य चिद्वस्त्वात्मेति सुस्थितम् ॥

[The doubts—as to how the expressions सर्वान्तरत्व, the innermost principle of all, and सार्वात्म्य, the Selfhood of all, can be used

in respect of Brahman-Ātman that alone is said to exist, since, if 'others' exist besides, these expressions cannot be employed at all; and if 'others' are not there the expression सर्वं, 'all', would be devoid of meaning—are removed by the Śruti—अतोऽन्यदार्तम् i.e, all else other than Brahman-Ātman is perishable as being only a superimposition due to Māyā on the One Consciousness, Ātman, like the serpent superimposed on a rope, and is sublated by the knowledge of Reality; that is, it is only apparent and in fact does not exist.]

This is taught by the Śrutis like नेति नेति, नेह नानास्ति-किञ्चन. In this respect says the *Vivekacūdāmani*—

असत्कल्पो विकल्पोऽयं विश्वमित्येकवस्तुनि ।
निर्विकारे निराकारे निर्विशेषे भिदा कुतः ॥ (400)
द्रष्टृदर्शनदृश्यादिभावशून्यैकवस्तुनि ।
निर्विकारे निराकारे निर्विशेषे भिदा कुतः ॥ (401) etc.

and परिपूर्णमनाद्यन्तमप्रमेयमविक्रियम् ।
एकमेवाद्वयं ब्रह्म नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन ॥ (465)
प्रत्यगेकरसं पूर्णमनन्तं सर्वतोमुखम् ।
एकमेवाद्वय ब्रह्म नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन ॥ (467) etc.

[In the one Entity, Brahman, the conception of the universe is a mere phantom, whence can there be any diversity in That which is Changeless, Formless and Absolute!

In the one Entity which is Changeless, formless and Absolute, and devoid of the distinctions of seer, seeing and seen, whence can there be any diversity!

There is only Brahman, the One without a second, Infinite, without beginning or end, Transcendent and Changeless; there is no duality whatsoever in It

There is only Brahman, the One without a second, which is the innermost in all, Homogeneous, Infinite, Endless and All-pervading; there is no duality whatsoever in It]

10.6.7 Apavadadrishti, the One Endeavour of all Adhyatmasastras

It is the endeavour of all *Śāstras* pertaining to Self to secure this अपवाददृष्टि i.e., decisive knowledge that there is nothing other than Self. Says the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* (Ni. Pra. Pu. 6-125-1)—

सिद्धान्तोऽध्यात्मशास्त्राणां सर्वापह्नव एव हि ।
नाविद्यास्तीह नो माया शान्तं ब्रह्मेदमक्रमम् ॥

This is exemplified as seen already in the *Pañcadaśī* and the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* quoted above which point to the situation where Self alone shines without a second Entity, and also by the use of phrases such as—

सर्वग्रहोपसंशान्तौ, अखिलवृत्तीनामभावाश्च, अत्यन्ताभाव एवास्ति, अत्यन्ताभावसंपत्त्या ।

This is seen to be emphasised in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* again and again. Right from the beginning, the hymn itself points to this very situation by—(a) comparing the universe seen in Ātman to a city seen in a mirror where it does not exist, the picture analogy, (b) declaring that right from space and time all else inclusive of creation, sustenance and dissolution, the triad of states viz., the waking, the dream and the deep sleep, *pratikarmavyavasthā*, the bodies, gross, subtle and causal are all concocted by Māyā, (c) the use of the phrase असत्कल्पार्थगम् which is assertive of the non-existence of whatever pertains to parlance pointing out that the existence and shine everywhere and of everything is always that of Ātman and that the so-called creation is only a myth, the cause-effect relation, the parlance pertaining to *pramāṇa, prameya, sambandha* (relations), *bheda* (difference) etc , all being concoctions. Enquiry has also shown that the actual *svarūpa* of each one of—space, time, cause, knowledge, experience, speech, the Guru, the disciple, the Veda, Īśvara, jīva, goal aimed at—is none other than

*

Brahman-Ātman, the Supreme Consciousness, the name and form being a mere superimposition. The quest for knowledge about anything whatever, is seen to culminate in revealing Brahman-Ātman. Consideration of the states as also the reasonings pertaining to them such as—the non-difference between the waking and the dream states, *anvayavyatireka* (co-presence and co-absence) and reductio ad absurdum indicated by the words व्यावृत्तास्वनुवर्तमानम्—points out that all else other than Brahman-Ātman is *mithyā*; that is, in reality they do not exist, तुच्छा

10.7.1 Devotion the Necessary Equipment

Leading the devout disciple on to this firm conviction, the Guru now graciously reveals to him verily Himself, this One Consciousness, Brahman-Ātman sought after, as the very Self of the disciple himself—

अन्तः स्फुरन्तं स्वात्मानं प्रकटीकरोति भजताम्।

The word भजताम् indicates the necessary equipment on the part of the disciple. His sole concern must be only this One Consciousness that alone exists. Śruti (Br. U. 6-4-21) and the *Bhāsya* thereon say—

तमेव धीरो विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत ब्राह्मणः।
नानुध्यायाद्बहूञ्छब्दान् वाचो विग्लापनं हि तदिति ॥

[The intelligent aspirant after Brahman knowing about This (Ātman) alone should attain direct realisation. He should not think of too many words for it is particularly fatiguing to the organ of speech]

तमीदृशमात्मानमेव धीरो धीमान् विज्ञायोपदेशतः शास्त्रतश्च, प्रज्ञां शास्त्राचार्योपदिष्टविषयां जिज्ञासापरिसमाप्तिकरीं कुर्वीत ब्राह्मणः। एवं प्रज्ञाकरणसाधनानि संन्यासशमदमोपरमतितिक्षासमाधानानि कुर्यादित्यर्थः। नानुध्यायान्नानुचिन्तयेद्बहून् प्रभूताञ्छब्दान्। तत्र बहुत्वप्रतिषेधात्

केवलात्मैकत्वप्रतिपादकाः स्वल्पाः शब्दा अनुज्ञायन्ते । 'ओमित्येवं ध्यायथ आत्मानम्', 'अन्या वाचो विमुञ्चथ' इति चाथर्वणे । वाचोर्विग्लापन विशेषेण ग्लानिकरं श्रमकरं हि यस्मात् तत्तद्बहुशब्दाभिध्यानमिति ।

[The intelligent aspirant knowing about this kind of Self alone, from the instruction of the Guru and the *Śāstras*, should endeavour to realise what he has been taught so as to reach the culmination in respect of his quest and put an end to all questioning That is, he should practise the means leading to it viz., renunciation, calmness, self-control, withdrawal of the senses, fortitude and concentration. He should not think of too many words This restriction on the use of too many words implies that a few words dealing exclusively with the Oneness of Ātman are permissible The *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* has it—'Meditate upon Ātman with the help of the syllable Om' and 'Give up all other speech', because thinking of too many words is particularly fatiguing to the organ of speech]

10.7.2 Panditya, Balya, Mauna—Mukhyabrahmanya

The *Kaholabrāhmaṇa* (Br. U. 5-5-1) says—

एवं वै तमात्मानं विदित्वा ब्राह्मणाः पुत्रैषणायाश्च वित्तैषणायाश्च लोकैषणायाश्च व्युत्थायाथ भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्ति । . . . तस्माद्ब्राह्मणः पाण्डित्यं निर्विद्य बाल्येन तिष्ठासेत् । बाल्यं च पाण्डित्यं च निर्विद्याथ मुनिरमौनं च मौनं च निर्विद्याथ ब्राह्मणः ।

[Knowing this very Self, the *brāhmanas* renounce desire for sons, for wealth and for the worlds, and lead a mendicant's life. Therefore the knower of Brahman, having known all about scholarship, should try to live upon that strength which comes of knowledge, having known all about the strength as well as scholarship, he becomes meditative, having known all about both meditativeness and its opposite, he becomes a knower of Brahman.]

The gist of the *Bhāṣya* on the Śruti is—

In accordance with the tradition in this respect, the

brāhmana, having secured from the *Ācārya* and Śruti, the knowledge which is essentially different from the means and results, visible and invisible, of *karma* i.e , the knowledge of the Self, should renounce all desires and lead a mendicant's life. This is the culmination of that knowledge for it arises only with the elimination of desires, this knowledge being contradictory to them—

एषणाव्युत्थानावसानमेव हि तत् पाण्डित्यम् (एतदात्मविज्ञानम्), एषणातिरस्करोद्भवत्वादेषणाविरुद्धत्वात् ।

That renunciation of desires is automatically conjoined with the knowledge of Self, is seen to be emphasised by the use of the suffix क्त्वा in the Śruti, as referring to the same individual. The ignorant, who being overpowered by desires and senses, derives strength from the means and the results of *karma*. Quite unlike these, this knower of Brahman who has renounced all desires and activity in respect of them should try to live upon that strength which comes of Knowledge. Strength is the total elimination of the vision of objects, by Self-knowledge—

बलं नाम आत्मविद्ययाऽशेषविषयदृष्टितिरस्करणम्। अतस्तद्भावेन बाल्येन तिष्ठासेत् । (Br. Bhā)

This is the बाल्य or बाल्यभाव. In support thereof are Śrutis such as आत्मना विन्दते वीर्यं (Ke. U. 2-4) (Through Self, one attains strength) and नायमात्मा बलहीनेन लभ्यः (Mu U. 3-2-4) (This Self is unattainable by the weak). Having known all about this strength and scholarship, he becomes meditative, in other words, a *Yogī* What a knower of Brahman should do is to eliminate all ideas of non-Self; doing this he accomplishes his task and becomes a *Yogī*—

एतावद्धि ब्राह्मणेन कर्तव्यम्, यदुत सर्वानात्मप्रत्ययतिरस्करणम्, एतत्कृत्वा कृतकृत्यो योगी भवति । (Bṛ. Bhā.)

Incidentally, attention may be drawn to the verse—

आत्मानात्माकारं स्वभावतोऽवस्थितं सदा चित्तम् ।
आत्मैकाकारतया तिरस्कृतानात्मदृष्टि विदधीत ॥ (*Śreyomārga*)

[The *antahkarana* by its very nature assumes always the modes pertaining to both Self and non-Self The latter are to be dispelled leaving the *antahkarana* to remain with the mode pertaining to Self only.]

The culmination of this is *mauna*. Having thus known all about *amauna* and *mauna*, he attains the conviction that 'All is Brahman', ब्रह्मैव सर्वम्. Having reached this goal that is Brahman, he is literally a *Brāhmaṇa*—निरुपचरितं हि तदा तस्य ब्राह्मण्यं प्राप्तम्. He is firmly convinced that all else is naught—अतोऽन्यदार्तम्। (Br U. 5-4-2). The *Vārtikasāra* points out that by *pāṇḍitya* is meant *śravana* by which is secured decisive knowledge of the purport of the *Śāstra*. By *bālya* is meant *manana* wherein with the aid of reasoning, all doubts in this respect are dispelled, thereby providing the strength necessary to conquer desires and develop childlike attitude without any sense of pride as pointed out in the *Brahmasūtra* (3-4-14-50). By *mauna* is meant *nididhyāsana* whereby all mental modes pertaining to the non-Self vanish

Says the *Vārtikasāra* (3-5-66 to 74)—

यस्माद्ब्रह्मविदः पूर्वे फलसंन्यासमाप्नुयुः ।
तस्माद्विविदिषुः कुर्यात्पाण्डित्यं फलसिद्धये ॥

पाण्डित्यबाल्यमौनानि श्रवणादीनि तैरयम् ।
भवति ब्राह्मणस्तच्च ब्राह्मण्यं ब्रह्मरूपता ॥

पण्डेति बुद्धेर्नामैतत् सा जाता यस्य मानतः ।
स पण्डितस्तस्य कर्म पाण्डित्यं श्रवणं तु तत् ॥

आचार्याच्चागमाच्छ्रुत्वा निःशेषं वेदनं ततः ।
बालभावेन तिष्ठासेद्युक्त्या मननतत्परः ॥
श्रवणं शास्त्रतात्पर्यनिश्चयो मननं पुनः ।
अर्थासम्भावनोच्छित्त्यै युक्तीनामनुचिन्तनम् ॥
असम्भावनया ज्ञाने दुर्बले सत्यथैषणाः ।
उद्भवन्ति ततो ज्ञानं कुर्वीत प्रबल सुधीः ॥
नैवात्मा बलहीनेन लभ्य इत्यपरा श्रुतिः ।
अनाविष्करणं बाल्य दम्भादेरिति सूत्रकृत् ॥
पाण्डित्येन विदित्वाथ छित्वा बाल्येन संशयम् ।
मुनिर्ध्यानसमाधिभ्या भवेद्धीवृत्तिशान्तये ॥
प्रशान्तवृत्तिके चित्ते परमानन्ददीपके ।
कृतकृत्यो ब्रह्मभावं गतो ब्राह्मण उच्यते ॥

10.7.3 One-pointed Devotion

In respect of this *sādhana* says the *Gītā* (V-17)—

तद्बुद्धयस्तदात्मानस्तन्निष्ठास्तत्परायणाः ।
गच्छन्त्यपुनरावृत्तिं ज्ञाननिर्धूतकल्मषाः ॥

[With their Consciousness in That, their Self being That, intent on That, with That for their Supreme goal, they go, never again to return, their sins being washed away completely by means of Knowledge]

Śrī Bhagavān Himself gives expression to this in the *Gītā* (X-9, 10) wherein He says 'With their thought on Me, with their life absorbed in Me, instructing one another about Me and ever speaking of Me, they are content and delighted. To these, ever devout, worshipping Me with love, I give that devotion of Knowledge by which they attain Me'—

मच्चित्ता मद्गतप्राणा बोधयन्तः परस्परम् ।
कथयन्तश्च मां नित्य तुष्यन्ति च रमन्ति च ॥

तेषां सततयुक्तानां भजतां प्रीतिपूर्वकम् ।
ददामि बुद्धियोगं तं येन मामुपयान्ति ते ॥

Speaking in the same manner says the sage Vasiṣṭha in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* (3-9-1, 2) that this is the portal for *jīvanmukti* as also *videhamukti*—

तच्चित्तास्तद्गतप्राणा बोधयन्तः परस्परम् ।
कथयन्तश्च तन्नित्यं तुष्यन्ति च रमन्ति च ॥
तेषां ज्ञानैकनिष्ठानामात्मज्ञानविचारिणाम् ।
सा जीवन्मुक्ततोदेति विदेहोन्मुक्ततैव या ॥

What is intended is *tatparatā*, steadfastness in the search for, and unflinching devotion to, Śrī Bhagavān, the Consciousness Itself, the very Self of the seeker, by which, as a result only of the Grace of the Lord, is secured the Knowledge of the Brahman-Ātman resulting in release.

Says the *Sūtrabhāṣya* (2-3-16-41)—तदनुग्रहहेतुकेनैव च विज्ञानेन मोक्षसिद्धिर्भवितुमर्हति । Also the *Sūtrabhāṣya* (3-2-1-5) says—

किं पुनर्जीवस्येश्वरसमानधर्मत्वं नास्त्येव ? न नास्त्येव । विद्यमानमपि तत् तिरोहितमविद्यादिव्यवधानात् । तत्पुनस्तिरोहितं सत् परमेश्वरमभिध्यायतो यतमानस्य जन्तोर्विधूतध्वान्तस्य तिमिरतिरस्कृतेव दृक्शक्तिरौषधवीर्यादीश्वर-प्रसादात् संसिद्धस्य कस्यचिदेवाविर्भवति, न स्वभावत एव सर्वेषां जन्तूनाम् ।

[Is it meant that jīva has no attribute similar to that of Īśvara? Not that he has not, but though present, it remains hidden since it is screened off by Avidyā etc That attribute, remaining hidden, becomes manifest in the case of some rare person who meditates on Īśvara with diligence, for whom the darkness of ignorance gets removed, and who has secured the grace of Īśvara, like the regaining of the power of sight through the potency of medicine by one who had lost it through the disease called *timira*. But it does not come naturally to all and sundry.]

It is clear from this that unalloyed devotion to Īśvara is the means to secure the identity with Him. In the chapter on *Pratyabhijñādarśanam* says the *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*—

भक्तिलक्ष्मीसमृद्धानां किमन्यदुपयाचितम् ।
एतया वा दरिद्राणां किमन्यदपयाचितम् ॥

[For those who are steeped in devotion, what other 'wealth' is there to crave for? For those who are utterly impoverished in respect of this 'wealth', what other poverty is there to be got rid of?]

Śrī Bhagavān says in the *Gītā* (VII-14)—

मामेव ये प्रपद्यन्ते मायामेतां तरन्ति ते ॥

[Whoever seek Me alone, they cross over this illusion.]

and in the *Gītā* (X-11)—

तेषामेवानुकम्पार्थमहमज्ञानजं तमः ।
नाशयाम्यात्मभावस्थो ज्ञानदीपेन भास्वता ॥

[Out of mere compassion for them I, abiding in their *antahkarana*, destroy the darkness born of ignorance, by the luminous lamp of Knowledge]

The hymn (10) itself gives expression to all these succinctly in the lines—

तेनास्य श्रवणात्तदर्थमननाद्ध्यानाच्च सङ्कीर्तनात् ।
सर्वात्मत्वमहाविभूतिसहित स्यादीश्वरत्व स्वतः सिध्येत् . . .

10.7.4 Twin-aspects of Devotion

It is thus seen that the use of the word *bhajatām* in the hymn is intended to emphasise the twin-aspects of the equipment that is needed on the part of the *sādhaka* for the manifestation of the One Consciousness which is the *Svarūpa* of Īśvara, of the Guru and of the seeker as well. While *vicāra* which has been delineated at length is one of the aspects, the other, the complementary aspect, is the

emotional involvement ordinarily spoken of as *bhakti*. The culmination of the twin-aspects of the *sādhana*, usually spoken of as *jñāna* and *bhakti* implied in the word *bhajatām* as pointed out, is what is voiced by Śrī Bhagavān in the *Gītā* (XV-19)—

यो मामेवमसम्मूढो जानाति पुरुषोत्तमम् ।
स सर्वविद्भजति मां सर्वभावेन भारत ॥

Says the *Bhāsya* thereon—

यो मामीश्वरं यथोक्तविशेषणमेवं यथोक्तेन प्रकारेणासम्मूढः सम्मोहवर्जितः सन् जानात्ययमहमस्मीति पुरुषोत्तमं स सर्ववित् सर्वात्मना सर्वं वेत्तीति सर्वज्ञः सर्वभूतस्थं भजति मां सर्वभावेन सर्वात्मतया हे भारत ।

[He who undeluded (i.e., never looking upon the body etc., as himself or as belonging to himself) thus knows Me, the Supreme Lord specified above, as 'I am He', he being the Ātman of all, knows all. Thus attaining Me, the Ātman of all, he worships Me in all modes]

It is thus seen that the plenary experience, the *Akhandākāravrttijñāna*, is what is spoken of as the culmination of *jñāna* from the intellectual standpoint and as the culmination of *bhakti* from the emotional standpoint.

10 7.5 Devotion—Threefold; Devotion to Pratyagatman

This devotion may be construed as being threefold—devotion to one's Innermost Ātman, devotion to Īśvara, the Supreme Lord and devotion to the Guru. The 'devotion' to oneself is always there in the form of supreme love to oneself, परमप्रेम, whatever one considers oneself to be; and it must now be specifically only to the Innermost Self which has been searched for and found out at the behest of the Śruti, सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्य', and takes the form of enquiry at the feet of the Guru, which comprises of *śravana*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*, pursued with steadfast adherence i.e., the

contemplation on one's *Svarūpa*. The continuous contemplation of the meaning of the Śruti 'That is Ātman That thou art' and the instruction of the Guru 'Thy essential nature is Brahman, thou art That only', is the indispensable cause of such realisation. This contemplation which is of the form of continuous flow of accordant ideas uninterrupted by contrary ideas is the immediate cause for jñāna. *Śama* etc., are the cause of jñāna through the portal of *nididhyāsana*, the culmination in *vicāra*.

Say the *Vivekacūdāmani* (32) and the *tīkā* thereon—

मोक्षकारणसामग्र्यां भक्तिरेव गरीयसी ।
स्वस्वरूपानुसन्धानं भक्तिरित्यभिधीयते ॥

श्रुत्याचार्योपदेशेन स आत्मा तत्त्वमसीति श्रुतौ योऽर्थः तव स्वरूपं ब्रह्म तदेव त्वमिति, तदनुसन्धानं तद्भावनाधारा विजातीयप्रत्ययातिरस्कृतसजातीयप्रत्ययप्रवाहरूपा साक्षात्कारेऽसाधारणं कारणमिति भावः। शमादीनां विचारद्वारकनिदिध्यासनद्वारा कारणत्वं ज्ञाने, अस्य तु साक्षादिति भावः।

10.7.6 Futility of Samadhis Without Wisdom, the Pratyabhijnajnana

It is evident therefore that ignorance cannot be eradicated by mere theoretical knowledge, *paroksajñāna*. Nor is it eradicated by the casual or fleeting *samādhis* without the necessary knowledge pertaining to it. Just as a man ignorant of the qualities of an emerald cannot recognise it by the mere sight of it in the treasury, nor can another recognise it if he has not seen it before, although he is full of theoretical knowledge on the subject, in the same way must theory be supplemented with practice in order that a man may become an expert. Also want of attention is a serious obstacle, for, a man looking up at the sky cannot identify the individual constellations. Even a learned scholar is no better than a

fool if he does not pay attention when a thing is explained to him. On the other hand, a man, though not a scholar, but yet attentive, having heard all about the planet Venus, goes out in confidence to look for it, knowing how to identify it, and finally discovers it, and so is able to recognise the same whenever he sees it again. Inattentive people are simply fools who cannot understand the ever recurring *samādhis* in their lives. They are like a man who begs for his daily food, ignorant of the treasure under the floor of his house. So *samādhi* is useless to such people. The intellect of babes is always unconditioned and yet they do not realise Ātman. There is no use of falling even into *nirvikalpasamādhi* without gaining the fruit of its wisdom ; even if he should experience it a hundred times, it will not liberate the individual Need it therefore be said that momentary *samādhis* in the waking state are useless ! So is it said in the *Tripurārahasya* (*jñāna-khaṇḍa*), chapter 17—

तस्मादज्ञानिनां नार्थः समाधौ सम्भवत्यपि ।
यथाऽविदितमाणिक्यः पश्यन् कोशगृहे मणिम् ॥
न जानाति यथाऽन्यस्तु श्रुतज्ञातमणिः क्वचित् ।
दृष्ट्वा प्रत्यभिजानाति तत्परो मणिमञ्जसा ॥
अतत्परः श्रुतमपि भूयः पश्यन् मणिं क्वचित् ।
न विजानाति तदिह ब्रह्मन् सुनिपुणोऽपि सन् ॥
तथा मूढा न विन्दन्ति फलं विज्ञानसंश्रयम् ।
अज्ञातत्वात् पण्डितास्तु श्रुतज्ञानयुता अपि ॥
अतत्परत्वहेतोस्तु न विजानन्ति सर्वथा ।
यथा हि तारकां पश्यन्नपि जानाति न क्वचित् ॥
मूढः श्रुतज्ञानहीनः श्रुतज्ञानयुतोऽपि वै ।
पश्यन्नपि च नो वेत्ति तत्परत्वविवर्जनात् ॥

यस्तु श्रुत्वा शुक्रतारां दिगाकारादिलक्षणैः ।
मया ज्ञेयं सर्वथेति तत्परो बुद्धिमान् नरः ॥
एकाग्रमानसः पश्यन् प्रत्यभिज्ञास्यति स्फुटम् ।
एवमज्ञानतो मूढाश्चान्ये तात्पर्यवर्जनात् ॥
न विजानन्ति स्वात्मानं ब्रह्मन् सत्सु समाधिषु ।
भिक्षामटति दुर्दैवाद्यथा वै विस्मृताकरः ॥
तस्मादेता दशाः सर्वाः समाधीनां निरर्थकाः ।
अत एव शिशूनां हि सर्वदा निर्विकल्पकम् ॥
विज्ञानफलहीनेन किं समाधिशतेन वा ।
तस्माद्विज्ञानहीनैस्तैः फलं नास्ति समाधिभिः ॥
(39 to 48, 108)

It is evident therefore that if direct experience of the Truth is to be gained, one should pursue with one-pointed attention *śravana* and *manana*; and thereafter *nididhyāsana* must be practised i.e., the ascertained knowledge of the oneness of Ātman must be contemplated with steadfast devotion, even forcibly if necessary, till after its realisation. Thereafter, one will be able to identify Ātman with the Supreme and thus destroy the ignorance, the root of *samsāra*; there is no doubt about it.

The contemplation being ripe, the Inner Self is realised, and this state of realisation is called *nirvikalpasamādhi*. Memory of this realisation enables one to identify the Inner Self with the Universal Self as 'I am That'. This is *pratyabhijñājñāna* as the *Tripurārahasya* continues to say—

अथ निश्चितमात्माख्यतत्त्वमद्वयमादरात् ।
अनुध्यायेदापरोक्ष्यं हठवृत्त्यापि यत्नतः ॥ (67)
ततो विकल्पविषयीकृत्य ध्यातं परं पदम् ।
संसारमूलमज्ञानं नाशयेन्नात्र संशयः ॥ (68)

पक्वध्याने निर्विकल्पे समाध्याख्ये परं पदम् ।
आसाद्य पश्चात् संस्मृत्य प्रत्यभिज्ञानवान् भवेत् ॥ (69)

10.7.7 Devotion to Atman—Aksharopasana

The idea is that the one that is established in jñāna i.e., *Akhaṇḍākāravṛtti*, is ipso facto established in *Parābhakti* in all its modes. Such characteristics of the *jñānī* that is the *bhakta*, are to be cultivated by the seeker in all aspects of the *sādhana*. These are pointed out by Śrī Bhagavan Himself in chapter XII of the *Gītā* (13 to 20). The *Bhāṣya* says that it is with reference to those who contemplate *Akṣara* i e., the Imperishable, the *saṁnyāsins* who are devoted to right knowledge and have abandoned all desires, that He proceeds to teach those characteristics such as 'absence of hatred of any being' which form the direct means to immortality—

तस्मादक्षरोपासकानां सम्यग्दर्शननिष्ठानां संन्यासिनां त्यक्तसर्वैषणानाम् 'अद्वेष्टा सर्वभूतानाम्' इत्यादिधर्मपूगं साक्षादमृतत्वकारण वक्ष्यामीति प्रवर्तते ।

The *Akṣaropāsana* is as per the *Gītā* (XII-3, 4)—

ये त्वक्षरमनिर्देश्यमव्यक्त पर्युपासते ।
सर्वत्रगमचिन्त्यं च कूटस्थमचलं ध्रुवम् ॥
संनियम्येन्द्रियग्रामं सर्वत्र समबुद्धयः ।
ते प्राप्नुवन्ति मामेव सर्वभूतहिते रताः ॥

[Those who ever contemplate the Imperishable, the Indefinable, the Unmanifest, the Omnipresent, the Unthinkable, the Unchangeable, the Immutable, the Eternal—having restrained all the senses, always equanimous, intent on the welfare of all beings, they reach Me only.]

Commenting on कूटस्थमचलम् says the *Madhusūdanī*—

कूटस्थमज्ञानतत्कार्याधिष्ठानमित्यर्थः । . . . अत एव सर्वविकाराणामविद्याकल्पितत्वात् तदधिष्ठानं साक्षिचैतन्यं निर्विकारमित्याह ।

By *Kūṭastha* is meant the Substratum of ignorance and the products thereof. Therefore, these being concoctions of Avidyā, the Substratum which is the Witness-consciousness is unchangeable.

Commenting on सर्वभूतहिते रताः, says the *Śankarānandīvyākhya*—

सर्वेषां ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बान्तानां भूतानां प्राणिनां हिते परमप्रेमास्पदत्वात् प्रियतमे प्रत्यगात्मनि रताः सर्वत्र प्रत्यग्रूपेण स्थितमात्मानं सर्वात्मकोऽहमिति स्वात्मना पश्यन्त इत्यर्थः ।

Commenting on पर्युपासते, says the *Bhāsya*—

परि समन्तात्, उपासते । उपासनं नाम यथाशास्त्रमुपास्यस्यार्थस्य विषयीकरणेन सामीप्यमुपगम्य तैलधारावत्समानप्रत्ययप्रवाहेण दीर्घकालं यदासनम्, तदुपासनमाचक्षते ।

Says the *Ānandagiriṭīkā* thereon—

निरुपाधिकेऽक्षरे कथमुपासनेति पृच्छति उपासनमिति । शास्त्रतोऽक्षरं ज्ञात्वा तदुपेत्यात्मत्वेनोपगम्योपासते तथैव तिष्ठन्ति पूर्णचिदेकतानमक्षरमात्मानमेव सदा भावयन्तीत्येतदिह विवक्षितमित्याह—यथेति ।

[Intent on the welfare of all beings from Brahmā down to the tiniest creature, they recognise that the Universal Self—that is dearest to each one of them being their Innermost Ātman—as their very Self This is the import.

Contemplation of the Imperishable which is free from adjuncts consists in securing the knowledge pertaining to It from the *Śāstra* and thereafter approaching It by way of identifying oneself with It, and then abiding in It, that is, ever contemplating the Boundless, Consciousness of one consistency, the Imperishable, as one's very Self.]

They contemplate by seeing Ātman everywhere, and are totally unmindful of anything like non-Self, as says the *Nīlakanṭhavyākhya* on the *Gītā* (XII-3)—

पर्युपासते सर्वप्रकारेणोपासते । उपासनमिहानात्मनामदर्शनमेव ।

10.7.8 Devotion to Isvara—Cosmic Form

This devotion to Īśvara is referred to in the hymn when it speaks of the *Māyāvī*—the Cause of origination, sustenance and dissolution of the universe—in the stanzas two, three, four and six, as also in stanza nine where the cosmic form has been brought in, in connection with the *upāsana* mentioned therein. Such devotion as pertaining to the cosmic form described in the *Viśvarūpādhyāya* of the *Gītā* is mentioned by Śrī Bhagavān in chapter twelve along with the *Akṣaropāsana*. As regards those who are unable to relinquish completely their notion of embodiedness, says Śrī Bhagavān—

मय्यावेश्य मनो ये मां नित्ययुक्ता उपासते ।
श्रद्धया परयोपेतास्ते मे युक्ततमा मताः ॥

क्लेशोऽधिकतरस्तेषामव्यक्तासक्तचेतसाम् ।
अव्यक्ता हि गतिर्दुःखं देहवद्भिरवाप्यते ॥

ये तु सर्वाणि कर्माणि मयि संन्यस्य मत्पराः ।
अनन्येनैव योगेन मां ध्यायन्त उपासते ॥

तेषामहं समुद्धर्ता मृत्युसंसारसागरात् ।
भवामि न चिरात्पार्थ मय्यावेशितचेतसाम् ॥

(*Gītā* XII-2, 5, 6, 7)

The *Nīlakanṭhavyākhya* on the *Gītā* (XII-6) says—

सर्वाणि नित्यनैमित्तिकस्वाभाविकादीनि संन्यस्य समर्प्य मत्परा अहमेव परः सर्वकर्मभिः प्राप्यो येषां ते मत्परा मद्ध्यानपरा वा । अनन्येन भेदशून्येनाहमेव भगवान्वासुदेव इति परमेश्वरेऽहंग्रहलक्षणेन योगेन चेतःसमाधानेन मां ध्यायन्त उपासते तत्रैव ध्याने स्थैर्यं लभन्ते ।

[Those who, fixing their thought on Me, contemplate on Me, always devout, endued with supreme faith, those in My opinion are the best of the *Yogins*.

Greater is their difficulty whose minds are set on the Unmanifest, for the Goal, the Unmanifest, is very hard for the embodied to reach

But for those who worship Me, dedicating to Me all actions—natural and prescribed such as the obligatory and the occasional rites—by realising that I alone am the Ultimate Goal sought to be attained by all actions, and meditating on Me as their very Self without making any difference as 'Verily am I Bhagavān Vāsudeva Himself', I become ere long O Pārtha! their rescuer from the ocean of the mortal *samsāra*]

The *Vivekacūdāmani* also refers to *bhakti* as contemplation of the *Paramātman* denoted by the word 'That' as oneself in the manner of *ahamgrahopāsana* or the meditation on the jīva as non-different from the *Paramātman*, though there is difference between the jīva and the *Paramātman* for the nonce; others say, that is *bhakti*. But this is not *mukhyabhakti*, as it is preceded by a sense of difference which is a delusion—

स्वात्मतत्त्वानुसन्धानं भक्तिरित्यपरे जगुः । (33)

टीका—स्वात्मनः स्वस्य जीवस्य तत्त्वानुसन्धानम् । तस्य भावस्तत्त्वम्, तत्पदवाच्यार्थत्व परमात्मत्वमित्यर्थः । तस्यानुसन्धानं वास्तविकभेदसत्त्वेऽपि अभेदेनोपासनमहंग्रहोपासनमिति यावत् । तद्भक्तिरित्यपरे जगुरिति भेद-बुद्धिपुरस्सराया भ्रान्तिरूपाया अस्या मुख्यभक्तित्व नास्तीति सूचितम् ।

The *Madhusūdanitīkā* on the *Gītā* (XII-6, 7) says—

ननु फलैक्ये क्लेशाल्पत्वाधिक्याभ्यामुत्कर्षनिकर्षौ स्याताम्, तदेव तु नास्ति, निर्गुणब्रह्मविदा हि फलमविद्यातत्कार्यनिवृत्त्या निर्विशेषपरमानन्द-बोधब्रह्मरूपता, सगुणब्रह्मविदा त्वधिष्ठानप्रमाया अभावेनाविद्यानिवृत्त्यभावा-दैश्वर्यविशेषः कार्यब्रह्मलोकगताना फलम् । अतः फलाधिक्यार्थमायासाधिक्यं न न्यूनतामापादयतीति चेत्, न, सगुणोपासनया निरस्तसर्वप्रतिबन्धाना विना गुरूपदेशं विना च श्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनाद्यावृत्तिक्लेश स्वयमाविर्भूतेन

वेदान्तवाक्येनेश्वरप्रसादसहकृतेन तत्त्वज्ञानोदयादविद्यातत्कार्यनिवृत्त्या ब्रह्मलोक एवैश्वर्यभोगान्ते निर्गुणविद्याफलपरमकैवल्योपपत्तेः; 'स एतस्माज्जीवघनात् परात्परं पुरिशय पुरुषमीक्षते' इति श्रुतेः। स प्राप्तहिरण्यगर्भैश्वर्ये भोगान्त एतस्माज्जीवघनात् सर्वजीवसमष्टिरूपात् पराच्छ्रेष्ठाद्धिरण्यगर्भात्पर विलक्षण श्रेष्ठं च पुरिशयं स्वहृदयगुहानिविष्टं पुरुष पूर्ण प्रत्यगभिन्नमद्वितीय परमात्मानमीक्षते स्वयमाविर्भूतेन वेदान्तप्रमाणेन साक्षात्करोति, तावता च मुक्तो भवतीत्यर्थः। तथा च विनापि प्रागुक्तक्लेशेन सगुणब्रह्मविदामीश्वरप्रसादेन निर्गुणब्रह्मविद्याफलप्राप्तिरितीममर्थमाह द्वाभ्याम्—तुशब्द उक्तशङ्कानिवृत्त्यर्थः। ये सर्वाणि कर्माणि मयि संन्यस्य सगुणे वासुदेवे समर्प्य मत्परा अहं भगवान् वासुदेव एव परः प्रकृष्टप्रीतिविषयो येषां ते तथा सन्तोऽनन्येनैव योगेन न विद्यते मां भगवन्तं मुक्त्वाऽन्यदालम्बन यस्य तादृशेनैव योगेन समाधिना एकान्तभक्तियोगापरनाम्ना मा भगवन्त वासुदेवं सकलसौन्दर्यसारनिधानमानन्दघनविग्रहं द्विभुज चतुर्भुज वा समस्तजनमनोमोहिनीं मुरलीमतिमनोहरैः सप्तभिः स्वरैरापूरयन्त वा दरकमलकौमोदकीरथाङ्गसङ्गिपाणिपल्लव वा नरसिंहत्वादिरूप वा परमकारुणिक सुन्दरसुन्दरं श्रीमद्रघुनन्दनरूप वराहादिरूपं वा यथादर्शितविश्वरूप वा ध्यायन्तश्चिन्तयन्त उपासते समानाकारमविच्छिन्नं चित्तवृत्तिप्रवाह संतन्मते समीपवर्तितया आसते तिष्ठन्ति वा तेपा मय्यावेशितचेतसा मयि यथोक्ते आवेशितमेकाग्रतया प्रवेशित चेतो यैस्तेपामहं सततोपासितो भगवान् मृत्युसंसारसागरान्मृत्युयुक्तो यः संसारो मिथ्याज्ञानतत्कार्यप्रपञ्चः स एव सागर इव दुरुत्तरस्तस्मात् समुद्धर्ता सम्यगनायासेन उदूर्ध्वे सर्वबाधावधिभूते शुद्धे ब्रह्मणि धर्ता धारयिता ज्ञानावष्टम्भदानेन भवामि न चिरात् क्षिप्रमेव तस्मिन्नेव जन्मनि।

It may be said—The alternatives mentioned here in respect of *sādhana* would be comparable as to which is the superior one as involving lesser difficulty in respect of the effort, provided what is attainable is the same for both; but it is not so The goal in respect of the knowers of Brahman without attributes

is the attainment of the Absolute Brahman that is Supreme Bliss and Consciousness by the cessation of Avidyā and its brood But that in respect of the *upāsanā* of Brahman with attributes, falling short of the valid knowledge of the Substratum, thereby failing to remove Avidyā, is only the attainment of certain special powers enjoyed in the realm of Hiranyagarbha, which after all is a product and thus ephemeral The fruit of contemplation on the Absolute being thus superior, such contemplation is worth the extra efforts.

Śrī Bhagavān refutes this argument. In the realm of Hiranyagarbha itself, at the end of the enjoyment of celestial powers, final liberation, the fruit of the knowledge of the attributeless Brahman, is attainable by the cessation of Avidyā and its products, on the dawn of the knowledge of Reality, the meaning of the *Mahāvākya* revealing itself by the Grace of Īśvara, even without the instruction from the Guru and without the effort involved in sustained practice of *śravana*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana* either, all obstacles having been removed by the *sagunopāsana* The Śruti says 'He leaves the realm of the Hiranyagarbha and finally realises the Supreme Puruṣa hidden in the cave of his heart'. He realises the Supreme Reality with the help of *Vedāntic* truths which reveal themselves to him without any effort on his part, thereby he becomes liberated. Thus the *sagunopāsana* leads to the same goal through divine grace as the one attained by the knowers of Absolute Brahman.

Śrī Bhagavān describes these devotees as those who dedicate all their work to Vāsudeva, the possessor of all benign attributes, consider Him as the most lovable of all beings, and are thus devoted to Him exclusively, renouncing all other objects of attachment. They concentrate on Him as—the

ground of the Essence of all beauty and delight, incarnated in any of His various forms, either two-armed or four-armed, as the Universal Enchanter playing on His flute with its melodious strains combining all the seven fundamental notes, or as the four-armed deity carrying conch, disc, maze and lotus, or as Nṛsimha etc., or as Rāma the extremely kind and supremely beautiful, or the Varāharūpa, or in His cosmic form as revealed to Arjuna. Thus He can be the object of single-minded contemplation and worship. The mind becomes a monolithic stream of Consciousness with the idea of Bhagavān as its only content. Life becomes a continuous existence in the proximity of the Divine. Śrī Bhagavān says that He rescues such worshippers of His, from the death-straddled existence in this unfordable ocean of sorrows, this world of appearances stemming from misconception and illusion. Śrī Bhagavān easily hoists them to Absolute Reality, the end of all limitations, beyond the world of appearance, with true Knowledge acting as a lever. And this He does quickly even in that very life.

10.7.9 Devotion to One's Own Guru—Liberation from the Mrityu called Karma

Of Supreme importance in this connection is the venerable Guru, one's own *Ācārya*, who is, as has been pointed at the outset, none other than Īśvara who has assumed this form out of His benevolence and infinite mercy with the avowed object of rescuing the deserving disciple from *samsāra*. In the *Bhagavadgītā* it is seen that Bhagavān Śrīkṛṣṇa Himself exemplifies this Such a happening is traced to the immense good fortune that is the result of worship, in the manner prescribed by the Śāstra, done in hundreds of lives with ardent devotion. Such an *avatāra* who

can be seen, approached, spoken to, heard and touched, before whom one can lay bare one's own problems, difficulties and doubts as well, is immediately recognised to be Consciousness Itself with an apparently materialised form, a *māyika* vesture, that is Īśvara Himself who has become accessible even on the empirical plane, thereby rendering it easy for the disciple to attach himself directly to the Infinite. Speaking in the same language, performing similar actions and leading the same pattern of life as others, He is the exemplar in a concrete way, of whatever is to be done in life at every level and in every aspect of it. Serving Him wholeheartedly—तस्यैवाहम्—is what is to be done by the disciple All his *karma* will be sublimated and the disciple is redeemed from the throes of the *mṛtyu* called *karma*. Besides obeying the Guru's behest and refraining from doing anything not sanctioned by Him, there are no other injunctions and prohibitions, as Śrīrāma has pointed out. Resting always in Ātman, His *Svarūpa*, but coming down to the level of the seeker, as it were, to lift him up, the Guru is indeed the *avatāra* of Bhagavān. By way of service to Him, He provides opportunities for sublimation of all actions on the part of the disciple As the *Gītā* exemplifies, He not only instructs formally, but also assures and encourages at every step—

न हि कल्याणकृत्कश्चिद्दुर्गतिं तात गच्छति ॥ (VI–40)
तेषां नित्याभियुक्तानां योगक्षेमं वहाम्यहम् ॥ (IX–22)
अपि चेत्सुदुराचारो भजते मामनन्यभाक् ।
साधुरेव स मन्तव्यः सम्यग्व्यवसितो हि सः ॥
क्षिप्रं भवति धर्मात्मा शश्वच्छान्तिं निगच्छति ।
कौन्तेय प्रतिजानीहि न मे भक्तः प्रणश्यति ॥ (IX–30, 31)
मा शुचः संपदं दैवीमभिजातोऽसि पाण्डव ॥ (XVI–5)

मय्यैवैते निहताः पूर्वमेव
निमित्तमात्रं भव सव्यसाचिन् ॥ (XI-33)
मच्चित्तः सर्वदुर्गाणि मत्प्रसादात्तरिष्यसि । (XVIII-58)

He discourses freely and looks after the disciple even by chastising him when necessary—

क्लैब्यं मा स्म गमः पार्थ नैतत्त्वय्युपपद्यते ।
क्षुद्रं हृदयदौर्बल्यं त्यक्त्वोत्तिष्ठ परन्तप ॥ (II-3)
अथ चेत्त्वमहङ्कारान्न श्रोष्यसि विनङ्क्ष्यसि ॥ (XVIII-58)

यदहङ्कारमाश्रित्य . . . कर्तुं नेच्छसि यन्मोहात् करिष्यस्यवशोऽपि तत् । (XVIII-59, 60)

10.7.10 Liberation from the Mrityu Called Kama

Instruction is for seekers of various types of competency, oriented differently as the instructions in the various chapters in respect of *Karma, Yoga, Bhakti, Jñāna, Samnyāsa* etc., show, as also for *adhikāris* at various levels as the twelfth chapter particularly (7 to 11) shows. As the fourth chapter indicates, all this is in line with the *Śrutisampradāya* wherein a variety of disciples like Janaka, Indra, Nārada, Bhrgu, Bālāki, Satyakāma, Jānaśruti and Maitreyī of different *varṇas, āśramas*, sex etc., though of different persuasions, are each accommodated and shown the way. The *Gītā* also says—

मां हि पार्थ व्यपाश्रित्य येऽपि स्युः पापयोनयः ।
स्त्रियो वैश्यास्तथा शूद्रास्तेऽपि यान्ति परां गतिम् ॥ (IX-32)

Indeed, He instructs the disciple to surrender himself to Him completely, enabling Him thereby to take the entire responsibility to secure his deliverance—

सर्वधर्मान् परित्यज्य मामेकं शरणं व्रज ।
अहं त्वा सर्वपापेभ्यो मोक्षयिष्यामि मा शुचः ॥ (XVIII-66)

Verily the direct means for abiding in the *Svarūpa* is, apart from His own example, taught by His exposition of the characteristics of the realised one—*Sthitaprajña*, *Samnyāsī*, *Yogī*, *Bhakta* and *Gunātīta* His one endeavour is to establish the disciple firmly in the *Svarūpa* which is Himself as He Himself swears, and thereby abolish the apparent difference between the two, as the lines in the *Gītā* show—

पूता मद्भावमागताः (IV–10)
त्यक्त्वा देहं पुनर्जन्म नैति मामेति (IV–9)
ज्ञानी त्वात्मैव मे मतम् (VII–18)
मामेवैष्यसि सत्यं ते प्रतिजाने प्रियोऽसि मे। (XVIII–65)

The *Ācārya*, as pointed out by Śrī Śrī Bhagavatpāda, confers His own *Svarūpa*—स्वीय साम्य विधत्ते। (*Śataślokī*-1). This is seen from the fact that they have derived wisdom from the Guru, with hearts full of mercy, emancipate by their teachings, all those who are fortunate enough to abide in their presence, from the three kinds of misery—*ādhyātmika, ādhibhautika* and *ādhidaivika*—and the three kinds of sin—of body, speech and mind—just as, by virtue of the fragrance diffused by a sandal tree, other trees around it are also full of fragrance at all times and afford shelter from heat to diverse beings. So says Śrī Śrī Bhagavatpāda (*Śataślokī*-2)—

यद्वच्छ्रीखण्डवृक्षप्रसृतपरिमलेनाभितोऽन्येऽपि वृक्षाः
शश्वत्सौगन्ध्यभाजोऽप्यतनुतनुभृतां तापमुन्मूलयन्ति ।
आचार्याल्लब्धबोधा अपि विधिवशतः सन्निधौ संस्थितानां
त्रेधा तापं च पाप सकरुणहृदयाः स्वोक्तिभिः क्षालयन्ति ॥

Indeed in the presence of the Master, one feels 'lifted up' completely from the morass in which he was deeply stuck—

यस्यानुभवपर्यन्तं बुद्धिस्तत्त्वे प्रवर्तते ।
तद्दृष्टिगोचरास्सर्वे मुच्यन्ते सर्वकिल्बिषैः ॥ (*Sūtasamhitā*)

Futile and childish arguments are given up, confidence is gained and one turns a new leaf in one's life. To realise its value, it is only to be experienced Such is the coveted acquisition for which one has been longing all along The *jñānasādhana* variously enumerated such as *amānitva*, *daivi-sampat* etc., all rise up to the conscious level, being aligned in His presence, like iron filings in the field of a magnet. By surrender i.e., by placing Him in the position occupied by him, the ego is got rid of and he is now not other than what He is. The undercurrent and upsurge of *Akhandākāra-vrtti* is obvious. This is actually experienced in His benign presence where one sees that his little Self has run away. It is only He that is directing the organs, the mind and the intellect of the disciple. Thus it is He who is really inside as well, though apparently outside. This is a taste, as it were, of the Bliss of Realisation which defies all verbal description and assessment Indeed the disciple no longer has his wagon hitched to any station in empirical life. He is redeemed and he now transcends these. Finding his Guru as his very Self, he is no longer misled into loving his lower Self He now supremely loves only Ātman, Īśvara, his Guru; all else is naught for him—प्रेमैवास्तौ. He is thus liberated from the *mṛtyu* called desire.

10.7.11 Liberation from the Mrityu called Avidya

Having thus made to transcend *karma* and *kāma*, the volitional and the emotional aspects of his mind being sublimated, he is now enabled to transcend non-apprehension, error and doubt i.e., sublimate his intellectual faculties by enquiry at the feet of his Guru. Emotional involvement to the fullest extent is what is meant or implied by the word भजताम् In other cases it would be entanglement. This deliberate

entanglement is प्रतिकल्पना. Similar is the involvement in respect of activity Both are cases of sublimation So is enquiry He is led to the culmination of His enquiry by the unfolding of the *Akhandākāravṛtti*, thereby making him transcend the *mṛtyu* called Avidyā. He is now none other than Īśvara, the Guru. Such devotion to one's own Guru is all-comprehensive and inclusive of devotion to one's own Self and devotion to Īśvara. Indeed there is no principle higher than the Guru, and the Guru is verily the Supreme Brahman Itself—

न गुरोरधिकं तत्त्वम्, गुरुस्साक्षात्परं ब्रह्म (*Gurugītā*)

It is only by such devotion that the disciple is enabled to escape from the clutches of the forms of *mṛtyu* like the body and the senses, arising from the threefold *mṛtyu*—Avidyā, *kāma* and *karma*—and remains over as Pure Consciousness—

अविद्याकामकर्माख्यमृत्यो रूपाण्यतीत्य सः ।
जाग्रद्देहेन्द्रियादीनि तिष्ठति ज्योतिरात्मना ॥
(*Bṛhadvārttikasāra* 4-3-7-121)

Such steadfast devotion is absolutely vital for securing direct realisation of One's own Self by transcending Avidyā, *kāma* and *karma*, and without it one cannot expect release from these bonds even after the lapse of hundreds of crores of lives. Says the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* (57)—

अविद्याकामकर्मादिपाशबन्धं विमोचितुम् ।
कः शक्नुयाद्विनात्मानं कल्पकोटिशतैरपि ॥

For such a devotee, the Guru reveals Himself as the very *Svarūpa* of the disciple in Its full glory—भजता स्वात्मानं प्रकटीकरोति. This is the One Consciousness, the Evershining Reality—स्फुरणं सदात्मकम्, अन्तः स्फुरन्त सदा, which sustains all beings right from Hiranyagarbha down to the tiniest of creatures, enabling one to hear, smell, taste, describe etc.—

येनेक्षते शृणोतीदं जिघ्रति व्याकरोति च ।
स्वाद्वस्वादू विजानाति तत्प्रज्ञानमुदीरितम् ॥
चतुर्मुखेन्द्रदेवेषु मनुष्याश्वगवादिषु ।
चैतन्यमेकं ब्रह्मातः प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म मय्यपि ॥
(*Śukarahasyopaniṣad* quoted in the *Pañcadaśī* V-1, 2)

This is the *Prajñāna*, the *idam*-free *aham* which never rises or sets, making known all else which appear and disappear, being superposed on It व्यावृत्तास्वनुवर्तमानमहमित्यन्तः स्फुरन्तं सदा. These latter are what have already been referred to as those which are by themselves non-entities—असत्कल्पार्थगम्. It is the *Ācārya* who by His infinite Grace removes many an obstacle in the way of manifestation in Its full glory of this Entity which alone exists and shines and which though ever shining, had been veiled as it were—

मायाशक्तिविलासकल्पितमहाव्यामोहसंहारिणे ।
अज्ञानतिमिरान्धस्य ज्ञानाञ्जनशलाकया ।
चक्षुरुन्मीलितं येन तस्मै श्रीगुरवे नमः ॥

10.8.1 Prakatikarana—No Second Entity Like Avidya and Its Offshoots Ever Was, Is, Will be

This Consciousness, the Shine which, as Īśvara in association with *upādhis*, provides facilities for the devotee for worship and *sādhana* and appearing as Guru leads him step by step by instruction, removing thereby the various phases of *ajñāna*, eventually reveals Itself without *upādhi* as the very Self of the seeker—

ईश्वरो गुरुरात्मेति मूर्तिभेदाद्विभागिने ।
व्योमवद्व्याप्तदेहाय दक्षिणामूर्तये नमः ॥ (*Mānasollāsa* I-30)

This Consciousness is at once the Supreme Peace of Silence, which is most eloquent as making known everything else

including speech. This is the Supreme purport of the entire Śruti as revealed by each one of the *Mahāvākyas*. Bringing together all the affirmations and negations in respect of Brahman in the manner pointed out by the two *adhikaranas*, viz., the *Ānandādyadhikarana* (3-3-6) and the *Aksarādhikarana* (3-3-20), all other statements in the Śruti such as those delineating *srsti* etc., the five sheaths, the triad of states, etc., as also those referring to Māyā have been shown to subserve the purpose of the *Mahāvākyas*. The knowledge of the *Svarūpa* results in the attainment of the Supreme Bliss in Its full glory, as also the realisation that duality never was, never is, nor will ever be. This realisation is given expression to by the *Svārājyasiddhi* (2-61) and the *tīkā* thereon which speaks in a similar vein—

इत्थं सर्वमहावाक्यानां प्रत्येकं प्रत्यग्ब्रह्माखण्डैक्यबोधकत्वं व्युत्पाद्य 'आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य' इत्यधिकरणोक्तन्यायेन सर्वशाखीयानि आनन्दादि-भावरूपविशेषणानि, 'अक्षरधियान्त्ववरोधः' इत्यधिकरणोक्तन्यायेन अस्थू-लत्वाद्यभावरूपविशेषणानि चोपसंहृत्य सर्वावान्तरवाक्यानां स्वस्वसन्निहित-तत्तन्महावाक्यैकवाक्यतायां सर्वमहावाक्यैः सम्भूय, प्रतिपादितं सर्वतो व्यावृत्तं सकार्याविद्यानिर्मूलनक्षमं सर्वश्रुतिपरमतात्पर्यविषयार्थमनुसन्धान-सौकर्याय पिण्डीकृत्य दर्शयन् तदवगमफलं त्रैकालिकद्वैतबाधरूपमपरिच्छिन्ना-नन्दात्मावाप्तिरूपं चाभिलप्य दर्शयति—नित्यमिति ।

नित्यं शुद्धं विबुद्धं विकृतिविरहितं नित्यमुक्तस्वभावं
सत्यं सूक्ष्मं निरस्तद्वयमनवयवं पूर्णमानन्दरूपम् ।
प्रत्यग्ब्रह्माहमस्मि स्वरसदृशि रवौ ध्वान्तवद्विश्वमेत-
न्नासीदास्ते भविष्यत्यपि मयि सुखसज्ज्योतिरात्मन्यसङ्गे ॥

[I am That which is free from origination and destruction, without any flaw, Self-effulgent Consciousness, free of the six-fold modification, ever free from even the possibility of bondage, unsublatable, devoid of properties such as grossness etc., free

from duality, without any internal difference, pervading within and without, of the nature of unalloyed Bliss, the Innermost Witness of *antahkarana* etc , Ātman, verily Brahman, the purport of all the Śrutis. Just as darkness cannot exist in the Sun who is by nature bright, the universe did not, does not, and will not exist in Me, the Bliss, Existence, Consciousness, transcending the triad of states.]

So declare the Śrutis etc.,—

न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिर्न बद्धो न च साधकः ।
न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥ (Mā. Kā. 2-32)

[There is no dissolution, no origination, none in bondage, none aspiring for wisdom, no seeker of liberation and none liberated This is the absolute Truth]

तदेतद्ब्रह्मापूर्वमनपरमनन्तरमबाह्यमयमात्मा ब्रह्म सर्वानुभूः ।
(Br. U. 4-5-19)

[That Brahman which is Ātman is without cause or effect, without interior or exterior, this Self, the perceiver of everything, is Brahman.]

ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यते । (Mā. Kā. 1-18)

[This duality exists not, when the highest Truth is known.]

तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्थसम्यग्धीजन्ममात्रतः ॥
अविद्या सह कार्येण नासीदस्ति भविष्यति ।
(Saṁ. Vā 183, 184)

[On the mere rise of the true knowledge generated by the *Mahāvākya* 'That thou art', Avidyā, along with its effects, was not, is not and will not be]

10.8.2 Sublation of Sakshitva of Atman

In this connection, the *Siddhāntabindu* (9) raises an objection—Since what is involved in each of the triad of states, as being attached to it, is false along with the states, their Witness also would be false, there being nothing special in Him—

ननु जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्त्यवस्थासहिताना त्रयाणामपि तदभिमानिना मिथ्या-त्वात्तत्साक्षिणोऽपि मिथ्यात्वं स्यादविशेषादित्याशङ्क्य विशेषाभिधानेन साक्षिणः सत्यत्वमाह्।

This is answered in the *Daśaślokī* (9)—

अपि व्यापकत्वाद्धितत्वप्रयोगात्स्वतस्सिद्धभावादनन्याश्रयत्वात् ।
जगत्तुच्छमेतत्समस्तं तदन्यत्तदेकोऽवशिष्टः शिवः केवलोऽहम् ॥

[Moreover, Ātman being all-pervading, It having been taught to be the highest object of man's attainment, It being of the nature of self-manifest knowledge and not dependent on anything else, the whole of this universe which is of a nature different from It, is unreal. I am that One, which alone remains over, the Auspicious and Absolute. The import is that all else is naught, Ātman alone is.]

10.8.3 Sublation of Akhandakaravritti; Sublator

Here a doubt may be raised—when the primal ignorance is destroyed by the *Akhandākāravṛtti*, even though the entire universe which is a product of ignorance is sublated, this *Brahmākāravṛtti* remains over, there being nothing to destroy it; and as such duality persists Therefore what remains over is not the One without a second If another *vṛtti* is brought in to destroy this *antaḥkaranavṛtti*, then that *vṛtti* remains over as the second and this process results in infinite regress. As such there is no escape at all from duality. Says the *Svārājyasiddhiṭīkā* (2-61)—

नन्वस्त्वखण्डाकारवृत्त्या मूलाज्ञाननाशे तत्कार्यसर्वप्रपञ्चबाधः तथापि नाद्वितीयवस्तुपरिशेषः, ब्रह्माकारवृत्तेर्नाशकाभावेन परिशेषे तयैव सद्वितीयताया दुर्वारत्वात्। यदि च तद्बाधाय वृत्त्यन्तरमपेक्ष्येत तर्हि तस्या एव परिशेषः स्यात्। अन्यान्यवृत्त्यभ्युपगमे त्वनवस्था स्यादिति सद्वितीयपरिशेषो दुर्वार इत्याशङ्कामपाकुर्वन्नाह—इत्थमिति ।

By way of removing this doubt says the *Svārājyasiddhi* (2-62)—

इत्थ वाक्याद्विमृष्टादरणिविमथनाद्वह्निकीलेव सद्यः
संभूताखण्डवृत्तिस्तृणमिव निखिलद्वैतजालं समोहम् ।
दग्ध्वा निर्वाणसंज्ञे निरतिशयसुखे नित्यसिद्धात्मतत्त्वे
सद्यो याति प्रणाशं कतकरज इवोदस्य पङ्कं जलस्य ॥

[The *Akhandākāravrtti*, the plenary experience, which has been shown decisively as the purport of the entire Śruti, even as it arises, destroys the entire mesh of duality along with its cause, Avidyā, and itself disappears immediately, leaving over the Eternal, Non-dual Ātman, the Supreme Bliss, spoken of as *Nirvāna*, in the manner of fire churned with the help of two sticks, which burns the grass and then becomes extinguished; or in the manner of the powder of the clearing fruit, *kataka*, which subsides after removing the mud from water]

These two examples are cited also in the *Advaitasiddhi* and the *Siddhāntaleśasangraha*

It is accepted that Vedic injunction स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः (One's own Veda should be learnt) pertains to the entire Veda inclusive of itself, the notion of difference is brought in to differentiate one thing from another as also itself from either of them. Avidyā is responsible for itself and its ramifications as well. Consciousness is responsible for making known all else and Itself as well and the statement नेह नानास्ति (In this Ātman there is no multiplicity) refutes all duality inclusive of itself. In the same way the acceptance that the *Akhandākāravrtti* sublates all duality inclusive of itself, is without blemish. The *vrtti* as associated with Consciousness is the sublator as differentiated from its insentient aspect which is the sublated.

This would not involve the defect of the *vrtti* being both the subject and the object of one and the same process

of sublation, since the sublation of the primal ignorance is accepted as the sublation of all duality Nor would it involve the defect of simultaneity of both the origination and the destruction of the *vṛtti*, as sublation, relating itself to the three periods of the past, the present and the future, is accepted to be different from destruction. All this has been said by viewing *Akhandākāravṛttijñāna* i.e., बोधेद्धा बुद्धिः, as the *vṛtti* in which Consciousness is reflected as the dispeller of *ajñāna*. Alternatively, if बुद्धीद्धो बोधः i.e., Consciousness in association with the *vṛtti* is viewed as the dispeller of *ajñāna*, as in the example cited, of the fire burning the grass, there would not be any defect The two illustrations given in the *śloka* are indicative of the alternative views Says the *Svārājyasiddhiṭīkā* (2-62)—

'स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः' इति विधेः स्वपरविधिप्रवर्तकत्ववद्भेदस्य स्वपरभेदकत्ववदविद्यायाः स्वपरनिर्वाहकत्ववच्चैतन्यस्य स्वपरप्रकाशत्ववत् 'नेह नानास्ति' इति वाक्यस्य स्वपरसाधारणसर्वद्वैतनिषेधकत्ववच्च वृत्तेरपि स्वपरसाधारणसर्वद्वैतबाधकत्वाभ्युपगमे दोषाभावात्। चित्सवलितरूपेण बाधकता, जडमात्रांशेन बाध्यतेति भेदसंभवाच्च। न चैवं वृत्तेः स्वबाधकत्वे स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोध उत्पत्तिध्वंसयौगपद्यापत्तिश्चेति वाच्यम्। मूलाज्ञानबाधस्यैव सर्वद्वैतबाधात्मकत्वाभ्युपगमेन आद्यदोषाभावात्। बाधस्य त्रैकालिकत्वेन ध्वंसवैलक्षण्याभ्युपगमाच्च द्वितीयदोषस्याप्यभावादिति। इदं च बोधेद्धा बुद्धिरेव अज्ञाननिवर्तिकेति मतमाश्रित्योक्तम्। यदि च तृणादिसंधुक्षितो वह्निरिव बुद्धीद्धो बोध एव सर्वद्वैतबाधक इति सिद्धान्तः पर्यालोच्यते तदा तु न कश्चिद्दोषः। एतन्मतभेदसूचनायैव हि श्लोके दृष्टान्तद्वयोपादानमिति भावः।

What the dispeller of *ajñāna* does is this—All those coming under the category of *vyāvṛttas* like बाल्यादि, जाग्रदादि, the six-fold transformation inclusive of death as pertaining to the gross body, the various gross bodies one after another in the

various lives, the disposition, moods etc , of the subtle body as also the apparently persisting subtle body in various lives, Avidyā itself as also the final *vṛtti* that is the *Akhanḍākāravṛtti*, are removed without any vestige whatsoever. *Vyāvṛttas* mean also those that are excluded. Discarding these, one has to take hold firmly of what 'is' i.e., Ātman that can never be *vyāvṛtta*. That is, look into and search only for Ātman by leaving out every one of these, by steadfast devotion. This steadfast devotion is really devotion to the *Ācārya*, the *Jñānasvarūpa*, the *Sphurana*, which is only one and the same at all times and everywhere In this search, the direction is secured by always being aware that the 'Light' for this search in darkness, Avidyā, comes only from the *Sphuraṇa*, the Inner Self, the *Ācārya*, Īśvara And the obstacles in the way, the *vyāvṛttas*, are all removed by the Grace and continuous instruction from the *Ācārya*. Intellectual impediments are because of the wrong notions of Ātman and Brahman.

These are removed by a proper study of the Veda and the *Vedānta*, the fruit of which is in making known the *Svarūpa* of Brahman-Ātman as revealed by the *Mahāvākyas*—'That Thou art' which is the *Upadeśavākya* (instruction) and 'I am Brahman' which is the *Anubhavavākya* (experience). All else in the Veda and the *Vedānta* is only auxiliary to this, as the Śruti and the *Gītā* show—

सर्वे वेदा यत्पदमामनन्ति (Ka. U. 1-2-15)

वेदैश्च सर्वैरहमेव वेद्यो वेदान्तकृद्वेदविदेव चाहम् ॥ (*Gītā* XV-15)

This *Akhanḍākāravṛttijñāna* is the culmination in the removal of all impediments pertaining to the realisation of Brahman-Ātman So it is that the training for this purpose till the culmination precedes the actual experience of the व्यावृत्तास्वनुवर्तमानमहमित्यन्तः स्फुरन्तं सदा. Says the *Bṛhadvārtika*—

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं वस्तु ब्रह्मेति भण्यते ।
ब्रह्मार्थो दुर्लभोऽत्र स्याद्द्वितीये सति वस्तुनि ॥

10.8.4 Progress Temporal; Perfection, the Eternity, in a Flash

It should not be thought that progress and perfection are conceptions pointing to the same level of experience. The one takes place in time; the other signifies transcending it. Perfection is not attained in the time order, but it is victory over time. That is, perfection is not to be understood as taking place gradually or step by step, but in a flash at some point during the progress This is the significance of the Śruti quoted by Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda in the *Kathopanisad-bhāsya* (1-3-12)—अनध्वगा अध्वसु पारयिष्णवः—which means that the knowers 'arrive at the goal without travelling'. The *cidacidgranthi* is torn asunder by the *Mahāvākyajñāna* and thereafter the *Cit* shines in Its full glory. That the *granthi* is torn means that the names and forms of all that is super-imposed including Avidyā, the very existence of which is only the Substratum, स्वरूपेणाध्यस्त, are sublated leaving behind *Sat*, the *Adhiṣṭhāna*, अधिष्ठानावशेषो हि नाशः कल्पितवस्तुनः.

10.8.5 'Sublation' of Maya

Says the *Sūtrabhāsya* (2-1-6-14)—

सर्वज्ञस्येश्वरस्यात्मभूत इवाविद्याकल्पिते नामरूपे तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्याम-निर्वचनीये संसारप्रपञ्चबीजभूते सर्वज्ञस्येश्वरस्य मायाशक्तिः प्रकृतिरिति च श्रुतिस्मृत्योरभिलप्येते ।

[Name and form which constitute the seeds of the entire expanse of phenomenal existence and which are conjured up by Avidyā, are, as it were, non-different from the Omniscient Īśvara and they are non-determinable as real or unreal and are mentioned in the Śrutis and *Smrtis* as the power called Māyā of the Omniscient Īśvara or as *Prakrti*, the primordial nature]

Says the *Bhāsya* on the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* (1-3-11)—

महतोऽपि परं सूक्ष्मतरं प्रत्यगात्मभूतं सर्वमहत्तरं चाव्यक्तं सर्वस्य जगतो वीजभूतमव्याकृतनामरूपं सतत्त्वं सर्वकार्यकारणशक्तिसमाहाररूपमव्यक्ताव्याकृताकाशादिनामवाच्य परमात्मन्योतप्रोतभावेन समाश्रितम् . . . ।

[Beyond even the *mahat*, subtler than that, being its internal principle, greater than all is the *avyakta*, the seed of all the universe, the unmanifest state of name and form, the combined state of the potentialities of all causes and effects, denoted by the terms *avyakta*, *avyākrta*, *ākāśa* etc , entering in the Supreme Ātman as warp and woof. . .]

This power, Māyā, is the very essence of the cause, and the effect is the very essence of the power, as the *Sūtrabhāsya* (2-1-6-18) says—

कारणस्यात्मभूता शक्तिः, शक्तेश्चात्मभूत कार्यम् ।

In respect of this power, the *Darśanasarvasva* (p. 193) says—

ब्रह्मैव पारमार्थिक तत्त्वम्, तस्यास्त्येका मायाख्या शक्तिः ; सा च वस्तुतस्ततोऽभिन्नापि कल्पिततद्भेदवती, ब्रह्मणः सत्यत्वेन तु तद्रूपेण सा सत्येत्युच्यते, ब्रह्मातिरिक्तत्वस्य मिथ्यात्वेन तु तेन रूपेण सा मिथ्येति कथ्यते । स्वरूपतः सा सत्या वा मिथ्या वेति प्रश्ने तु स्वरूप यदि ब्रह्मरूपत्वं वा ब्रह्मभिन्नत्व वा विवक्षितं तदोक्तमेवोत्तरम् । यदि तु मायात्वशक्तित्वदृश्यत्वादिकम्, तदा धर्ममात्रस्य मिथ्यात्वेन तत्तद्धर्मेण रूपेण सा मिथ्यैव । एव सति तत्तद्धर्मोपलक्षितं स्वरूप सत्यं स्यादिति पर्यनुयोगे त्विष्टापत्तिरेव, ब्रह्मण एव सर्वधर्मोपलक्षितत्वात् । घटत्वादिनापि तस्यैव व्यवहारात् । सा च शक्तिरनुपपन्नार्थप्रदर्शकत्वरूपस्वातन्त्र्यशालितयाऽपर्यनुयोज्या सत्यत्वे मिथ्यात्वे वोक्तरीत्या स्वानुरूपान् भ्रान्तान् भ्रमविपयान् भ्रमांश्च नैकविधान् स्फारयति, स्वयमेवोद्भासितेन चोपायकलापेन कांश्चिन्मुक्ततया भासयति, वस्तुतस्तु न बन्धो न वा मोक्षः । नन्वेवं भ्रम-

*

निवृत्तिरेव मायाया निवृत्तिर्न तु स्वरूपतोऽपि तस्या निवृत्तिरिति स्यादित्याक्षेपे तु पूर्वोदीरितरीत्यैवोत्तरम्, यथा मिथ्या तथा निवृत्ता, यथा तु सत्या तथाऽवशिष्टेति चिदतिरिक्तं नावशिष्टम् ।

[Brahman alone is the ultimate Reality It has a power spoken of as Māyā Though it is, in fact, non-different from Brahman, it is concocted as different from Brahman In its 'aspect' as non-different from Brahman, the Reality, it is construed as real In its 'aspect' (which, however, is *mithyā*) as other than Brahman, it is *mithyā*, since otherness from Brahman is itself *mithyā*. If it is asked whether in itself i.e , by its own *svarūpa*, it is real or *mithyā*, the answer to this question is as shown above in either case i.e., whether by *svarūpa* is meant non-difference from Brahman or otherness from Brahman—if by *svarūpa* is meant its Māyā-aspect i e , power-aspect i e , if its *svarūpa* is what characterises it as Māyā, power, or as an object of knowledge, then in each of these aspects, it is verily *mithyā*, since all characteristics are *mithyā* This being so, if it is remarked that the *svarūpa* indicated by each of these characteristics is real, it is indeed acceptable that way since Brahman Itself is the One indicated by all characteristics ; even potness etc , stand for Brahman alone. This power is not to be questioned, as it has the liberty of presenting phenomena which defy reason

Whatever it is, real or *mithyā*, it shows up in consonance with itself, illusions, objects of illusions and those under the sway of illusion, variously. It also presents some as liberated, by the means which is also set up by itself; but in actuality there is neither bondage nor liberation. If it is objected that in such a case, removal of illusion would itself have to be the removal of Māyā and Māyā as such would not be removed, the answer is the same as what has already been given viz , in so far as it is *mithyā*, it is removed , but as Reality it remains over ; however, nothing different from *Cit* remains over]

10.8.6 Ajnana Once Sublated Never Reappears; Badha Distinguished from Pradhvamsabhava; Abhava a Vikalpa

Removing the possible doubt that *ajñāna* that is destroyed by *jñāna* might reappear much in the same way as the universe which reappears after being destroyed in dissolution, the nature of sublation is made clear in the *Svārājyasiddhi* (3-15)—

ननु ज्ञानेन नाशितमप्यज्ञानं प्रलये नष्टं जगदिव पुनरुद्भवेदित्याशङ्कां वारयन् तद्बाधस्वरूपं निर्धारयति—बाधितमिति ।

बाधितं स्यादसद्ध्वस्तवैधर्म्यतो मोहबाधोऽपि न ध्वंसरूपोऽपरः ।
बाधबुद्धिश्च नाऽभावमात्रप्रथा स्यादभावोऽप्यधिष्ठानरूपोऽथवा ॥

A thing that is sublated is absolutely non-existent, without any residue left in a potential form, as distinguished from an existent effect that merges into the cause on destruction. The sublation of Avidyā is not non-existence posterior to destruction, *pradhvamsābhāva*, formulated by the *Naiyāyikas*, for, if that were the case, this *pradhvamsābhāva* would continue to exist and there would be duality in liberation. Rather, it is only the Substratum itself. So it is that *ajñāna* that is sublated, really never was, never is and never will be, as shown already. Again, destruction is only the ultimate state of transformation of an existent, and not a form of non-existence, *abhāva*, for it is reasonable to regard destruction only as the merging of an existent in its cause. It is also suggestive of this that a non-existent to which no quality can be ascribed cannot be said to be related to attributes like origination etc., counter-correlate, substratum etc., distinction from absolute non-existence, difference etc. If it is objected that even if sublation is none other than absolute non-existence at all time, that itself remains over as the second entity, the reply is—the notion of sublation is not

merely the notion of non-existence, for in that case the statement 'there is no colour in the air' would have to be characterised as sublation On the other hand, it must be accepted that sublation is the experience of the non-existence of the superimposed in the substratum. So then let that which cannot but be accepted—the knowledge of the substratum—be the sublating knowledge and not the knowledge of *abhāva* i.e., the non-existence of the superimposed The *abhāva*, also being *anirvacanīya*, must be traced to Māyā and thus cannot continue to abide after the sublation of Māyā. If it is maintained that—since the *Vārtika* "was not, is not and will not be", referring to Avidyā and its products uses the particle *na* (not), the sublating knowledge has necessarily to refer to *abhāva* as experienced—such prattling is accommodated as well, by pointing out that in such notions as 'in the non-existence of the pot, the pot is not' even though the two viz., the support and the supported are identical, they are referred to as being different (a distinction without a difference). This is a *vikalpa*, a notion consequent on the knowledge of the words employed, an expression, however, without a content. So also is the notion that the ground is bereft of the pot; it is the mere ground itself that is referred to relating it to a pot or without it; as such there is no such thing like an *abhāva* other than its support Or again, the two *abhāvas* viz , that of the sublating cognition and that of the superposed entity that is sublated, are both only of the *svarūpa* of the substratum itself When the counter-correlate is *mithyā*, it cannot be maintained that it is a counter-correlate of a real *abhāva*. The idea is—if it is said, however, that the *abhāva* is also *mithyā*, then the substratum alone remains over So says the *ṭīkā* on the *Svārājyasiddhi* (3-15)—

ननु त्रैकालिकात्यन्ताभाव एव प्रथमानो बाधोऽस्तु तथापि तेनैव सद्वितीयतेत्याशङ्क्याह—बाधबुद्धिश्चेति । नाभावमात्रप्रथा बाधबुद्धिः । वायौ रूपं नास्तीति प्रथाया अपि तथात्वप्रसङ्गात् । अपि तु तदारोपाधिष्ठाने तदभावप्रथेत्यवश्य वाच्यम् । एवं तर्ह्यवश्यापेक्षिताधिष्ठानतत्त्वप्रथैव अव्यभिचरिता बाधबुद्धिरस्तु नाभावप्रथा । अभावस्याप्यनिर्वचनीयतया मायिकत्वव्यवस्थापनेन मायानिवृत्तौ स्थित्ययोगादित्यर्थः । ननु 'नासीदस्ति भविष्यति' इति सत्कार्योऽविद्यानिवृत्तेर्वार्तिके नञा उल्लेखादभावप्रथा आवश्यकी बाधबुद्धाविति जल्पंस्तुष्यत्वित्यभिप्रेत्याह—स्यादिति । अथवेति पक्षान्तरे । घटाभावे घटो नास्तीति प्रत्यये, अभेदेऽपि 'शब्दज्ञानानुपाती वस्तुशून्यो विकल्पः' इति विकल्परूपस्य आधाराधेयभावप्रत्ययस्य दर्शनाद्भूतले घटो नास्तीति प्रत्ययेऽपि भूतलस्यैव घटसापेक्षनिरपेक्षरूपाभ्या तथा व्यपदेशप्रत्यययोः सिद्धेर्नाधिकरणादन्योऽभावोऽस्तीत्यर्थः । अथवा आरोपाधिकरणे बाधबुद्धिविपययोरभावोऽधिष्ठानरूप एव । मिथ्याभूतस्य प्रतियोगिनो वस्तुतः सत्याभावप्रतियोगित्वादिनिरूपकत्वायोगात् । अभावस्यापि मिथ्यात्वे त्वधिष्ठानमात्रस्यैव परिशेषादिति भावः ।

In this connection may be recalled the *Bhāsyas* by Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda—

प्रध्वंसाभावोऽप्यारभ्यत इत्यभावस्य विशेषाभावाद्विकल्पमात्रमेतत् । भावप्रतियोगी ह्यभावः । यथा ह्यभिन्नोऽपि भावो घटपटादिभिर्विशेष्यते भिन्न इव 'घटभावः', 'पटभावः' इति । एव निर्विशेषोऽप्यभावः क्रियागुणयोगाद्द्रव्यादिवद्विकल्प्यते । न ह्यभाव उत्पलादिवद्विशेषणसहभावी । विशेषणवत्त्वे भाव एव स्यात् । (*Bhāṣya* on Tai. U. 1)

[To say that *pradhvamsābhāva* is produced is only a verbal quibble, in as much as nothing specific can be predicated of *abhāva* *Abhāva* is indeed only the negative of *bhāva* Just as existence, *bhāva*, though one and the same throughout, is yet distinguished by cloth, pot etc ,—e.g , we speak of the existence of a cloth, the existence of a pot etc ,—so also though *abhāva* is

in itself devoid of all distinctions, yet it is spoken of as different, and in association with different acts or qualities, as though it were a substance etc *Abhāva* cannot, indeed, be associated with attributes as the blue lotus is associated with its attributes. If it were possessed of attributes, then it would come under the category of *bhāva*]

Says the *Ānandagiriṭikā* on it—

प्रतियोगिना च विशेषणेन नाभावस्य सहभावोऽस्ति। घटप्रध्वंसस्य नित्यत्वे घटस्यापि नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गात्।

[*Abhāva* cannot be associated with the counter-positive as an attribute, for, in that case if the destruction of a pot is eternal, the pot also would have to be eternal.]

Says the *Vārtika* on it—

आविर्भावतिरोभावैर्धर्मिण्यां मृदि सर्वदा।
धर्मा घटादयः सर्वे वर्तन्ते न त्वभावगाः॥
नास्त्यभावस्य संबन्धः क्रियया वा गुणेन वा।
निरात्मकत्वान्नैवालं संबद्धुं केनचित् क्वचित्॥
तस्मात् स्यात्कल्पनामात्रो व्यवहारप्रसिद्धये।
प्रध्वसादिरभावोऽयं शिलापुत्रादिवन्मृषा॥
तस्मादविद्याव्युच्छित्तौ स्यादवस्थानमात्मनि।
न चाविद्याप्रहाण स्याद्ब्रह्मविद्यामृते क्वचित्॥ (30 to 33)

[All objects such as the pot ever inhere in clay etc , which is their cause, either in the manifest form or in a latent form; they are never non-existent.

Non-existence has no relation either with action or quality. Since it has no existence it cannot be related to anything in any place

Therefore non-existence such as *pradhvamsābhāva* which is admitted for the sake of worldly parlance, is only a concoction. It is unreal like a stone-son

So when Avidyā is removed, one abides in one's own Ātman. Destruction of Avidyā can never be brought about except by Brahman-knowledge]

Says the *Sūtrabhāsya* (2-2-4-26)—

न हि . . . अभावस्य शशविषाणादीनां च निःस्वभावत्वाविशेषादभावत्वे कश्चिद्विशेषोऽस्ति, . . . यदि पुनरभावस्यापि विशेषोऽभ्युपगम्येतोत्पलादीनामिव नीलत्वादिस्ततो विशेषवत्त्वादेवाभावस्य भावत्वमुत्पलादिवत् प्रसज्येत ।

[There is no distinction as regards the nature of non-existence, since non-existence and the horns of a hare are both equally unsubstantial (false) .. If again, distinctive attributes be ascribed to non-existence like blueness etc , of a lotus etc , then, on the very analogy of the lotus etc , non-existence will turn out to be an existent by the very fact of possessing qualities.]

Again says the *Gītābhāsya* (XVIII-48)—

घटादेरेव प्रागभावस्य स्वकारणसंबन्धो भवति न वन्ध्यापुत्रादेरभावस्य तुल्यत्वेऽपीति विशेषोऽभावस्य वक्तव्यः । एकस्याभाव', द्वयोरभावः, सर्वस्याभावः, प्रागभावः, प्रध्वंसाभावः, इतरेतराभावः, अत्यन्ताभावः—इति लक्षणतो न केनचिद्विशेषो दर्शयितु शक्यः ।

[If we are to hold that the *prāgabhāva* of only a pot etc., becomes related to the cause, but not that of the barren woman's son etc., notwithstanding that both are alike non-entities, *abhāva*, it is necessary to show how one non-entity can be distinguished from the other Non-existence of one, non-existence of two, non-existence of all, antecedent non-existence, *prāgabhāva*, non-existence after destruction, *pradhvamsābhāva*, reciprocal non-existence, *itaretarābhāva*, absolute non-existence, *atyantābhāva*—nobody can point out any definite distinctions among these in themselves.]

10.8.7 Universe—Brahman-Atman Alone for the Wise ; Diverse for the Deluded

It is thus seen that however much the notion of *abhāva*

be deemed to be useful in parlance, it is an empty concept that has been concocted. That the notions of *bheda* (difference) and *sambandha* (relation) are also such indefinite entities that are concocted, has already been seen So are *guna* (attribute), *karma* etc , in relation to *dravya* (substance) which itself is none other than the *Satpadārtha*, Existence Also, space, time, Śruti, *Ācārya*, Self and all else have been seen to be none other than Brahman Itself. All distinctions based on names and forms are but concoctions—*vikalpas* The hymn itself in the third stanza characterises all that is spoken of as other than Self as having only apparent existence and not real existence. In the ninth stanza of the hymn in the lines—

> भूरम्भांस्यनलोऽनिलोऽम्बरमहर्नाथो हिमांशुः पुमा-
> नित्याभाति चराचरात्मकमिद यस्यैव मूर्त्यष्टकम् ।
> नान्यत्किञ्चन विद्यते विमृशतां यस्मात्परस्माद्विभोः

it is asserted that what appears, *ābhāti*, as the eight-fold form of Īśvara with the ingredients—earth, water, fire, air, ether, Sun, Moon and Self—i e., the entire universe of the moving and the unmoving, is seen by the discerning as none other than the Supreme and All-pervading i.e., all else is but *vikalpa* It is only those who are deluded by Māyā that see otherwise, as the eighth stanza of the hymn says—

> विश्वं पश्यति कार्यकारणतया स्वस्वामिसंबन्धतः
> शिष्याचार्यतया तथैव पितृपुत्राद्यात्मना भेदतः ।
> स्वप्ने जाग्रति वा य एष पुरुषो मायाऽपरिभ्रामितः

10.9 Realisation—Fact of Experience; All Speculative Reasoning Set at Rest

10.9.1 Instruction to Whom—Brahman or Another?

The *Siddhāntabindu*—(7) speaks in a similar vein by way

of replying to a question that is typical of the ones that are raised in this situation—

ननु कस्य ब्रह्मभाव उपदिश्यते, ब्रह्मणोऽब्रह्मणो वा? नान्त्यः। तस्य जडत्वादसत्त्वाच्च। न प्रथमः। उपदेशानर्थक्यात्। ब्रह्मभावस्य स्वत एव सिद्धत्वात्। जीवस्य स्वतो ब्रह्मभावेऽप्यविद्याव्यवधानं ज्ञानेन निवर्त्यत इति चेन्न। अविद्यानिवृत्तेरनात्मत्वे द्वैतापत्तेर्ब्रह्मणोऽसिद्धिप्रसङ्गात्। तदुक्त वार्तिके—

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं वस्तु ब्रह्मेति भण्यते।
ब्रह्मार्थो दुर्लभोऽत्र स्याद्द्वितीये सति वस्तुनि ॥ इति।

अभिन्नत्वे चोपदेशानर्थक्यमित्युक्तम्। अत्र किं परमार्थतः फलाभावमभिप्रैपि, किं वा प्रतीतितोऽपि? तत्राद्यमिष्टापत्त्या परिहरति—

न शास्ता न शास्त्रं न शिष्यो न शिक्षा न च त्वं न चाहं न चायं प्रपञ्चः।
स्वरूपावबोधो विकल्पासहिष्णुस्तदेकोऽवशिष्टः शिवः केवलोऽहम् ॥

अयमर्थ.—यद्यप्यविद्यानिवृत्तिरात्मानात्मा वेत्यादिविकल्पने किमपि फलं निरूपयितु न शक्यते, तथापि स्वरूपावबोधो विज्ञानफलमनुभूयते। न चैतत्कथमिति शङ्कनीयम्। सर्वद्वैतोपमर्देन विकल्पासहिष्णुत्वात्। नहि दृष्टेऽनुपपन्नं नाम। . . . पूर्वमपि ब्रह्मस्वरूपस्यैव सतो जीवस्य ज्ञानाद्ब्रह्मभाव दर्शयति। सर्वं च द्वैतं वारयति।

[Who is it that is taught to realise one's own Brahmanhood? Is it Brahman or other than Brahman? Not the latter, because it is insentient and unreal. Not the former, for, Brahman being self-evident, the instruction would be futile If it is said that though jīva is by itself Brahman, the impediment of Avidyā is removed by knowledge, it cannot be so because if the removal of Avidyā is different from Ātman, then there would be duality and Non-dual Brahman would not be established. It has been said in the *Bṛhadvārtika*—An entity that is neither excluded by anything nor inhering in everything, is termed Brahman, if there were a second entity, it would not be possible to find a thing termed Brahman.

If the removal of Avidyā is non-different from Brahman, then the instruction would be futile as stated already. Is this futility meant in the ultimate sense or even in empirical parlance? Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda, welcoming the former view, clears the issue—There is in fact neither the preceptor nor the scripture nor the pupil nor the teaching Neither is there in fact what you call 'thou', nor what you know as 'I', nor this phenomenal universe. Although the discussion as to whether the removal of Avidyā is identical with, or different from, Ātman, leads nowhere, still the realisation of the Blissful Self-effulgent Brahman-Ātman—the result of enquiry—is a fact of experience. Nor should anyone doubt as to how this can happen. All duality being exterminated, there is no scope whatsoever for any speculation or questioning In the face of direct experience, rejection on grounds of reasoning is impossible.]

10 9.2 Removal of Avidya—Questions

The discussion so far in the *Svārājyasiddhi* and the *Siddhāntabindu* quoted here, centres round the apparent onslaught of the so-called reasoning on the idea of the removal of Avidyā as pertaining to the nature of the remover, the removal, the removed, Ātman and Brahman and the manner of meeting it effectively. The questions and objections raised are for example—Is the remover merely the *Akhaṇḍākāravṛtti* which is insentient or is it the sentient Ātman? How does it operate? Does the remover remain over after the removal of Avidyā? How is this remover removed? Does Avidyā that has been removed recur? Is this remover an ultimate reality or *anirvacanīya*? Whose Avidyā is it that is removed? Is it that of Omniscient Brahman or the insentient non-Brahman? In either of these cases, instruction would be futile. Is Avidyā removed by Brahman-knowledge? Is the removal of Avidyā, *sat*, *asat*, *sadasat* or *anirvacanīya*? If *sat*, is it different or non-different

from Ātman or both? Since these questions have no satisfactory answers, there can be no such thing like liberation characterised as the removal of Avidyā by Brahman-knowledge How can *Akhandākāravṛttijñāna* which is *mithyā* be a *pramāṇa*?

These and a host of other such questions raised in respect of That which transcends all speculation are not at all pertinent and are futile gymnastics like wrestling with the empty sky. Many scholars with their minds overpowered with dualistic tendencies and those who have not enjoyed the fragrance of the knowledge of the ultimate Reality, deny the removal of Avidyā by Brahman-knowledge. So says the *Tattvaśuddhi*-44—

इह खलु वहवो भेदवासितान्तःकरणाः सन्तः, अनाघ्रातपरमार्थतत्त्वविज्ञाना ब्रह्मविज्ञाननिमित्तामज्ञाननिवृत्तिमपलपन्ति । . . . यदप्युक्त 'अज्ञाननिवृत्तिः किं सती किं वा असती ?' इत्यादि, तदखिलमाकाशमुष्टिहननमिवायोग्यविपयमेवानवसरदुष्टं विकल्पजालमुत्पश्यामः ।

10.9.3 Appeal to Direct Experience

While schools other than the *Vedānta* seek to establish their own point of view, they also resort to *jalpa* in the process. The enquirers who resort to *vādakathā* also become unsettled thereby. In order to protect them, the concepts of the other schools are examined, their arguments met and appropriate formulations are given as well. For example, the remover of Avidyā is not merely either the *vṛtti* or Brahman-Ātman, the Substratum-Consciousness, but it is the Consciousness in association with the *vṛtti* or the *vṛtti* in association with the Consciousness—'बुद्धीद्धो बोधः' or 'बोधेद्धा बुद्धिः'. Sublation, बाध, is not the same as destruction, ध्वंस, of the *Naiyāyikas* which is a transformation of an existent,

भावविकार, and which is momentary, क्षणिक. It is not absolute non-existence, अत्यन्ताभाव, of the *Naiyāyikas* either. What is formulated is in consonance with experience in respect of illusions like the shell-silver etc. The fruit of sublation by *Akhandākāravrtti* also belongs only to the world of parlance, प्रातीतिक, and not ultimately real, पारमार्थिक. What is a *pramāna* need not be real, *satya*; the criterion is only the generation of unsublated knowledge In this respect Śruti with its purport in the *Mahāvākya* is the *pramāna*. *Akhandākāravṛtti* is only an indicator, उपलक्षक, and disappears with its material cause, Avidyā, and therefore there is no duality in liberation that is Brahman-Ātman. Above all, the *Vedānta* is based on the realisation, the direct experience, of Brahman-Ātman, which no type of reasoning can unsettle, नहि दृष्टेऽनुपपन्नं नाम. So is it that the *Daśaślokī* says—विकल्पासहिष्णुः. Says the *Vārtika* (4-3-421)—

तस्मात्संभावनामात्रः संसारः प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
उक्तेऽर्थे मशयश्चेत्स्यात् प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्या समीक्ष्यताम् ॥

[Therefore *samsāra* is only fancifully imagined in the Inner Ātman If there is doubt in this respect, see it for yourself, abiding in *Pratyagātman* i e, by direct experience]

10.9.4 Attack on Avidya; Onslaught on the Non-existent

This experience shows that the removal of Avidyā does not mean anything negative, because categorisation like negative and positive obtains only in the realm of Avidyā Says the *Vārtika*—Avidyā itself being unreal, the knowledge of the Supreme Ātman, fighting shy to kill the already dead, consumes the negative character also; and having burnt the very classification, negative and positive entities, through the fire of Ātman as 'not this, not this' and having removed the darkness and the error created by it, itself enters the fire—

स्वयमेव त्ववस्तुत्वादविद्यायाः परात्मधीः ।
मृतमारणाल्लज्जन्ती साभावमपि निर्दहेत् ॥
भावाभावविभागं सा नेति नेत्यात्मवह्निना ।
प्लुष्टापास्ततमस्तज्जविकल्पात्मानलं विशेत् ॥

Again, it has been shown that the concepts so dextrously postulated by the opponents are many a time concocted ones, which are empty without content, *vikalpas*, imaginary. The case of *abhāva*, its relations with the ground to the counter-correlate etc , and divisions within its fold, have been exposed in the light of the *Bhāsya* and the *Svārājyasiddhi*. So are relations and differences, however valuable all these are, in the practical affairs in the empirical world. So is the fate of every concept As will be evident on thorough examination it is a *vikalpa*, *tucchā*. What is taken as a fact, *vāstava*, in empirical life has to be spoken of as *anirvacanīya* when reasoning is brought to bear on it and in the ultimate it will be *tucchā* as the *Pañcadaśī* has shown. Illusions, for example the case of a serpent in a rope, are sufficiently illustrative of this state of affairs The hymn itself indicates this by—असत्कल्पार्थगम्, व्यावृत्तासु, नान्यत्किञ्चन विद्यते विमृग्यताम् and सर्वात्मत्वम्. All *prakriyās*, reasonings etc., are when one is in the throes of Avidyā, just as all problems pertaining to *srsti*, *sthiti*, *laya*, past, present and future are for the one who is in the throes of time. When time is transcended the problems pertaining to these are no longer there. Categorisation, use of reasoning and raising of questions etc., are all attempts of the one in the realm of Avidyā, to get over Avidyā, after which they cannot torment any more, since they themselves are not there. While the rat, when alive, cannot kill the cat, how can it do so when it is dead? So says the *Pañcadaśī* (VII-279)—

जीवन्नाखुर्न मार्जारं हन्ति हन्यात्कथं मृतः ॥

Let the corpse of *ajñāna* and its creations, killed by Knowledge, remain. There is no fear for Knowledge, the king. On the other hand, there is only fame for him because of them; says the *Pañcadaśī* (VII-282)—

तिष्ठन्त्वज्ञानतत्कार्यशवा बोधेन मारिताः ।
न भीतिर्बोधसंराजः कीर्तिः प्रत्युत तस्य तैः ।

10.9.5 Reasoning to Subserve Experience

If the logician does not have faith in his own experience and if logic has no finality, how will he arrive at the firm knowledge of truth? If it is said that logic is required for a proper comprehension by the mind, in that case argument must conform to one's own experience and must not be perverse; says the *Pañcadaśī* (VI-29, 30)—

स्वानुभूतावविश्वासे तर्कस्याप्यनवस्थितेः ।
कथं वा तार्किकंमन्यस्तत्त्वनिश्चयमाप्नुयात् ॥

बुद्धयारोहाय तर्कश्चेदपेक्षेत तथा सति ।
स्वानुभूत्यनुसारेण तर्क्यतां मा कुतर्क्यताम् ॥

Liberation from the thraldom of questions, reasoning etc., along with their progenitor, Avidyā, by *Akhaṇḍākāravṛtti-jñāna* is a well-known fact as testified to by the experience of the liberated and vouchsafed by the Śruti (Mu. U. 2-2-18)—

भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिश्छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः ।
क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे ॥

[When He that is both high (as cause) and low (as effect) is seen, the knot of the heart is untied, all doubts are solved and all his *karma* is consumed]

Says the *Tattvaśuddhi* (44)—

अत्रेदमाचक्ष्महे। 'तरति शोकमात्मवित्' (*Ch. U.* VII 1-3)

(Here we say this—'the knower of Ātman goes beyond grief'.)

अविद्यायाः परं पारं तारयसि (*Pr. U.* VI-8)

(You alone have helped to cross the ocean of ignorance.)

भूयश्चान्ते विश्वमायानिवृत्तिः (*Śve. U.* 1-10)

(And again there is cessation of all illusions in the end.)

मामेव ये प्रपद्यन्ते मायामेतां तरन्ति ते। (*Gītā* VII-14)

(Whoever seek Me alone, they cross over this illusion.)

ज्ञानेन तु तदज्ञानं येषां नाशितमात्मनः। (*Gītā* V-16)

(To those whose ignorance is destroyed by the knowledge of Ātman)

तरत्यविद्यां विततां हृदि यस्मिन् निवेशिते

(He, on cognising whom in the heart, crosses over the Avidyā that is widely spread.)

इत्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतयस्तावज्ज्ञानादज्ञाननिवृत्तिं दर्शयन्ति। लोके च रज्ज्वादिविषयप्रमाणज्ञानं सर्पादिविपर्यासेन साकं तदज्ञानं निवर्तयद्दृश्यते। ततश्च श्रुतिस्मृतिन्यायैर्ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानादेव तद्गताज्ञानस्य कार्येण सह निवृत्तिर्निश्चीयते।

[Śrutis and *Smṛtis* such as these point out that *ajñāna* is destroyed by Jñāna In the world also it is seen that the jñāna of the rope etc, arising from *pramāṇa* removes, along with the illusion of the serpent etc, the underlying Avidyā as well Thus by Śruti, *Smṛti* and reason, it is established that Avidyā, along with its products, is removed by the cognition of the identity of Brahman and Ātman.]

10.9.6 Removal of Avidya—Experience and Arthapatti

That there is the removal of Avidyā is itself the proof of such a removal. Strictly, even Avidyā has no proof,

much less its removal. Avidyā does not stand the scrutiny of *pramāṇa*, for that is its nature. Says the *Sambandhavārtika* (181, 182)—

अविद्याया अविद्यात्व इदमेव तु लक्षणम् ॥
मानाघातासहिष्णुत्वमसाधारणमिष्यते ।

Says also the *Iṣṭasiddhi* (8-18)—

जह्यादविद्याऽविद्यात्व विचारं सहते यदि ।
न्यायाघातासहिष्णुत्वमविद्यालक्षणं यतः ॥

In the face of direct experience, the rejection of the removal of Avidyā on grounds of reasoning is impossible, just as the arrival of a lame person. That is, when a lame person, seen stranded in a forest from where there is no known means of transport to his residence in a city, is actually seen subsequently in his house, there is no point in bringing reason in support of the impossibility of his arrival. On the other hand, one must postulate that he must have been brought by a rider along with him on his horse or somebody has carried him or even that the grace of a *yogī* made him walk to his destination.

10.9.7 Removal of Avidya—Prakriyas

It is evident that in these circumstances one must have recourse to what results by *arthāpatti* i.e., presumption, because there is the well-known fact of the removal of Avidyā and it cannot apparently be categorised in any of the four known modes Depending on the import read into the words Avidyā, *anirvacanīya*, *abhāva*, *nivṛtti* etc., which are sought to be used in a technical sense, the destruction of Avidyā is characterised variously as the fifth mode, *pañcamaprakāra*, *anirvacanīya*, *adhiṣṭhānasvarūpa* etc , as is seen in the *Nyāya-makaranda*, the *Iṣṭasiddhi*, the *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha*, the

Advaitasiddhi etc. These belong to the realm of the *prakriyās* formulated for the use of the seekers of different pursuasions. The answer given depends also on whether the position is seen from the point of view of parlance or from the standpoint of realisation of Brahman-Ātman, the One Ultimate Reality.

Says the *Tattvaśuddhi*-44—

नाज्ञाननिवृत्तिः सदसदनिर्वचनीयप्रकारा अस्माभिरभ्युपगम्यते, किन्तु पञ्चमप्रकारा। सदसदादिप्रकाराः किल निवृत्तयोर्भावाभावयोरेव दृष्टाः। अज्ञान पुनः सदसद्विलक्षणम्। अतस्तन्निवृत्तिरपि तदनुसारिणी युक्ता। यक्षानुरूपो बलिरिति हि न्यायः। तस्मादज्ञानस्यानिर्वचनीयत्व ब्रह्मज्ञानादज्ञाननिवृत्तिं च श्रुतिस्मृतिन्यायैरुपलभ्य अनिर्वचनीयाज्ञानानुसारेण सदसदादिप्रकारविलक्षणामज्ञाननिवृत्ति परिकल्पयाम इति नाज्ञाननिवृत्तेरभावप्रसङ्गो नापि द्वैतवादप्रसङ्गः। अथवा आत्मस्वरूपमेव अज्ञाननिवृत्तिः . . . यथा घटादिप्रागभावनिवृत्तिर्घटादिरेव, एव ब्रह्माज्ञाननिवृत्तिरपि निवृत्तित्वान्निवृत्तिमत्प्रतियोगिस्वरूपमात्रमेवेति युक्तम्।

Says the *Śāstrasiddhāntaleśatātparyasaṅgraha* (4)—

अविद्यानिवृत्तिरपि स्वकारणाविद्यावदनिर्वाच्यैव। न चोपादानाविद्यानुवृत्त्याऽनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्ग इति वाच्यम्। तस्या निवृत्तेः क्षणिकभावविकारत्वोपगमेन स्वतो नाशात्।

[The removal of Avidyā is, just like its cause Avidyā, indefinable It cannot be said that liberation cannot result since Avidyā, the material cause, continues to exist, for, it is admitted that being itself a momentary transformation, the removal of Avidyā also disappears]

The *Advaitasiddhi* (4-1, 2) outlines the method Selections, by way of illustration, from the summary of which, as given in the *Advaitasiddhisiddhāntasāra* (4) pertaining to some of the topics already discussed, are—

*

वाक्यजा चरमा वृत्तिस्तया वृत्त्योपलक्षितः ।
आत्मैवाज्ञानहानिः स्याद्विकल्पस्तत्र नेष्यते ॥ (2)

तत्रोपलक्षणस्यैव साध्यत्वेनास्ति साध्यता ।
न चोपलक्षणध्वस्त्या ध्वस्तिर्मुक्तेरपीष्यते ॥ (3)

पाके निवृत्ते नो दृष्टा निवृत्तिः पाचकस्य वा ।
तदुक्त शास्त्रसिद्धान्तरहस्यतत्त्ववेदिभिः ॥ (4)

निवृत्तिरात्मा मोहस्य ज्ञातत्वेनोपलक्षितः ।
उपलक्षणनाशेऽपि स्यान्मुक्तिः पाचकादिवत् ॥ (5)

उपलक्ष्यस्वरूपस्यासाध्यत्वेऽप्युपलक्षणे ।
साध्यत्वेनैव साध्यत्वमुपलक्षितवस्तुनः ॥ (7)

यद्वाऽविद्यानिवृत्तिः स्याद्वृत्तिरेतद्विरोधिनी ।
यावत्कार्यजनेर्वैरिकार्यं ध्वंस इतीष्यते ॥ (8)

पाश्चात्यवृत्तिपर्यन्तविरोध्यात्मकमेव यत् ।
कार्यं तद्रूपभावेऽपि ध्वसस्याधाररूपता ॥ (9)

नेति नेतीति वेदान्तस्वारस्यादात्मनः पृथक् ।
निवृत्तिस्तात्त्विकी काचिन्नास्तीत्येव विदा मतम् ॥ (10)

तस्मादज्ञानहानिः स्यादात्मरूपं तदाकृतिः ।
वृत्तिर्वा नात्र दोषोऽपि शङ्क्यः सिद्धमिति स्फुटम् ॥ (13)

स्वज्योतिपाध्यबाध्यत्वेऽविद्याया बाधकं मतम् ।
वेदान्तजन्यपाश्चात्यवृत्त्यारूढ चिदद्वयम् ॥ (15)

वृत्त्युपारूढचैतन्यं वृत्तिर्वा चित्फलान्विता ।
निवर्तिकास्त्वविद्याया दोषो नास्ति मतद्वये ॥ (16)

जडत्वाच्छुद्धधीवृत्तेर्भासकत्वाच्चितस्तथा ।
मायाऽनिवर्तकत्वेऽपि विशिष्टेऽतोस्य संभवः ॥ (22)

[The final *vrtti* viz , the *Akhaṇḍākāravrtti* arises from the *Mahāvākya* The removal of Avidyā is verily Ātman indicated by this *vrtti* There is no room for any other conjecture in this respect Liberation is figuratively referred to as being brought about when the *vrtti*, the *upalaksana* indicating it, is brought about , and by the destruction of the *upalaksana*, liberation is not destroyed. The cook is nowhere seen to be destroyed when the cooked material is consumed. So it is said by those who know the secret that is the purport of the Śāstra that—the removal of Avidyā is Ātman indicated by the knowledge of the *Mahāvākya* , even when the *upalaksana* is destroyed, liberation continues to abide, like the cook in the example cited Even though the indicated *Svarūpa* is not a thing to be brought about, it is spoken of as being brought about only because of the *upalaksana*. *Avidyānivrtti* can very well be the *vrtti* as it is accepted that that effect which puts an end to the process of generation of effects is destruction Though destruction is an effect in opposition to all other effects, its destruction is only the *Svarūpa* of the Substratum. The interesting feature of the Śruti 'Not this, not this' is in pointing to the absence of any so-called destruction that is real as other than Ātman. Hence undoubtedly there would not be any defect in regarding the destruction of ignorance as the *Svarūpa* of Ātman or as the ultimate *vrtti*. Even though Ātman, the Consciousness without a second, is not by Itself the sublator of Avidyā, as enshrined in the ultimate *vrtti* It is the sublator The Consciousness as enshrined in the final *vrtti*, or the *vrtti* with the Consciousness as reflected in it could, without any blemish, be regarded as the sublator. Though neither the *vrtti* by itself, being inert, nor the Consciousness by Itself as the revealer, is not the sublator, the one as qualified by the other can be the sublator.]

Other incidental topics are also to be found in this work. All these are discussed elaborately in the *Advaitasiddhi* (4). The concluding sentences of (4-1) are—

प्राप्तप्राप्तिरूपतया फलस्यानन्दप्रकाशस्य स्वरूपतोऽसाध्यत्वेऽपि

तत्तिरोधायकाज्ञाननिवर्तकवृत्तेः, साध्यत्वमात्रेण साध्यत्वोपपत्तेः कण्ठगतचामी-करादौ तथा दर्शनात्। तस्मादज्ञानहानिरात्मस्वरूप तदाकारावृत्तिर्वेति सिद्धम्। ये तु पञ्चमप्रकारादिपक्षाः, ते तु मन्दबुद्धिव्युत्पादनार्था इति न तत्समर्थ-नमर्थयामः।

[Even though the fruit that is sought, *Jñānānandasvarūpa*, is all along acquired, only it is said to be acquired in so far as the *vrtti* that is the destroyer of *ajñāna* that is veiling Ātman is to be acquired, as seen in the case of an example of a necklace etc. Thus the destruction of *ajñāna* is the *Svarūpa* of Ātman or the *vrtti* with Ātman as the content. Characterising this destruction as the fifth mode etc , is only a measure adopted in the case of the less competent, and as such no attempt is made to justify it]

The hymn also, with the reading मायाऽपरिभ्रामितः in stanza eight is seen to make a reference to *prakriyās* depending on the concoctions of the deluded seeker, मायापरिभ्रामितः, as already shown Says the *Sankṣepaśārīraka* (2-163)—

स्वीयाविद्याकल्पिताचार्यवेदन्यायादिभ्यो जायते तस्य विद्या।
विद्याजन्मध्वस्तमोहस्य तस्य स्वीये रूपेऽवस्थितिः स्वप्रकाशे॥

[The knowledge of Ātman arises to the aspirant from the Guru, *Upanisads* and the principles of interpretation which are also concocted by his own Avidyā When his Avidyā is removed by the rise of knowledge of the Supreme Ātman, he abides in his own Self-effulgent *Svarūpa*.]

10.9.8 Akhandakaravritti the Ultimate Pramana

Says the *Sūtrabhāsya* (2-1-6-14)—

अपि चान्त्यमिद प्रमाणमात्मैकत्वस्य प्रतिपादक नातः परं किञ्चिदा-काङ्क्ष्यमस्ति। यथा हि लोके यजेतेत्युक्ते कि केन कथमित्याकाङ्क्ष्यते नैवं 'तत्त्वमसि', 'अह ब्रह्मास्मि' इत्युक्ते किञ्चिदन्यदाकाङ्क्ष्यमस्ति, सर्वा-त्मैकत्वविषयत्वात्रगते। सति ह्यन्यस्मिन्नवशिष्यमाणेऽर्थ आकाङ्क्षा स्यात्,

न त्वात्मैकत्वव्यतिरेकेणावशिष्यमाणोऽन्योऽर्थोऽस्ति य आकाङ्क्षेत। न चेयमवगतिर्नोत्पद्यत इति शक्य वक्तुम्, 'तद्धास्य विजज्ञौ' इत्यादि-श्रुतिभ्यः। अवगतिसाधनाना च श्रवणादीनां वेदानुवचनादीनां च विधानात्। न चेयमवगतिरनर्थिका भ्रान्तिर्वेति शक्य वक्तुम्, अविद्यानिवृत्ति-फलदर्शनात्, बाधकज्ञानान्तराभावाच्च। प्राक्चात्मैकत्वावगतेरव्याहतः सर्वः सत्यानृतव्यवहारो लौकिको वैदिकश्चेत्यवोचाम। तस्मादन्त्येन प्रमाणेन प्रतिपादित आत्मैकत्वे समस्तस्य प्राचीनस्य भेदव्यवहारस्य बाधितत्वान्नानेकात्मकब्रह्मकल्पनावकाशोऽस्ति।

[Furthermore, this is the ultimate *pramāna* establishing the Oneness of Ātman, after which nothing else remains to be sought after for knowledge Unlike the desire which necessarily arises in common life to know, 'what, with what and how', on hearing the injunction, 'One should sacrifice', there remains nothing more to be sought for after one is taught 'That thou art' or 'I am Brahman', for this knowledge has for its content the unity of the universal Self. The curiosity can arise only when something is left unexplained, but nothing about which one may become curious remains over beyond the Oneness of Self Besides, it cannot be said that such a knowledge does not arise, since there are Śrutis such as 'That Reality of Self he understood from him', and the means of knowledge such as *śravana* etc., and the study of the Vedas etc., are prescribed. It cannot be said that this realisation is useless or erroneous for firstly it is seen to result in the removal of Avidyā and secondly there is no other knowledge to sublate it. We have stated earlier that, before the realisation of the Oneness of Ātman, all parlance pertaining to the true and false, worldly or Vedic, remains unimpeded. Hence when the Oneness of Ātman is established by the ultimate *pramāna*, the previous parlance involving distinctions becomes sublated in its entirety, there is no longer any possibility of entertaining the idea that Brahman is composite]

Thus after refuting all objections and showing how the

problems raised are solved in consonance with reason, the *Tattvaśuddhi* (44) concludes — तस्माद्ब्रह्मज्ञानादज्ञाननिवृत्तिरुपपन्नतरा. (That *ajñāna* is removed by *Brahmajñāna* is thus eminently reasonable.)

10.9.9 Vedanta Unassailable

It is evident therefore that the position of the *Vedānta* is unassailable. The declarations of all other *Śāstras* are like the shouts of foxes which prevail only until they are absolutely silenced by the *Mahāvākya*, the roar of the mighty lion that is *Vedānta*—

> तावद्गर्जन्ति शास्त्राणि जम्बुका विपिने यथा ।
> न गर्जति महाशक्तिर्यावद्वेदान्तकेसरी ॥

The plenary experience, the *Akhandākāravṛttyanubhava*, which is the ultimate *pramāṇa*, is in consonance with the other *pramāṇas* in this respect that are the *Śāstra*, reasoning and the instruction from the Guru. It is the roar of the mighty lion, one's own *Svarūpa*, Brahman-Ātman, which silences once for all, all the other prattlings due to the various stances adopted because of influences of other *Śāstras* etc. Says the *Vivekacūdāmani* (475)—

> स्वस्याविद्याबन्धसंबन्धमोक्षात् सत्यज्ञानानन्दरूपात्मलब्धौ ।
> शास्त्रं युक्तिर्देशिकोक्तिः प्रमाणं चान्तस्सिद्धा स्वानुभूतिः प्रमाणम् ॥

All activity and abstinence from it, diversity in the universe, conflicting views of different schools of thought, struggle, enquiry, attainments etc., are all only in the realm of Avidyā Ignorance and knowledge are both patent to all—from the child to the learned. That which corresponds to fact is knowledge; that which is otherwise is Avidyā. The removal of Avidyā through knowledge is also patent without enquiry. Indeed, there will be no enquiry without it. Its

reality is what is enquired into here. The enquiry is as to whether it is *sat*, *asat*, *sadasat* or *anirvacanīya* and whether it is in non-Self or Self. By the full strength of logic it is established that it is indefinable, or the destruction of Avidyā is only Self. Even then, Self alone remains since the delusion also has an existence only through Self as for the serpent through the rope. There is the final release and it is through knowledge, and the knowledge which removes Avidyā dissolves in the One. Avidyā is in Ātman; and its destruction is also only in Ātman because of being subservient to Ātman. Says the *Bṛhadvārtika* (1-4, 1365-1367)—

सर्ववादिविरोधेऽपि संवादोऽनुभवे यथा ।
वादिनामविसंवादस्तथाऽज्ञानेऽप्यसंशयः ॥
तद्वद्बाधोऽप्यबोधस्य बोधेनाभ्युपगम्यते ।
एतावतैव पर्याप्तमस्मद्राद्धान्तसिद्धये ॥
अस्मद्राद्धान्तसंसिद्धौ नान्यद्राद्धान्तसिद्धता ।
तत्सिद्धावस्य संसिद्धिर्न कथञ्चिन्निवार्यते ॥

Says also the *Iṣṭasiddhi* (8)—

नैष दोषः प्रसिद्धत्वाद्विद्याविद्याद्वयस्य तु ।
आबालपण्डितं विद्या यथावस्त्वन्यथेतरा ॥ (13)
विद्येतरहानिश्च प्रसिद्धैवाविचारतः ।
न ह्यन्यथाविचारोऽपि तत्तत्त्वं तु विचार्यते ॥ (14)
सदसत्किमनिर्वाच्यं तदनात्मन्युतात्मनि ।
इति तच्च नयाद्व्यत्वादन्त्यं पक्षमतिष्ठिपम् ॥ (15)
आत्मैवाज्ञानहानिर्वा तदाप्यात्मैव शिष्यते ।
आत्मनैवात्मवत्त्वाच्च मोहस्याहेस्स्रजा यथा ॥ (16)
दर्शनानि विरुद्धानि जगद्वैचित्र्यमेव च ।
तस्मात्सर्वस्य सिद्ध्यर्थं विचार्य निरधारि सा ॥ (24)

अस्ति मुक्तिरसौ बोधाद्बोधोऽबोधनुदेकलः ।
आत्मन्यबोधस्तस्यैव तन्नाशोऽप्यात्मशेषतः ॥ (25)

10.9.10 Prakatikarana—The Realisation 'I The One, The Unsublatable, The Auspicious'

It is clear from this that all concoctions—those in respect of the world, in respect of the enquirer and in respect of Īśvara—are removed by the decisive knowledge, the *Akhandākāravrttijñāna* arising from the *Mahāvākya*. What the *Mahāvākya* does is to remove the illusions such as—*paroksatva* of Īśvara, the *paricchinnatva* (finitude) of the jīva—and all other concoctions in Ātman along with the Avidyā responsible for them. Thereafter, there is no question to be asked, no answer, nor even the *Śāstra* Speech is transcended along with the rest of the world This is precisely the import of the line in the hymn—

व्यावृत्तास्वनुवर्तमानमहमित्यन्तः स्फुरन्त सदा ।

All concoctions in Ātman being removed, there is no impediment whatsoever for Ātman to shine in Supreme Peace, in full glory In his effort to attain this 'state', the seeker is to be guided by the *Sphurana*, the Shine, that is always there, however faint it may be to start with Since the goal attained is the Supreme Peace Itself, all talk which is only tiresome is to be relinquished except the *Pranava*, AUM, symbolising Ātman—

वाचो विग्लापनं हि तत् (*Br. U.* 4-4-21)

ओमित्येव ध्यायथ आत्मानम्, अन्या वाचो विमुञ्चथ ।
(*Mu U.* 2-2-6), (*Mu. U.* 2-2-5)

The disciple finds himself in the state described in the first stanza of the hymn—

विश्वं दर्पणदृश्यमाननगरीतुल्यं निजान्तर्गतं
पश्यन्नात्मनि मायया बहिरिवोद्भूतं यथा निद्रया ।

This decisive view that the so-called universe does not exist i.e., the removal of all impediments, enables the realisation of Ātman in Its full glory, in Supreme Peace—यः साक्षात्कुरुते—there being nothing remaining like non-apprehension, doubt or misapprehension, in this regard. This is given expression to in the eighth *śloka* of the *Daśaślokī* wherein the triad of states referred to are indicative of all that is negated, व्यावृत्त—

न जाग्रन्न मे स्वप्नको वा सुषुप्तिर्न विश्वो न वा तैजसः प्राज्ञको वा ।
अविद्यात्मकत्वात्त्रयाणां तुरीयस्तदेकोऽवशिष्टश्शिवः केवलोऽहम् ॥

[There is no waking state for me, nor dream, nor even deep sleep. I am neither the *Viśva* nor the *Taijasa* nor the *Prājña*, because all the three are effects of Avidyā, I am the fourth. Therefore I am the One, the Unsublatable, the Auspicious and the Absolute]

10.10.1 Supreme Peace—Silent Eloquence

This is the प्रकटीकरण transcending all verbal description, the Supreme Peace that is symbolised by the auspicious *Maunamudrā*—मुद्रया भद्रया.

This is not revealed by the use of words which, however, have been employed to negate all else. This is the method employed by Śruti to 'make known' 'That', Brahman, which transcends all particularities. It is beyond the pale of words and not cognisable by the mind—

यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते । अप्राप्य मनसा सह । (*Tai U.* 2-4)

It transcends the territory of the known as also that of the unknown—

अन्यदेव तद्विदितादथो अविदितादधि (*Ke. U.* 1-4)

The instruction could only be of the type 'Not this, not this'—

अथात आदेशो नेति नेति (*Bṛ. U.* 2-3-6)

It can be indicated even by Śruti, only by negating all else—अतद्व्यावृत्त्याय चकितमभिधत्ते श्रुतिरपि (*Śivamahimnastotra*). Speech, in any of its forms—परा, पश्यन्ती, मध्यमा, वैखरी—from the gross to the subtlest, stands transcended Though the *Mahāvākya* is employed for the purpose, साक्षात्तत्त्वमसीति वेदवचसा यो बोधयत्याश्रितान्, the revelation is only by way of indication, लक्षणा. The experience of Ātman in states like deep sleep, *samādhi* and the fleeting *samādhis* (intervals between two *vṛttis* etc.,) are instances wherein silence alone reigns; no sound can be associated with the *Svarūpa* as such. Sound, sonic or otherwise, is always in association with a process involving change, like origination, sustenance, growth, change of state, decay and dissolution; and Ātman transcends all these, being perfect Repose Itself wherein silence alone prevails. Even while these processes are in vogue, the Witness-Consciousness said to be revealing them is ever experienced to be reposing in Its silent Splendour. Only in parlance they are spoken of as being revealed, much in the same way as the Sun is said to reveal the objects of the world, though the Sun has only been shining by Himself—सविता प्रकाशयति, सविता प्रकाशते. This profound Silence that is Self-effulgent is also the profoundest of all secrets as It remains hidden deeply, as it were, in spite of Its providing the existence and shine of everything in parlance—मौनं चैवास्मि गुह्यानां (*Gītā* X-38). It is not revealed by words or any *pramāṇa* of parlance, but can only become patent, as it were, when all parlance is got rid of. Commenting on the Śruti (Br. U. 5-5-1)—

तस्माद्ब्राह्मणः पाण्डित्यं निर्विद्य बाल्येन तिष्ठासेत् । बाल्यं च पाण्डित्यं च निर्विद्याथ मुनिरमौनं च मौनं च निर्विद्याथ ब्राह्मणः ।

says the *Bhāsya*—

अमौनं च आत्मज्ञानानात्मप्रत्ययतिरस्कारौ पाण्डित्यबाल्यसंज्ञकौ, निःशेषं कृत्वा। मौनं नाम अनात्मप्रत्ययतिरस्करणस्य पर्यवसानं फलम्, तच्च निर्विद्याथ ब्राह्मणः कृतकृत्यो भवति। ब्रह्मैव सर्वमिति प्रत्यय उपजायते। स ब्राह्मणः कृतकृत्योऽतो ब्राह्मणः। निरुपचरितं हि तदा तस्य ब्राह्मण्यं प्राप्तम्।

[Therefore *brāhmana*, having known all about scholarship, should try to live upon that strength which comes of Knowledge. Having known all about scholarship and strength, which respectively mean Self-knowledge and elimination of ideas of the non-Self, he knows all about meditativeness too—which is the culminating result of the latter Having known all about these, he becomes a knower of Brahman, accomplishes his task. He attains the conviction that all is Brahman. Because he has reached the goal, therefore he is a *Brāhmana*, a knower of Brahman, for then his status as a knower of Brahman is literally true]

The instruction about this profound Silence cannot be imparted in any manner other than this profound Silence Itself. Says the *Sūtrabhāsya* (3-2-5-17)—It is seen in the Śruti that Bādhva being asked by Bāskali, instructed silently without uttering a word. Bāṣkali requested 'Teach me Brahman, Sir'. Bādhva became silent. When the question was repeated a second and a third time, he said, 'I have already spoken, but you are not comprehending. This Ātman is quiescence'.—

बाष्कलिना च बाध्वः पृष्टः सन्नवचनेनैव ब्रह्म प्रोवाचेति श्रूयते 'स होवाचाधीहि भो इति स तूष्णीं बभूव त ह द्वितीये वा तृतीये वा वचन उवाच ब्रूमः खलु त्वं तु न विजानासि उपशान्तोऽयमात्मा' इति।

Reference to this situation is made in the tenth *śloka* of the *Daśaślokī* and in detail in the *Siddhāntabindu* on it—

न चैकं तदन्यद्द्वितीयं कुतः स्यान्न वा केवलत्वं न चाकेवलत्वम् ।
न शून्यं न चाशून्यमद्वैतकत्वात् कथ सर्ववेदान्तसिद्धं ब्रवीमि ॥ (10)

[When there is not 'one' itself, how can there be a 'second' as distinct from it? Neither is there its absoluteness nor non-absoluteness, nor is it a void nor a non-void. It being by nature unique, how can I speak of It which is established by all *Upanisads*?]

10.10.2 Instruction Symbolised—Auspicious Chinmudra

This silent eloquence is the celebrated manner in which the ever youthful Śrīdakṣināmūrti makes known the Supreme Truth, Brahman, to the throng of pupils, the aged disciples, seers, steadfastly devoted to Brahman. Obeisance to this *Ācārya*, the Exalted, revelling in His *Svarūpa* and radiant with Blissful Effulgence, to which, in His infinite mercy, He has been pointing by the blessed symbol, *Cinmudrā*. So says Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda—

मौनव्याख्याप्रकटितपरब्रह्मतत्त्वं युवानं
वर्षिष्ठान्तेवसदृषिगणैरावृतं ब्रह्मनिष्ठैः ।
आचार्येन्द्रं करकलितचिन्मुद्रमानन्दरूपं
स्वात्मारामं मुदितवदनं सद्गुरुं तं नमामि ॥

There are five different Vedic descriptions of the form of Śrīdakṣināmūrti varying in the symbols of the four hands, but *Cinmudrā* spoken of here is common to all and is the chief characteristic of this particular manifestation of the Lord. The *mudrās* or postures of the other hands too are symbolic of the means towards the Supreme Knowledge. The various forms of incarnation are themselves *mudrās* i.e., representations with postures, gestures or attitudes, symbolising and thereby directing attention to what is sought to be instructed. Says the *Sūtrabhāṣya* (1-1-7-20)—Even for the Supreme

Lord, there may be forms created at His will out of Māyā, for the sake of favouring the aspirants as is declared in the *Smṛti*—'O Nārada ! it is a Māyā created by Me that you see Me in this form possessed of dualities'—

स्यात्परमेश्वरस्यापीच्छावशान्मायामयं रूपं साधकानुग्रहार्थम् ।
माया ह्येषा मया सृष्टा यन्मां पश्यसि नारद ।
सर्वभूतगुणैर्युक्तं मैवं मां ज्ञातुमर्हसि ॥

The *Cinmudrā* is formed by drawing the right forefinger away from the other three upright fingers and joining its tip with that of the thumb. The three fingers held upright represent the three states viz., the waking, the dream and the deep sleep, each of them composed of the three principles of the enjoyed, the enjoyer and the enjoyment. The forefinger symbolises the jīva. When it is one with the group of the above three i.e , the world of experience, it is separated from the thumb which stands for the Immovable, Unchanging Truth, the Supreme Self. When, through discrimination, the jīva knows that he is totally different from the three states, and identifies himself with the Supreme Lord through the awareness 'I am the eternal Witness of all that is', then all ignorance and the sorrows of *samsāra* cease ; the jīva attains liberation This awareness indicated by the *Cinmudrā* is clearly described in the *Kaivalyopaniṣad* (18)—

त्रिषु धामसु यद्भोग्यं भोक्ता भोगश्च यद्भवेत् ।
तेभ्यो विलक्षणः साक्षी चिन्मात्रोऽहं सदाशिवः ॥

Because it indicates the Pure Consciousness, चिन्मात्र, it is called *Cinmudrā*. To impart this knowledge which cannot be conveyed directly even by words, the Lord, out of His unlimited Grace, has contrived this ingenius mystic device palpable to the visual perception, just as the *Pranava* is to the

auditory. This auspicious symbol has been referred to variously as *Bhadramudrā*, *Kalyānakāriṇīmudrā*, *Śobhanāmudrā*, *Vidyāmudrā*, *Vyākhyānamudrā*, *Tārakamudrā*, *Jñānamudrā* etc., indicating the various ways in which this unique experience represented by it can be looked upon. The symbol which brings into union the forefinger which is a pointer to an individual with the thumb which is used to indicate Īśvara in the *Śāstra*, अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषः (Ka U.), demonstrates that there is no longer any difference experienced between the two, *tvam* and *Tat* i.e., the disciple is established in the Brahman-Ātman *Svarūpa* indicated by the *Mahāvākya*, तत्त्वमसि, 'That thou art', by the removal of impediments. Again it also demonstrates the non-difference of the disciple addressed as *tvam*, pointed to by the forefinger and the Guru who points to himself by the thumb as *aham*, as indicated by the *Mahāvākya*, त्वमेवाहम्, 'thou art Myself'. What is conveyed by the reciprocal rendering of the *Mahāvākya* as त्वमेव तत्, अहमेव त्वम्—'That is thou alone, I am thyself'—is also demonstrated by the symbol. By this symbol the Guru is drawing attention of the disciple to the plenary experience kindly conferred on him just as the sage Yājñavalkya does in the case of Janaka, though by the use of the words—अभयं वै जनक प्राप्तोऽसि—'O Janaka! verily hast thou attained the Fearless'. This is conveyed by the hymn itself in the third stanza in the line—यत्साक्षात्करणाद्भवेन्न पुनरावृत्तिर्भवांभोनिधौ—for fear arises because of a second only when one is steeped in *samsāra*. Says the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* (2-7)—

यदा ह्येवैष एतस्मिन्नदृश्येऽनात्म्येऽनिरुक्तेऽनिलयनेऽभय प्रतिष्ठां विन्दते ।
अथ सोऽभयं गतो भवति ।

[When, in truth, this seeker gains fearless support in Brahman which is never an object, not having a body or an

abode, and which transcends definition, then has he reached the Fearless.]

This is demonstrated by the *mudrā* wherein the forefinger has been withdrawn from its association with the other three, symbolising the three *guṇas* and made to abide in the thumb, indicating the escape of the jīva from the clutches of *samsāra* and abiding in Ātman with the direct realisation of his Brahmanhood—अहं ब्रह्मास्मि.

10.10.3 Obeisance in Reverential Identification with Utmost Gratitude

The Guru has graciously conferred His own status on the disciple—स्वीयं साम्यं विधत्ते. There is now the realisation that the same entity, Brahman-Ātman, was being cognised previously threefold—Īśvara, Guru and Ātman—due to Avidyā So also the world was looked upon variously with differences and relations—

विश्वं पश्यति कार्यकारणतया स्वस्वामिसंबन्धतः
शिष्याचार्यतया तथैव पितृपुत्राद्यात्मना भेदतः ।

and also in its eightfold form, all because of delusion, मायापरिभ्रामितः. Now that it is realised that there is nothing other than Brahman-Ātman, नान्यत्किञ्चन विद्यते विमृशता यस्मात् परस्माद्विभोः, the world with its multiplicity is seen by the disciple who is no longer under delusion—मायाऽपरिभ्रामितः—as only a painting on a canvas, चित्रपट, that is, as having no reality but that of his own, the Substratum. He is now Īśvara, *Sarvaśakti* (the Almighty), *Māyāvī* (the Wielder of Māyā), *Yogī*, *Sarvajña* (the Omnicient), the all-embracing One Consciousness, Śrīdakṣiṇāmūrti, the very *Svarūpa* of the Veda, the Sustainer of the universe as also the One in which the universe dissolves, the Guru, the remover of Avidyā by


the instruction of the *Mahāvākya*, employing the same concoctions as the ones indulged in by the deluded disciple, *paribhrāmita*, now to liberate him from them, at the same time reposing in Himself by being aware that there is no other thing, as brought out in the various stanzas of the hymn. From His own standpoint, He alone is, Brahman, the very *Svarūpa* of *Moksa*—

अनाधेयातिशयब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वान्मोक्षस्य ।
नित्यशुद्धब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वान्मोक्षस्य ।
ब्रह्मभावश्च मोक्षः । (*Sū. Bhā.* 1-1-4-4)

Speaking in terms of parlance, he is regarded as a *jīvanmukta*, liberated, yet embodied till his *prārabdhakarma* is exhausted On this direct realisation, the disciple, with utmost gratitude, pays obeisance to his Guru who is now seen to be shining in full glory, as the very *Svarūpa* of the disciple, as expressed by the refrain—

तस्मै श्रीगुरुमूर्तये नम इदं श्रीदक्षिणामूर्तये ॥

which has so far been a prayer with a desire to secure this end, and which is now an expression of the experience of identity as indicated by the term नमः (*namaḥ*).



10.11 CONCLUSION—RESUMÊ—SARVATMATVA

This has been the endeavour of the entire hymn which is to secure for the seeker by heralding before him the *Svarūpa* of what he has continuously and persistently been searching, and also in delineating the method to be pursued for securing this aim. This goal though termed variously in parlance—as Supreme happiness without any tinge of sorrow, as Peace, as realisation of Truth, as knowledge of Reality having known which there would be no uncertainties, doubts or unknownness regarding anything whatsoever, as removal of all obsessions, as Transcendence, as securing once for all the berth in which one is poised eternally without in any sense being affected by anything else whatsoever—is Brahman-Ātman, the One Consciousness which alone is and with which as the Substratum, appears the entire universe by delusion, and into which it lapses. The apparent shine of all else which is seemingly existing is only the Shine of this Substratum.

The primary concern of everyone, which obviously is about oneself, is Brahman-Ātman. One is concerned with anything else in so far as it subserves one's own interest. Basically, however, the real *Svarūpa* of oneself as also that of all else i.e., the universe in which one feels concerned and entangled, is only Brahman-Ātman.

Appropriate enquiry is the doorway for this realisation. However, enquiry in respect of the universe based on the formulations of the so-called causal principles involving the notions of cause and effect etc., analysis and synthesis involving arbitrarily postulated notions of connections and differences etc., in the manner of what is done in the case of

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the other so-called disciplines supposed to be based on the so-called empirical *pramānas*, classifications based thereon, the so-called reasonings involving inferences and postulates, in short, all discussions involving details pertaining to parlance in respect of the world inclusive of space and time based on concoction regarded as axiomatic etc., are all the endeavour of the deluded who do not even know what they themselves are amongst the body, the senses etc., which pass off as oneself in various contexts All this is a distant cry from the 'experience' that each one has in respect of himself or the universe. One's attention must be drawn to this aspect of the situation and one must be made to recognise and evaluate it properly i.e , place it suitably. All concoctions must be eschewed and all inspiration and teaching must be obtained directly from the One which he seeks to be eternally, and which in fact he has always been i.e., Brahman-Ātman. All illumination must stem only from this Entity. This Brahman-Ātman is the revered Guru, one's own *Svarūpa*, that accomplishes this task eminently by showing the seeker-disciple as to how the worldly experiences can be accounted for only in terms of the Shine of this Inner Self, Brahman-Ātman, and in no other way, by drawing his attention to the experience of the triad of states, the waking etc., enabling him to see that all parlance including origination, sustenance and destruction of the world is but a dream, as also by establishing him in the *Sāksisvarūpa* which is *Sphuraṇam Sadātmakam*. The *Vedavāk* (an expression of the *Sphuranam*) is the Supreme *Pramāṇa* in this respect The Śruti is only an attempt to put in words such subtle experiences and it also prescribes the methods of securing them. Not only the *sādhana* pertaining to the ultimate realisation,

but also the parlance pertaining to creation, sustenance and dissolution of the so-called triad of states, the regularity seen in common parlance such as *pratikarmavyavasthā* etc., are understood only on the basis of the plenary experience namely that of abiding in the 'State' in which the *tvam-padārtha* is clearly seen to be the *Tatpadārtha* as well i.e., based on the *Akhaṇḍākāravṛtti* experience, even though not realised as such in ordinary parlance. The concepts and reasonings that the Master employs are designed to sublimate the ones that are used by the disciple in the mesh in which he has been caught, apparently by accepting them. Aids—such as illustrations of the dream, magic, seed and sprout, eclipse etc., etc., which though taken from parlance do not bind him to parlance but serve to liberate him from it and sublimate the faculties involved—are employed. The disciple's attention is drawn to his own experiences to which he had practically turned a blind eye hitherto, all the while indulging in blabble. By the Supreme Grace of the Master, a way out of the dark dense forest in which the disciple has been roaming, is now seen. The method is to gear all faculties—intellectual, emotional and volitional—towards what is intended to be secured to the exclusion of all else which must be shunned totally. Total surrender on the part of the disciple is absolutely necessary for this purpose. An important step in this endeavour is to realise that one is the Witness, the *Sākṣī*, of all that is and is happening. This realisation enables one to dissociate oneself from all the *idam*-aspects of the universe and leaves him in the state of *idam*-free *aham*. He is no longer involved in anything. Not only that; he is the very Shine, *Sphuraṇa*, which illuminates everything else. This *Svarūpa* is Its own testimony requiring no other evidence in

respect of It. It is also seen thereby that 'he' is not the body, the vital airs, the mind, the intellect or the void, but the Principle which transcends these and illumines all these which are also among the *idam*-aspects of the universe. It is also directly seen that the witnessed, the entire universe involving all these, appears and disappears on the 'anvil' that is one's *Svarūpa*, the *Sphurana*, the Substratum. This shows that he is *Īśvarasvarūpa*, *Sarvajña* and *Sarvaśakti*, the *Tatpadārtha*, from the standpoint of the world, though always transcendent and remaining in oneself, Brahman-Ātman, without any concern for the universe. The inspiration as also the plenary experience arises from the silent teaching from this *Svarūpa* alone. This shows that this *Svarūpa* is really what is meant by the *Veda*, the Śruti, which has been accepted as the only *pramāṇa* in this respect. This *Sphuraṇasvarūpa* is verily the Master, the Guru, who by revealing Himself as the अनुवर्तमानम् व्यावृत्तासु i.e., the abiding Ātman which was apparently latent, now renders It 'patent' —प्रकटीकरोति. The so-called universe (inclusive of the mind etc.), appearing variously, is only a stream of changing 'states' of the underlying Substratum in which one has been abiding always during the interval between any two of them as also while appearing to be in any of them. This realisation as also the conviction that all these states etc., are only superposed and are illusory, aided by contemplation (if necessary) on the *Aṣṭamūrtisvarūpa* of the Substratum, enables one to be established in the situation envisaged in the first stanza, the *apavādadṛṣṭi*, namely that the universe in its myriad aspects does not exist. All the so-called objects are mere concoctions, and words supposed to denote them are mere *vikalpas* One's real *Svarūpa*, Brahmanhood, that is

native to oneself indicated by अहं ब्रह्मास्मि stands out. Thus one is established in *Sarvātmatva*, the *Svarūpa*—of oneself, the Master and Īśvara—the One Consciousness. Thereafter there is no return to the humdrum mundane world

Hearing, श्रवण, the silent teaching offered by the Master, the One Consciousness, the *Svarūpa*, cogitation, मनन, in the manner pointed out, and steadfast contemplation on the *Svarūpa* as such, ध्यान, and also revelling in It, giving expression always to It with adoration, सङ्कीर्तन, would crown the disciple with the glory, श्रीः, of *Sarvātmatva* which is the *Svarūpa* of Īśvara with His powers, the venerable Master and oneself. That the means for being established in this *Svarūpa* is *śravana*, *manana*, *dhyāna* and *sankīrtana* in respect of this very hymn itself is emphatically declared by Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda Himself in the stanza—

सर्वात्मत्वमिति स्फुटीकृतमिद यस्मादमुष्मिस्तवे
तेनास्य श्रवणात् तदर्थमननाद्ध्यानाच्च सङ्कीर्तनात् ।
सर्वात्मत्वमहाविभूतिसहित स्यादीश्वरत्वं स्वतः
सिध्येत्तत्पुनरष्टधा परिणत चैश्वर्यमव्याहतम् ॥

This is reminiscent of the Śruti—

आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः ।

So also does the line—

नान्यत्किञ्चन विद्यते विमृशतां यस्मात्परस्माद्विभोः

recall to the mind the Śrutis—

सर्वं खल्विद ब्रह्म, नेति नेति, नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन, तदात्मानमेवावेदहं ब्रह्मास्मीति तस्मात्तत्सर्वमभवत् । etc.

The word सर्वात्मत्व recalls to the mind—इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा as also the plenary experience expressed by the Śruti–अहं ब्रह्मास्मि. In fact all along it has been seen to be in evidence that in

respect of the goal, the way, the steps in respect of the *sādhana* as also other details like illustrations etc., the hymn speaks in the manner of the Śruti giving expression to what is contained therein. The methodology employed is reminiscent of the Brahmasūtras and the *Bhāsya*, in respect of *Samanvaya*, *Avirodha*, *Sādhana* and *Phala*. The perfume of Supreme devotion that pervades the hymn and the manner of offering the teaching in the conversational style with love and compassion is as what is evidenced in the *Gītā* and the *Bhāsya* thereon. Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda Himself says in the *Vivekacūdāmani* (576)—

सकलनिगमचूडास्वान्तसिद्धान्तरूपं परमिदमतिगुह्यं दर्शितं ते मयाद्य ।
अपगतकलिदोषं कामनिर्मुक्तबुद्धिं स्वसुतवदसकृत्त्वा भावयित्वा मुमुक्षुम् ॥

[I have today repeatedly revealed to thee, as to one's own son, this excellent and profound secret, which is the inmost purport of all *Vedānta*, the secret of *Vedas*, considering thee an aspirant after liberation, purged of these taints of this Dark Age and of a mind free from desires.]

हितमिदमुपदेशमाद्रियन्ता विहितनिरस्तसमस्तचित्तदोपाः ।
भवसुखविमुखाः प्रशान्तचित्ताः श्रुतिरसिका यतयो मुमुक्षवो ये ॥
(*Vivekacūdāmani*—580)

[May these *Samnyāsins*, who are seekers after liberation, who have purged themselves of all taints of the mind by the observance of the prescribed methods, who are averse to worldly pleasures, and who are of serene mind, and take delight in the Śruti, appreciate this salutary teaching !]

This enables the seeker to revel in the thought of the hymn, chanting it, all the while continuously abiding in its purport. Also in a short compass the entire teaching is offered in the manner of a devotional song. Each stanza is veritably a fragrant flower in full bloom giving expression to Brahman-Ātman as the Guru, the means of securing identity

with Him such as *Akhaṇḍākāravṛtti*, *vicāra*, devotion, surrender as also the relation of it to the one or the other of the phases in common parlance as seen apparently in the life of such a Master. This is in evidence also in His various other works such as the *Manīsāpañcakam*, the *Daśaślokī*, the *Nirvāṇāṣaṭkam* etc. This is in the manner of the Śruti speaking of the *Mahāvākya* and the *avāntaravākyas* etc , or of the various *lakṣaṇas* in respect of Brahman which may be taken individually or collectively to signify the same *Svarūpa*. The entire hymn with the gamut of the *ślokas* is of the nature of a string studded with gems performing a task similar to that of the *Brahmasūtras*, given expression to by Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda Himself in the statement—वेदान्तवाक्यकुसुमग्रथनार्थत्वात् सूत्राणाम्. It is an offering, to put it again in His own words—

विविधब्रह्मसंदृष्टिमालिकाभिरलङ्कृतम् ।
पूर्णानन्दात्मतादृष्टिं पुष्पाञ्जलिमनुस्मरेत् ॥

as also ईश्वरो गुरुरात्मेति भेदत्रयविवर्जितैः ।
बिल्वपत्रैरद्वितीयैरात्मलिङ्गं यजेच्छिवम् ॥ (*Parāpūjā*)

However, in spite of the simplicity of exposition and its inviting nature, the depth of the thought involved is unfathomable, प्रसन्न and गम्भीर, as is well known in respect of Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda's works. Nevertheless this does not, in the least, detract from the use of the hymn for the intended purpose, as it makes clear the method of search, where to search and what to search, by directly pointing to one's own experience. This makes it easy for everyone, including those who are not fortunate enough to have access to Śruti, to proceed with *sādhana* using the hymn itself for the purpose, as declared by the hymn itself in the phrases—तेन अस्य श्रवणात्, स्यात् ईश्वरत्वम् etc. The method provided and the assurance with which the end result is pointed out are astounding—

मूर्तं चामूर्तमपि प्रतिषिध्य हि नेति नेतिवाक्यवशात् ।
द्रक्ष्यन्ति यं सुकृतिनः सततं प्रणमामि दक्षिणामूर्तिम् ॥

(*Dakṣiṇāmūrtimantramātṛkāstava*—11 by Śṛṅgerī Jagadguru Śrī Śrī Candraśekharabhāratīmahāsvāmipāda in '*Stotrāṇi*')

[Obeisance always to Śrīdakṣiṇāmūrti, the direct realisation of whom is secured by the righteous that are wise, by negating both the gross and the subtle superimpositions on the basis of the Śruti 'Not this, Not this', as is well known.]

शुकाद्या मुनीन्द्रा विरक्ताग्रगण्याः समाराध्य यं ब्रह्मविद्यामवापुः ।
तमल्पार्चनातुष्टचेतोऽम्बुजातं चिदानन्दरूप भजे दक्षिणास्यम् ॥

(*Śrīdakṣiṇāsyabhujaṅgaprayātastuti*—14 by Śṛṅgerī Jagadguru Śrī Śrī Saccidānandaśivābhinavanṛsiṁhabhāratī-mahasvāmipāda in '*Bhaktisudhātaraṅgiṇī*')

[I adore that Lord Śrīdakṣināmūrti who is verily the Consciousness-Bliss and who is easily pleased even by meagre worship, by worshipping whom with Supreme devotion, Śuka and others, the foremost among *munis* of the highest order of renunciation, secured *Brahmavidyā*]

वेदान्तवाक्यपुष्पेभ्यो ज्ञानामृतमधूत्तमम् ।
उज्जहारालिवद्यो नस्तस्मै सद्गुरवे नमः ॥

(*Upadeśasāhasrī*—XVIII-233)

[I bow down to my Teacher, a knower of Brahman, who collected for us the nectar of knowledge from the Vedāntas like a bee collecting the best honey from flowers.]

आशैलादुदयात् तथास्तगिरितो भास्वद्यशोरश्मिभि-
र्व्याप्तं विश्वमनन्धकारमभवद्यस्य स्म शिष्यैरिदम् ।
आराज्ज्ञानगभस्तिभिः प्रतिहतश्चन्द्रायते भास्कर-
स्तस्मै शङ्करभानवे तनुमनोवाग्भिर्नमस्तात् सदा ॥

(Bṛ Vā VI-5-25)

[The rays that is the fame of the disciples Sanandanācārya and others of Śrī Śrī Bhagavatpādācārya pervading the entire expanse between the Eastern and the Western horizons, dispel

the ignorance of the competent seekers who surrender, while the rays of knowledge emanating from Śrī Śrī Bhagavatpādācārya, verily the Supreme Consciousness Itself, pervade the entire universe, as exposed to which even the brightest physical object, the Sun, pales into insignificance appearing like the Moon. Obeisance be always to this Supreme Effulgence, the Master, through deed, word and thought]

प्रकाशात्मिकया शक्त्या प्रकाशानां प्रभाकरः ।
प्रकाशयति यो विश्वं प्रकाशोऽयं प्रकाशताम् ॥

(*Mānasollāsa*—X-24)

[He who, by His power of light, affords light to all lights, who lights the whole universe, may that Light shine full in His Light !]

संसाराध्वनि तापभानुकिरणप्रोद्भूतदाहव्यथा-
खिन्नानां जलकाङ्क्षया मरुभुवि भ्रान्त्या परिभ्राम्यताम् ।
अत्यासन्नसुधाम्बुधिं सुखकरं ब्रह्माद्वयं दर्शय-
न्त्येषा शङ्करभारती विजयते निर्वाणसंदायिनी ॥

(*Vivekacūdāmani*—581)

[On those—who being afflicted by the scorching rays of the threefold misery in the course of *samsāra*, wander forth in quest of water in the mirages of desert sands—this auspicious message of Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda, heralding triumphantly the blissful ocean of non-dual Brahman which is in the closest proximity, confers liberation.]

Thus Śrī Śrī Ācāryapāda, verily Śrīdakṣiṇāmūrti Himself, has gifted this succinct hymn to accomplish what Śruti has been endeavouring to do. Such is the abounding Grace of the Master, the Supreme Consciousness, who confers His own *Svarūpa*. Obeisance to Him in reverential identification—

तस्मै श्रीगुरुमूर्तये नम इदं श्रीदक्षिणामूर्तये ॥

॥ श्रीसद्गुरुचरणारविन्दार्पणमस्तु ॥

ॐ तत्सत् ॥

Appendix

॥ दक्षिणामूर्त्युपनिषत् ॥

DAKṢIṆĀMŪRTYUPANIṢAD

(With English Translation by Śrī Allādi Mahādeva Śāstrī)

ओ सह नाववतु। सह नौ भुनक्तु। सह वीर्यं करवावहै। तेजस्विनावधीतमस्तु। मा विद्विषावहै। ओ शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः ॥

[May (Brahman) protect us both! May He give us both to enjoy! Efficiency may we both attain! Effective may our study prove! Hate may we not (each other) at all! Om Peace! Peace!! Peace!!!]

ॐ ब्रह्मावर्ते महाभाण्डीरवटमूले महासत्राय समेता महर्षयः शौनकादयस्ते ह समित्पाणयस्तत्त्वजिज्ञासवो मार्कण्डेयं चिरजीविनमुपसमेत्य पप्रच्छुः केन त्व चिरं जीवसि केन वानन्दमनुभवसीति।

[Om! In the *Brahmāvarta*, at the foot of a mighty *bhāndīra* (fig) tree, there assembled Śaunaka and other mighty sages for a great sacrifice. Then, desirous to know of Truth, they approached the long-lived Mārkandeya with sacrificial fuel in hand, and asked: Whereby dost Thou live so long? and whereby dost Thou enjoy such Bliss?]

परमरहस्यशिवतत्त्वज्ञानेनेति स होवाच।

[He said: It is by knowledge of the highest secret, of Śiva, the Reality.]

किं तत्परमरहस्यशिवतत्त्वज्ञानम्। तत्र को देवः। के मन्त्राः। का निष्ठा। किं तज्ज्ञानसाधनम्। कः परिकरः। को बलिः। कः कालः। किं तत्स्थानमिति।

स होवाच। येन दक्षिणामुखः शिवोऽपरोक्षीकृतो भवति तत्परमरहस्यशिवतत्त्वज्ञानम्। यः सर्वोपरमकाले सर्वानात्मन्युपसंहृत्य स्वात्मानन्दे सुखे मोदते प्रकाशते वा स देवः।

[What is it which constitutes knowledge of the highest secret, of Śiva, the Reality? Who is the Deity there? What,

the *mantras*? What, the devotion? What, the means to that knowledge? What, the necessary aids? What, the offering? What, the time? What, the seat thereof?

He said: That constitutes knowledge of the Highest Secret—of Śiva, the Reality—by which Śiva, the Dakṣiṇāmukha, becomes intuited, He is the Deity who, at the time of universal dissolution, absorbs all into Himself, And who shines and delights in the happiness of His own inherent Bliss.]

अत्रैते मन्त्ररहस्यश्लोका भवन्ति । मेधा दक्षिणामूर्तिमन्त्रस्य ब्रह्मा ऋषिः । गायत्री छन्दः । देवता दक्षिणास्यः । मन्त्रेणाङ्गन्यासः ।

ॐ आदौ नम उच्चार्य ततो भगवतेपदम् ।
दक्षिणेतिपदं पश्चान्मूर्तयेपदमुद्धरेत् ॥
अस्मच्छब्दं चतुर्थ्यन्त मेधांप्रज्ञापदं वदेत् ।
समुच्चार्य ततो वायुबीजं च्छं च ततः पठेत् ॥
अग्निजायां ततस्त्वेष चतुर्विंशाक्षरो मनुः ॥

ध्यानम्—

स्फटिकरजतवर्णं मौक्तिकीमक्षमालाममृतकलशविद्याज्ञानमुद्राः कराब्जैः ।
दधतमुरगकक्षं चन्द्रचूडं त्रिणेत्रं विधृतविविधभूषं दक्षिणामूर्तिमीडे ॥

मन्त्रेण न्यासः—

अदौ वेदादिमुच्चार्य स्वराद्यं सविसर्गकम् ।
पञ्चार्णं तत उद्धृत्य अं ततः सविसर्गकम् ।
अन्ते समुद्धरेत्तारं मनुरेष नवाक्षरः ॥

ध्यानम्—

मुद्रां भद्रार्थदात्रीं सपरशुहरिणं बाहुभिर्बाहुमेकं
जान्वासक्तं दधानो भुजगवरसमाबद्धकक्ष्यो वटाधः ।
आसीनश्चन्द्रखण्डप्रतिघटितजटः क्षीरगौरस्त्रिणेत्रो
दद्यादाद्यः शुकाद्यैर्मुनिभिरभिवृतो भावशुद्धिं भवो

मन्त्रेण न्यासः—

तारं ब्लूं नम उच्चार्य मायां वाग्भवमेव च ।
दक्षिणापदमुच्चार्य ततः स्यान्मूर्तयेपदम् ॥
ज्ञानंदेहिपदं पश्चाद्वह्निजायां ततो न्यसेत् ।
मनुरष्टादशार्णोऽयं सर्वमन्त्रेषु गोपितः ॥

भस्मव्यापाण्डुराङ्गः शशिशकलधरो ज्ञानमुद्राक्षमाला-
वीणापुस्तैर्विराजत्करकमलधरो योगपट्टाभिरामः ।
व्याख्यापीठे निषण्णो मुनिवरनिकरैः सेव्यमानः प्रसन्नः
सव्यालः कृत्तिवासाः सततमवतु नो दक्षिणामूर्तिरीशः ॥

मन्त्रेण न्यासः—

तारं माया रमाबीज पदं साम्बशिवाय च ।
तुभ्यं चानलजायां च मनुर्द्वादशवर्णकः ॥

ध्यानम्—

वीणां करैः पुस्तकमक्षमालां बिभ्राणमभ्राभगळं वराढ्यम् ।
फणीन्द्रकक्ष्यं मुनिभिः शुकाद्यैः सेव्यं वटाधःकृतनीडमीडे ॥

मन्त्रेणाङ्गन्यासः—

विष्णुऋषिः । अनुष्टुप्छन्दः । देवता दक्षिणास्यः ।

तारं नमो भगवते तुभ्यं वटपदं ततः ।
मूलेतिपदमुच्चार्य वासिनेपदमुद्धरेत् ॥
वागीशायपद पश्चान्महाज्ञानपदं ततः ।
दायिनेपदमुच्चार्य मायिनेनम उद्धरेत् ॥
वह्निजायां ततस्त्वेष द्वात्रिंशद्वर्णको मनुः ।
आनुष्टुभो मन्त्रराजः सर्वमन्त्रोत्तमोत्तमः ॥

ध्यानम्—

मुद्रापुस्तकवह्निनागविलसद्बाहुं प्रसन्नाननं
मुक्ताहारविभूषण शशिकलाभास्वत्किरीटोज्ज्वलम् ।

अज्ञानापहमादिमादिमगिरामर्थं भवानीपतिं
न्यग्रोधान्तनिवासिनं परगुरुं ध्यायाम्यभीष्टाप्तये ॥

[I adore the three-eyed, moon-crested Daksināmūrti who is of pebble and silver colour, holding in the hands a rosary of pearls, a vessel of nectar, a book and the symbol of wisdom; having a serpent for his girdle, and putting on various ornaments.

May the milk-white three-eyed Primal Being (Bhava) grant us purity of thought, He who, seated at the foot of a fig tree, surrounded by Śuka and other sages, holding in the hands the symbol of the blessed wisdom, with axe and deer, one of the hands resting on the knees, the loins girdled round by a mighty serpent, a digit of the moon enclosed in His clotted hair!

May Daksināmūrti, the Gracious Lord, ever protect us, His body white with ashes, wearing a digit of the moon, with the lotus-like hands shining with the symbol of wisdom, a rosary, a lute, and a book, handsome with the *yogic* belt, seated in the posture of an expositor, surrounded by hosts of mighty sages, with serpents on, and clad in hide!

I adore Him who in His hands holds a *vīnā*, a book and a rosary, with a cloud-like throat, who is rich in gifts, girdled by a mighty serpent, resorted to by Śuka and other sages, who has made the foot of a fig tree His abode.

I contemplate, for the attainment of the highest end, the Supreme Guru, the spouse of Bhavānī, the serene-faced Primal Being, He who is spoken of in all the Vedas (the first utterances), whose hands shine with the symbol (of wisdom), with a book, fire and a serpent, who, bedecked with garlands of pearls and a crown blazing forth brilliant with the digit of the moon, resides at the foot of a fig tree and removes the ignorance of all]

सोऽहमिति यावदास्थितिः सा निष्ठा भवति । तदभेदेन मन्त्राम्रेडनं ज्ञानसाधनम् । चित्ते तदेकतानता परिकरः । अङ्गचेष्टार्पणं बलिः । त्रीणि धामानि कालः । द्वादशान्तपदं स्थानमिति ।

[*Devotion* consists in firmly dwelling in the constant thought that 'I am He'. Repetition of the *mantra* as inseparate from Him constitutes the *means* to that knowledge. To be concentrated in thought upon Him exclusively proves an effective *aid* to it. The dedicating of all bodily activity (to Him) forms the *offering*. The three states of consciousness (*dhāmans* or *avasthās*, such as *jāgrat*, *svapna*, and *suṣupti*) are the proper *time* for it The proper *place* is the twelve-pointed seat *i.e.*, the *sahasrāra* or thousand-spoked wheel in the cavity of the head]

ते ह पुनः श्रद्दधानास्तं प्रत्यूचुः। कथं वाऽस्योदयः। किं स्वरूपम्। को वाऽस्योपासक इति।

[Then again they asked Him as follows, full of faith: How comes His manifestation? What is His form? And who is His worshipper?]

स होवाच—

वैराग्यतैलसंपूर्णे भक्तिवर्तिसमन्विते।
प्रबोधपूर्णपात्रे तु ज्ञप्तिदीपं विलोकयेत्॥
मोहान्धकारनिःसारे उदेति स्वयमेव हि।
वैराग्यमरणिं कृत्वा ज्ञानं कृत्वोत्तरारणिम्॥
गाढतामिस्रसंशान्त्यै गूढमर्थं निवेदयेत्।
मोहभानुजसङ्क्रान्तं विवेकाख्यं मृकण्डुजम्॥
तत्त्वाविचारपाशेन बद्धं द्वैतभयातुरम्।
उज्जीवयन्निजानन्दे स्वस्वरूपेण संस्थितः॥
शेमुषी दक्षिणा प्रोक्ता सा यस्याभीक्षणे मुखम्।
दक्षिणाभिमुखः प्रोक्तः शिवोऽसौ ब्रह्मवादिभिः॥

सर्गादिकाले भगवान्विरिञ्चिरुपास्यैनं सर्गसामर्थ्यमाप्य।
तुतोष चित्ते वाञ्छितार्थांश्च लब्ध्वा धन्यः सोऽस्योपासको भवति धाता॥

य इमां परमरहस्यशिवतत्त्वविद्यामधीते स सर्वपापेभ्यो मुक्तो भवति। य एवं वेद स कैवल्यमनुभवतीत्युपनिषत्॥

[He said In the mighty lamp of *wisdom*, overflowing with the oil of *vairāgya* (indifference to worldly objects) and furnished with the wick of *Bhakti* (Faith) one should kindle the light of knowledge and see. Then the darkness of delusion being dispelled, (Śiva) Himself becomes manifested With a view to dispel the utter darkness, the devotee should produce fire, making *vairāgya* the lower *arani* (stick) and knowledge the upper one, and then Śiva will exhibit to his view the hidden Reality Dwelling in the devotee as his own very Self with His inherent bliss, He revives *viveka* or discriminative wisdom hitherto overpowered with delusion and oppressed by duality for want of proper enquiry into truth. Thus (in the language of the Purāna) Śiva, showing Himself in all His bliss, restores to life the son of Mrkandu, hitherto oppressed with the fear of Yama, the latter dragging him with the bands of rope tied around his body.

The word 'Daksinā' means *Buddhi* Because *Buddhi* is the eye by which Śiva can be *directly* seen, He is called *Daksinābhimukha* by the *Brahmavādins*

At the beginning of creation, Brahmā, the Lord, having worshipped Śiva, attained power to create and was delighted at heart. The devotee in this path, steady in his effort, attains all objects of desire and becomes quite happy.

Whoever studies this highly Secret Doctrine of Śiva, the Reality, He is delivered from all sins. He who knows thus attains liberation]

SUCH IS THE UPANISAD

ओं सह नाववतु । सह नौ भुनक्तु । सह वीर्यं करवावहै । तेजस्वि-
नावधीतमस्तु । मा विद्विषावहै । ओं शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः ॥

ओं तत् सत्

[May (Brahman) protect us both ! May He give us both to enjoy ' Efficienc) mav we both attain ' Effective may our study prove ' Hate may we not (each other) at all ' Om Peace ! Peace '' Peace ''']

OM TAT SAT

